IOTL, there was an attempt on Napoleon's life by an italian nationalist named Felice Orsini in 1858. He threw a bomb on Napoleon's carriage, and it killed almost everyone except for Napoleon III himself. It was later revealed that Orsini was supported by british radicals and enabled to get his equipment by lax british asylum laws. This caused a short diplomatic crisis between Britain and France. But what if Napoleon III had been killed by Orsini's bomb?
We know that Napoleon III's son was only two years old in 1858, so who would take the regency? How different will be the regent's international policies from Napoleon III's, concerning the german question, the mexican empire, the American Civil War and the Second Shcleswig War?
 
Then there is probably no Italian unification, at least not so soon. Almost certainly no Mexican Empire. There might still a Franco-Prussian War of some kind.
 

Bytor

Monthly Donor
You would probably be intersted in this thread on the same subject https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-on-italian-unification.387208/#post-12325299

According to the Sénatus-consult of 23 july 1856, the regency would go to Eugenie if she had survived the attack, if she had died, the regent would have been Jerome, who would die in 1860 and then Napoleon Joseph (Plon-Plon) until 1874 when Napoleon IV would come of age: such a long regency could indeed cause trouble, but it could also see an earlier liberalisation of the Empire under Plon-Plon, which could be a good thing.
 
Prince Napoléon was a radical, anti clerical and supportive of worker's right (he provided some funding for the French delegation to the 1st Workers International meeting, had connections with some leaders and notably was a protector of Joseph Proudhon), and may have been naturally keen to bond with Republicans if not for their ostracization of him over his acceptance and rallying of the Empire. Otherwise, he still had some connections with some prominent figures such as Emille Ollivier (he played IOTL a role as intermediary between Napoléon III and Ollivier during negotiations over forming a government), Victor Hugo (longtime friends from the days of the Second Republic, Hugo's two sons were freed from prison on Prince Napoléon's intervention, and Hugo went as far as saying the prince was the 'true Napoléon' by opposition to the Emperor) and even George Sand. But overall, his stubborn character and his pride or ego had isolated him.
The point is that he was despised by the establishment, conservatives as republicans.

Given the regency provisos were tailored specifically against him (Napoléon III distrusted him, looking him in the way the Orléans were to the Bourbons, and his father King Jérôme would resign from the presidency of the Senate in protest of this treatment of his son), a regency of Prince Napoléon would have likely not given way to any significant progress because of the Regency Council being stuffed by people who would likely be opponents. I imagine that this would have led to some degree of paralysis with the Prince Regent potentially using frequently the few regal powers he has, veto and pardon, but unable to pass any significant progressive legislation (even the nomination of ministers, but I need to look at the details of the regency act). This situation could make the Corps Législatif, otherwise a rubber stamp institution, a more independent and decisive body on its own, but still less powerful on account of the reforms passed by Napoléon III IOTL in the 1860's not likely to happen anytime soon. On one hand, these reforms had allowed Republican opposition to gain significant traction and this lack of political reform could slow it down, but on the other hand, the poer struggle could make up for this lack, not to mention Prince Napoléon systematic use of pardon would shield most opposition figure from legal consequences of their activities.

Then, there is a serious danger for the regime to be replaced, not by a restored republic, but with the monarchy. I'm not saying a monarchist coup is unavoidable, but it is a possibility. First, most of the political establishment of the Second Empire, at least in its early days, was made up of opportunists who had followed then President Louis-Napoléon into his imperial ambitions due to his popularity and the guarantee of order he presented, but who hadn't much loyalty to the Bonaparte dynasty itself. When you count that Army's leadership was monarchist friendly, it's not impossible to imagine that if the political confrontation between Prince Napoléon and the establishment becomes too important, the conservatives could just decide to depose Napoléon IV and his regent, and restore the Orléans dynasty. The thing is that at the time of the Orsini assassination attempt, the Empire was a fragile construction much tied to Napoléon III (we see how it ended IOTL) and it wasn't until the appointment of Ollivier as Prime Minister (de facto but unofficial since the title didn't exist) and the Constitution of 1870 that the Empire gained solid foundations that would have ensured a smooth succession if not for the war.
 
Prince Napoléon was a radical, anti clerical and supportive of worker's right (he provided some funding for the French delegation to the 1st Workers International meeting, had connections with some leaders and notably was a protector of Joseph Proudhon), and may have been naturally keen to bond with Republicans if not for their ostracization of him over his acceptance and rallying of the Empire. Otherwise, he still had some connections with some prominent figures such as Emille Ollivier (he played IOTL a role as intermediary between Napoléon III and Ollivier during negotiations over forming a government), Victor Hugo (longtime friends from the days of the Second Republic, Hugo's two sons were freed from prison on Prince Napoléon's intervention, and Hugo went as far as saying the prince was the 'true Napoléon' by opposition to the Emperor) and even George Sand. But overall, his stubborn character and his pride or ego had isolated him.
The point is that he was despised by the establishment, conservatives as republicans.

Given the regency provisos were tailored specifically against him (Napoléon III distrusted him, looking him in the way the Orléans were to the Bourbons, and his father King Jérôme would resign from the presidency of the Senate in protest of this treatment of his son), a regency of Prince Napoléon would have likely not given way to any significant progress because of the Regency Council being stuffed by people who would likely be opponents. I imagine that this would have led to some degree of paralysis with the Prince Regent potentially using frequently the few regal powers he has, veto and pardon, but unable to pass any significant progressive legislation (even the nomination of ministers, but I need to look at the details of the regency act). This situation could make the Corps Législatif, otherwise a rubber stamp institution, a more independent and decisive body on its own, but still less powerful on account of the reforms passed by Napoléon III IOTL in the 1860's not likely to happen anytime soon. On one hand, these reforms had allowed Republican opposition to gain significant traction and this lack of political reform could slow it down, but on the other hand, the poer struggle could make up for this lack, not to mention Prince Napoléon systematic use of pardon would shield most opposition figure from legal consequences of their activities.

Then, there is a serious danger for the regime to be replaced, not by a restored republic, but with the monarchy. I'm not saying a monarchist coup is unavoidable, but it is a possibility. First, most of the political establishment of the Second Empire, at least in its early days, was made up of opportunists who had followed then President Louis-Napoléon into his imperial ambitions due to his popularity and the guarantee of order he presented, but who hadn't much loyalty to the Bonaparte dynasty itself. When you count that Army's leadership was monarchist friendly, it's not impossible to imagine that if the political confrontation between Prince Napoléon and the establishment becomes too important, the conservatives could just decide to depose Napoléon IV and his regent, and restore the Orléans dynasty. The thing is that at the time of the Orsini assassination attempt, the Empire was a fragile construction much tied to Napoléon III (we see how it ended IOTL) and it wasn't until the appointment of Ollivier as Prime Minister (de facto but unofficial since the title didn't exist) and the Constitution of 1870 that the Empire gained solid foundations that would have ensured a smooth succession if not for the war.
Interesting.
Say, whom did Prince Napoleon lean to as a geopolitical friend? Britain? Austria? Prussia? Or would he continue Napoleon III's italian ambitions?
 

Bytor

Monthly Donor
Interesting.
Say, whom did Prince Napoleon lean to as a geopolitical friend? Britain? Austria? Prussia? Or would he continue Napoleon III's italian ambitions?

It's hard to say - he didn't marry that Savoian princess (I forget her name) until 1859 which would be after N3's assassination. Plon-plon's father, Jérôme would have been 2nd in line after N4 and would be the regent in the event of Eugénie's death as well. Far more important, I feel, is Charles de Morny, N3's half brother who is rarely mentioned in alt-hist. De Morny was initially very influential upon Napoleon but, somewhat like Plon-Plon, N3 came distrust he somewhat in later years. Maximilian, the puppet emperor of Mexico, was reputedly chosen in part to scuttle de Morny's ambition to that position.

At N3's assassination, Jérôme, Napoleon-Joseph and de Morny, all still the very closest advisors would almost certainly for a triumvirate with Jérôme possibly appointing his son as Senate President to replace Troplong (a relatively indistinguished gentleman to the rest of history) and certainly confirming de Morny as continued President of the Corps Législatif. With Jérôme's death in 1860, Napoleon-Joseph becomes regent, de Morny taking his place as Senate President and somebody trusted and important in OTL like Rouher moving into the Corps Législatif.

De Morny dies in 1864, but he would have been the foil between Plon-plon and his father, though given his own liberalist sympathies he would have most often sided with Plon-Plon against the known extravagance of Jérôme. The major instance I can see him going against Plon-plon is how to react to Italy over the assassination, moderating Plon-plon's favours there. He probably would have convince Plon-plon, who was no dummy himself and far less given to extravagance than either his father or uncle (and perhaps even more pragmatic if we consider how he managed things post-exile) to use the inevitable anti-Italian sentiment in the Empire for nationalist/imperialist purposes against any that might seek to rebel. The two of them would roll out things like reduced press censorship, the ability the Senate and Corps Législatif to vote on (and eventually create) laws far faster than N3 ever did. De Morny and Plon-plon would likely set the Empire well on the way to being a constitutional monarchy a la Great Britain because their liberalist sympathies would let them see it as the perfect proactive way to maintain and ensure the support that N3 have gained through and came to power on restoring universal suffrage, where N3 only did those things reactively to stave off faltering power, blinkered by the majesty of imperialism and trying to court the Catholic and clerical votes. By the time of de Morny's death, the cabinet position of Minister President of the Council of State could potentially be one of real power rather than a primus inter pares.

At least, that's the direction France heads in my timeline though I haven't fully worked out what it means for things like the Franco-Prussian War or the Scramble for Africa.
 
King Jérôme spent much in terms of money in his exile, and that caused him trouble in marriage, but in the end, by the time of the Second Republic, the father and the son had been reconciled. Plus, it's unlikely he would be that politically active: he resigned his presidency of the Senate, actually more an honorific office, to protest against Napoléon III and the establishment denigration of his son. Given he was old and probably not physically fit for official duties, I imagine he would have renounced the regency to pass it on his son.

As for Morny, he was for sure a great schemer, and though a half-brother to Napoléon III, he was out of the succession line (due to his bastard status, he was not a Bonaparte per se). His loyalties, through blood ties, would lie in the Bonaparte dynasty without a doubt, but though he is more connected and appreciated than his cousin Prince Napoléon, his task would be nonetheless very hard since the Imperial regime legitimacy much lied in the persona of Napoléon III himself. With the Emperor gone, the velleities of the nominally allied establishment are to be put in test, especially with high temptations of Orleanist restoration (as per the plan stopped short by the coup in 1851). It remains right to say an alliance of Prince Napoléon with Morny will be necessary and in order if there is to be any serious attempt at keeping the dynasty on the throne. This is especially more of a possibility when we know that IOTL, in spite of some dislike between the two, they eventually came close to forming a political alliance before Morny suddenly died in 1865. But for the time being, the perspective of any political reform is to be pushed back to the majority of Napoléon IV due to the problems I mentionned in my previous post, namely the inertia of the political and business establishment. For these same reasons, there is to exclude any major foreign commitment, ie Italy and Mexico, possibly China, though it could keep continuing on minor colonial ventures in Africa mainly.

As far as it matter Prince Napoléon himself, his liberal (and libertine) character and history makes him more likely of sympathies with the British, Piedmont and Italian revolutionaries (though the Corsican he remains in heart is not someone who will forgive easily his cousin's assassination). His rejection of established order excludes Prussia, and Austria to a certain degree, while he holds a grudge against the Church and is a virulent anticlerical (that puts him in Piedmontese side against Austria and the Pope, and through proxy in French politics, the entire conservative wing). But anyway, to repeat my previous argument, the state of political paralysis that would happen in Napoléon IV's minority not only pushes back the perspective of intervention in Italy (and unification which, at the exception of Republicans, is opposed by most of the political spectrum), but it also ends for now Napoléon III's attempted come back of France into European politics (in this, the Italian war played a crucial role), and you would have to wait Napoléon IV's majority to potentially see another comeback.

To make a notice on Prince Napoléon marriage to Marie-Clotilde of Savoy, it wasn't a happy one on account of the contrast between the two, Prince Napoléon being libertine, a womanizer and anti clerica, while his wife, not to mention the big difference of ages, was a devout woman. The marriage was very political and barely accepted by the bride's father (Prince Napoléon's libertine reputation was widely known). I have not in mind a particular bride that could replace her, but I think it's worth to mention he remained in genuine love for his cousin Sophia even though she married the Crown Prince and future King of Netherlands, and the two kept a sustained correspondence (but there was no affair).
 
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