WI Nasser dies in '65, who is his successor, and what are their policies?

raharris1973

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If Nasser died of sudden natural or accidental causes (not a coup or assassination) around the end of 1965, who would have been his most likely successor, Sadat or somebody else?

Would his successor have blockaded the Straits of Tiran and expelled UNEF (key elements of theMay '67 Mideast crisis in OTL) during the 1960s?

Why or why not?
 
Prime Minister Zakaria Mohieddin (Mohi-al-Din) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zakaria_Mohieddin was often spoken of as Nasser's likely successor at the time; indeed, Nasser would later name his as his successor at the time of his short-lived "resignation" in 1967. But Mohieddin was considered the most pro-Western of the leading officlals around Nasser, and this might have caused him some trouble--as indeed it did in 1967. ("As in 1956, many of Nasser's left-wing opponents now rallied behind him. The anti-imperialist slogans on the demonstrations were also a warning to Nasser's designated successor, Zakaria Mohi-al-Din, seen by many in Egypt as the most pro-American member of the government." https://books.google.com/books?id=RbCBUzeq4ScC&pg=RA1-PA142 But of course in 1967 hard-core Nasserites and leftists had Nasser himself to rally to in opposition to Mohieddin; it is not clear to me who they would coalesce behind in the event of Nasser's death in 1965.)

Indeed, late 1965 looks like the ideal time for Mohiedden: in OTL he was at the height of his powers then. "After the muddled socialism of Ali Sabri led to economic chaos while the drift towards Russia had alienated potential Western donors, Mohieddin was appointed Prime Minister in September 1965. He called for sacrifices and rejuvenation of the economy; he purged the bureaucracy, raised taxes and prices, cut subsidies, encouraged private investment and stopped the move towards socialism. He negotiated with the oil companies and the formerly despised Gulf Rulers, obtained a preliminary deal with the US by which Egypt secured cheap grain and advocated devaluation at the behest of the IMF. He rejected numerous pleas to commute the death sentence onthe Muslim Brother leader Saiyidd Qutb and introduced the death penalty for drug trafficking. Putting Egyptian interests above Arab nationalism, Mohieddin realised that the Yemen War was the cause of both economic trouble and Western and conservative Arab hostility; even before coming to office he had persuaded Nasser to sign the Jiddah Agreement with King Faysal. His efforts to end the Yemen War infuriated Field Marshal Amer who joined Moheiddin's left-wing enemies and in September 1966 he was dismissed from the Premiership although he remained Vice President..." Robin Bidwell, *Dictionary of Modern Arab History,*, p. 276. https://books.google.com/books?id=3CstBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA276 If Mohieddin was already somewhat in eclipse by late 1966, why did Nasser briefly name him his successor in 1967? Basically, it was because Nasser in a moment of dejection over the outcome of the war said, "Zacharia Mohieddin always wanted to compromise with America...If it now has come to that, he had better take over from me. He has my blessing." https://books.google.com/books?id=piC6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PT281 If Nasser really felt that way, he soon changed his mind.)

Alternatives to Mohieddin and Sadat would be Ali Sabri--but he may have been seen as too left-wing--and Abdel Hakim Amer. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdel_Hakim_Amer Amer was later to be disgraced by his failure in the Six Day War, but as of 1965 he was considered very close to Nasser.

Sadat as president adopted many of the policies of Mohieddin but considered him a potential rival and kept him under surveillance. Mohieddin for his part opposed Sadat's opening to Israel, but that may just have been bitterness over Sadat having ascended to the office that once seemed within Mohiedden's grasp...

It is certainly plausible that *if* Zakaria Mohieddin had come to power in late 1965 and *if* he was able to consolidate it, he could have avoided the Six Day War, and perhaps set Egypt on a pro-Western course well before Sadat did in OTL. But those are big "ifs."
 

raharris1973

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It is certainly plausible that *if* Zakaria Mohieddin had come to power in late 1965 and *if* he was able to consolidate it, he could have avoided the Six Day War, and perhaps set Egypt on a pro-Western course well before Sadat did in OTL. But those are big "ifs."

Going with Mohieddin from '65, I suppose despite escalating Syrian-Israeli air and artillery duels, and despite Israeli Fatah raids on camps in Jordan, Egypt can avoid escalation, alliances with Syria and Jordan and leave UNEF in place indefinitely. While UNEF's presence in the Sinai and Gaza can be taken as an affront to Egyptian sovereignty, some UN forces, like in Cyprus, have been tolerated for decades on end.

Mohieddin may wind down the Yemen war faster and reconcile with Saudi Arabia. Even as figures in the regime and public voice dissatisfaction with Mohieddin's non-militant, moderately pro-western (though he will probably still do some arms buys or upgrades from the USSR) and moderately pro-market policies, he could carry them out for years.

By the end of the 1960s, it is probably an open secret that Israel has nuclear weapons capability (there is some speculation that the Israelis could have exploded at least an atomic device as early as spring/summer 1967, and that Shimon Peres proposed doing so). That factor could be employed in internal Egyptian debates to argue against conventional military confrontation with Israel.

Mohieddin's rule like Sadat's could involve some loosening of domestic political controls, so perhaps a resurgence of Muslim Brotherhood activism, a renewed crackdown, and then an assassination of Mohieddin could happen any time from the late 60s through 70s. Even so, I don't think that a successful assassination would lead to MB power any more than Sadat's did. A successor would come from within the regime, even if the regime does some accommodation to conservative Islam in cultural areas or subsidies for Al-Azhar.

A knock on consequences of an early Nasser death might be a lack of a coup against the Libyan monarchy, so no Gadhafi. Of course the *example* of Nasserism and anti-monarchical coups still existed, so maybe Gadhafi could still take over.

....What would you see happening if Field Marshal Amer took over instead?

Or Ali Sabri?

...and Sadat is still too low on the totem pole?
 
....What would you see happening if Field Marshal Amer took over instead?

Or Ali Sabri?

...and Sadat is still too low on the totem pole?


Sabri was considered the most pro-Soviet and socialist of Nasser's possible successors, Amer was less radical, but was incompetent--this should have been obvious even before the Six Day War from his performance in Yemen. Given that both men (and of course Mohieddein as well) had their enemies, I think Sadat as a compromise choice is a possibility even at that point.
 

raharris1973

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didn't Amer propose striking first against Israel in the May Crisis? With him in charge might the crisis happen, with Egypt striking first, and being able to engage its Air Force at least?
 
didn't Amer propose striking first against Israel in the May Crisis? With him in charge might the crisis happen, with Egypt striking first, and being able to engage its Air Force at least?

Amer seems initially to have favored a first strike, but later to have come around to Nasser's position:

"...Heikal claims that Nasser rejected the first-strike option, because he thought it would give the United States and Israel the pretext they were looking for. International opinion would be alienated, the Soviets might withdraw their support, and the United States could enter the war on Israel's side. When Nasser met with the military commanders on June 2, he told the air force commander that Egypt had to wait for Israel to attack:

"Sidqi just said 'Sir,' he said it in English, 'it will be crippling to me'. Abdel Hakim Amer looked at Sidqi and said, 'Sidqi, do you accept the first attack or do you want to fight the United States?'"[119]

It seems, therefore, that Amer had by this time accepted the political parameters within which Nasser was working, especially as regards his image of the United States. Badran also says that he tried to persuade Amer to allow a small first strike in order to provoke a war, but Amer unwillingly refused because of Nasser's wishes. [120]" http://www.mafhoum.com/press8/244P541.htm

It is possible that if not for Nasser, Amer would have struck first (despite Soviet as well as American urgings not to do so) but Israel IMO would still have won--Egypt would not even have the advantage of surprise it did in the Yom Kippur War.
 

raharris1973

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Amer seems initially to have favored a first strike, but later to have come around to Nasser's position:

It is possible that if not for Nasser, Amer would have struck first (despite Soviet as well as American urgings not to do so) but Israel IMO would still have won--Egypt would not even have the advantage of surprise it did in the Yom Kippur War.

I'll accept Israel winning even with an Egyptian first strike.

How soon could/would the Jordanians or Syrians strike after an initial Egyptian strike? Might Israel both counterattack Egypt *and* preempt/first-strike the Jordanians and Syrians?

What's the overall military effect if Egypt strikes first and gets its planes off the ground at least one, but Israel still wins? Is it as minor as just turning the 6 day war into the "7 day war", or as major as creating a lengthy struggle like the War for Independence?
 
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