I can only hope you are exposed to more voices than his alone on such issues then.

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Certainly am, posting on websites like these is one such way. I don't want to come across as a disciple of his, though I may have given that impression, the main reason I mentioned him is that invoking his name tends to spark off strong reactions!
My response last night was necessarily short.
The "problems" facing surface ships are no different to those that faced them during World War 2. They are vulnerable to air and sub-surface attack. But to say that this renders them unusable is just nonsense. It's as silly as the talk that the tank has no place on the modern battlefield due to the proliferation of ATGMs. (I recall Hugh White talking such shit too.) Or what about helicopters? Blown out of the sky by untrained rebels with 50-year-old guns and yet still of immense military utility?
The fact of the matter is that as the capabilities of surface warships have increased, so too has those required by an air force to be able to carry out attacks with a high prospect of success. This, of course, isn't a black and white question - it's not a case of whether either the adversary has those capabilities and, therefore, we won't operate anywhere near him or he doesn't have those capabilities and, therefore, we will do so with impunity. More likely, there will exist a significant grey area. We would expect, for example, that our own air combat forces (or those of an ally) would be able to detect and break up a strike, helping with early warning and targeting.
Surface warships continue to be important in a range of roles, as can be seen by what they have undertaken on operations for the RAN since WW2 - naval gunfire support, interdiction of enemy trade, embargo enforcement, escort, interdiction of pirates, C3 support.
My disagreements here are largely contextual. In the general sense while I think that the pendulum has swung further against surface ships it is fair to say that they still have a real role to play.
However, in the Australian context I am not so sure. This is largely due to the small numbers of advanced ships such as the AWD, and the limited circumstances in which we would need those capabilities. It really isn't difficult to overwhelm a couple of those ships, and trends suggest that it will become easier.
Furthermore, in what sort of context will we really have a need for these ships? In an alliance one sure, but then that depends on whether or not you want to remain such a close partner of the US. A separate debate, but even if it's a preference it is by no means guaranteed to even be an option.
Closer to home, what would we need such ships for? Certainly not continental defence, putting aside the incredible challenges any adversary would have in landing a force here it is submarine and air power which would be our main defence.
Perhaps engaging with the Indonesians, or someone else in the near north? Well if you want to be able to do that then certainly, you'll need capabilities such as these. But three ships in a class, or even eight or nine if the Future Frigates turn out the way many want them, is hardly going to be able to achieve this. They'll be swamped. The RAN has been the dominant force in the region thanks to a technological superiority that is vanishing quick, and once it becomes impossible to project surface naval power in a meaningful sense, why spend money on it?
Actually, successive governments have made very clear that their capabilities in disaster relief are very much valued.
That's true, but I was specific in mentioning Navy's position. Navy considers these ships a military capability. At ASPI's Future Surface Fleet conference earlier this year the CoN made it very clear that the focus of the Navy was on the label - to fight and win at sea.
If we're to have naval ships like the LHDs, there needs to be a military justification for them. Perhaps there is one, but disaster relief can't be substituted in as the raison d'être.
And how effectively? The capabilities of the LHDs far exceed any civilian ships and they are at high readiness (or will be when both are in service).
I should have been clear. If we want to disaster relief effectively, we do need specialised ships for it. The LHDs are one such means, but it would still be a lot cheaper to build ships that come without the various military requirements that bump up the costs and which tie up a lot of naval personal.
To be fair though, a good counter-argument could be that if we do have a military need for the LHDs, it would be cheaper to have them also perform disaster relief than build some other ships specifically for it. The crux of the debate then is whether or not we have a military justification.
Silly argument.
First, that's only a battalion group, and we have deployed at least such a force, or greater, since Vietnam on several occasions - Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan.
Second, it's the flexibility of the platform that is the key. One may not need to deploy 1000 troops, but having the ability to operate so many helicopters simultaneously, to carry so many vehicles and land them over the beach, having a fully equipped hospital, and so on, these capabilities are not all found in smaller ships.
All true, I am beginning to suspect that in large part the disagreement here is in broader strategic terms than in the specifics of the platforms. I am honestly very skeptical of our need to commit so strongly to deploying overseas in force. Other states like Japan have demonstrated that if you want to deploy a token force overseas in support of an ally that it is possible to get the ally to take the troops there. If all we want is to show the flag, we don't need such sophisticated capabilities. I'll concede though that if we do want to do more, that yes these ships are good for the job.
I don't really have time unfortunately to get into a long debate about our strategic posture in the 21st century (or indeed about the fleet specifically is worth adding) so I'll just state what I think it should be without really being able to respond further.
Just quickly:
The US is in relative decline, they may not be able to support us in future, we need to be better able to look after ourselves.
We are also in relative decline, we cannot overawe the ASEAN nations anymore, we need capabilities which will secure us at home, not up north, because we can't.
We go overseas to support the alliance, if there is no longer as great a need for the alliance we do not need to deploy so many troops there.
I'll be surprised if you don't disagree with most of this!
The point I'm making about those political realities is that with or without capabilities, the political leaders of the day will still want to send our armed forces off on overseas operations. Look at our history. I'd rather our servicemen and women have the best tools for the job rather than denying them the tools in the hope that this will influence some kind of non-interventionist government policy. That's not how the world works. You don't develop capabilities based on what you think the government should or shouldn't do, but on what the government is likely to want to do.
I actually agree with this 100%, but I do think it's a somewhat separate debate from what I was posting about. To be fair though I wasn't explicit. In a practical sense for policymaking, taking into account the political realities, then we definitely should invest in capabilities that are likely to be useful for ensuring that those policies we try to carry out are done so well.
My main contention in this debate is regarding what policies we should be pursuing, and hence what capabilities we should have for those policies I think we should be carrying out, than the opposite direction of what are the capabilities that are good for carrying out policies that we are going to be implementing irrespective of merit.
One very final note on Hugh White, you're right that he believes what he says but what I meant to say was that he doesn't believe that we he says will be picked up, even though he thinks it should. It would be a foolish man who actually thought it likely that we are going to scrap the surface fleet and built 32 submarines!
And with that I'm afraid I'll be unable to further reply for a while, lots of Hugh White readings to do and essays to write (not even joking).