Cryhavoc101
Donor
How long does it to unfold the wings on both fighters?
But European fighters do offer more space
Not very long
Whole vid worth a watch but 1 min in shows the Swordfish wings being unfolded
How long does it to unfold the wings on both fighters?
But European fighters do offer more space
even then the Hellcat was not as good as it is made out to be
I am not sure the more modern fighters would have changed even the number of casualties all that much if it came out earlier and may have been worse. It takes time to spin down a weapon system and spin up a new one , time Japan did not have. They were also cheaper and Japan was badly enough outnumbered as is. Only a little over 10,000 were made all war long. How more outnunbered would they be when you consider the time it takes to change production and the fact the new fighters were more expensive?
I agree, it was the most promising engine at the time yet they insisted on the Kinsei.But they did: the 1500hp Mitsubishi Kasei, available in 1939 to design with a fighter
A bit bigger in diameter, a bit heavier than what was in the Zero, but lighter than the R-2600
If we replace the Zero with a different contemporary design that has similar combat capability but a very different design approach, we can then discuss weather it would change much.
Take for example the D520.
Had the IJN been using the D520 in its navalized form, the superior training of IJN pilots would still allow them to overcome allied air strength in all the initial campaigns. Having used it in China, they would have developed tactics to suit their fighter and woul probably score the same massive kill/loss rates against allied fighters. Thelack of range would not have been a decisive facto. It would force the carriers to get a bit closer to Pearl, for example, but that wouldn't change OTL events.
The main difference would come in the Solomons campaign were the lack of range of the D520 would mean there would be no long range missions. This would reduce pressure on the US forces, but also reduce IJN fighter losses.
So as along as they have a decent fighter, their superior training will give them the same six months of superiority.
True
In the imperial navy's case having good aircraft with green novice pilots. Which is a very bad combination in finance and resources department.
Is there such a thing as a good aircraft for novices? Some kind of dive and scoot interceptor perhaps? Create some kind of high/low mix ala Spitfire/Hurricane using the novices to break up bombers and act as bait before the pros step in?
The Commonwealth had 'The Plan' - it's almost like they intended to win the war or something?
What if instead of focusing only maneuverability at all costs the japanese built their naval and army fighters like European designs? High speed, heavy armament, armored and self sealing fuel tanks, either liquid cooled or radial engined.
How much changes?
What difficulties will the allies have with these Japanese fighters?
What will the allies make to counter these fighters?
Reminder: not everything Friedman says is "correct" politically or factually. Short version. Based on what the Japanese knew and what the USN also believed, the ZERO makes perfect sense because if "it is all offense all the time in aircraft carrier warfare" the carriage of anything aloft that interferes with offense is obviously a wastage of gas and material. It should be also pointed out that Japan (and Germany) had limited access to and quantities of av-gas which is kind of important for pilot training. The Japanese do better than the Germans in substituting ground simulators but then the war comes along and the Japanese find out in 1943 what the USN learns in early 1942. WAR kills pilots quickly and you have to rush trainees through with inadequate training with the result that you have to hope that your rookies survive in enough numbers to become veterans and TEACHERS.
The brutal truth is that even the RN learns this fact as they lose their highly trained FAA pre-war professional navigators and pilots as casualties. This markedly handicapped Somerville in the Indian Ocean in the famous Sri Lanka actions off Columbo in April 1942. The Japanese had trained a deeper pilot reserve than the Anglo-Americans and were not really hurt by pilot shortages until mid 1943. The planes were important, but the pilots were far more important.
Armor, self sealing tanks, etc., only makes a difference when you get RADAR. The Anglo-Americans get there first and that is the cruncher.
The RN lost a lot of pilots before 43 and started from a very small pool - of the 3 carrier navies it is the most engaged and lost a horrible % of trained Pilots, 'Ground crew' and sailors when Courageous was torpedoed and again when Glorious forgot she was a man O war before the PLAN could start to pay dividends.
Hell even young Eric Brown is one of the only 2 surviving pilots from the sinking of the escort carrier HMS Audacity - this before he becomes the world's greatest pilot!
But even then they still manage to put new pilots through a 3 year training course - even if the course is slightly flawed due to the RNs pilot officer selection process which resulted in a higher % of washouts relative to the RAF and USAF/USN
And this will not really matter with regards to this POD until 45 when the BPF turns up!
The IJN does not start to lose large numbers of pilots till after Midway (even Midway is cheap for them in pilots - experienced airgroup 'ground crew' personnel lost with the carriers not so much) - the USN again relatively cheap losses versus the pool.
So with regards to this Pod very little changes as the surviving pool of IJN pilots are still facing a large number of very well trained and led USN pilots into large numbers of very good planes that are better than the A6m in an organisation that is not only able to both rotate Pilots and endure losses but massively expand during 43-45.
Pilot quality starts to uptick for the Allies in the SWPOA about March 1943, while the IJNAS declines. Surprisingly the IJAAS remains high clear into 1944.So regardless of the Aircraft that replaces the A6m in this scenario its still getting thrashed by its principle opponents from late 42.
Before that outside of the big carrier battles it's generally only facing the 2nd and sometimes 3rd string of both pilots and aircraft types so regardless of aircraft the IJN is likely going to have the better pilots and have the better of any combat during this period
If we replace the Zero with a different contemporary design that has similar combat capability but a very different design approach, we can then discuss weather it would change much.
Take for example the D520.
Had the IJN been using the D520 in its navalized form, the superior training of IJN pilots would still allow them to overcome allied air strength in all the initial campaigns. Having used it in China, they would have developed tactics to suit their fighter and woul probably score the same massive kill/loss rates against allied fighters. Thelack of range would not have been a decisive facto. It would force the carriers to get a bit closer to Pearl, for example, but that wouldn't change OTL events.
The main difference would come in the Solomons campaign were the lack of range of the D520 would mean there would be no long range missions. This would reduce pressure on the US forces, but also reduce IJN fighter losses.
So as along as they have a decent fighter, their superior training will give them the same six months of superiority.
Before 1942 I agree with that statement 100%. After the 1942 battles in the Indian Ocean, the RN virtually disappears in the Pacific. The air fighting in Europe's ocean littorals is intense, however, especially in the Mediterranean clear into late 1943. The RN FAA never recovers from it. Never. They lose their reconnaissance and trained navigator edge they have over the IJN and the USN. This is important. The BPF has further problems in 1944 as it tries to stand up its CTFs, mainly because its logistics is not yet state of the art and the IJN and the USN each have four carrier battles under their belts and have learned things the RN cannot possibly know. This does not reflect on the RN at all. Any navy in its 1944 situation would have these problems.
Eric Brown flew in more types of planes, but I bet there are a couple of Russians and Americans who matched him in air knowledge and ability to fly in a crisis. Could Eric do what the Mercury 7 or the Apollo crews did? How about the Корпус космонавта (Cosmonaut corps?). Probably. But I just wanted to point out that YMMV.
The British carriers tended to require men who could land on into shorter trap lengths. Maybe the British had a higher cutoff level and intolerance for hand eye coordination because of it; or their theoretical academic syllabus was tougher (It actually was not, but US pass/fail was more forgiving. You got two chances.). Americans (and Japanese) concentrated on flying the machine and knowing how to bomb and shoot. Pilots were spent like ammunition in both navies and had to be churned out. The RN has the same problem but nothing like 1943 for the Pacific combatants.
*It does matter. The British are better at air traffic management, worse at reconnaissance and maintenance, about equal at flight deck operations tempos, and also about equal at air to ship communications. The problem is that there is the RN way and the USN way and when confliction occurs, mistakes happen. At least one bungled Kamikaze intercept off Okinawa is due to a hash-up between US and British fighter directors. It was the Americans fault, but two navies talking past each other does not help.
Losing 200 American air crew at Midway out of a PACFlt trained reserve of 1600 is not insignificant.
Believe it, that a lot of Empire trained Australian and New Zealand pilots did their full bloody share during CARTWHEEL to whittle the IJNAS down to size. I make it a point to never forget that of the 7,000 Japanese aircraft splashed during CARTWHEEL, that at least 1/3 of them belong to the ANZAC pilots.
Pilot quality starts to uptick for the Allies in the SWPOA about March 1943, while the IJNAS declines. Surprisingly the IJAAS remains high clear into 1944.
Aircraft types. RAAF and RNZAF pilots were actually kind of good.
Sadly it was more to do with a criteria focusing more on the candidates being Gentlemen suitable for the Navy not the job of a Naval pilot - which resulted in a higher percentage of Pilots washing out - it was not a massive difference - just more than the RAF and USAAF/USN experienced and did force their lordships to change later in the war.
Fair enough was not aware that the pool was so small at the time - does that represent the entire USN pool?
I seem to recall that the IJN had 4000 trained pilots on Dec 7, 1941 - my understanding is that the main attrition was when they were land based after losing most of the carriers
I was aware, but I thought the exigencies of war had knocked the "gentlemen flyers club" nonsense out by 1942. I guess I was mistaken?