WI - no A bombs had been dropped, "Olympic" was postponed and the Soviets had tried to invade Japan?

I recently got involved in a discussion on the "Guardian"s comment threads, on the inevitable subject of the necessity of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One claim made was that Truman dropped the bomb in order to (a) deter the Soviets, and (b) to get a Japanese surrender before the Soviets could invade.

Which got me to thinking; would a Soviet invasion of Japan from the North have been a possibility? From what I can see, installing a force on Sakhalin was no great challenge. Anything more than that would have severely strained credibility; the Pacific Fleet was all but non-existent, and the Soviets had no experience at all of large scale amphibious operations - and no shipping designed to support it. The La Perouse Straight is of similar width to the English Channel, with (if anything) worse weather. And, of course they'd have faced intense Japanese resistance al;l the way up to the Kamikaze

I couldn't see the Soviets being in a position to launch an invasion attempt before spring '46, at the earliest; I can, however envisage circumstances that would have extended the war to that point (a technical failure during "Trinity", and Olympic postponed due to adverse weather in September '45).

Any thoughts on a timeline based on that PoD - including how the American and Allies might have responded?

An afterthought - can we avoid debate over Truman's motives for dropping the bomb? That's been done to death...
 
Last edited:
See the following video featuring D. M. Giangreco, Richard B. Frank, and David Glantz:

http://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan

The answer is no to both: the bombs were not dropped to prevent the Soviets from invading Japan (they couldn't have), nor were they dropped to intimidate Stalin. They were used to bring about a swift end to the war with as little further death as possible (as unacceptable as that moral reasoning is, given that it still entailed the wholesale incineration and poisoning of tens to hundreds of thousands of noncombatants).
 
Last edited:
See the following video featuring D. M. Giangreco, Richard B. Frank, and David Glantz:

http://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan

The answer is no to both: the bombs were not dropped to prevent the Soviets from invading Japan (they couldn't have), nor were they dropped to intimidate Stalin. They were used to bring about a swift end to the war with as little further death as possible.

My intent wasn't to reopen that particular far-too-often discussed issue; it was to explore how credible it was that Soviet intervention could have ended the war (and secondarily ended with them occupying at least one of the home islands)
 

Deleted member 94680

The answer is no to both: the bombs were not dropped to prevent the Soviets from invading Japan (they couldn't have), nor were they dropped to intimidate Stalin. They were used to bring about a swift end to the war with as little further death as possible.

My intent wasn't to reopen that particular far-too-often discussed issue; it was to explore how credible it was that Soviet intervention could have ended the war (and secondarily ended with them occupying at least one of the home islands)


IF (huge if) a Soviet invasion happened the bloodshed involved would have been so extreme the Kremlin would have demanded some large concessions in post-war Japan.


Soviet intervention would have ended the war, as the Japanese wouldn't have had anyone left to fight with.
 
The Soviets would have to borrow via Lend-lease the LSTs, the LSIs, Cargo ships and tankers to move their infantry divisions to invade...

IJAAF and IJN aircraft will probably be shifted to Kamikaze that Lend-Lease Soviet Fleet invading Northern Japan....
 
My intent wasn't to reopen that particular far-too-often discussed issue; it was to explore how credible it was that Soviet intervention could have ended the war (and secondarily ended with them occupying at least one of the home islands)

On its own? Probably not. The Japanese forces in Manchuria were only a fraction of their total military and were deliberately drained to prop up the Home Islands. The loss of Manchurian industry would hurt, but the Japanese accepted this in their strategic plan to withdraw to the Korean border.
 
An alternate viewpoint might be, had the Japanese forces caused a Soviet landing on Hokkaido to fail (and imagine the effect on Kamikaze attacks an ill-protected landing force crossing 20+ miles of stormy sea with minimal air-cover), it would probably have killed any ideas of a US invasion - so we'd be back to the use of the A-bomb. The difference being a much larger US arsenal of atomic weapons.

I say minimal air cover for the simple reason that the Red Air Force lacked long-range fighters in the vein of the P-51; and given the distances from the Soviet Mainland or Manchuria, that would have meant any air cover would have had to operate from hastily prepared landing strips on Sakhalin itself. From what I understand of the challenges faced in the building of the LPG facilities there, it's an awful place to have to construct anything.
 
The Soviets would have to borrow via Lend-lease the LSTs, the LSIs, Cargo ships and tankers to move their infantry divisions to invade...

IJAAF and IJN aircraft will probably be shifted to Kamikaze that Lend-Lease Soviet Fleet invading Northern Japan....


In a matter of months?
 
The USSR had very limited experience in amphibious operations, the "biggest" being across the Kerch Straits to Crimea (the straits are between 3 and 15 km wide and shallow). The distance between the southern tip of Sakhalin and the closest portion of Hokkaido is 40km, however from any potential port to a landing spot is much more than this. While it did not take the USSR very long to occupy the southern half of Sakhalin, support facilities there were minimal. An invasion force sailing directly from Vladivostok to Hokkaido is simply impossible, the Soviets did not have the amphibious lift to do this, period. Therefore you have to create an infrastructure on Sakhalin to support all the troops and equipment needed for the invasion as well as build airfields, build/improve ports, fuel depots and so forth to support the invasion. Then you have to get the amphibious lift you need, even just landing craft, and by fall 1945 given the USSR's actions in Eastern Europe I can't see the USA giving an amphibious task force or two to Stalin.

Everything you need for the invasion has to be shipped from European Russia to Vladivostok, thousands of miles along a limited capacity railroad, and then transported to Sakhalin, with somewhat limited shipping. Assuming all these ASB things happen, and the Japanese cannot possibly miss this, you then sail this task force across waters at best nasty and at worst terrible, with limited air cover and minimal naval support to the landing area, which by the way is at least 200km from your support airfields. You have limited air strikes to prep the landing area, minimal naval gunfire support, and essentially zero protection against kamikazes.

Assuming Stalin goes for this, and assuming they can cobble together some amphibious lift, just doing all the preparations means it can't go off until spring, 1946 between preparations and the weather. Even then it will be a shoestring affair from a materiel standpoint. This sort of large scale amphibious landing is one of the more complex operations in military science. While the USSR had good generals and staff officers, there was essential zero experience and zero doctrine for this sort of thing. Can't see it being doable, and if tried a disaster for the Russians.
 

nbcman

Donor
The Soviets would have to borrow via Lend-lease the LSTs, the LSIs, Cargo ships and tankers to move their infantry divisions to invade...

IJAAF and IJN aircraft will probably be shifted to Kamikaze that Lend-Lease Soviet Fleet invading Northern Japan....

The US did give them some ships and training as part of Project Hula. But the quantity of craft delivered by the US was limited and was only intended to be sufficient to allow the Soviets to invade the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands as agreed upon during discussions in late 1944 through early 1945. The number of craft delivered to the Soviets may not have been enough since the Soviets lost 5 of 16 landing craft involved in the opposed invasion of Shumshu that occurred after the Japanese surrender. It would be difficult or impossible for the Soviets to get enough manpower ashore on Hokkaido even against the limited Japanese forces there considering they would have lost a significant amount of ships invading the above Islands prior to attempting to invade Hokkaido.
 
The Soviets would have to wait until 1946 in order to finish overrunning Manchuria and Korea and build-up the necessary capability. By then Japan would have long surrendered, bomb or no bomb.
 

jahenders

Banned
The Soviets would have to wait until 1946 in order to finish overrunning Manchuria and Korea and build-up the necessary capability. By then Japan would have long surrendered, bomb or no bomb.

Exactly. Once you reach the situation you have in Aug/Sep (Japan completely blockaded, subjected to US airstrikes at any time and place, fleet destroyed or trapped in port, air force destroyed or unable to fly without being annihilated, shortages, beginnings of starvation and disease), it's a matter of time before the Japanese surrender -- 3 to 12 months tops.
Several events could shorten that:
- Russian declaration of war -- 3-6 months
- A-bombs -- 3-6 months
- US invasion -- 3-6 months

So, without the bombs, the Japanese were probably going to surrender between Nov 45 and May 46.

The US was planning to invade in late 45. If they don't, it would still be at least mid 46 before the Russians could mount any substantial landing and even that would be doubtful of success -- probably late 46.
 
So, without the bombs, the Japanese were probably going to surrender between Nov 45 and May 46.

Doubtful. As long as the militarists clung to some hope that, in their words, "victory might be salvaged," their hold over the future of Japan would have been iron clad. Even with the dire straits the Japanese historically found themselves in August 1945 there was no talk of an end to the war on anything like the OTL terms until after the bombs were actually dropped. It would have taken either an invasion or a lengthy blockade to finally snuff them out.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
I recently got involved in a discussion on the "Guardian"s comment threads, on the inevitable subject of the necessity of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One claim made was that Truman dropped the bomb in order to (a) deter the Soviets, and (b) to get a Japanese surrender before the Soviets could invade.

Which got me to thinking; would a Soviet invasion of Japan from the North have been a possibility? From what I can see, installing a force on Sakhalin was no great challenge. Anything more than that would have severely strained credibility; the Pacific Fleet was all but non-existent, and the Soviets had no experience at all of large scale amphibious operations - and no shipping designed to support it. The La Perouse Straight is of similar width to the English Channel, with (if anything) worse weather. And, of course they'd have faced intense Japanese resistance al;l the way up to the Kamikaze

I couldn't see the Soviets being in a position to launch an invasion attempt before spring '46, at the earliest; I can, however envisage circumstances that would have extended the war to that point (a technical failure during "Trinity", and Olympic postponed due to adverse weather in September '45).

Any thoughts on a timeline based on that PoD - including how the American and Allies might have responded?

An afterthought - can we avoid debate over Truman's motives for dropping the bomb? That's been done to death...

As noted, without Project HULA, the Soviets can't even mount the operations they did, historically.

Basically, it comes down to blockade and starvation.

Best,
 

Deleted member 94680

It would have taken either an invasion or a lengthy blockade to finally snuff them out.

Blockade to the point of genocidal starvation probably. It was the bombs - plural, as the first wasn't enough on its own - and the belief that more would be dropped soon that convinced them to surrender.
 

jahenders

Banned
Doubtful. As long as the militarists clung to some hope that, in their words, "victory might be salvaged," their hold over the future of Japan would have been iron clad. Even with the dire straits the Japanese historically found themselves in August 1945 there was no talk of an end to the war on anything like the OTL terms until after the bombs were actually dropped. It would have taken either an invasion or a lengthy blockade to finally snuff them out.

That depends on the definition of "lengthy blockade" -- more months of dwindling supplies of EVERYTHING, starvation, disease, relentless bombing, etc. will have an impact. I think 3-12 months would likely do the trick, but the exact number could certainly be debated. Without a doubt the best answer was a a few a-bombs to end their suffering, our efforts, and additional Russian gains.
 
That depends on the definition of "lengthy blockade" -- more months of dwindling supplies of EVERYTHING, starvation, disease, relentless bombing, etc. will have an impact. I think 3-12 months would likely do the trick, but the exact number could certainly be debated. Without a doubt the best answer was a a few a-bombs to end their suffering, our efforts, and additional Russian gains.

We know for a fact that the Japanese planned to stockpile at least 6 months' worth of ammunition in each of the targeted invasion zones. Given that supplies were rapidly requisitioned for the defense of Kyushu it is likely that these standards would have been speedily attained (in fact, the deadline for completion of the stockpiling of operational and reserve supplies was the end of August), meaning that the Japanese could in theory be confident in their ability to fight on for nearly a year and a half given a staggered invasion.
 
We know for a fact that the Japanese planned to stockpile at least 6 months' worth of ammunition in each of the targeted invasion zones. Given that supplies were rapidly requisitioned for the defense of Kyushu it is likely that these standards would have been speedily attained (in fact, the deadline for completion of the stockpiling of operational and reserve supplies was the end of August), meaning that the Japanese could in theory be confident in their ability to fight on for nearly a year and a half given a staggered invasion.

The problem isn't necessarily supplies... well, it is, but more on that later. The entire Japanese strategy behind Ketsu-Go (and thus, the hopes of both the war and peace parties in the Japanese cabinet) is built on two assumptions:

1. That the United States has to invade.
2. That the invasion can be repelled.

If the US comes out and says "Nah, we're not going to invade, just blockade and bomb until they give up" (as it very well might have in August 45) then the first assumption is blown out of the water and the second one is rendered irrelevant.

The problem for the Japanese then becomes one of food: the country was teetering straight towards famine and the first signs of social disintegration were beginning to show up in the summer of '45. If the US announcement isn't enough of a morale blow to the Japanese leadership, then the famines and social disintegration (the latter compounded by the former) will basically render Japan unable to effectively resist in '46. It's hard for a army to fight when it has revolted against itself out of hunger.
 
The problem isn't necessarily supplies... well, it is, but more on that later. The entire Japanese strategy behind Ketsu-Go (and thus, the hopes of both the war and peace parties in the Japanese cabinet) is built on two assumptions:

1. That the United States has to invade.
2. That the invasion can be repelled.

If the US comes out and says "Nah, we're not going to invade, just blockade and bomb until they give up" (as it very well might have in August 45) then the first assumption is blown out of the water and the second one is rendered irrelevant.

The problem for the Japanese then becomes one of food: the country was teetering straight towards famine and the first signs of social disintegration were beginning to show up in the summer of '45. If the US announcement isn't enough of a morale blow to the Japanese leadership, then the famines and social disintegration (the latter compounded by the former) will basically render Japan unable to effectively resist in '46. It's hard for a army to fight when it has revolted against itself out of hunger.

It still would have taken a relative long (but indeterminate) period of time, and trying to actually starve out Japan is a far more difficult task than the isolation of a few Pacific Islands (the garrisons of which, despite being decimated by starvation and disease to the point where some were reduced to cannibalism, still fought fanatically to the end). Nor is there enough evidence to support the contention that the populace at large would have revolted; despite fears on the part of Hirohito and some members of the government over such an eventuality the threat was never really present as evidenced by the glaring lack of any resistance groups or even an organized plot against the government, indeed, the only such incident of that kind that actually did take place was an attempt to continue the war.

There is some reason to believe that this attempt (exclusively carried out by mid-level Army officers) may have been backed and orchestrated by some very senior figures within the Japanese political elite and given the chance such people would have continued to take steps to make even the possibility of a surrender impossible. In many ways, the longer the Japanese stayed in the war the more dangerous the situation became.

The Japanese might have eventually collapsed due to famine, but such a process would have taken at least a couple of years.
 
I'm not sure you can use the example of the New Guinea or Pacific Island IJA garrisons as a model for how the civilian populace of Japan would have coped with the deteriorating conditions brought about by a prolonged siege of the Home Islands. In a country-wide famine could Japan have held out, could have held together for 2 years?

Would there have been revolts or even a civil war at some point between the militarists and more pragmatic Japanese armed forces?

If the Allies (mainly USA) had decided to conduct an invasion then it seems in retrospect that the Operations Olympic and Coronet may not have been the wisest of choices as it played exactly into the Japanese militarists desire for a decisive land battle to inflict ruinous casualties on the Allies.

Perhaps a continuation of the blockade combined with some landings at more unlikely and therefore more lightly defended areas? Why hurry? Seize some more remote parts of the Home Islands and bring ashore large enough forces to defend these pockets and wait for the Japanese armed forces to counter attack. Treat the captured civilian population well and feed them abundantly. Document all these events and broadcast radio accounts and drop pictorial leaflets everywhere. Could a starving civilian population and/or militia been encouraged to revolt?

Its seems a grim but accurate assessment that barring some unlikely miracle the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the least bloodiest way to end the Pacific War.
 
Top