Before we get into talking about the strategy and tactics in the Battle of the Nile we need to assess the similarities and differences in hindsight of both battles. I then give answers of what I agree with and disagree in your response (concentrate on my disagreement) and I analyse a paragraph I came across on my research travels.
The differences:
The first difference: A large part of the Danish fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen was apparently not in good condition and only Siælland and Holsteen were in good condition. Also, the age of the Danish ships must be considered. In the battle of the Nile the French did have some old ships but a majority of them had been built relatively recently and they were all in good condition. They were therefore looked after and not neglected or repaired after the battle.
The second difference: The geographical shape of the land in relation to the sea is completely different. The clear difference is Aboukir Bay gives ‘cover’ in how the land arches inward toward the sea and thus creates a curved bay as it moves down. Copenhagen, on the other hand, is clean-cut and open, with the Danish fleet in front of it. The French did not take full advantage of this arch and the Bay, where they were supposed to string the ships of line together using metal cords.
The third difference: Despite the Danish having more batteries, the French did not strategically and tactically use the potential that the shore batteries at Aboukir Point and Aboukir Island held and how they could have influenced the Battle of the Nile.
The similarities:
The first similarity: The British had a similar amount and type of ships of the line in both battles, Third Rate ships of the line which gave a certain amount of firepower but also a certain degree of manoeuvrability than Second and First Rate ships of Line.
The second similarity: In both battles, there are shoals within the geographical proximity.
The fourth difference: However it’s the placement of these shoals which affects the battles differently. With the French it was to their left and behind them, whereas with the Danish it was to the left and their right. This created a bottleneck by which British funnelled their ships of the line up and where the battle took place between the Danish and British.
The third similarity: Olfert Fischer and François-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers have very similar naval careers. They both rose through the ranks but Fischer and was born to Danish admiral, whereas D'Aigalliers was from an aristocratic family.
I see more vital differences than similarities
What I agree with and disagree with your response:
Agree with:
- Danish were both better trained and motivated
- The approaches to The Sound are far worse than Aboukir Bay
- Land Fortifications are vastly superior to anything the French could have constructed.
Kind of disagree with: “Danes were in a superior position”
- Agree with: “Danes were in a superior position” - They were in a superior position only in relation to the unlimited manpower, resources and the dangerous approach that the Sound provided when approaching Copenhagen. I would say that the shoals provided an advantage because the British had to play the bottleneck strategy of funnelling the ships between the shoals to fight the Danish.
- Disagree with: “Danes were in a superior position” – The geographical shape of Aboukir Bay in relation to Copenhagen’s shape offered more strategic and tactical opportunities. In that I mean the shape offers a lot more exploitation and this should have played a central role in the French strategy to defeat Nelson’s strategy. Aboukir Bay is curved but Copenhagen is flat. (See images below)
In my research I found this paragraph on a website:
“The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the
repeated letters from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor, in spite of
repeated soundings which showed this course possible, the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of
despondent inertia still lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.”
- Definition of ‘Despondent’: in low spirits from loss of hope or courage.
- Definition of ‘Inertia’: a tendency to do nothing or to remain unchanged.
“Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was known that their range did not cover the head of the French line.”
This is relating to the fact that the head of the French fleet line did not align with Aboukir point to be within the batteries firing range. These batteries would have given the front of the Fleet covering fire upon the British approach to the French Fleet. The British penetrated the French line mainly at the front; this would have prevented this from happening because the British would have been under fire from Aboukir point and Island. One would presume Nelson would have to change his plan and penetrate the rear of the French Fleet.
“The frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely warning were at anchor in the bay.”
(This relates to the 4 fifth rates ships of the line unable to participate in the battle because they were in anchorage behind the lined French ships.)
“Numerous water parties were on shore and with them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables from one vessel to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had been vaguely planned.”
(It had been ‘vaguely planned’ had it, what an incompetent idiot, you don’t have to be intelligent to know, its common sense. It’s logic.)
“At a hurried council it was proposed to put to sea, but this was given up for the sufficient reason that there was no time.”
(You don’t say, if you had made the decision quicker you would have got to Alexandria Bay, yet you decided to squabble in indecision. Better yet if you had any intelligence you would have put in motion the correct strategy and tactics to defeat Nelson but no you suffered from ‘despondent inertia’.)
“The French were cleared for action only on the out-board side. Their admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a fear reasonable enough if his ships had been sailing before the wind at sea; but at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective and the wind blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van would be far more dangerous, since support could less easily be brought up from the rear.”
(Your inability to align your fleet with the batteries would have concentrated your thoughts of strategy and tactics on the rear of your fleet since you would have secured the front of the French fleet. You should have used the manoeuvrability of the 4 fifth rates at the rear in order to prevent British penetration of the line.
When given command of the fleet Bruix would probably be given a list of rear-admirals, captains and second in commands that is on offer within the Navy. I like Étienne Eustache Bruix and Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville so much, I have decided that with the possible link that Tréville possibly taught Bruix. Bruix becomes Vice-Admiral instead of naval minister. He is given Command the French Mediterranean Fleet instead of François-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers. Bruix then contacts Tréville to be one of his Rear-Admirals. Even more interestingly
Jean Jacques Étienne Lucas was second in command of Le Formidable under the command of Bruix in 1799. Lucas was also in command of a Frigate before this. Lucas fits in line with Bruix’s idea of young and talented officers. I would say he should remain in second in command of a frigate within the fleet. But when the battle is imminent he would best serve in command of Aboukir Point and Aboukir Island batteries.
Altered French Mediterranean Fleet at the Battle of the Nile:
- Guerrier (Third rate), 74 - Captain Jean-François-Timothée Trullet
- Conquérant (Third rate), 74 - Captain Etienne Dalbarade
- Spartiate (Third rate), 74 - Captain Maurice-Julien Emeriau
- Aquilon (Third rate), 74 - Captain Antoine René Thévenard
- Peuple Souverain (Third rate), 74 - Captain Pierre-Paul Raccord
- Franklin (Third rate), 80 - Contre-amiral Armand Blanquet, Captain Maurice Gillet
- Orient (First rate), 120 - Vice-amiral Étienne Eustache Bruix, Contre-amiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve, Captain Luc-Julien-Joseph Casabianca
- Tonnant (Third rate), 80 - Commodore Aristide Aubert Du Petit Thouars
- Heureux (Third rate), 74 - Captain Jean-Pierre Etienne
- Mercure (Third rate), 74 - Lieutenant Cambon
- Guillaume Tell (Third rate), 80 - Contre-amiral Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville, Captain Saulnier
- Généreux (Third rate), 74 - Captain Louis-Jean-Nicolas Lejoille
- Timoléon (Third rate), 74 - Captain Louis-Léonce Trullet
- Sérieuse (Fifth rate), 36 - Captain Claude-Jean Martin
- Artémise (Fifth rate), 36 - Captain Pierre-Jean Standelet
- Justice (Fifth rate), 40 - Captain Villeneuve
- Diane (Fifth rate) 40 - Contre-amiral Denis Decrès, Captain Éléonore-Jean-Nicolas Soleil
Summary of the British and French Fleet’s at the Battle of the Nile:
The British had 13 Third Rate ships of the line, 1 Fourth Fate ship of the line and 1 Sloop-of-War.
In comparison, the French had 1 First Rate ship of the line, 11 Third Rate ships of the line and 4 Fifth Rate ships of the line
https://marinesol.org/the-naval-battle-of-abukir/ -
This website shows how the battle of the Nile progressed by using a gif image
Battle of Copenhagen