TFSmith121
Banned
Kyushu was designed to secure airfields, anchorages, and
The Kyushu operation was designed to secure airfields, anchorages, and bases for the Honshu operation; towards the end of the planning stages, when there were indications of the IJA build-up, the planners were considering switching the objective to Shikoku. There was even some consideration of going straight for Honshu ... and its not like the US could not switch gears; Leyte rather than Mindanao after Palau comes to mind.
The other reality is that the US units allotted for Kyushu - including the 3rd and 5th fleets and 6th Army, built around the I, IX, XI, and V 'Phib corps (made up of the 1st Cavalry, 2nd Marine, 3rd Marine, 5th Marine, 11th Airborne, 25th, 33rd, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 77th, 81st, 98th, and Americal divisions) were hardly novices; other than the 98th, which had not yet seen action, they were all veteran formations, and several were elite.
Combine that experience with US tactics and firepower, and the realities of the general weakness in everything but manpower of the IJA by 1945-46, and the possibility of the US not gaining its objectives on Kyushu (essentially, the southern third of the island) is pretty close to impossible.
There's also the reality that the US alone had 14 ground force divisions in the Pacific beyond those assigned to 6th Army, and something like 24 more in transit or detailed from the ETO; in addition, the Allies all had forces preparing for service under US command in the event of a campaign in Japan... the front-line US forces in the Pacific not assigned to 6th Army included:
1st, 4th, 6th Marine divisions; 6th, 7th, 24th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th, and 96th divisions; while the 12th and 93rd would presumably have sufficed for the PI, along with the re-activated PCA.
The weather would have more of an impact than anything the IJA could do, much less the IJN.
Best,
The Kyushu operation was designed to secure airfields, anchorages, and bases for the Honshu operation; towards the end of the planning stages, when there were indications of the IJA build-up, the planners were considering switching the objective to Shikoku. There was even some consideration of going straight for Honshu ... and its not like the US could not switch gears; Leyte rather than Mindanao after Palau comes to mind.
The other reality is that the US units allotted for Kyushu - including the 3rd and 5th fleets and 6th Army, built around the I, IX, XI, and V 'Phib corps (made up of the 1st Cavalry, 2nd Marine, 3rd Marine, 5th Marine, 11th Airborne, 25th, 33rd, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 77th, 81st, 98th, and Americal divisions) were hardly novices; other than the 98th, which had not yet seen action, they were all veteran formations, and several were elite.
Combine that experience with US tactics and firepower, and the realities of the general weakness in everything but manpower of the IJA by 1945-46, and the possibility of the US not gaining its objectives on Kyushu (essentially, the southern third of the island) is pretty close to impossible.
There's also the reality that the US alone had 14 ground force divisions in the Pacific beyond those assigned to 6th Army, and something like 24 more in transit or detailed from the ETO; in addition, the Allies all had forces preparing for service under US command in the event of a campaign in Japan... the front-line US forces in the Pacific not assigned to 6th Army included:
1st, 4th, 6th Marine divisions; 6th, 7th, 24th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th, and 96th divisions; while the 12th and 93rd would presumably have sufficed for the PI, along with the re-activated PCA.
The weather would have more of an impact than anything the IJA could do, much less the IJN.
Best,