WI: No Australian Submarine Corporation?

We tried to do that with the Dibb review but found ourselves poorly equipped for the contingencies we faced. Our best bet is to have a flexible force able to step up to a high level in a dire emergency.
 

abc123

Banned
We tried to do that with the Dibb review but found ourselves poorly equipped for the contingencies we faced. Our best bet is to have a flexible force able to step up to a high level in a dire emergency.

Jack of all trades, master of none?
 
We tried to do that with the Dibb review but found ourselves poorly equipped for the contingencies we faced. Our best bet is to have a flexible force able to step up to a high level in a dire emergency.

Absolutely.

Dibb, White et al were partly responsible for the fact our Army fell to four regular infantry battalions - four!
 
Now don't get me wrong, while I am (literally) a student of Hugh White's I by no mean agree with everything he says. His anti-surface ship bent is much stronger than my own, and as I alluded to in my previous post there are absolutely political realities which mean that actually scrapping the surface fleet tomorrow is essentially impossible.

I can only hope you are exposed to more voices than his alone on such issues then. :)

However I will say that you haven't addressed the problems which I have argued face surface ships in the 21st century. Putting aside political realities, those of us who commentate on defence policy in this country would be remiss to advocate ships which are simply unusable in their stated role. Do you think that the AWDs in particular actually have an important role to play in the day-to-day operations of the navy? Today it is the Anzacs that are the workhorses, not the Adelaides. Why should this change? Will the AWDs actually be able to overcome the current array of A2AD which face large surface ships?

My response last night was necessarily short.

The "problems" facing surface ships are no different to those that faced them during World War 2. They are vulnerable to air and sub-surface attack. But to say that this renders them unusable is just nonsense. It's as silly as the talk that the tank has no place on the modern battlefield due to the proliferation of ATGMs. (I recall Hugh White talking such shit too.) Or what about helicopters? Blown out of the sky by untrained rebels with 50-year-old guns and yet still of immense military utility?

The fact of the matter is that as the capabilities of surface warships have increased, so too has those required by an air force to be able to carry out attacks with a high prospect of success. This, of course, isn't a black and white question - it's not a case of whether either the adversary has those capabilities and, therefore, we won't operate anywhere near him or he doesn't have those capabilities and, therefore, we will do so with impunity. More likely, there will exist a significant grey area. We would expect, for example, that our own air combat forces (or those of an ally) would be able to detect and break up a strike, helping with early warning and targeting.

Surface warships continue to be important in a range of roles, as can be seen by what they have undertaken on operations for the RAN since WW2 - naval gunfire support, interdiction of enemy trade, embargo enforcement, escort, interdiction of pirates, C3 support.

Furthermore it is worth pointing out that the LHDs are not there for disaster relief. This is a position Navy itself has clearly articulated. That they can do it is great, but it is not an argument for them.

Actually, successive governments have made very clear that their capabilities in disaster relief are very much valued.

As for the Navy, this is from their own website:

The ship's roles are to:

  • embark, transport and deploy an embarked force (Army in the case of the ADF but could equally be an allied Army or Marines), along with their equipment and aviation units, and
  • carry out/support humanitarian missions.

That can be done far more cheaply by civilian ships if need be.

And how effectively? The capabilities of the LHDs far exceed any civilian ships and they are at high readiness (or will be when both are in service).

Also, where do you think we will be deploying a thousand troops to in one hit? And what sort of circumstance requires that we ourselves be able to do that? I don't think you'll be able to name many where 1000 troops is either enough, or not massive overkill.
Silly argument.

First, that's only a battalion group, and we have deployed at least such a force, or greater, since Vietnam on several occasions - Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan.

Second, it's the flexibility of the platform that is the key. One may not need to deploy 1000 troops, but having the ability to operate so many helicopters simultaneously, to carry so many vehicles and land them over the beach, having a fully equipped hospital, and so on, these capabilities are not all found in smaller ships.

As for the central point which you're making, that political realities are such that policymakers will want certain capabilities that a submarine-only fleet cannot provide, well I don't disagree.

Good.

That's why I wrote that we do need to replace the Anzacs with equivalent ships. It is these ships that actually do all the things that the policymakers have wanted in a peacetime sense. They have done this very well without displacing 7000 tonnes or more and having capabilities beyond their role as frigates. We can and should replace them. But they really don't need to be quasi-destroyers, and nor do we really need the AWDs or LHDs.

On the destroyers, which, as you say, are hardly Arleigh Burkes, a more capable warship means adversaries need more capable platforms and weapons systems to pose a threat. That's a plus.

On the LHDs, we needed two ships to transport the 1RAR battalion group to Somalia. We needed to hire civilian shipping and add a bloody Incat ferry to support our East Timor commitment. The capabilities a single one of those ships will give us is more than worth any additional cost over whatever Hugh would prefer us to have built.

You are right that policymakers in this country are pretty unlikely to follow either Hugh's vision or my watered down version of it, or indeed one that is further watered down than my own. If you want me to predict what sort of fleet we'll actually have, well I think it will probably consist of all the ships I've been arguing against and almost certainly not even 12 submarines. However as I'm not in the business of policymaking I don't feel constrained by those political realities when making my normative argument.

The point I'm making about those political realities is that with or without capabilities, the political leaders of the day will still want to send our armed forces off on overseas operations. Look at our history. I'd rather our servicemen and women have the best tools for the job rather than denying them the tools in the hope that this will influence some kind of non-interventionist government policy. That's not how the world works. You don't develop capabilities based on what you think the government should or shouldn't do, but on what the government is likely to want to do.

One final note regarding Hugh White being out of touch, well I won't pretend to not be pretty enamoured with him. He's a fantastic teacher and entertaining lecturer. But even with that bias in mind I think it's a misinterpretation of his writings to say that he actually believes that many of his suggestions will be picked up. He worked in government for a long time. I think that at this late date in his career he's more interested in provoking the right debates, a task he performs well. But then again, perhaps I am just biased.

I tend to believe that when people make an argument they actually believe it, and the reality is that White has been afforded publicity for his beliefs time and time again, which means he is influential.
 
I can only hope you are exposed to more voices than his alone on such issues then. :)=

Certainly am, posting on websites like these is one such way. I don't want to come across as a disciple of his, though I may have given that impression, the main reason I mentioned him is that invoking his name tends to spark off strong reactions!

My response last night was necessarily short.

The "problems" facing surface ships are no different to those that faced them during World War 2. They are vulnerable to air and sub-surface attack. But to say that this renders them unusable is just nonsense. It's as silly as the talk that the tank has no place on the modern battlefield due to the proliferation of ATGMs. (I recall Hugh White talking such shit too.) Or what about helicopters? Blown out of the sky by untrained rebels with 50-year-old guns and yet still of immense military utility?

The fact of the matter is that as the capabilities of surface warships have increased, so too has those required by an air force to be able to carry out attacks with a high prospect of success. This, of course, isn't a black and white question - it's not a case of whether either the adversary has those capabilities and, therefore, we won't operate anywhere near him or he doesn't have those capabilities and, therefore, we will do so with impunity. More likely, there will exist a significant grey area. We would expect, for example, that our own air combat forces (or those of an ally) would be able to detect and break up a strike, helping with early warning and targeting.

Surface warships continue to be important in a range of roles, as can be seen by what they have undertaken on operations for the RAN since WW2 - naval gunfire support, interdiction of enemy trade, embargo enforcement, escort, interdiction of pirates, C3 support.

My disagreements here are largely contextual. In the general sense while I think that the pendulum has swung further against surface ships it is fair to say that they still have a real role to play.

However, in the Australian context I am not so sure. This is largely due to the small numbers of advanced ships such as the AWD, and the limited circumstances in which we would need those capabilities. It really isn't difficult to overwhelm a couple of those ships, and trends suggest that it will become easier.

Furthermore, in what sort of context will we really have a need for these ships? In an alliance one sure, but then that depends on whether or not you want to remain such a close partner of the US. A separate debate, but even if it's a preference it is by no means guaranteed to even be an option.

Closer to home, what would we need such ships for? Certainly not continental defence, putting aside the incredible challenges any adversary would have in landing a force here it is submarine and air power which would be our main defence.

Perhaps engaging with the Indonesians, or someone else in the near north? Well if you want to be able to do that then certainly, you'll need capabilities such as these. But three ships in a class, or even eight or nine if the Future Frigates turn out the way many want them, is hardly going to be able to achieve this. They'll be swamped. The RAN has been the dominant force in the region thanks to a technological superiority that is vanishing quick, and once it becomes impossible to project surface naval power in a meaningful sense, why spend money on it?

Actually, successive governments have made very clear that their capabilities in disaster relief are very much valued.

That's true, but I was specific in mentioning Navy's position. Navy considers these ships a military capability. At ASPI's Future Surface Fleet conference earlier this year the CoN made it very clear that the focus of the Navy was on the label - to fight and win at sea.

If we're to have naval ships like the LHDs, there needs to be a military justification for them. Perhaps there is one, but disaster relief can't be substituted in as the raison d'être.

And how effectively? The capabilities of the LHDs far exceed any civilian ships and they are at high readiness (or will be when both are in service).

I should have been clear. If we want to disaster relief effectively, we do need specialised ships for it. The LHDs are one such means, but it would still be a lot cheaper to build ships that come without the various military requirements that bump up the costs and which tie up a lot of naval personal.

To be fair though, a good counter-argument could be that if we do have a military need for the LHDs, it would be cheaper to have them also perform disaster relief than build some other ships specifically for it. The crux of the debate then is whether or not we have a military justification.

Silly argument.

First, that's only a battalion group, and we have deployed at least such a force, or greater, since Vietnam on several occasions - Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan.

Second, it's the flexibility of the platform that is the key. One may not need to deploy 1000 troops, but having the ability to operate so many helicopters simultaneously, to carry so many vehicles and land them over the beach, having a fully equipped hospital, and so on, these capabilities are not all found in smaller ships.

All true, I am beginning to suspect that in large part the disagreement here is in broader strategic terms than in the specifics of the platforms. I am honestly very skeptical of our need to commit so strongly to deploying overseas in force. Other states like Japan have demonstrated that if you want to deploy a token force overseas in support of an ally that it is possible to get the ally to take the troops there. If all we want is to show the flag, we don't need such sophisticated capabilities. I'll concede though that if we do want to do more, that yes these ships are good for the job.

I don't really have time unfortunately to get into a long debate about our strategic posture in the 21st century (or indeed about the fleet specifically is worth adding) so I'll just state what I think it should be without really being able to respond further.

Just quickly:

The US is in relative decline, they may not be able to support us in future, we need to be better able to look after ourselves.

We are also in relative decline, we cannot overawe the ASEAN nations anymore, we need capabilities which will secure us at home, not up north, because we can't.

We go overseas to support the alliance, if there is no longer as great a need for the alliance we do not need to deploy so many troops there.

I'll be surprised if you don't disagree with most of this!

The point I'm making about those political realities is that with or without capabilities, the political leaders of the day will still want to send our armed forces off on overseas operations. Look at our history. I'd rather our servicemen and women have the best tools for the job rather than denying them the tools in the hope that this will influence some kind of non-interventionist government policy. That's not how the world works. You don't develop capabilities based on what you think the government should or shouldn't do, but on what the government is likely to want to do.

I actually agree with this 100%, but I do think it's a somewhat separate debate from what I was posting about. To be fair though I wasn't explicit. In a practical sense for policymaking, taking into account the political realities, then we definitely should invest in capabilities that are likely to be useful for ensuring that those policies we try to carry out are done so well.

My main contention in this debate is regarding what policies we should be pursuing, and hence what capabilities we should have for those policies I think we should be carrying out, than the opposite direction of what are the capabilities that are good for carrying out policies that we are going to be implementing irrespective of merit.

One very final note on Hugh White, you're right that he believes what he says but what I meant to say was that he doesn't believe that we he says will be picked up, even though he thinks it should. It would be a foolish man who actually thought it likely that we are going to scrap the surface fleet and built 32 submarines!

And with that I'm afraid I'll be unable to further reply for a while, lots of Hugh White readings to do and essays to write (not even joking).
 
Before I read everything and make a proper comment I have to say I'm surprised that this thread got so many replies.
 
Furthermore, in what sort of context will we really have a need for these ships? In an alliance one sure, but then that depends on whether or not you want to remain such a close partner of the US. A separate debate, but even if it's a preference it is by no means guaranteed to even be an option.

Closer to home, what would we need such ships for? Certainly not continental defence, putting aside the incredible challenges any adversary would have in landing a force here it is submarine and air power which would be our main defence.

Perhaps engaging with the Indonesians, or someone else in the near north? Well if you want to be able to do that then certainly, you'll need capabilities such as these. But three ships in a class, or even eight or nine if the Future Frigates turn out the way many want them, is hardly going to be able to achieve this. They'll be swamped. The RAN has been the dominant force in the region thanks to a technological superiority that is vanishing quick, and once it becomes impossible to project surface naval power in a meaningful sense, why spend money on it?

To avoid starting another debate on the Australia/US alliance, in a DoA context the use of the AWDs and Future Frigates would be immense. They would be one part of a wider network in the battlespace. You cannot look at capability and platforms without taking into account where it fits in amongst the wider network. Navy surface combatants are one cog amongst many, take it away and the whole suffers a drop in capability. Most of our wider acquisitions now and in the future are (supposed) to be all about where the platform fits in the battlespace. Take away the high end surface combatants and the network becomes exposed.

All true, I am beginning to suspect that in large part the disagreement here is in broader strategic terms than in the specifics of the platforms. I am honestly very skeptical of our need to commit so strongly to deploying overseas in force. Other states like Japan have demonstrated that if you want to deploy a token force overseas in support of an ally that it is possible to get the ally to take the troops there. If all we want is to show the flag, we don't need such sophisticated capabilities. I'll concede though that if we do want to do more, that yes these ships are good for the job.

The LHD gives the government flexibility. The chances of Australian troops hitting a contested beach out of them are about zero, but it gives the government and ADF a capability to act in our region if we see fit. One example is the options it would have opened up with Fiji had we a similar capability beforehand.

We also can't always rely on the US, particularly in our immediate region. We should be able to stand on our own two feet without being a drain on coalition resources. That's the problem sweeping the West, states have cut funding and capability, expecting and hoping the US will pick up the slack so they don't have to. Which means you have a wider hollowing out of capability as the remaining resources are stretched.
 

Ian_W

Banned
So what if ASC was never formed, a yard never built from scratch in Adelaide and the Collins class was built by one of Australia's existing naval ship builders? Would a more experienced shipbuilder have gotten it right? What about the AWDs, without ASC ruining them would they be on time and on budget?

My thinking would be 'No', as the major problems with the Collins were either mythical (loud when it goes fast - no shit, it's a diesel sub), or were from integrating American weapons into a base Swedish design (best solved by using the weapins it is designed for), or were from the fact it's a big cruiser-class submarine (which is simply a bad idea - if you need the range, use surface tankers or milch cows).
 
Absolutely.

Dibb, White et al were partly responsible for the fact our Army fell to four regular infantry battalions - four!

My memory also extends to the army's role conceptualised as defeating 'thugs in thongs.' That period is still acutely remembered and felt by the senior officers of the Army.
 
What if you hired people who knew how to build boats?

You guys are talking the 90's right? Both Newport News and Electric boat were having layoffs. Contract out for a while a group of American shipbuilders in a yard and the boats would be done right , under budget and under time.
 
Somewhere in one of those walls of text someone said something about a network, and taking away high end warships takes out a chunk of the network. This is very true. Every time I hear about how X plane flown by someone could beat Y plane flown by the RAAF I think about the exercise where the RAAF ADGies had a simulated gun battle with a Coy of 3 RAR paras on a hardstand packed with fast jets at a bare base. The rest of 3 RAR covered the assault coy and pinned down other defenders and kept the egress route open. Or an older exercise where a Frigate found itself undetected near an airbase and simulated shelling the crap out of it.

These are prime examples of having a balanced force, the RAAF didn't take out the exercise's opposing air force, it was the Army and Navy.

Anyway, back to my original point, I don't think the formation of ASC has given us a strategic asset, rather I think that due to politics it has proved to be a strategic problem and we'd be better off without it regardless of the problems with the Collins class.
 
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Jack of all trades, master of none?

Better that than being the worlds greatest motor mechanic when the plumbing breaks.

We spent a long time preparing for Defence of Australia scenarios that never even looked like panning out. Instead we went to Timor and the Middle East, all of which give us plenty of Defence of Australia credibility by virtue of widespread combat experience.
 
You know, it hasn't been mentioned yet but there is a real problem with the motivation of many workers in the yards. I don't have direct experience of the facilities in Adelaide, but I was involved in the refit and commissioning of ships at the facilities in WA and NSW, and it was a real problem.

I think I have highlighted some of this previously in the Australian Politics Thread, but in effect many of the workers were miraculously much more efficient on a Friday morning so they could knock off early for skimpies. Of course, ASC should have employed skimpies full time to enhance their productivity. Unfortunately, this is a reality of almost any construction site in Australia nowadays and the favoured solution seems to be either pay the Union leader(s) off or simply not engage in the work.
 
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