WI: Napoleone di Buonaparte, Liberator of Spanish Italy

[Deleted member 109224]

Here's an idea: What if Spain had gotten Corsica from Genoa rather than France and Napoleone (who retains his Corsican name and pronunciation) goes down in history as the man who liberated Corsica, the State of the Presidi, Naples, and Sicily from Spanish domination and established an independent Kingdom?

I think this state would be likely to conquer Tunisia as well, given, the historic Sicilian-Tunisian War of 1801-1804.

 

[Blorg]

I think he would tend in his early days try to go for a enlightened dictator role

 

[Socrates]

The Spanish weren't in charge of Italy at the time of the Corsican crisis.

 

[Deleted member 109224]

The Spanish weren't in charge of Italy at the time of the Corsican crisis.

Naples and Sicily were a sovereign state in personal union with the Bourbons of Spain.

 

[funnyhat]

Naples and Sicily were a sovereign state in personal union with the Bourbons of Spain.

But they weren't ruled by the king of Spain. Charles III had to abdicate their thrones to become the Spanish king. His son Ferdinand ruled Naples and Sicily.

 

[Socrates]

Naples and Sicily were a sovereign state in personal union with the Bourbons of Spain.

No, they weren't. They were a separate cadet line of the "Spanish" Bourbons.

 

[walmart]

Would Napoleon even be sent into the military or allowed up the ranks if Corsica remained Genoan

 

[Socrates]

Would Napoleon even be sent into the military or allowed up the ranks if Corsica remained Genoan

Remaining Genoan is difficult. I don't see anyone putting down the rebellion to help out the Genoans, and the Genoans can't do it on their own.

If you want Corsica to remain Italian, have the British intervene against French intervention. Then the Neapolitan Bourbons can buy it off the French as a compromise peace.

 

[Carp]

France's policy from the 1730s until not long before the annexation - perhaps as late as 1767 - was that Corsica should remain Genoese. That it ended up in French hands was the particular result of Choiseul and his developing thinking on the issue over the course of the 1760s, and anything which removes Choiseul from power or keeps him focused on another issue could easily avert the 1768 cession. You don't necessarily need a British response to keep Corsica out of French hands, just a shift in French policy or leadership. Even in March 1768, King Louis wrote (in the third person) that the conquest of Corsica would be "very onerous to the finances of His Majesty, who will not be compensated for it by the finances of such a poor island" and that Corsica was "useless to him and could be very onerous to him." Perhaps this protestation at such a late date was just to cover his ass as Choiseul moved forward with his plan, but at the very least it reflected what had been the longstanding belief of the French monarchy since the 1730s.

In fact the French briefly feared in 1767 that Corsica might end up in the hands of the Spanish. Boyer, France's representative in Genoa, reported that the Genoese "want either subsidies, or Spanish troops to replace French troops in Corsica, or they intend (which seems more likely) to engage the King of Spain to mediate between Genoa and France." This was plausible in part because the then-existing treaty between Genoa and France, by which French troops occupied certain places in Corsica, was expiring. But Charles III of Spain flatly turned them down - he had absolutely no interest in getting involved in this mess and would not spare a single coin for a Genoese subsidy.

Even if you change the attitude of the Spanish king, however, the notion of Corsica becoming Spanish (or Neapolitan) at this time seems very remote to me. France's policy since 1730 had always been to assert their preeminence in Corsica; they did not necessarily want the island for themselves, but they wished to deny it to any other power. Because of the Franco-Spanish alliance, in which Spain was clearly the junior partner, no Spanish/Neapolitan government would be likely to challenge French policy in this way and risk opening a breach with their chief ally. Maintaining good relations with Paris was far more important than some worthless island. It may be that even if the conquest of 1768-9 was averted - which I do not consider difficult - a French annexation at some later date would still be likely, if for no other reason than that annexation was the only solution to the interminable "Corsican problem" which would ensure that the island would never fall to a rival power.

The possibilities for Corsica going to another owner are far better earlier in the century, but then you don't get Napoleon.

 

[Deleted member 109224]

France's policy from the 1730s until not long before the annexation - perhaps as late as 1767 - was that Corsica should remain Genoese. That it ended up in French hands was the particular result of Choiseul and his developing thinking on the issue over the course of the 1760s, and anything which removes Choiseul from power or keeps him focused on another issue could easily avert the 1768 cession. You don't necessarily need a British response to keep Corsica out of French hands, just a shift in French policy or leadership. Even in March 1768, King Louis wrote (in the third person) that the conquest of Corsica would be "very onerous to the finances of His Majesty, who will not be compensated for it by the finances of such a poor island" and that Corsica was "useless to him and could be very onerous to him." Perhaps this protestation at such a late date was just to cover his ass as Choiseul moved forward with his plan, but at the very least it reflected what had been the longstanding belief of the French monarchy since the 1730s.

In fact the French briefly feared in 1767 that Corsica might end up in the hands of the Spanish. Boyer, France's representative in Genoa, reported that the Genoese "want either subsidies, or Spanish troops to replace French troops in Corsica, or they intend (which seems more likely) to engage the King of Spain to mediate between Genoa and France." This was plausible in part because the then-existing treaty between Genoa and France, by which French troops occupied certain places in Corsica, was expiring. But Charles III of Spain flatly turned them down - he had absolutely no interest in getting involved in this mess and would not spare a single coin for a Genoese subsidy.

Even if you change the attitude of the Spanish king, however, the notion of Corsica becoming Spanish (or Neapolitan) at this time seems very remote to me. France's policy since 1730 had always been to assert their preeminence in Corsica; they did not necessarily want the island for themselves, but they wished to deny it to any other power. Because of the Franco-Spanish alliance, in which Spain was clearly the junior partner, no Spanish/Neapolitan government would be likely to challenge French policy in this way and risk opening a breach with their chief ally. Maintaining good relations with Paris was far more important than some worthless island. It may be that even if the conquest of 1768-9 was averted - which I do not consider difficult - a French annexation at some later date would still be likely, if for no other reason than that annexation was the only solution to the interminable "Corsican problem" which would ensure that the island would never fall to a rival power.

The possibilities for Corsica going to another owner are far better earlier in the century, but then you don't get Napoleon.

Could a compromise be made in which Naples gets Corsica?

 

[Carp]

Could a compromise be made in which Naples gets Corsica?

I'm not sure what that compromise would be. The issue is not merely one of land or prestige, but perceived national security.

 

[Socrates]

I'm not sure what that compromise would be. The issue is not merely one of land or prestige, but perceived national security.

Which is exactly why Naples getting it could be a compromise. If the France can't get it for themselves, due to British naval domination, the Neapolitans are the ideal candidates. They are not a big enough power to threaten French power but they are a big enough power to defend Corsica against one of the other big boys, especially with French backing. They also have dynastic links to France and were keen to get out from Spain's shadow.

 

[Carp]

Which is exactly why Naples getting it could be a compromise. If the France can't get it for themselves, due to British naval domination, the Neapolitans are the ideal candidates. They are not a big enough power to threaten French power but they are a big enough power to defend Corsica against one of the other big boys, especially with French backing. They also have dynastic links to France and were keen to get out from Spain's shadow.

I get it, but I'm having trouble imagining the chain of events which leads to this. If the British are the ones preventing France from taking the island, why would they not also prevent Naples, a far weaker state, from doing so? If Britain is willing to use such power in the Mediterranean so as to dissuade France from taking the island, their strongest rival state, what compels them to compromise at all? Why not back the status quo, or support the Paolists? British public opinion was strongly in favor of the Paolist government of Corsica, and while the ministry might be more inclined to realpolitik they're still going to have to explain in the Commons why they are saving the Corsicans from one Bourbon only to sell them out to another.

I should also point out that, at this point, Naples would still have to conquer Corsica, and I'm not sure they can. The 18th century Neapolitan army was not exactly among Europe's best. My bet is that the King of Naples would still need outside help - French or Spanish, undoubtedly - to reduce the island.

 

[Deleted member 109224]

I get it, but I'm having trouble imagining the chain of events which leads to this. If the British are the ones preventing France from taking the island, why would they not also prevent Naples, a far weaker state, from doing so? If Britain is willing to use such power in the Mediterranean so as to dissuade France from taking the island, their strongest rival state, what compels them to compromise at all? Why not back the status quo, or support the Paolists? British public opinion was strongly in favor of the Paolist government of Corsica, and while the ministry might be more inclined to realpolitik they're still going to have to explain in the Commons why they are saving the Corsicans from one Bourbon only to sell them out to another.

I should also point out that, at this point, Naples would still have to conquer Corsica, and I'm not sure they can. The 18th century Neapolitan army was not exactly among Europe's best. My bet is that the King of Naples would still need outside help - French or Spanish, undoubtedly - to reduce the island.

Perhaps...
1) Spain gets it and France and Britain proceed to bully Spain into handing it over to Naples
2) France gets it, and Britain bullies France into handing it over to Naples - perhaps in exchange for something else (French Menorca?)

 

[Socrates]

I get it, but I'm having trouble imagining the chain of events which leads to this. If the British are the ones preventing France from taking the island, why would they not also prevent Naples, a far weaker state, from doing so? If Britain is willing to use such power in the Mediterranean so as to dissuade France from taking the island, their strongest rival state, what compels them to compromise at all? Why not back the status quo, or support the Paolists? British public opinion was strongly in favor of the Paolist government of Corsica, and while the ministry might be more inclined to realpolitik they're still going to have to explain in the Commons why they are saving the Corsicans from one Bourbon only to sell them out to another.

I should also point out that, at this point, Naples would still have to conquer Corsica, and I'm not sure they can. The 18th century Neapolitan army was not exactly among Europe's best. My bet is that the King of Naples would still need outside help - French or Spanish, undoubtedly - to reduce the island.

Because extended naval deployments are expensive, full blown wars are even more expensive and Britain is financially constrained after the Seven Years War (see Revolution, American). So the chain of events could be France invades, Britain blockades the island, full blown war is averted with compromise agreement. Neither side wants a war in 1768, but neither side wants to be humiliated either.

The rebels would also have likely been dealt a major blow by the French by this point so makes it easier for Neapolitans to take over.

 

[TheNerd_]

Here's an idea: What if Spain had gotten Corsica from Genoa rather than France and Napoleone (who retains his Corsican name and pronunciation) goes down in history as the man who liberated Corsica, the State of the Presidi, Naples, and Sicily from Spanish domination and established an independent Kingdom?

I think this state would be likely to conquer Tunisia as well, given, the historic Sicilian-Tunisian War of 1801-1804.

View attachment 430706

It could have been that he even unites all of Italy including the papal states, but that would be pretty darn ASB. Rather, I see, due to the establishment of the Bonaparte dynasty, that the Sothern Question doesn't exist, due to the fact that The Kingdom of Two Sicilies would have developed industrially and culturally. But all of that is true if we assume that he still receives military education despite not feeling the drive to do so.

Damn. Changing Napoleon is always hard. It always requires some kind of near-ASB event to set things in motion, like the otherwise good timeline The Golden Eagle.

 

[Direwolf22]

I toyed with an idea like this way back in the day for the first draft of Disaster at Leuthen. The problem than as now with your scenario is Corsica lacks anywhere near the military capabilities to take on a major power like Spain or its Sicilian branch. So if Napoleon even tried to expand his rule/influence off the island it would be crushed by overwhelming force.

I think Socrates' scenario may work for a Napoleonic take over of Corsica but thats about as far as I think this can get.

 

[Deleted member 109224]

It could have been that he even unites all of Italy including the papal states, but that would be pretty darn ASB. Rather, I see, due to the establishment of the Bonaparte dynasty, that the Sothern Question doesn't exist, due to the fact that The Kingdom of Two Sicilies would have developed industrially and culturally. But all of that is true if we assume that he still receives military education despite not feeling the drive to do so.

Damn. Changing Napoleon is always hard. It always requires some kind of near-ASB event to set things in motion, like the otherwise good timeline The Golden Eagle.

I toyed with an idea like this way back in the day for the first draft of Disaster at Leuthen. The problem than as now with your scenario is Corsica lacks anywhere near the military capabilities to take on a major power like Spain or its Sicilian branch. So if Napoleon even tried to expand his rule/influence off the island it would be crushed by overwhelming force.

I think Socrates' scenario may work for a Napoleonic take over of Corsica but thats about as far as I think this can get.

Napoleon's family was prominent in Corsica, no? What was the main military academy for Neopolitans at the time? If Corsica is a Bourbon possession, could Napoleon get the same sort of education in France as OTL?

Perhaps Napoleon is stationed in Peninsular Naples when the French Revolution kicks off. Inspired by what is going on in the country he was educated in, Napoleon overthrows the Sicilian Bourbons and proclaims himself Consul or King.

Given that OTL Sicily went to war with Tunis, and that Napoleon OTL did his own thing and invaded the near east, I would think that North Africa would be the first place Buonaparte invades. A Sicilian Empire from Corsica to Cairo perhaps?

 

[Herucalmo]

Fundamentally the insular and reactionary and massively corrupt Neapolitan aristocracy and the usually moribund state they sat atop is not exactly the same material as what gave Napoleon his Soult, his Ney, his Berthier, etc... and also fundamentally the peasantry of the Mezzogiorno had been horribly suppressed and exploited and lacked much of the political space as even Bourbon France gave the lower classes to live and breath and organize themselves. Even Napoleon himself would struggle to prevail at the head of a bandit army in the mountains against just the pressure brought to bare by Spain let alone one of the greats like Austria or France or Great Britain. And even ruling moderately securely in the Sicilies is highly unlikely to give Napoleon the funds to purchase the ships needed to achieve sustained naval superiority over the Corsairs nor the artillery and engineers to crack open Tunisia's defenses and fortified places nor the gathered intelligence and the knowhow to set up any kind of Napoleonist faction and diplomatic concession within Tunisia and would be forced to operate as a junior partner to the British or the Sardinians like OTL. Napoleon escaped going down with the disaster at Egypt but if he attempted to springboard off this ATL coalition to make himself conqueror of North Africa he would have to answer to them and would likely be utterly finished as a commander and statesman by the time the British sail away and the Ottomans come rolling up.

 

[Carp]

Because extended naval deployments are expensive, full blown wars are even more expensive and Britain is financially constrained after the Seven Years War (see Revolution, American). So the chain of events could be France invades, Britain blockades the island, full blown war is averted with compromise agreement. Neither side wants a war in 1768, but neither side wants to be humiliated either.

A blockade is exactly the sort of thing that leads to a "full blown war," especially a blockade just off France's own coastline. After all, a blockade doesn't mean anything unless the blockaders are willing to fire upon the blockade-runners. One could argue that the Seven Years War (as a global rather than a strictly American war) was itself sparked by British interdiction of French transports moving troops overseas; why should it be different this time? This would be an open provocation to war, an aggressive and hostile imposition of British demands into a bilateral Franco-Genoese matter. The time for Britain and France to stop this with a minimal lack of face is long past; the Fourth French Intervention, which eventually led to the conquest, started back in 1764. By 1768 there are already considerable French forces on the island who have been there for years. If Britain wanted to keep France out of Corsica they ought to have secured that as part of the peace that ended the Seven Years War. That might be possible, but it doesn't fulfill this WI (unless Britain for some reason subsequently decides to sell the island to Naples, which is... less than intuitive).

Make no mistake, if the French are stopped from invading Corsica by a British blockade and back down, the humiliation will be enormous. Pawning off the island to Naples thereafter will not decrease that humiliation one iota. The world will see the British imposing themselves into French affairs and telling Louis what to do, and the French backing down in fear. Wars may be expensive, but France doesn't sell its honor cheaply.

The real issue here is that giving/selling the island to Naples doesn't solve anything. It doesn't help the French, because their whole goal was to keep Corsica from falling into the hands of another power (including Spain and her associated states). It doesn't help Paoli, who will fight either way. It helps the British only slightly, as while they get to poke France in the eye (which the British do love) the island is still going to a Bourbon power. It doesn't really even help the Neapolitans - Corsica produces almost nothing and the island is by this point famous for rebellion and intractability. It was a huge money pit for France that never came close to paying for its own administration, let alone paying back the costs of invasion and occupation. That's something that seriously needs to be considered - does Ferdinand of Naples even want this rock? France only annexed it to deny it to others, a concern which Ferdinand does not share.


If I had to pick the most promising way to do this I think I'd avert the French conquest entirely. Kill Paoli, get Corsica to fall back into civil war, or by some other means allow the status quo (that is, nominal but mostly ineffective Genoese control over the island) to continue longer. By 1769 the Revolution had been ongoing for 40 years, you can probably stretch it out a little more. Then, at some future point - perhaps during the American War of Independence, when the major powers are busy elsewhere - have the King of Naples step in and offer to take the island off Genoa's hands, while at the same time making deals with some of the Corsican factions/leaders so they'll accept the cession. Perhaps this is all masterminded by John Acton, the pro-British minister in Naples who promoted a naval buildup and maritime trade. The exhausted Genoese let Corsica go, the Corsicans (or at least some of them) say "well, autonomy within Naples is better than slavery to Genoa" and accept the cession, the British are reasonably pleased because Acton is their guy, and the French are occupied elsewhere and can't do much except protest. I still doubt Ferdinand actually wants Corsica but perhaps Acton or other ministers convince him, and the island is perhaps a little more attractive if the Corsicans (or at least some of them) actually support the cession, rather than France/Britain just handing Ferdinand a seething ball of rebellion and saying "here, have fun with this."