Germany either World War lacked the surface navy and ships, especially troop ships, to invade England although they did manage Norway and Finland. If they had built a sizable surface Navy in the 1930's, they wouldn't have had the steel to build an army sufficient for it's far more important European campaigns so Austria and the Sudatenland yes, Poland probably not and France certainly not for invasion.
Sending troops in a passenger liner for a nucleus would be feasible, like the attack in Danzig and in Norway but only once and at the very start of hostilities, at best a few thousand infantry with perhaps artillery, tanks, and trucks arriving on coordinated freighters. Seizing the Panama Canal would be the most possible for such a stroke, sized force, and ability to get shipping there. The U.S. had a sizable surface navy and far more commercial and passenger shipping to utilize in response although it would have taken months to even get Marines down there in response during which time the Canal's equipment could have been thoroughly wrecked (as a suicide mission and one that would only help the Japanese Navy by slowing U.S. naval reinforcement of the Pacific fleet-big deal in 1942 though.)
There was an alt history novel with a German Panzer expeditionary force sent by cargo ships into Northern Mexico and then striking across the border presumably to disrupt the oil fields in West Texas or copper mines in Arizona (low yield for throwing away precious tanks and tank crews, they were always critically short of these.) The novel had Apaches, Hopi, local ranchers etc. responding in a replay of cavalry vs. Apaches that was an entertaining novel.
The most likely way to beat the logistics and sea lift requirements would be taking the German American Bund movement to actively organizing guerrillas and full military units to seize or disrupt key areas like Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Cincinnatti, Texas, etc. with quite large German-American populations (there's actually more Americans of German descent than British Isles, around 28 million currently, and in the 1930's many were only a generation or two emigrated.) So putting together a German-American "army" the size of the regular Army of 300,000 or so men scattered at small posts in the U.S., Pacific, etc. and armed primarily with bolt-action Springfield or Enfield rifles, WWI machine guns, a few hundred trucks and tanks, fewer still modern artillery pieces, and few aircraft would be more "doable" than it initially sounds. A few cargo ships with light and heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft 88's, some half-tracks and light tanks to obsolete for France, lots of grenades and mortars, and they'd have a competitive force for the 1930's-1940 Army. Fighting many small battles across the Midwest would certainly disrupt America's ability and interest in supplying the British, Russians, and Chinese forces but that'd take a lot of foresight to realize how crippled Stalin would be without U.S. massive aid or that the U.S. would and could build enough cargo ships quickly enough to outpace U-Boat sinkings and sustain the British Isles. Assuming, somehow, the fighting went on from 1940-1943 in the U.S. that might tip the balance for Russia being forced to the peace table with Germany and perhaps Britain starved into submission or losing Egypt and the Suez Canal without U.S. armor and artillery supplementing the British forces in Egypt. It'd also give probably a 1-2 year breathing space for Japan to repair and utilize the Dutch East Indies' oilfields, Malaya's rubber, and Indochina's mines into their supply chains while not attacking Pearl Harbor or the Phillipines and leaving the U.S. out of it in the Pacific. Generally that kind of long term warfare in the U.S. would require a supplying government providing arms, funds, training, intelligence, etc. and it's a long ways from Germany or Argentina for that matter and that'd take significant changes in Mexico in the late 1930's-40's to be supportive.