WI No A6M Zero fighter?

even then the Hellcat was not as good as it is made out to be

I recall reading on a German pilot first coming across a FAA Hellcat thinking it was just some radial powered Hurricane at first, till he found all the tricks for the dealing with the Hurricane didn't apply anymore, like trying to dive to get away, and realized that he was up against a US plane, and that's the one tactic that was guaranteed never to work
 
I am not sure the more modern fighters would have changed even the number of casualties all that much if it came out earlier and may have been worse. It takes time to spin down a weapon system and spin up a new one , time Japan did not have. They were also cheaper and Japan was badly enough outnumbered as is. Only a little over 10,000 were made all war long. How more outnunbered would they be when you consider the time it takes to change production and the fact the new fighters were more expensive?
 
I am not sure the more modern fighters would have changed even the number of casualties all that much if it came out earlier and may have been worse. It takes time to spin down a weapon system and spin up a new one , time Japan did not have. They were also cheaper and Japan was badly enough outnumbered as is. Only a little over 10,000 were made all war long. How more outnunbered would they be when you consider the time it takes to change production and the fact the new fighters were more expensive?

True

In the imperial navy's case having good aircraft with green novice pilots. Which is a very bad combination in finance and resources department.
 
But they did: the 1500hp Mitsubishi Kasei, available in 1939 to design with a fighter
A bit bigger in diameter, a bit heavier than what was in the Zero, but lighter than the R-2600
I agree, it was the most promising engine at the time yet they insisted on the Kinsei.
 
Have the original 16-Shi Japanese Navy specifications for the successor to Mitsubishi's A6M "Zero" fighter ever surfaced?

As I understand it, there was a delay in starting design work on the 16-Shi design for a successor to the new A6M in 1940 and 1941 because of problems with development of the 14-Shi Mitsubishi J2M land based interceptor "Raiden" and the illness of chief designer Jiro Horikoshi. By the time Mitsubishi and Jiro Horikoshi were able to return work on the successor to the Zero, it was April of 1942 and the specifications had been updated to the 17-Shi version. The 17-Shi specifications resulted in the Mitsubishi A7M "Sam" carrier fighter.
 
If we replace the Zero with a different contemporary design that has similar combat capability but a very different design approach, we can then discuss weather it would change much.
Take for example the D520.
Had the IJN been using the D520 in its navalized form, the superior training of IJN pilots would still allow them to overcome allied air strength in all the initial campaigns. Having used it in China, they would have developed tactics to suit their fighter and woul probably score the same massive kill/loss rates against allied fighters. Thelack of range would not have been a decisive facto. It would force the carriers to get a bit closer to Pearl, for example, but that wouldn't change OTL events.
The main difference would come in the Solomons campaign were the lack of range of the D520 would mean there would be no long range missions. This would reduce pressure on the US forces, but also reduce IJN fighter losses.
So as along as they have a decent fighter, their superior training will give them the same six months of superiority.
 
If we replace the Zero with a different contemporary design that has similar combat capability but a very different design approach, we can then discuss weather it would change much.
Take for example the D520.
Had the IJN been using the D520 in its navalized form, the superior training of IJN pilots would still allow them to overcome allied air strength in all the initial campaigns. Having used it in China, they would have developed tactics to suit their fighter and woul probably score the same massive kill/loss rates against allied fighters. Thelack of range would not have been a decisive facto. It would force the carriers to get a bit closer to Pearl, for example, but that wouldn't change OTL events.
The main difference would come in the Solomons campaign were the lack of range of the D520 would mean there would be no long range missions. This would reduce pressure on the US forces, but also reduce IJN fighter losses.
So as along as they have a decent fighter, their superior training will give them the same six months of superiority.

I would add that once the Commonwealth Air training scheme and the equivalent US system starts delivering very well trained pilots in large quantities which is probably by early 1942 as you say this 6 months is up

It's been said that the 'rookie' pilots from these training schemes were often better pilots than the veterans they replaced as they themselves had been taught by the survivors who had learned the best lessons and had been comprehensively trained to a higher standard then the pilots they replaced.

As for the A6m its only real fault was not having a replacement in the wings (I did a funny) or a Spitfire like continued development in order to keep it competitive until the end of the war.

As to the OPs question the 'instead of an A6m' aircraft is likely to be a follow on design from a late 30s aircraft - what else did the Japanese have that they might have used to develop an A5m replacement?

The A5m successor might be a navalised KI-27 with a replacement along the lines of the KI-43 by start of 1942?
 
True

In the imperial navy's case having good aircraft with green novice pilots. Which is a very bad combination in finance and resources department.

Is there such a thing as a good aircraft for novices? Some kind of dive and scoot interceptor perhaps? Create some kind of high/low mix ala Spitfire/Hurricane using the novices to break up bombers and act as bait before the pros step in?
 
Is there such a thing as a good aircraft for novices? Some kind of dive and scoot interceptor perhaps? Create some kind of high/low mix ala Spitfire/Hurricane using the novices to break up bombers and act as bait before the pros step in?

The Hellcat, that's why it was so important, you could put well trained but not exquisitely trained reservists in it. It suffered in performance to the Corsair but was much easier to fly and much easier to land on a ship (rather important for a naval fighter) while it still had good performance, heavy armament, and could take a lot of punishment.
 
So it is a legitimate doctrine. But how do we make it work in the Japanese context? The Hellcat doesn't really fit their difficulties with under powered engines. A6M is good and cheap but needs competent pilots. What else do they have in the cupboard?
 
The Commonwealth had 'The Plan' - it's almost like they intended to win the war or something?


Reminder: not everything Friedman says is "correct" politically or factually. Short version. Based on what the Japanese knew and what the USN also believed, the ZERO makes perfect sense because if "it is all offense all the time in aircraft carrier warfare" the carriage of anything aloft that interferes with offense is obviously a wastage of gas and material. It should be also pointed out that Japan (and Germany) had limited access to and quantities of av-gas which is kind of important for pilot training. The Japanese do better than the Germans in substituting ground simulators but then the war comes along and the Japanese find out in 1943 what the USN learns in early 1942. WAR kills pilots quickly and you have to rush trainees through with inadequate training with the result that you have to hope that your rookies survive in enough numbers to become veterans and TEACHERS.

The brutal truth is that even the RN learns this fact as they lose their highly trained FAA pre-war professional navigators and pilots as casualties. This markedly handicapped Somerville in the Indian Ocean in the famous Sri Lanka actions off Columbo in April 1942. The Japanese had trained a deeper pilot reserve than the Anglo-Americans and were not really hurt by pilot shortages until mid 1943. The planes were important, but the pilots were far more important.

Armor, self sealing tanks, etc., only makes a difference when you get RADAR. The Anglo-Americans get there first and that is the cruncher.
 
What if instead of focusing only maneuverability at all costs the japanese built their naval and army fighters like European designs? High speed, heavy armament, armored and self sealing fuel tanks, either liquid cooled or radial engined.

How much changes?
What difficulties will the allies have with these Japanese fighters?
What will the allies make to counter these fighters?

All together it might take much more time to the WAllies to fight their way to Iwo Jima and Okinawa, so we have Soviets capturing whole Korea and Manchuria.
As for the fighter's qualities - high speed means shorter time of reaction, that is crucial for a side that is lagging in introduction of radar-assisted air defence, both ship- and land-based. Speed parity, let alone advantage = less likely to be jumped by a better performing enemy. Heavy armament means that 'leakers' (enemy bombers that managed to get trough) are fewer and/or more damaged; also means that P-47s or F6Fs or whatever will more likely succumb to a burst that hit home.
Good air cooled engines were around, however Japanese (at least IJN) gambled that 1000+- HP engines will cut it in 1942. Gamble didn't paid off. They also squandered too much time on purpose-built floatplane fighter by Kawainshi and purpose-built land-based fighter by Mitsubishi. Also with purpose-built carrier-based recon by Nakajima. The 3 mistakes leaving A6M to hold the fort long after the expiry date.
 

Reminder: not everything Friedman says is "correct" politically or factually. Short version. Based on what the Japanese knew and what the USN also believed, the ZERO makes perfect sense because if "it is all offense all the time in aircraft carrier warfare" the carriage of anything aloft that interferes with offense is obviously a wastage of gas and material. It should be also pointed out that Japan (and Germany) had limited access to and quantities of av-gas which is kind of important for pilot training. The Japanese do better than the Germans in substituting ground simulators but then the war comes along and the Japanese find out in 1943 what the USN learns in early 1942. WAR kills pilots quickly and you have to rush trainees through with inadequate training with the result that you have to hope that your rookies survive in enough numbers to become veterans and TEACHERS.

The brutal truth is that even the RN learns this fact as they lose their highly trained FAA pre-war professional navigators and pilots as casualties. This markedly handicapped Somerville in the Indian Ocean in the famous Sri Lanka actions off Columbo in April 1942. The Japanese had trained a deeper pilot reserve than the Anglo-Americans and were not really hurt by pilot shortages until mid 1943. The planes were important, but the pilots were far more important.

Armor, self sealing tanks, etc., only makes a difference when you get RADAR. The Anglo-Americans get there first and that is the cruncher.

The RN lost a lot of pilots before 43 and started from a very small pool - of the 3 carrier navies it is the most engaged and lost a horrible % of trained Pilots, 'Ground crew' and sailors when Courageous was torpedoed and again when Glorious forgot she was a man O war before the PLAN could start to pay dividends

Hell even young Eric Brown is one of the only 2 surviving pilots from the sinking of the escort carrier HMS Audacity - this before he becomes the world's greatest pilot!

But even then they still manage to put new pilots through a 3 year training course - even if the course is slightly flawed due to the RNs pilot officer selection process which resulted in a higher % of washouts relative to the RAF and USAF/USN

And this will not really matter with regards to this POD until 45 when the BPF turns up!

The IJN does not start to lose large numbers of pilots till after Midway (even Midway is cheap for them in pilots - experienced airgroup 'ground crew' personnel lost with the carriers not so much) - the USN again relatively cheap losses versus the pool

So with regards to this Pod very little changes as the surviving pool of IJN pilots are still facing a large number of very well trained and led USN pilots into large numbers of very good planes that are better than the A6m in an organisation that is not only able to both rotate Pilots and endure losses but massively expand during 43-45.

So regardless of the Aircraft that replaces the A6m in this scenario its still getting thrashed by its principle opponents from late 42.

Before that outside of the big carrier battles it's generally only facing the 2nd and sometimes 3rd string of both pilots and aircraft types so regardless of aircraft the IJN is likely going to have the better pilots and have the better of any combat during this period
 
The RN lost a lot of pilots before 43 and started from a very small pool - of the 3 carrier navies it is the most engaged and lost a horrible % of trained Pilots, 'Ground crew' and sailors when Courageous was torpedoed and again when Glorious forgot she was a man O war before the PLAN could start to pay dividends.

Before 1942 I agree with that statement 100%. After the 1942 battles in the Indian Ocean, the RN virtually disappears in the Pacific. The air fighting in Europe's ocean littorals is intense, however, especially in the Mediterranean clear into late 1943. The RN FAA never recovers from it. Never. They lose their reconnaissance and trained navigator edge they have over the IJN and the USN. This is important. The BPF has further problems in 1944 as it tries to stand up its CTFs, mainly because its logistics is not yet state of the art and the IJN and the USN each have four carrier battles under their belts and have learned things the RN cannot possibly know. This does not reflect on the RN at all. Any navy in its 1944 situation would have these problems.

Hell even young Eric Brown is one of the only 2 surviving pilots from the sinking of the escort carrier HMS Audacity - this before he becomes the world's greatest pilot!

Eric Brown flew in more types of planes, but I bet there are a couple of Russians and Americans who matched him in air knowledge and ability to fly in a crisis. Could Eric do what the Mercury 7 or the Apollo crews did? How about the Корпус космонавта (Cosmonaut corps?). Probably. But I just wanted to point out that YMMV.

But even then they still manage to put new pilots through a 3 year training course - even if the course is slightly flawed due to the RNs pilot officer selection process which resulted in a higher % of washouts relative to the RAF and USAF/USN

The British carriers tended to require men who could land on into shorter trap lengths. Maybe the British had a higher cutoff level and intolerance for hand eye coordination because of it; or their theoretical academic syllabus was tougher (It actually was not, but US pass/fail was more forgiving. You got two chances.). Americans (and Japanese) concentrated on flying the machine and knowing how to bomb and shoot. Pilots were spent like ammunition in both navies and had to be churned out. The RN has the same problem but nothing like 1943 for the Pacific combatants.

And this will not really matter with regards to this POD until 45 when the BPF turns up!

*It does matter. The British are better at air traffic management, worse at reconnaissance and maintenance, about equal at flight deck operations tempos, and also about equal at air to ship communications. The problem is that there is the RN way and the USN way and when confliction occurs, mistakes happen. At least one bungled Kamikaze intercept off Okinawa is due to a hash-up between US and British fighter directors. It was the Americans fault, but two navies talking past each other does not help.

The IJN does not start to lose large numbers of pilots till after Midway (even Midway is cheap for them in pilots - experienced airgroup 'ground crew' personnel lost with the carriers not so much) - the USN again relatively cheap losses versus the pool.

Losing 200 American air crew at Midway out of a PACFlt trained reserve of 1600 is not insignificant.

So with regards to this Pod very little changes as the surviving pool of IJN pilots are still facing a large number of very well trained and led USN pilots into large numbers of very good planes that are better than the A6m in an organisation that is not only able to both rotate Pilots and endure losses but massively expand during 43-45.

Believe it, that a lot of Empire trained Australian and New Zealand pilots did their full bloody share during CARTWHEEL to whittle the IJNAS down to size. I make it a point to never forget that of the 7,000 Japanese aircraft splashed during CARTWHEEL, that at least 1/3 of them belong to the ANZAC pilots.

So regardless of the Aircraft that replaces the A6m in this scenario its still getting thrashed by its principle opponents from late 42.
Pilot quality starts to uptick for the Allies in the SWPOA about March 1943, while the IJNAS declines. Surprisingly the IJAAS remains high clear into 1944.

Before that outside of the big carrier battles it's generally only facing the 2nd and sometimes 3rd string of both pilots and aircraft types so regardless of aircraft the IJN is likely going to have the better pilots and have the better of any combat during this period

Aircraft types. RAAF and RNZAF pilots were actually kind of good.
 

DougM

Donor
Taken overall I think at the beginning of the war the lose of the A6M will have some noticeable downside for Japan. Assuming it builds a fighter closer to the Western pattern it will result in slower aircraft (Japan generally did not have perticularly powerfull engines). These aircraft will have shorter range/time aloft) and will suck more fuel. The will also tend to be larger and thus you can put less of them on a given flattop. And the aircraft will behave more closely to the US aircraft and thus the Americans will be a bit more familiar with how to fight them.

Keep in mind that putting armor and self sealing tanks and such will keep more pilots alive as the planes will hold up to damage better. But it won’t be a huge increase as the planes will perform worse and thus more hits will be scored on these aircraft.
Add in few Aircraft hours in the air because of shorter range and using more fuel in a fuel short Navy and fewer larger aircraft per aircraft carrier and the ratio of Japanese fighters to American fighters in any given engagement will be worse so this will increase the hits on the aircraft also.
And who knows how the shorter combat range effects tactics and such in a give battle so that may adversely effect things.
End result is you should see a lot more hits on Japanese airplanes to begin with (when the US was not sure how to fight them) but any given hit will on average do less damage against these tougher aircraft.

So with the result being that the US will encounter effectively less aircraft in any engagement and these aircraft will perform less well in combat. So with the closer performance the shorter range and the lower numbers the outcome will be worse for Japan and better for the US. That being said the aircraft will be safer for the pilots so you may see more Japanese pilots survive longer. But I don’t think this will be enough unless Japan starts pulling the pilots to train new pilots .

So in the beginning I think the US will do a bit better in pretty much any engagement. In the middle it will see Japan have a few more experienced pilots (but not that many more as the aircraft they fly will not be as good so they will get hit more often) and in the end when the newer US fighters are out and the US has rediculus numerical advantage it just won’t matter

The end result is a plus for the US to start, a plus to Japan in the middle and irrelevant at the End of the war.

If you realy want to see Japan do better overall you need to have them pull thier best pilots to teach the next generation.

But keep in mind that at the beginning of the war when the “Zero” and the Japanese navel AirPower got its dangerous reputation it was basically doing so by expenditure of its future. Building the aircraft light and nasty ment they were more deadly in combat (to both sides) so they had a combat advantage but at the cost of killing more of thier own pilots. And keeping these pilots in combat ment they had a more experienced pilot corp so they would do better in combat. But they didn’t have this experience teaching the next generation. Both of these results in better combat records to begin with when Japan had the numbers and could aford to pay the price but ultimately it made well trained pilots hard to come by. But frankly nothing Japan could do was going to stop them being hideously out numbered at the End. The US had twice the population and a lot more resources and more industries to start with and they were not getting blown to pieces so nothing Japan could do would have had a drastic effect.
 
If we replace the Zero with a different contemporary design that has similar combat capability but a very different design approach, we can then discuss weather it would change much.
Take for example the D520.
Had the IJN been using the D520 in its navalized form, the superior training of IJN pilots would still allow them to overcome allied air strength in all the initial campaigns. Having used it in China, they would have developed tactics to suit their fighter and woul probably score the same massive kill/loss rates against allied fighters. Thelack of range would not have been a decisive facto. It would force the carriers to get a bit closer to Pearl, for example, but that wouldn't change OTL events.
The main difference would come in the Solomons campaign were the lack of range of the D520 would mean there would be no long range missions. This would reduce pressure on the US forces, but also reduce IJN fighter losses.
So as along as they have a decent fighter, their superior training will give them the same six months of superiority.

Agree with your post but from what I have read the D520 would have been a rotten carrier plane. Terrible vision forward, nasty low speed stall, prone to ground looping and poor rudder control during the landing run.
 
Before 1942 I agree with that statement 100%. After the 1942 battles in the Indian Ocean, the RN virtually disappears in the Pacific. The air fighting in Europe's ocean littorals is intense, however, especially in the Mediterranean clear into late 1943. The RN FAA never recovers from it. Never. They lose their reconnaissance and trained navigator edge they have over the IJN and the USN. This is important. The BPF has further problems in 1944 as it tries to stand up its CTFs, mainly because its logistics is not yet state of the art and the IJN and the USN each have four carrier battles under their belts and have learned things the RN cannot possibly know. This does not reflect on the RN at all. Any navy in its 1944 situation would have these problems.

Yes - a different type of war being played out in the Western Pac

Eric Brown flew in more types of planes, but I bet there are a couple of Russians and Americans who matched him in air knowledge and ability to fly in a crisis. Could Eric do what the Mercury 7 or the Apollo crews did? How about the Корпус космонавта (Cosmonaut corps?). Probably. But I just wanted to point out that YMMV.

For his part he claimed Neil Armstrong was the greatest pilot ever - but I believe that Brown was slated to fly the M52 before it was cancelled (which would have flown before the Bell X1).

The British carriers tended to require men who could land on into shorter trap lengths. Maybe the British had a higher cutoff level and intolerance for hand eye coordination because of it; or their theoretical academic syllabus was tougher (It actually was not, but US pass/fail was more forgiving. You got two chances.). Americans (and Japanese) concentrated on flying the machine and knowing how to bomb and shoot. Pilots were spent like ammunition in both navies and had to be churned out. The RN has the same problem but nothing like 1943 for the Pacific combatants.

Sadly it was more to do with a criteria focusing more on the candidates being Gentlemen suitable for the Navy not the job of a Naval pilot - which resulted in a higher percentage of Pilots washing out - it was not a massive difference - just more than the RAF and USAAF/USN experienced and did force their lordships to change later in the war.

*It does matter. The British are better at air traffic management, worse at reconnaissance and maintenance, about equal at flight deck operations tempos, and also about equal at air to ship communications. The problem is that there is the RN way and the USN way and when confliction occurs, mistakes happen. At least one bungled Kamikaze intercept off Okinawa is due to a hash-up between US and British fighter directors. It was the Americans fault, but two navies talking past each other does not help.

When Robin came to play with Sara (to Bring Pacflt carrier strength back up to 2!), USS Robins Captain Mackintosh insisted from when she turned up at Norfolk that they would do things the American way - but these are both long tenured organisations - and both quite conservative so I am not surprised there was such issues.

Losing 200 American air crew at Midway out of a PACFlt trained reserve of 1600 is not insignificant.

Fair enough was not aware that the pool was so small at the time - does that represent the entire USN pool?

Believe it, that a lot of Empire trained Australian and New Zealand pilots did their full bloody share during CARTWHEEL to whittle the IJNAS down to size. I make it a point to never forget that of the 7,000 Japanese aircraft splashed during CARTWHEEL, that at least 1/3 of them belong to the ANZAC pilots.

Sadly they were generally sidelined into a sideshow campaign and poorly used later in the war despite their experience.

Pilot quality starts to uptick for the Allies in the SWPOA about March 1943, while the IJNAS declines. Surprisingly the IJAAS remains high clear into 1944.

I seem to recall that the IJN had 4000 trained pilots on Dec 7, 1941 - my understanding is that the main attrition was when they were land based after losing most of the carriers

Aircraft types. RAAF and RNZAF pilots were actually kind of good.

Australia went from 50 RAAF pilots trained a year to training about 27000 from 41 - 45 for their part of the 'Plan' - Good effort from the 'down under'.
 
Sadly it was more to do with a criteria focusing more on the candidates being Gentlemen suitable for the Navy not the job of a Naval pilot - which resulted in a higher percentage of Pilots washing out - it was not a massive difference - just more than the RAF and USAAF/USN experienced and did force their lordships to change later in the war.

I was aware, but I thought the exigencies of war had knocked the "gentlemen flyers club" nonsense out by 1942. I guess I was mistaken?

Fair enough was not aware that the pool was so small at the time - does that represent the entire USN pool?

Pre-war USN trained pool was about 3,700 aircrew split between staff flying and ship billets. A lot of them (pilots) were flying LRMPs (PBYs). CV aircrew (pilots) were theoretically 3 per plane embarked authorized, but in practice on December 7, 1941 it was more like 1.8 pilots per plane. Japanese aircrew reserves, IJN and IJA, were variously 4,500 - 5,700 depending on who you believe. I go with Parshall and Tully at about 3,200 IJN and 2,500 IJA. These were really small air forces by European standards. USNR pilot reserves (there was a flying cadet program, a HUGE one) was about 7,000, but they were nowhere up to the regulars' standards. They needed refresher and remedial training. In fact it is the USNR retreads after training who make CACTUS work. About HALF of the PACFlt (800 of them, 400 combat losses) regulars from war start are casualties or rotated stateside by Midway. The IJN take a pilot beating, too, but they do not rotate out as many for instructors. Figure 450 lost by Guadalcanal? Then comes the year long fighting in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea and the STAGGERING casualties among the Japanese air crews. Don't forget that the Australians are having their own Donnybrook beating off Japanese raiders in the northern territories and fighting for air control of the Timor and Arafura Seas.

I seem to recall that the IJN had 4000 trained pilots on Dec 7, 1941 - my understanding is that the main attrition was when they were land based after losing most of the carriers

Correct, but it is not just the Solomon Islands: the air front and actual air fighting stretches from eastern Java all the way to Efate. Figure 5000 kilometers!
 
I was aware, but I thought the exigencies of war had knocked the "gentlemen flyers club" nonsense out by 1942. I guess I was mistaken?

It possibly was by 1942 - but by then the selection process is delivering those pilots to front line squadrons in 45!
 
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