WI no Churchill but Chamberlain does not do separate Peace?

I strongly suspect that there would have been less of a Norway Scandal had there been a Different person (that is not Churchill) in charge of the Royal Navy in early 1940.

There would not have been the Norway debate- hence no coalitiion at that point.

Chamberlain had decided that there was no pont in doing deals with Hitler because his word was worthless.

Events in 1940 might have followed similar course except that the Coalition would get formed in June 1940 in reaction to the fall of France...

Absent Churchill does Britain do better. Churchill thought of himself as a sttategic genius. IN hindsight maybe he was not
 

TruthfulPanda

Gone Fishin'
The problem with Chamberlain is that he will croak in late 1940 or so.
I do not see neither Chamberlain nor Halifix doing a separate peace.
And Britain would probably do better without Churchill at the helm ... the bloke was great at speeches but otherwise ... and his main fault was "Eastener" i.e. snapping at the ankles of the enemy/death by a million cuts.
 
and his main fault was "Eastener" i.e. snapping at the ankles of the enemy/death by a million cuts.
More IMO the desire for extravagant operations to win the war on the cheap, that where not going to work. Rather than just letting control of the worlds oceans and therefore trade have its effect?

Was snapping at the easy bits, preferably isolated by sea from mainland europe not the best strategy post FoF?

Looking at Churchill war time faults what would we list?
- Gallipoli
- Norway
- Greece
- Dieppe
- Singapoor
- Trying to push up Italy?
- Bomber command over BoA?

On Churchill positive side do we underestimate his relationship with US?
 
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Was snapping at the easy bits, preferably isolated by sea from mainland europe not the best strategy post FoF? ...

In the short run. Britain was unprepared for the new strategic situation of July 1940. A peripheral strategy was what was practical in 1941 & possibly 1942. The one attempt to return to the continent in the Balkans in early 1941... we know how that went. Unfortunately many Brit leaders became gun shy and stuck to the periphrial idea too long.
 
In the short run. Britain was unprepared for the new strategic situation of July 1940. A peripheral strategy was what was practical in 1941 & possibly 1942. The one attempt to return to the continent in the Balkans in early 1941... we know how that went. Unfortunately many Brit leaders became gun shy and stuck to the periphrial idea too long.
What do you think should be changed?
 
From 1940 work towards a invasion of NW Europe NLT 1943. Perhaps even 1942.
How do they go about this?

I would suggest best case (from BoF/BoB),
- Better BoA - use more aircraft and ships inc early CVEs, helps economy etc makes everything easier
- Add in more aircraft spotting means that more KM heavy units die early on, reducing threat
- Cut down RAF operations v mainland Europe especially Germany to save aircraft loses for little gain
- Win/do better in N Africa by not getting diverted to Greece, only hold Create no mainland landings
- Do invasion practices somewhere useful rather than Dieppe, North Africa (v behind the line of Italy or French NA) or Med islands that can then be held to make it worth it
- Clear the route though Med by holding the entire southern shore and Malta
- Better plan in SE Asia, hold Malay barrier etc....

Still don't think it get them ready for a 42 invasion of NW Europe, or even very good for 43?
 
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Still don't think it get them ready for a 42 invasion of NW Europe, or even very good for 43?

Axis strength in west Europe was 2/3 in 1943 and half the strength in 1942 of 1944, the port garrisons weaker, and the beaches defended only by sentries and observation posts. Not getting ready does not seem to have been a good plan.
 

Driftless

Donor
This POD also leads to the question: who replaces Chamberlain when he's too sick to carry on? Halifax, Amery, Eden, ????
 
Axis strength in west Europe was 2/3 in 1943 and half the strength in 1942 of 1944, the port garrisons weaker, and the beaches defended only by sentries and observation posts. Not getting ready does not seem to have been a good plan.
Isn't part of that a reflection of the Germans perceived need for garrisons?

The Germans would have some idea of how many especially US troops where ready in GB so moved more from (or that could have been sent to) the eastern front later on. If more where available earlier then they would defend more?
 
I strongly suspect that there would have been less of a Norway Scandal had there been a Different person (that is not Churchill) in charge of the Royal Navy in early 1940.

There would not have been the Norway debate- hence no coalitiion at that point.

Chamberlain had decided that there was no pont in doing deals with Hitler because his word was worthless.

Events in 1940 might have followed similar course except that the Coalition would get formed in June 1940 in reaction to the fall of France...

Absent Churchill does Britain do better. Churchill thought of himself as a sttategic genius. IN hindsight maybe he was not
(Edit: Possible timeline:)
Chamberlain lets Hitler invade Poland in 1939 with nothing more than diplomatic protests (and a severance of all but the most basic diplomatic communications), because absent Churchill nagging away in the late 1930's the UK is even less prepared than in the Original Timeline and can't declare war in 1939. There's probably an embargo on British companies buying or selling to Germany.
Chamberlain possibly has to resign over Poland though, and without a war starting a General Election gets called (one is just about due; sufficiently so that it probably makes sense to call one in the wake of the invasion of Poland, rather than waiting a bit longer for when it might otherwise naturally come).
It takes the British a couple of months to sort themselves out politically, whilst efforts to play military catchup with Germany are ongoing. Meanwhile, no war (yet) with Britain and France means no blockade and Germany continues to trade on the high-seas. Hitler's generals and the German population are even more in awe of Hitler - now he's taken over most of Poland, without anything being done (except the British government collapsing).
I don't know that Labour can get a majority in the UK in late 1939; probably not, but let's say the Conservatives get returned with a much reduced majority.
Much frantic rearmament takes place in the UK. Possibly there are desperate behind the scenes discussions with Italy and Russia (although I've read comment to the effect that Chamberlain hated and mistrusted the Russians; sufficiently so at least to refuse any notion of an alliance with Stalin after the rest of Czechoslovakia got devoured in 1939); there are certainly discussions with France. I don't know if the invasion of Poland brings the French government down.
Hitler starts planning Operation Barbarossa, convinced that the British and French will never lift a finger to stop him. These silly trade sanctions will go away eventually; this is just face-saving posturing to their people. (And don't they hate the communists, too?)
That's my thoughts on 'what if no 1930's & 1940's Churchill?'
 
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The Germans would have some idea of how many especially US troops where ready in GB so moved more from (or that could have been sent to) the eastern front later on. If more where available earlier then they would defend more?

There were estimates drawn from assorted spies, air photos, studies of population and industrial estimates. Those I've looked at were way off. Maybe based on wishfull thinking? ie: underestimating the 1941 Red Army strength by half. Or overestimating the Allied army strength in the UK by a third in 1944. They also had a very poor appreciation of the nature of littoral operations and large scale coastal invasions.
 

Ian_W

Banned
(Edit: Possible timeline:)
Chamberlain lets Hitler invade Poland in 1939 with nothing more than diplomatic protests (and a severance of all but the most basic diplomatic communications), because absent Churchill nagging away in the late 1930's the UK is even less prepared than in the Original Timeline and can't declare war in 1939.

This is an OTL Cabinet Paper from December 1937.

http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-23-90a-c-49.pdf

Note Churchill is not part of that cabinet, and they are preparing for not just a war, but a long war, and have already seen there may be a problem with the Low Countries ...
 
This is an OTL Cabinet Paper from December 1937.

http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-23-90a-c-49.pdf

Note Churchill is not part of that cabinet, and they are preparing for not just a war, but a long war, and have already seen there may be a problem with the Low Countries ...
See 'Air Parity Lost 1934-1935' in Volume I of Churchill's WW2 memoirs.
In November 1934, Stanley Baldwin (either due to misinformation or head-in-the-sand ostrich mode) was confidently informing the House of Commons that not only did Germany not have a stronger airforce, but that the British had 'a margin in Europe of 50%'.
Churchill claims it took some efforts by himself and others to get Mr. Baldwin to revise his 'everything's fine' assessment of the situation.

(I believe that there is a theory that the 1933 East Fulham by-election result may have encouraged the government towards a lackadaisical if not hostile interest in military spending.)

This is before the 1937 date you cite for the government trying to rearm at; something, at least seems to have turned the attitudes around between 1934 and 1937 in the original timeline.

Edit:
I note the papers you linked to indicate a cabinet discussion about a coordination of defence report; Churchill may not have been in the cabinet in 1937, but wasn't he on at least one of the coordination of defence committees at that time?
 

Ian_W

Banned
See 'Air Parity Lost 1934-1935' in Volume I of Churchill's WW2 memoirs.
In November 1934, Stanley Baldwin (either due to misinformation or head-in-the-sand ostrich mode) was confidently informing the House of Commons that not only did Germany not have a stronger airforce, but that the British had 'a margin in Europe of 50%'.
Churchill claims it took some efforts by himself and others to get Mr. Baldwin to revise his 'everything's fine' assessment of the situation.

(I believe that there is a theory that the 1933 East Fulham by-election result may have encouraged the government towards a lackadaisical if not hostile interest in military spending.)

This is before the 1937 date you cite for the government trying to rearm at; something, at least seems to have turned the attitudes around between 1934 and 1937 in the original timeline.

Edit:
I note the papers you linked to indicate a cabinet discussion about a coordination of defence report; Churchill may not have been in the cabinet in 1937, but wasn't he on at least one of the coordination of defence committees at that time?

Unlike Churchill, Chamberlain is actually good at this stuff.

Read deeper into that report, particularly at the Prime Minsters comment about jigs and so on at aircraft factories, and the need to make sure the factories are up to date for new production.
 
More IMO the desire for extravagant operations to win the war on the cheap, that where not going to work. Rather than just letting control of the worlds oceans and therefore trade have its effect?

Was snapping at the easy bits, preferably isolated by sea from mainland europe not the best strategy post FoF?

Looking at Churchill war time faults what would we list?
- Gallipoli
- Norway
- Greece
- Dieppe
- Singapoor
- Trying to push up Italy?
- Bomber command over BoA?

On Churchill positive side do we underestimate his relationship with US?

Okay now look at the negative side of FDR.
He ran for reelection in 1940 on the keeping us out of War platform which he'd been trying for 4 years to get his into for a politician even that's a stretch.
He did not sufficiently supply the islands in the Pacific with what he could have so therefore they were pretty much thrown under the bus at the beginning of the war.
He put American citizens in concentration camps.
When it came to major military decisions with our allies he let politics overrule what was the best solution.
At Yalta he gave Stalin half of Europe to enslave and it wasn't really ours to give is the worst part.
He did nothing to try to get Jews into the United States instead sending back a boatload Plus to certain death in Germany. I could go on and on but you get the general impression no leaders perfect and I don't think Great Britain would have done as well in the war without Churchill. I don't dislike or like Churchill or FDR they were needed at the time.
 
Unlike Churchill, Chamberlain is actually good at this stuff.

Read deeper into that report, particularly at the Prime Minsters comment about jigs and so on at aircraft factories, and the need to make sure the factories are up to date for new production.
Pretty sure the comments about the shadow factories, etc, etc, on the papers headed 361 & 362 were part of a rather long presentation being made by the Secretary of State for Air, Viscount Swinton, and not Neville Chamberlain.
Also, as far as I can see going over it in detail so far, the primary focus (upto paper 362) seems to be mostly doing what costs as little money 'now' (1937) as possible. Still reading, but wanted to respond on this.

Edit:
'370' Chamberlain says something about jigs, but the topic was introduced by Viscount Swinton, earlier in the meeting; he [Chamberlain] seems to me to be saying 'I think that sounded good', and following Swinton's lead - although what's unclear here is what discussions there may have been between the two men before the meeting on the topic.
 
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Unlike Churchill, Chamberlain is actually good at this stuff.

Read deeper into that report, particularly at the Prime Minsters comment about jigs and so on at aircraft factories, and the need to make sure the factories are up to date for new production.
Reading on:
'372' Neville Chamberlain seems to me to say that he thinks that Hitler might disarm. If I read that right, he really has no clue as far as I can see who and what he's dealing with. I suppose though that it might say though that 'we must disarm to make Hitler happy' which indicates an even greater absence of idea of what's going on in Europe and in Hitler's head.
'376' section (g)(i) seems to me to say that 'diplomacy & foreign policy is basically to be dictated by a need to save money'.
'377' section (g)(ii) seems to me to say 'we will look at the option of producing inferior quality planes ('qualitative disarmament')'. (Unless this is an ambiguous reference to trying to persuade Hitler to promise to produce inferior quality planes, which again seems to me to show a lack of understanding of what Hitler is about.)

I'm going to be kind and say that I think those minutes show just how out of his depth Neville Chamberlain was (or at least how little he understood Hitler).

About the sanest comments in the document seem to me to come on page 363 from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, where he seems to be saying that if money has to be saved, improving factories is a better bet than buying a lot of aircraft which may be obsolete in seven years' time. Again, to be generous to Chamberlain supporters, I can see that there is a possibility that this is something which might have been discussed between Chamberlain and the Chancellor before the meeting, and the idea might have had input from or originated with Chamberlain, even if the Chancellor was the one to actually bring it up in Cabinet.
 
Churchill was very good at rewriting the history of the 1930's to make him appear to be a lone voice in the wilderness. The truth is that although he used the best rhetoric he was by far the only voice in parliament aware of the threat from the dictatorships and calling for rearmament. This group helped push the government to year on year increases in defence spending from 1934. However it's hard to sell high defence spending to the electorate during peace time. Therefore it's hard to do much until a threat really shows itself. OTL this was Munich 1938 and after that the pace of rearmament in the UK was frantic. I see no reason for this to be different without Churhill. Especially as in many circles he was felt to be past it and he damaged his reputation further during the succession crisis. Indeed a different champion would have emerged for rearmament who might have brought about better results.

Post Munich it becomes only a matter of time before the war starts. Chamberlain knows this which makes him not declaring war highly unlikely even without Churhill.

Pre May 1940 Churchill's only major gaff at the Admiralty was pushing for the intervention in Norway. If the forces used where better prepaired for fighting German troops (OTL they had originally been intended to occupy Norway without serious resistance) and if France held than Norway looks a useful strategy for denying the Germans useful bases and resources for low cost. Even in OTL Narvik was captured and without France falling would have been a useful base for further operations. Indeed even without Churchill it is entirely possible that someone else in a position of power would have pushed for it.

Post May 1940 any PM is going to make mistakes. But wars are not fought by one person.
 
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