After the First World War Prime Minister David Lloyd George decided to continue the coalition with Bonar Law's Conservatives, while leaving dissatisfied Liberals led by H.H. Asquith to be separate of Lloyd George's party causing a schism. In the end the Conservatives made massive gains while the Liberal Party had split deeply leading to the rise of the Labour Party. Before the election, a Liberal delegation had met DLG to discuss reunifying the party, which Lloyd George rejected instead opting for the coalition. What if David Lloyd George, the Man who won the War in his zenith, moved to unite the Liberals and end the wartime coalition for the election? Questions are how well would a united Liberal Party headed by DLG have done in 1918 and what effects would it have on British politics down the road?
WI: No "Coupon" election, Lloyd George unites the Liberals in 1918
- Thread starter Prussian1871
- Start date
Ah, Liberal reunification in 1918 is an old favorite of mine:
***
Was the estrangement really hopeless? My understanding is that while
Lloyd George was negotiating with the Unionists, he was also putting out
feelers to the Asquith Liberals for Liberal reunification, offering
Asquith the opportunity to return as Lord Chancellor, an offer Asquith
declined. Suppose the negotiations with the Unionists had failed (we'll
say that LG refuses to swallow Bonar Law's limit on the number of Liberals
who could get the "coupon"--the point of the limitation was of course to
make LG a captive of the Unionists) and those with the Asquithians had
succeeded? The Liberals might still lose--in fact, I would say that they
probably would--but they would at least remain a major party that could
(like the Conservatives after another victorious war leader's electoral
defeat in 1945) hope for a comeback. Whereas in OTL the Asquithian
Liberals were reduced to minor-party status and even the apparently
stronger showing of the Coalition Liberals was misleading, since they
largely held their seats on Unionist sufferance. (One could of course say
that the difference between this *1918 and OTL's 1945 is that after 1945
the Conservatives faced no rival party on the Right, whereas the Liberals
in this ATL would have to cope with the rise of Labour on the Left. But
if the Liberals in 1918 and thereafter presented a united and reasonably
progressive alternative to the Unionists, I am not certain that Labour
would have grown as rapidly as it did, or would have become as hostile to
the Liberals as in OTL, where IMO the hostility was partly based both on
distrust of LG and on an eventual feeling of "we've overtaken the
Liberals, now is the time to finish them off." Had LG refrained from his
Labour-bashing of the "coupon" campaign, and if the Liberals remained
stronger and Labour weaker, the latter might have been more open to Lib-
Lab cooperation.)
What makes Liberal reunification IMO at least somewhat plausible is that
there seem to have been (at least at the start of the campaign) very few
philosophical differences between the Lloyd George and Asquith Liberals.
See my discussion at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/ed27e3f59966167f
where I point out that the main objection of the Asquithian Liberals was
not to LG's peace or domestic program but to his allowing himself to become
the prisoner of a Unionist-dominated Coalition, thus assuring that however
progressive his own ideas might be, they could never be enacted. I also
note LG's November 12 speech (welcomed by Asquith and Woodrow Wilson)
advocating both reform at home ("Revolution I am not afraid of. Bolshevism
I am not afraid of. It is reaction I am afraid of.") and a just peace
unsullied by the spirit of revenge. (The rest of LG's campaign was in many
respects the opposite of the November 12 speech, leaving it for future
historians to debate which was the "real" LG.)
In any event, even if Liberal reunification would have the *immediate*
consequence of LG's defeat, he would have a better chance of a comeback
than after he later lost power in OTL, not only because he would (as I
said above) have had a stronger Liberal Party to lead, but also because
such a reunification would perhaps do something to lessen one of his worst
political liabilities--his reputation for unscrupulousness. (His
*historical* reputation would also be higher, of course. I can see posts
here on whether the Versailles Treaty would have turned out better if only
Lloyd George had still been in power in 1919...) To quote Trevor Wilson,
"Never the most trusted of politicians, he acquired from this performance
a reputation for sharp practice and want of scruple which dogged him for
the rest of his career. As one result, the Conservatives whom he served
so well at this time were able, with shameless ingratitude, to cast him
aside four years later, and to make it appear that such conduct reflected
not on their honour but on his." *The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-
1935*, p. 157. Or as the old rhyme put it :
Lloyd George, no doubt,
When his life ebbs out,
Will ride in a flaming chariot,
Seated in state
On a red-hot plate
'twixt Satan and Judas Iscariot;
Ananias that day
To the Devil will say,
"My claim for precedence fails,
So move me up higher,
Away from the fire,
And make way for that liar--from Wales!"
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/h9Pfm5FkXqI/5-qUjNJHA88J
***
Was the estrangement really hopeless? My understanding is that while
Lloyd George was negotiating with the Unionists, he was also putting out
feelers to the Asquith Liberals for Liberal reunification, offering
Asquith the opportunity to return as Lord Chancellor, an offer Asquith
declined. Suppose the negotiations with the Unionists had failed (we'll
say that LG refuses to swallow Bonar Law's limit on the number of Liberals
who could get the "coupon"--the point of the limitation was of course to
make LG a captive of the Unionists) and those with the Asquithians had
succeeded? The Liberals might still lose--in fact, I would say that they
probably would--but they would at least remain a major party that could
(like the Conservatives after another victorious war leader's electoral
defeat in 1945) hope for a comeback. Whereas in OTL the Asquithian
Liberals were reduced to minor-party status and even the apparently
stronger showing of the Coalition Liberals was misleading, since they
largely held their seats on Unionist sufferance. (One could of course say
that the difference between this *1918 and OTL's 1945 is that after 1945
the Conservatives faced no rival party on the Right, whereas the Liberals
in this ATL would have to cope with the rise of Labour on the Left. But
if the Liberals in 1918 and thereafter presented a united and reasonably
progressive alternative to the Unionists, I am not certain that Labour
would have grown as rapidly as it did, or would have become as hostile to
the Liberals as in OTL, where IMO the hostility was partly based both on
distrust of LG and on an eventual feeling of "we've overtaken the
Liberals, now is the time to finish them off." Had LG refrained from his
Labour-bashing of the "coupon" campaign, and if the Liberals remained
stronger and Labour weaker, the latter might have been more open to Lib-
Lab cooperation.)
What makes Liberal reunification IMO at least somewhat plausible is that
there seem to have been (at least at the start of the campaign) very few
philosophical differences between the Lloyd George and Asquith Liberals.
See my discussion at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/ed27e3f59966167f
where I point out that the main objection of the Asquithian Liberals was
not to LG's peace or domestic program but to his allowing himself to become
the prisoner of a Unionist-dominated Coalition, thus assuring that however
progressive his own ideas might be, they could never be enacted. I also
note LG's November 12 speech (welcomed by Asquith and Woodrow Wilson)
advocating both reform at home ("Revolution I am not afraid of. Bolshevism
I am not afraid of. It is reaction I am afraid of.") and a just peace
unsullied by the spirit of revenge. (The rest of LG's campaign was in many
respects the opposite of the November 12 speech, leaving it for future
historians to debate which was the "real" LG.)
In any event, even if Liberal reunification would have the *immediate*
consequence of LG's defeat, he would have a better chance of a comeback
than after he later lost power in OTL, not only because he would (as I
said above) have had a stronger Liberal Party to lead, but also because
such a reunification would perhaps do something to lessen one of his worst
political liabilities--his reputation for unscrupulousness. (His
*historical* reputation would also be higher, of course. I can see posts
here on whether the Versailles Treaty would have turned out better if only
Lloyd George had still been in power in 1919...) To quote Trevor Wilson,
"Never the most trusted of politicians, he acquired from this performance
a reputation for sharp practice and want of scruple which dogged him for
the rest of his career. As one result, the Conservatives whom he served
so well at this time were able, with shameless ingratitude, to cast him
aside four years later, and to make it appear that such conduct reflected
not on their honour but on his." *The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-
1935*, p. 157. Or as the old rhyme put it :
Lloyd George, no doubt,
When his life ebbs out,
Will ride in a flaming chariot,
Seated in state
On a red-hot plate
'twixt Satan and Judas Iscariot;
Ananias that day
To the Devil will say,
"My claim for precedence fails,
So move me up higher,
Away from the fire,
And make way for that liar--from Wales!"
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/h9Pfm5FkXqI/5-qUjNJHA88J
Very good analysis! Do you think the Liberals will be able to retain their major party status in the long-run?
Thomas1195
Banned
Lets see. LG would have lost, so he would have avoided Cash for Honour because he would not have a chance to do so. There are several cards that the Liberals could and would use to attack the Tories.
First, Liberals would bash the Tories for Geddes Axe or something similar, and the latter would now have to carry the full responsibility for failure to deliver Homes fit for Heroes. Meanwhile, Liberals could listen to Keynes to promise large scale public works to solve postwar unemployment, making them a main card to win elections. This would allow them to win 1922-1924 election. Then, large-scale public works on housing and infrastructures for growth and Georgist land reform (including Land Value Tax - they should make it as high as possible) would undermine both the Tories and the Socialist.
Next, if the Tories became realists tried to prevent the breakup the Austto-Hungarian Empire, Liberals would be very likely to use Wilson's national self-determination to attack them.
Then, regarding the Turks, Liberals would attack the Tories for either military intervention or for failure to stand up for the Armenians.
Finally, regarding WNT, if the Tories did not sign WNT (although very unlikely), the Liberals would bash them for "wasteful" spending on military.
First, Liberals would bash the Tories for Geddes Axe or something similar, and the latter would now have to carry the full responsibility for failure to deliver Homes fit for Heroes. Meanwhile, Liberals could listen to Keynes to promise large scale public works to solve postwar unemployment, making them a main card to win elections. This would allow them to win 1922-1924 election. Then, large-scale public works on housing and infrastructures for growth and Georgist land reform (including Land Value Tax - they should make it as high as possible) would undermine both the Tories and the Socialist.
Next, if the Tories became realists tried to prevent the breakup the Austto-Hungarian Empire, Liberals would be very likely to use Wilson's national self-determination to attack them.
Then, regarding the Turks, Liberals would attack the Tories for either military intervention or for failure to stand up for the Armenians.
Finally, regarding WNT, if the Tories did not sign WNT (although very unlikely), the Liberals would bash them for "wasteful" spending on military.