WI: No Bermuda Hundred Campaign

Japhy

Banned
In 1864 the Army of the James, consisting of the X and XVIII Corps of the Union Army, was created combining Union forces that had previously been deployed against the Virginia and Carolina coasts. Under the command of Major General Benjamin Butler the Army would famously be trapped in Bermuda Hundred like the campaign by a cork after failing to take Petersburg at the start of the 1864 Spring Campaign. Of the three main diversionary efforts of Grant's Spring Offensive the Army of the James managed to have the least impact, and was contained by minimal Confederate efforts. So the question I ask is, what happens if Grant doesn't even bother with it? Would the two additional corps have a decisive effect if added into the Army of the Potomac or into for that matter Sigel's Department of Western Virginia? Or for that matter would the Army of the James been put to better use going as a combined force on a return engagement for Charleston or some other point on the Atlantic Coast?
 
In 1864 the Army of the James, consisting of the X and XVIII Corps of the Union Army, was created combining Union forces that had previously been deployed against the Virginia and Carolina coasts. Under the command of Major General Benjamin Butler the Army would famously be trapped in Bermuda Hundred like the campaign by a cork after failing to take Petersburg at the start of the 1864 Spring Campaign. Of the three main diversionary efforts of Grant's Spring Offensive the Army of the James managed to have the least impact, and was contained by minimal Confederate efforts. So the question I ask is, what happens if Grant doesn't even bother with it? Would the two additional corps have a decisive effect if added into the Army of the Potomac or into for that matter Sigel's Department of Western Virginia? Or for that matter would the Army of the James been put to better use going as a combined force on a return engagement for Charleston or some other point on the Atlantic Coast?
Having studied Grant's plans for Virginia in 1864, Grant suggested using 60,000 men to invade North Carolina.

Grant consulted his staff officer Cyrus Comstock and Army of the Cumberland engineer William F. "Baldy" Smith, both of whom had served in the eastern theatre and consulted native Viginian George Thomas to look over his plan before submitting it to Henry Halleck.

The plan was most likely based on Grant's experience at Vicksburg and was considerably daring. Grant would invade North Carolina with an army of 60,000 that would destroy the supply lines into Virginia, while simultaneously closing off the key port of Wilmington and striking an overall Confederate weak point in North Carolina, a state that barely voted to secede and with insufficient defenses against an effort like that one that Grant proposed.

Henry Halleck objected to the plan. He had two primary objections to this plan; one, it would leave DC's defenses too weak and allow Lee to come north, and two, he insisted that the manpower for such an expedition could not be assembled. The second point was absolute rubbish. At the start of Grant's spring offensive, the Army of the Potomac had 120,000 men, Siegel's force had 10,000 while the Army of the James had 33,000 men.

Halleck's objections to Grant's plan was mostly due to the fact that the government was committed to the overland route, for the reason of maintaining an overwhelming army between Lee and DC, and to avoid any appearance of suggesting McClellan's strategy in 1862 may have been correct in an election year.

However, I believe that Grant should've used the Army of the James to invade North Carolina while the Army of Potomac held Lee's attention. With the Army of the James (or rather the Army of Cape Fear?) destroying Lee's supply lines, Lee must retreat to Southern Virginia where Grant has a better opportunity to destroy Lee in open ground.
 
Here is Grant's original proposal:
[CONFIDENTIAL.] HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Nashville, Tenn., January 19, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: I would respectfully suggest whether an abandonment of all previously attempted lines to Richmond is not advisable, and in lieu of these one be taken farther south. I would suggest Raleigh, N. C., as the objective point and Suffolk as the starting point. Raleigh once secured, I would make New Berne the base of supplies until Wilmington is secured.
A moving force of 60,000 men would probably be required to start on such an expedition. This force would not have to be increased unless Lee should withdraw from his present position. In that case the necessity for so large a force on the Potomac would not exist. A force moving from Suffolk would destroy first all the roads about Weldon, or even as far north as Hicksford. From Weldon to Raleigh they would scarcely meet with serious opposition. Once there, the most interior line of railway still left to the enemy, in fact the only one they would then have, would be so threatened as to force him to use a large portion of his army in guarding it. This would virtually force an evacuation of Virginia and indirectly of East Tennessee. It would throw our armies into new fields, where they could partially live upon the country and would reduce the stores of the enemy. It would cause thousands of the North Carolina troops to desert and return to their homes. It would give us possession of many negroes who are now indirectly aiding the rebellion. It would draw the enemy from campaigns of their own choosing, and for which they are prepared, to new lines of operations never expected to become necessary. It would effectually blockade Wilmington, the port now of more value to the enemy than all the balance of their sea-coast. It would enable operations to commence at once by removing the war to a more southern climate, instead of months of inactivity in winter quarters. Other advantages might be cited which would be likely to grow out of this plan, but these are enough. From your better opportunities of studying he country and the armies that would be involved in this plan, you will be better able to judge of the practicability of it than I possibly can. I have written this in accordance with what I understand to be an invitation from you to express my views about military operations, and not to insist that any plan of mine should be carried out. Whatever course is agreed upon, I shall always believe is at least intended for the best, and until fully tested will hope to have it prove so.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
 
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