WI: Nazi Invasion of Norway Fails

Driftless

Donor
In keeping with the more timely mobilization notice, perhaps General Fleischer is able to return to Narvik from the field prior to the initial German attack. He would likely have fought rather than surrender the town as quickly as his subordinate, Colonel Sundlo, did.

Also, the Norge & Eidsvold open fire while the German destroyers are coming up the fjord. Any hit by the 8.2"/210mm guns of those ships does critical damage to the destroyers and the troops on board. OTL, the Germans sank both ships immediately following a parley, before they could respond. With early mobilization, that situation probably doesn't develop.
 
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A POD that results in a full or nearly full mobiliasation of the Norweigian army, with more robust orders - for example some of the Batteries did not engage parts of the Invasion fleet and even those that did were quite forgiving would very likely defeat the some what ramshakle forces conducting the sea assaults.

Had robust orders been given then mine fields would have been deployed and the batteries would have engaged to the best of their abilities - rather than being half worried about wether they were actually at war or not!

Have troops dug in around the airports and other units capable of moving towards the sound of the guns and even without British and French forces the Germans are in trouble - the initial invasion force for Oslo for example is only about 2000 troops and that befoire they start having ships shot out from underneith them.

So even a ramshackle part mobilisation would make for a significant change ?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The RN alone can not defeat the German invasion, as was demonstrated

What if the Nazi invasion of Norway failed?The reason the invasion failed could be the Royal Navy managing to stop the some or most of the invasion force and stop reinforcement and/or resupply of any German soldiers that land or the Norwegian government manages to properly prepare and with help from the British Army and Royal Navy the German invasion force is defeated.

The RN alone can not defeat the German invasion, as was demonstrated historically; the difference being the German air superiority over southern Norway, which is - to be blunt - the only part of Norway that matters strategically, in terms of population, transportation/communications/and in terms of proximity to Germany.

The campaign was lost, essentially, when the Germans seized Oslo, and the success or failure or that effort is entirely on the Germans and Norwegians; a more effective Norwegian mobilization will, of course, make a difference there.

Having said that, the problem for the Norwegians is that anything they realistically can do (absent the equivalent of the US intelligence advantage at Midway, for example) is still vulnerable to the Germans being able to concentrate their invasion forces, rather than dispersing them along almost the entire Norwegian coastline. The Norwegians, of course, can't do that ... the Germans have the initiative, the Norwegians are reactive, so the relative advantage (even setting aside the reality the Germans have been mobilized since 1939) the difference in KM seapower vs. the RNoN, the difference in LW airpower vs. Norwegian airpower, even the difference between the available German army forces (~90,000+) vs. the likely Norwegian garrison around Oslo is a huge differential.

Especially given that sunrise in southern Norway in April is usually before 0700 and sunset not until 2000, which probably gives another hour of useful twilight ... 15-16 hours of daylight is an advantage to the side with the airpower advantage, for both offensive operations, air defense, transport, and simple reconnaissance.

And (IIRC) it is worth noting that the Allies (the specialized FAA dive-bomber units flying the Skua, in fact) managed to sink one German warship during the campaign, the light cruiser Koenigsberg; the LW managed to sink three Allied warships, the light cruiser Curlew and the destroyers Bison and Afridi.

If the British, French, and Norwegians conclude an alliance with a clear chain of command, joint staff, and British and French logistics and supply for the Norwegians before the German invasion, that's one thing; but throwing together a coalition in wartime in the middle of an active campaign is pretty much a recipe for failure, as witness Norway, Greece, ABDA, and similar experiences. Worked for the Axis as well, of course; this sort of ability can't simply be made up...

Coalition warfare - and joint and combined operations involving the same coalition - is not something that can be extemporized.

The Allied were able to carry off combined and joint operations sucessfully in 1942-45 (and, for that matter, pretty much ever since) because of a tremendous amount of work, including a mature alliance system; that does not exist in 1940.

Best,
 
Like I have pointed out before, whether Finland still allies with the Germans is dependent of the Allies in 1940 signalling to Finland that the Finns have Western backing if the USSR makes another move to invade and annex the country. If such a signal is not forthcoming, the crucial decisionmakers in Finland might still consider it necessary to seek help from Germany instead. I agree that this is less likely than IOTL, but that is still a possibility.

Your points are all valid, but I think there is strong reason to believe Finland will choose to avoid the Continuation War. With Norway in Allied hands and a friendly Sweden, Finland is not completely alone and dependent on German goodwill. Helsinki is likely to let the Allies know they need additional support for them to stay out of the German orbit. The British can only do so much, but it's likely the USA will include Finland as a recipient for Lend Lease to encourage it to stay neutral.

I see Finland as an area where the world powers - Allies, Soviets, and Germany - will want to make sure is friendly, but above all kept out of the other's camp. I think every power would be willing to let the train of events dictate the final fate of Finland.

Finnish foreign policy from July 1940 to June 1941 is going to be difficult. The Finns will need to adopt a friendly neutrality to Germany - trading raw materials and providing intelligence - but not too much that it angers the British. The Finnish Army could also be useful as a "force in being" and keep some amount of Red Army tied on the Finnish border just in case the Finns attack.

Germany, I think, will be reluctant to involve the Finns too much since they are in contact with the West. If the Germans want strategic surprise, involving Finland in this scenario prior to June 22 is probably not the best thing.

Most likely after the initial German invasion, Finland demands its lost territories back with the implied threat they will re-enter the war. Stalin likely agrees. Finland might even get some of East Karelia, but this is less likely and runs a lot more risk at the time and for long term.

Finland will likely remain friendly to Germany throughout 1941 and 1942, trying to balance its options. After mid-1943 though, the Finns will definitely be orienting their foreign policy towards the Western Allies. Keeping their original borders postwar will mean keeping the Allies happy, and their entry into the war is almost assured sometime in 1944 at latest.
 
The RN alone can not defeat the German invasion, as was demonstrated historically; the difference being the German air superiority over southern Norway, which is - to be blunt - the only part of Norway that matters strategically, in terms of population, transportation/communications/and in terms of proximity to Germany.
Air superiority that sank a grand total of 5 allied ships, none heavier than a light cruiser.

And (IIRC) it is worth noting that the Allies (the specialized FAA dive-bomber units flying the Skua, in fact) managed to sink one German warship during the campaign, the light cruiser Koenigsberg; the LW managed to sink three Allied warships, the light cruiser Curlew and the destroyers Bison and Afridi.
5 actually, add in the ORP Grom to a lucky strike by a He 111, and HMS Gurkha. Really, for all their supposed 'air superiority' the Germans weren't very good at actually sinking ships.
 
Most likely after the initial German invasion, Finland demands its lost territories back with the implied threat they will re-enter the war. Stalin likely agrees. Finland might even get some of East Karelia, but this is less likely and runs a lot more risk at the time and for long term.

No.
After the fiasco of Winter War Stalin just calls it quits and gives up something that took so much effort to capture in the first place? I don't see this as a likely scenario, not at all.

Finnish political leadership will undoubtedly be tempted to do something if the Soviet Union seems to be suffering severe defeats against Germany in 1941 as per OTL, but without the German forces stationed to Lapland and the OTL extensive German military aid they'll lack the force to intervene to the war effectively even if they wanted to. Remember that part of the Moscow Peace Deal Finland officially relinquished all claims to territories ceded to the Soviet Union, so attempts to re-negotiate this deal is highly risky business for Finland. And in any case Stalin will check the bluff of Finland, since the Soviets (incorrectly) estimated that the Winter War had completely gutted the available reserves of the Finnish Army.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Air superiority that also allowed the LW to fly troops and supplies

Air superiority that sank a grand total of 5 allied ships, none heavier than a light cruiser.

5 actually, add in the ORP Grom to a lucky strike by a He 111, and HMS Gurkha. Really, for all their supposed 'air superiority' the Germans weren't very good at actually sinking ships.

Well, that's four more than the FAA got, and the RAF and French didn't get any... the point being, that's also the air superiority that also allowed the LW to fly troops and supplies into Oslo essentially unscathed, that allowed the German merchant ships to dock in Oslo (again, possession of the southeast essentially precludes the Allies from any chance of holding on to whatever enclaves they get in the center and northern part of the country), and - by the way - means that as soon as the summer offensive begins in Belgium and France, the Allies are on track to have to pull out anyway.

Of all the places in Europe in 1940 the Allies should have been spending time and resources, Norway was not it...

Best,
 
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Driftless

Donor
Of all the places in Europe in 1940 the Allies should have been spending time and resources, Norway was not it...

Best,

Ultimately, that is the truth.

From the Allied (British & French) side, fighting on land in Norway, even Denmark were going to be a diversion of resources when neither could afford that. The way it played out historically, was an ugly mix of indecisiveness, cross-purposes, chaotic planning, and duplicitiousness by leadership of both countries overwhelming the great courage and skill by the rank and file.

The Germans planned well and boldly executed their plan, and won out because of both parts, helped by some breaks that fell their way. You can certainly make a case that what good luck the Germans had was because they laid the ground work for it.

The Norwegian cabinet hung on far too long to what in hindsight can only be called the delusion that neutrality would keep the Nazi's away. With many of the cabinet being true-believer pacifists, I'm not sure how that view changes. As a result of that world view, the delayed mobilization sealed the countries fate.

I do think though, that the reason this topic keeps coming up, is in spite of those general conditions listed above; there were enough potential plausible POD's where the campaign plays out considerably different from history.

As you and others have pointed out, once the Luftwaffe & parachutists occupied the airfields at Oslo & Stavanger, that was a decisive tipping point for the campaign.

IF the general mobilization is ordered on April 5 as repeatedly requested by the Norwegian Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Hatledal; and clear , strong rules of engagement are issued, then things change....

With earlier mobilization, Perhaps the airfield seizures don't go as painlessly as they did in history. Even if the Germans successfully press home the attacks, there would be heavier losses to the parachute troops and their transports. As a result of a slower start, the initial battle develops into more of a grinding match between both sides, how does that impact the Fall Gelb timetable?

Similarly, with earlier and more clear instructions, the two old Norwegian coastal defense ships at Narvik aren't bushwhacked before engaging the German destroyers. Those destroyers were also carrying Gen Dietl and many of his mountain troops. Even a couple of secondary hits to those destroyers are going to cause casulties among the landing force. Also, with an earlier mobilization order, very likely Gen Fleischer returns to Narvik and takes control from his subordinate Col. Sundlo (found to be a Quisling supporter afterwards) Historically, Col Sundlo surrendered the town garrison without a fight. Fleischer was arguably the best field commander of the Norwegian army, so there's a decided shift in the fight. Even if the Germans do press home the initial attack on Narvik, they've lost many more of their troops in the process, and in theory should have been easier to drive out. Could the Norwegians hang onto the northern segment of the country and the iron ore port of Narvik, once the British and French pulled out in early June? By June, the Kriegsmarine is already short of surface warships for proposed use in Seelowe, so do they risk another go at Narvik?

In the end, if the Germans do capture the airfields and the main ports as they did historically, they will win the campaign, Still, with a few plausible changes, the cost is far higher.
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
Good summary...

Ultimately, that is the truth.

From the Allied (British & French) side, fighting on land in Norway, even Denmark were going to be a diversion of resources when neither could afford that. The way it played out historically, was an ugly mix of indecisiveness, cross-purposes, chaotic planning, and duplicitiousness by leadership of both countries overwhelming the great courage and skill by the rank and file.

The Germans planned well and boldly executed their plan, and won out because of both parts, helped by some breaks that fell their way. You can certainly make a case that what good luck the Germans had was because they laid the ground work for it.

The Norwegian cabinet hung on far too long to what in hindsight can only be called the delusion that neutrality would keep the Nazi's away. With many of the cabinet being true-believer pacifists, I'm not sure how that view changes. As a result of that world view, the delayed mobilization sealed the countries fate.

I do think though, that the reason this topic keeps coming up, is in spite of those general conditions listed above; there were enough potential plausible POD's where the campaign plays out considerably different from history.

As you and others have pointed out, once the Luftwaffe & parachutists occupied the airfields at Oslo & Stavanger, that was a decisive tipping point for the campaign.

IF the general mobilization is ordered on April 5 as repeatedly requested by the Norwegian Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Hatledal; and clear , strong rules of engagement are issued, then things change....

With earlier mobilization, Perhaps the airfield seizures don't go as painlessly as they did in history. Even if the Germans successfully press home the attacks, there would be heavier losses to the parachute troops and their transports. As a result of a slower start, the initial battle develops into more of a grinding match between both sides, how does that impact the Fall Gelb timetable?

Similarly, with earlier and more clear instructions, the two old Norwegian coastal defense ships at Narvik aren't bushwhacked before engaging the German destroyers. Those destroyers were also carrying the Gen Dietl and many of his mountain troops. Even a couple of secondary hits to those destroyers are going to cause casulties among the landing force. Also, with an earlier mobilization order, very likely Gen Fleischer returns to Narvik and takes control from his subordinate Col. Sundlo (found to be a Quisling supporter afterwards) Historically, Col Sundlo surrendered the town garrison without a fight. Fleischer was arguably the best field commander of the Norwegian army, so there's a decided shift in the fight. Even if the Germans do press home the initial attack on Narvik, they've lost many more of their troops in the process, and in theory should have been easier to drive out. Could the Norwegians hang onto the northern segment of the country and the iron ore port of Narvik, once the British and French pulled out? By June, the Kriegsmarine is already short of surface warships for proposed use in Seelowe, so do they risk another go at Narvik?

In the end, if the Germans do capture the airfields and the main ports as they did historically, they will win the campaign, Still, with a few plausible changes, the cost is far higher.

Good summary...

The one thing that seems to be made plain by the Allied experience in Norway is that it was the first of several painful examples of peripheral campaigns that were not well organized or planned, with results to be expected.

The problems and shortcomings in Norway were demonstrated again in Greece and in the ABDA's operations; ABDA, at least, was an attempt at a unified command, which certainly was a step in the right direction. TORCH showed the Allies were capable of joint and combined operations, and HUSKY made it clear how much better the Anglo-Americans were in 1943 than the British had been in 1940 and 1941...

Best,
 
Lots of interesting POD might have allowed the Allies to stop Germany in Norway. From there it might lead to keeping most of the surviving Kreigsmarine in the Baltic and less success of the U-Boats. I just wonder if the butterflies might have lead to stopping Germany from steamrolling France, as it was a close thing at times.
 
Without additional troops - Allied troops - Germany will win if they can capture the airfield. As Crete proved, it might be hard, but not impossible.
...
After all they are sitting in Denmark which is just a 'stone throw' away from Norway (OK, a very long throw though, but not overly).

Do bear in mind the difference in forces employed. Norway, one batallion of paras at Stavanger and one at Fornebu (who got lost and didn't make it), neither with any experience. Crete - one para division, with a full year of experience in Denmark, Norway, Netherlands etc.

If they met any organised resistance at all the first line German para / airmobile troops would have been in a huge amount of trouble very quickly. First ever combat operation, against troops on home soil, virtually no follow up, and no chance of quickly redirecting forces intended for Stavanger to Oslo and vice versa.

Denmark to Norway is 128km, versus 33km France to UK, so its not just a hop, step and jump. Without snatching an airfield at kickoff, they are never getting one, IMO.

Forcing past/over the RN, with aircraft operating from Denmark only, against allied aircraft operating from norway - seems like big ask.
 
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Currently perusing Inferno by Max Hastings; he says something I've long suspected, that if it hadn't been for the debacle in Norway, not only would this butterfly the fall of Chamberlain and rise of Churchill, but that this, in turn, would mean the British government "might very well have chosen a negotiated peace with Hitler".

Another sense I get, reading his account of the campaign, is that what really did Chamberlain in politically was his decision to withdraw British forces from Norway on April 27, and his government's subsequent poor handling of said decision (not telling the Norwegians, etc). If he doesn't make this decision (at least at said time), that might butterfly out the "Norway Debate" that proved his undoing, while Britain is still fully entangled in Norway when Hitler's armies strike west on May 10. If Chamberlain isn't on his way out at the time, he'll resolve to stay in office longer, meaning his government very well may end up signing a peace after the fall of France and fiascos at Dunkirk.

And if Norway still hasn't surrendered by then, it's fair to guess what at least one condition of the peace would be...
 
Currently perusing Inferno by Max Hastings; he says something I've long suspected, that if it hadn't been for the debacle in Norway, not only would this butterfly the fall of Chamberlain and rise of Churchill, but that this, in turn, would mean the British government "might very well have chosen a negotiated peace with Hitler".

Another sense I get, reading his account of the campaign, is that what really did Chamberlain in politically was his decision to withdraw British forces from Norway on April 27, and his government's subsequent poor handling of said decision (not telling the Norwegians, etc). If he doesn't make this decision (at least at said time), that might butterfly out the "Norway Debate" that proved his undoing, while Britain is still fully entangled in Norway when Hitler's armies strike west on May 10. If Chamberlain isn't on his way out at the time, he'll resolve to stay in office longer, meaning his government very well may end up signing a peace after the fall of France and fiascos at Dunkirk.

And if Norway still hasn't surrendered by then, it's fair to guess what at least one condition of the peace would be...

Not a expert, but my take is a accumulation of things did Chamberlain in, including his shabby handling of the Cezch crisis. He had a strong political base that gradually was eroded with each German victory. Churchhill himself & is allies were not passive in this. Churchill was not plucked from exile on a back bench to be PM. He had been steadily and sucessfully rebuilding his power base. Even with a German failure in Norway its probable the debacle in Belgium & France would have brought down Chamberlain.
 
Even with a German failure in Norway its probable the debacle in Belgium & France would have brought down Chamberlain.
But once that debacle happens, Britain is left to fight Nazi Germany alone; in that scenario, if Chamberlain is still PM but on his way out, he's in a position to make sure Britain does not prolong the war he so hates. Maybe that mean he clings a few weeks longer to agree to an armistice, maybe he forcefully demands Halifax succeeds him, or maybe something else.
 
Well of course he does, Norway was Churchill's baby, France less so since he had only a limited role there until the Germans actually invaded.
 
Well, that's four more than the FAA got, and the RAF and French didn't get any...

But the Allies didn't need to sink ships by air attack to stop the invasion. They could, if they had warning and wanted to, deploy overwhelming naval strength.

In which case, for the German invasion to come off, the Germans have to sink lots of Allied ships by air attack. And that they could not do in 1940; they didn't know how. The Luftwaffe didn't develop effective anti-ship ability until early 1941. I'm not saying they couldn't do any damage, but they couldn't do enough to overcome the immense disparity in naval forces.

Of course, I'm talking about the invasion, not the subsequent campaign. The invasion succeeded completely, giving the Germans control of all major cities and ports in Norway; also airfields. The Allies couldn't make an effective counter-invasion after that.
 

Ian_W

Banned
But once that debacle happens, Britain is left to fight Nazi Germany alone; in that scenario, if Chamberlain is still PM but on his way out, he's in a position to make sure Britain does not prolong the war he so hates. Maybe that mean he clings a few weeks longer to agree to an armistice, maybe he forcefully demands Halifax succeeds him, or maybe something else.

Chamberlain hates it, but he is also intending to win it.

He hates war but loves western civilisation more.

In any case, the Wallies holding Narvik alone, and resupplying it by destroyers at night, is enough to do a lot in 1940-42.
 
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