France set up one or two sister republic(s) in Egypt and Levant. I imagine that their survival will depend on the continued presence of a French army in the short term, and after that the conscription of local men into a army. The problem is that there lack a local group with similar values to the French Republicans which the French can turn power over to as local collaborators at least in Egypt, so the French have to set themself up as a local elite and indoctrinate the local population into proper republican values.

Considering how the Egyptian sister republics would be backed up only by the power of the French army, I don't think they would have to teach republican values to the native population. Military juntas don't tend to be democratic, is what I'm getting at. If Murad Bey, the Mamluk co-leader of Egypt, doesn't die of plague the instant he was about to turn to France's side, then he could serve as the "local collaborator". Just as how the Ottomans left the Mamluks in power when they conquered Egypt, France could do the same.
 
In terms of Egypt it was to be governed by governors and the first was Jean-Baptiste Kléber. His rule would have been interesting. It was to be ruled as a colony from the French Republic/Empire. It would have been designated the “French Colony of Egypt and Syria”.

This is where it gets interesting. One of the goals the memorandum set out by the French Republic was to cut the Isthmus of Suez by building a canal and Kléber would set this in motion during his tenure.

The colony would obviously be used as a staging ground in travelling to India. One of the jobs Kléber would have is to begin building transport ships along the Red Sea so they would not need to rely on a third party.

Grant also said the travelling of French soldiers, military aids and equipment would accumulate in aiding native Indian states and the Maratha confederacy against the British. As I recollect the British crushed and annexed a large part of their territory around 1804. Finally Grant says with Napoleon becoming Emperor and French power in the Near East and projecting that into India the French annex a large part Indian territory designated “French Hindustan” in 1809.
 
No, you have prove me otherwise. You just cannot quote a battle. A large part of French preparations will be on stringing the fleet together but victory also depends on the French Vice-Admiral tactics used in battle and how he would repulse the British. It would require strategic and tactical naval master class. Something I believe Bruix and Treville had a chance to accomplish. Fighting the French is a bit different to fighting the Danish.
Exactly, The Danes were in a superior position and both better trained and motivated. And still lost.
The approaches to The Sound are far worse than Aboukir Bay, the Land Fortifications are vastly superior than anything the French could have constructed. The Danes had time and resources to prepare and used them effectively, warships were stripped down into interconnected blockships, covered by shore batteries. And could easily replace stores and personnel from Copenhagen, which happened during the battle, there were instances where the British took violent offence to the Danes still doing this after they had supposedly surrendered.
There was a fully rigged reserve force in the Inner Harbour, that could have sortied, but took no part in the Battle.
(Possibly someone saw no advantage in either reinforcing failure or giving the Royal Navy more targets and potential prizes).

Copenhagen was a far harder battle. And probably far harder than Aboukir Bay could possibly be, being inherently a better more heavily supported position.
 
Before we get into talking about the strategy and tactics in the Battle of the Nile we need to assess the similarities and differences in hindsight of both battles. I then give answers of what I agree with and disagree in your response (concentrate on my disagreement) and I analyse a paragraph I came across on my research travels.

The differences:

The first difference: A large part of the Danish fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen was apparently not in good condition and only Siælland and Holsteen were in good condition. Also, the age of the Danish ships must be considered. In the battle of the Nile the French did have some old ships but a majority of them had been built relatively recently and they were all in good condition. They were therefore looked after and not neglected or repaired after the battle.

The second difference: The geographical shape of the land in relation to the sea is completely different. The clear difference is Aboukir Bay gives ‘cover’ in how the land arches inward toward the sea and thus creates a curved bay as it moves down. Copenhagen, on the other hand, is clean-cut and open, with the Danish fleet in front of it. The French did not take full advantage of this arch and the Bay, where they were supposed to string the ships of line together using metal cords.

The third difference: Despite the Danish having more batteries, the French did not strategically and tactically use the potential that the shore batteries at Aboukir Point and Aboukir Island held and how they could have influenced the Battle of the Nile.

The similarities:

The first similarity: The British had a similar amount and type of ships of the line in both battles, Third Rate ships of the line which gave a certain amount of firepower but also a certain degree of manoeuvrability than Second and First Rate ships of Line.

The second similarity: In both battles, there are shoals within the geographical proximity. The fourth difference: However it’s the placement of these shoals which affects the battles differently. With the French it was to their left and behind them, whereas with the Danish it was to the left and their right. This created a bottleneck by which British funnelled their ships of the line up and where the battle took place between the Danish and British.

The third similarity: Olfert Fischer and François-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers have very similar naval careers. They both rose through the ranks but Fischer and was born to Danish admiral, whereas D'Aigalliers was from an aristocratic family.

I see more vital differences than similarities

What I agree with and disagree with your response:

Agree with:
  • Danish were both better trained and motivated
  • The approaches to The Sound are far worse than Aboukir Bay
  • Land Fortifications are vastly superior to anything the French could have constructed.
Kind of disagree with: “Danes were in a superior position”
  • Agree with: “Danes were in a superior position” - They were in a superior position only in relation to the unlimited manpower, resources and the dangerous approach that the Sound provided when approaching Copenhagen. I would say that the shoals provided an advantage because the British had to play the bottleneck strategy of funnelling the ships between the shoals to fight the Danish.
  • Disagree with: “Danes were in a superior position” – The geographical shape of Aboukir Bay in relation to Copenhagen’s shape offered more strategic and tactical opportunities. In that I mean the shape offers a lot more exploitation and this should have played a central role in the French strategy to defeat Nelson’s strategy. Aboukir Bay is curved but Copenhagen is flat. (See images below)
In my research I found this paragraph on a website:

“The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor, in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible, the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.”
  • Definition of ‘Despondent’: in low spirits from loss of hope or courage.
  • Definition of ‘Inertia’: a tendency to do nothing or to remain unchanged.
“Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was known that their range did not cover the head of the French line.” This is relating to the fact that the head of the French fleet line did not align with Aboukir point to be within the batteries firing range. These batteries would have given the front of the Fleet covering fire upon the British approach to the French Fleet. The British penetrated the French line mainly at the front; this would have prevented this from happening because the British would have been under fire from Aboukir point and Island. One would presume Nelson would have to change his plan and penetrate the rear of the French Fleet.

“The frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely warning were at anchor in the bay.” (This relates to the 4 fifth rates ships of the line unable to participate in the battle because they were in anchorage behind the lined French ships.)

“Numerous water parties were on shore and with them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables from one vessel to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had been vaguely planned.” (It had been ‘vaguely planned’ had it, what an incompetent idiot, you don’t have to be intelligent to know, its common sense. It’s logic.)

“At a hurried council it was proposed to put to sea, but this was given up for the sufficient reason that there was no time.” (You don’t say, if you had made the decision quicker you would have got to Alexandria Bay, yet you decided to squabble in indecision. Better yet if you had any intelligence you would have put in motion the correct strategy and tactics to defeat Nelson but no you suffered from despondent inertia.)

“The French were cleared for action only on the out-board side. Their admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a fear reasonable enough if his ships had been sailing before the wind at sea; but at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective and the wind blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van would be far more dangerous, since support could less easily be brought up from the rear.” (Your inability to align your fleet with the batteries would have concentrated your thoughts of strategy and tactics on the rear of your fleet since you would have secured the front of the French fleet. You should have used the manoeuvrability of the 4 fifth rates at the rear in order to prevent British penetration of the line.

When given command of the fleet Bruix would probably be given a list of rear-admirals, captains and second in commands that is on offer within the Navy. I like Étienne Eustache Bruix and Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville so much, I have decided that with the possible link that Tréville possibly taught Bruix. Bruix becomes Vice-Admiral instead of naval minister. He is given Command the French Mediterranean Fleet instead of François-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers. Bruix then contacts Tréville to be one of his Rear-Admirals. Even more interestingly Jean Jacques Étienne Lucas was second in command of Le Formidable under the command of Bruix in 1799. Lucas was also in command of a Frigate before this. Lucas fits in line with Bruix’s idea of young and talented officers. I would say he should remain in second in command of a frigate within the fleet. But when the battle is imminent he would best serve in command of Aboukir Point and Aboukir Island batteries.

Altered French Mediterranean Fleet at the Battle of the Nile:
  • Guerrier (Third rate), 74 - Captain Jean-François-Timothée Trullet
  • Conquérant (Third rate), 74 - Captain Etienne Dalbarade
  • Spartiate (Third rate), 74 - Captain Maurice-Julien Emeriau
  • Aquilon (Third rate), 74 - Captain Antoine René Thévenard
  • Peuple Souverain (Third rate), 74 - Captain Pierre-Paul Raccord
  • Franklin (Third rate), 80 - Contre-amiral Armand Blanquet, Captain Maurice Gillet
  • Orient (First rate), 120 - Vice-amiral Étienne Eustache Bruix, Contre-amiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve, Captain Luc-Julien-Joseph Casabianca
  • Tonnant (Third rate), 80 - Commodore Aristide Aubert Du Petit Thouars
  • Heureux (Third rate), 74 - Captain Jean-Pierre Etienne
  • Mercure (Third rate), 74 - Lieutenant Cambon
  • Guillaume Tell (Third rate), 80 - Contre-amiral Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville, Captain Saulnier
  • Généreux (Third rate), 74 - Captain Louis-Jean-Nicolas Lejoille
  • Timoléon (Third rate), 74 - Captain Louis-Léonce Trullet
  • Sérieuse (Fifth rate), 36 - Captain Claude-Jean Martin
  • Artémise (Fifth rate), 36 - Captain Pierre-Jean Standelet
  • Justice (Fifth rate), 40 - Captain Villeneuve
  • Diane (Fifth rate) 40 - Contre-amiral Denis Decrès, Captain Éléonore-Jean-Nicolas Soleil
Summary of the British and French Fleet’s at the Battle of the Nile:

The British had 13 Third Rate ships of the line, 1 Fourth Fate ship of the line and 1 Sloop-of-War.

In comparison, the French had 1 First Rate ship of the line, 11 Third Rate ships of the line and 4 Fifth Rate ships of the line

https://marinesol.org/the-naval-battle-of-abukir/ - This website shows how the battle of the Nile progressed by using a gif image

Battle of Copenhagen

Battle of Copehagen.jpg
 
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Exactly, The Danes were in a superior position and both better trained and motivated. And still lost.
The approaches to The Sound are far worse than Aboukir Bay, the Land Fortifications are vastly superior than anything the French could have constructed. The Danes had time and resources to prepare and used them effectively, warships were stripped down into interconnected blockships, covered by shore batteries. And could easily replace stores and personnel from Copenhagen, which happened during the battle, there were instances where the British took violent offence to the Danes still doing this after they had supposedly surrendered.
There was a fully rigged reserve force in the Inner Harbour, that could have sortied, but took no part in the Battle.
(Possibly someone saw no advantage in either reinforcing failure or giving the Royal Navy more targets and potential prizes).

Copenhagen was a far harder battle. And probably far harder than Aboukir Bay could possibly be, being inherently a better more heavily supported position.

While true, this is not even important to the main subject: even if the French fleet is not destroyed in a specific battle, Napoleon is still stuck in Egypt, the Brtish-Russian alliance still have a naval advantage, and the French fleet is in a lousy shape, especially as far as the gunnery is involved (and still stuck to the old tactics), and the planned goal of reaching India is still a pure lunacy including project of building a Suez Canal or even a dual port. Communications with France are still a matter of luck and can not be relied upon and the Directorate can not sent significant reinforcements or needed supplies because the French armies in Italy are destroyed with a loss of the whole Peninsula and priorities are shifting. Broad cooperation of the natives can not be expected and a serious buildup of the occupation force by local recruitment is not to be expected. At best, the French could take a part of Syria but this does not add to their stability or to a change to go to India. So Nappy pretty much lost at the moment he sailed.
 
Now, this is a true map of the battle of the Nile. There is a lot going on though and it is difficult to read. https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~240556~5512287:Chart-of-the-coast-of-Egypt?sort=Pub_List_No_InitialSort,Pub_Date,Pub_List_No,Series_No&qvq=q:battle of the nile;sortub_List_No_InitialSort,Pub_Date,Pub_List_No,Series_No;lc:RUMSEY~8~1&mi=0&trs=4#

In the bottom right-hand corner, you have the position in which the French fleet was in when Napoleon took his army to shore using 260 transport ships at the Bay of Abouk Sham.

Then we have three separate maps of the Battle of the Nile on the left. (Notice how this map views the reader: Egypt is in front of you with the Mediterranean sea behind you, whereas the other maps I have used. Egypt is behind you, with the battle in front of you.)

To clarify there are two designated keys: everything in numbers are French ships and everything in letters are British Ships

All the images below represent the battle differently.

Wide battle image in the centre: Now this is very confusing. The numbers designate the travel of French ships after the defeat by Nelson by which most of them were destroyed because of the damage they suffered. I am sure that is it. If I am wrong I will correct myself. What is interesting about this image is that it states that there were "2 mortars and 6 Brafs cannons" placed on Abou-kir Island. The ships are represented by small black rectangular dots.

Bay of Abou-kir image : This image shows the British Ships direction of travel in attacking the French ships which are designated by lines. This image also adds more detail and representation regarding Abou-kir Point, Island and the shoals in relation to the battle. Notice number 18 "Briggs, gun boats etc." Placing them there would not do anything just render them useless. Should have been placed around Aboukir Island, which is a more forward commanding position.

I have no idea what "16f", "18f" and "20f" mean! I have checked all the keys and cannot find anything. It is just above number 18 of "Briggs, gun boats etc." It may have something to do with search parties which were sent ashore but that is a wild guess.

Bottom left-hand image: The image gives the final placement of British and French ships and the damage caused to them.

Given this information, I can now begin to think about strategy and tactics.

Just to put a face to a name. This is Étienne Eustache Bruix:

800px-Amiral_bruix.jpg


And this is Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville:

Louis-René-Madeleine_Levassor_de_La_Touche-Tréville.jpg
 
Could somebody write a timeline?

I will when I have time because it would be mega awesome. This scenario also connects to another scenario I investigated about a ‘Greater Iran’ and how Napoleon could have modernised it upon his conquest by taking the Emperor’s son to France and indoctrinated him into a French university.

The fruit of Napoleon’s conquest will be enormous if he conquers Egypt and Syria because it had so many opportunities. Egypt had a population of 3-4 million and Syria was densely populated and both of these areas fall within the ‘Fertile Crescent’. (See map)

If Napoleon can stop having the desire to wage war or French Egypt and Syria contributes to him winning the war in Europe which enable him to stop waging wars. Then French Egypt and Syria could make France the most populated, industrial/economic country on the planet and we have not even sold French Louisiana. (1804) This would require Franziation, forget about French Algeria for the moment. If Napoleon can participate in a mass migration of French people to the Nile you could have 93 million French people on the Nile and across the Fertile Crescent. Talking about falling in love with this Napoleonic empire.

7597AB20-FE23-408C-BBF7-D510EB86BF1C.png


C24E54AA-EE09-4625-A065-54B4D5FD98C8.png


(The conquest will also strangle Britain’s economic war against France. They gained 1.5 million in trade to India, so they lose that.)

I know this is a bit of strange topic to talk about now but I had a lecture at university once about ‘poisoning’ and we got talking about Napoleon’s arsenic poisoning in 1820. I said to the lecturer that I once read that Napoleon may have died because he had too much sexual intercourse. To my shock, he agreed and gave me a reason why that was correct. The lecturer was a scientist in biology.

Now if this is correct the intrigue is mind-boggling. Josephine became barren in 1795 through being accused of aristocratic lineage and was put in prison where she thought that she going to be guillotined. After Napoleon and Josephine got married she almost immediately began cheating on him during his Italian campaign. Skip forward to the Egyptian campaign rumours of his wife’s cheating is rife among the soldiers and officers. This all came to a head when a soldier told Napoleon.

Apparently, Napoleon murdered him in rage. After this Napoleon was never the same towards Josephine. Upon his return to Paris, he locked himself into a room with Josephine begging him to open the door. She never cheated again but Napoleon now began to cheat on her. If Josephine does not get imprisoned and has children with Napoleon for which he is utterly besotted and loyal to her only, Napoleon does not die in 1820 because he would not have had as much sexual intercourse as would have done.

Strange I know.
 
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If you were to write a timeline in which the admirals at Aboukir Bay are changed to the two you mentionned, leading to a french naval victory (and the deah of careless-with-his-life Nelson?), and subsequent impacts on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, as well as an early French-influenced Middle East, I would read the hell out of it. :)

I had always wondered what would have happened if the French upped their naval game during the Napoleonic wars. Not in the sense that they would destroy the whole Royal navy and invade Great-Britain peacemeal, but more in the sense that they would have the strength to contest some theaters. Namely the Meditteranean and the Indian Ocean, maybe the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico (with a successful restored colony of Louisiana. The army sent to Haïti being re-routed to the Mississippi instead of dying of yellow fever, after a deal with Louverture is found).
 
they would have the strength to contest some theaters. Namely the Meditteranean and the Indian Ocean

On that note, why don't we talk about one of the reasons Napoleon invaded Egypt: to contest British control over India. If the French had won a victory at Aboukir Bay, could they use their remaining naval power to disrupt commerce between the UK and one of it's most vital colonies? Perhaps more importantly, could Napoleon succeed in helping out his political ally, the Tiger of Mysore? This isn't even mentioning the planned Russo-French project to invade British India.
 
On that note, why don't we talk about one of the reasons Napoleon invaded Egypt: to contest British control over India. If the French had won a victory at Aboukir Bay, could they use their remaining naval power to disrupt commerce between the UK and one of it's most vital colonies? Perhaps more importantly, could Napoleon succeed in helping out his political ally, the Tiger of Mysore? This isn't even mentioning the planned Russo-French project to invade British India.

The obvious reply to the 1st question is: they could not. The British trade routes with India had been around Africa (red lines on the map) and Egypt was on a wrong side of the Med to be relevant. The whole project was based on a number of the fantastic ideas regarding a possibility to dig a canal (in OTL it took 10 years and more than 1M workers) or to build a brand new navy on the Red Sea.

What’s worse, France did not have enough of experienced naval cadres even for the fleet it did have. It was not just “let’s change admiral X to admiral Y and all problems are solved”. A victory at Aboukir was theoretically possible (if we ignore the fact that French naval gunnery was really bad: they preserved the pre-revolutionary system of firing at the rigging but did not preserve specialists capable to hit the rigging; or the fact that their commanders stuck to the old linear tactics and could not maneuver during the battle allowing Nelson to concentrate fire without a risk to be counter attacked, etc.) but it would change little in the terms of a general naval power and would not allow them either to cut the British routes to India or to get to India by land. So the answer to your second question is also “no”.

As for the Russian-French project, this was one more fantasy of the people who had no clue (and, to be fair, could not have it because mapping of the region was an issue of a distant future. Paul I told the Cossack leader that he does not have maps and all necessary knowledge should be obtained along the route. Force of 20,000 Cossacks marched Eastward without adequate supplies and any coherent idea regarding the route, plan of actions, etc. Plan of the joined operations was not much better: the route in Europe was clear but after landing on Iranian coast of the Caspian Sea it was just “fifty days march” to India with no anticipated problems on the way. Funny enough, the French troops were supposed to be led by Massena about whom Napoleon himself wrote that he never had a plan of a military campaign.

upload_2019-7-31_22-10-45.jpeg
 
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