WI:Napoleon II didn't die prematurely?

I never said he wasn't. What I said was he was still, in spite of his virtues, mostly ignorant of French political life, and giving that nobody in France (nobody that would politically count, that is) would really support him, he would have been lost in a crab's nest.


Then again, Napoleonic mythis really became popular after Nappie III coup. So far it was mostly a Romanticist intelligentia thing, and people voted Louis-Napoléon in order to vote not for Orléanist, not for Far-left and not for Cavaignac.


The Revolution of 1830 was mostly republican-driven (and more or less republican planned as well). The only thing that made Louis-Philippe being crowned were Guizot and La Fayette's skills. Heck, the future Orléans heir was really close to be shoot on barricades because of this.

And when Louis-Philippe tried to get acclaimed, he only get insults. A good part of the unstability of his reign is caused by Republicans : you basically have a political continuity from 1830 to 1848 which is, It seems I have to point it, a successful republican uprising.


But again, he had NO support in France when he was alive. Not one, not even his cousins.
I'm going to be vulgar, but nobody gave a fuck about him, and the only thing that prevents me to say his death was a non-event is because it's the day where his memory could be called upon political motives without any risk.




Again, I think you're too superficial in your understanding of XIXth french politics (no offense meant) : it's not because a political group is defeated that it cease to exist. The political weight of Legitimist in some regions (mostly West and Provence) is well attested up to the end of the century.


From what I saw (admittedly not on biographies, but on studies about Bonapartism in France), it was mostly a superficial knowledge and never influenced in any way French politics (even Napoléon-Louis and Louis-Napoléon simply didn't cared, until he died, then Louis-Napoléon went all coup about French politics)


But again : we're not discussing his virtues, skills or anything. The problem is that he was a problem for the Austrian court, and he would have been a problem for French politics as well. Without real support but still symbolical of something : he would have been an annoyance, an anomaly.

In a really troubled France at this time, where Bonapartism really became a thing anew thanks to Nappie III, he may have played the weird role of an "eternal candidate to nothing", having court or even political affluence (not unlike ousted ministers during Ancien Régime) but without great influence overall.

(And, really, I think you greatly overestimate Napoleon mythos in pre-1852 France, for what matter popular classes).


This...is really so full of wrong.

I mean, take a look at how Henri d'Artois reacted to Napoleon III's imperial proclamation.



If something the proclamation of the Second Empire made Chambord even more active politically up to begin sort of reconciliation with Orléans, which aborted even there (as it would do later) and establishing political programs with Legitimists still in France.


I may have a defaitist mindset, but really, one can be allowed to have such in face of all this, don't you think?

People may have voted for Louis-Napoleon because he was the least bad candidate, but his Bonaparte name and relation to Napoleon I did have a major role it his election, as most sources both pro and anti Empire can show. And the same things that made Louis-Napoleon a successful candidate would also apply to his cousin as well.

As for the July revolution, I would definitely argue against that. It was basically a relatively spontaneous result of the Ordinances of Saint Cloud and the unpopularity of King Charles X and his prime Minister the Prince de Polignac. By the time things got organized the new Provisional government was already ready to enthrone Louis-Philippe.

Your right about the lack of real support in France itself, I will give you that. However, I think at least part of it had to do with Napoleon II being forced to remain in Austria. If he were to successfully flee to a different country (Switzerland, Belgium or the UK, for examples) I think something similar to the exiled entourages of the Bourbons and the Orléans. Furthermore, being outside Austria could allow real contacts to be established with Bonapartists in France. Remember the question wasn't what Napoléon II could do at the time of his death, but what could have changed with his survival.

As to the Leigitimists, I'm definitely not underestimating them. Personally I'm a Legitimist at heart, support the rights of the Comte de Chambord and would love to do a TL later on about him. However, for the most part the Legitimists went dormant form the July revolution to the end of the Second Empire. Sure they established various Legitimist committees, newspapers and things like that, but at no time did Chambord try to take advantage of the situation in 1848 to lead a restoration or in 1849 negotiate with the Party of Order dominated National assembly.

Chambord for the most part seemed content to remain in exile, never taking advantage of various opportunities. Although, personally I think it might have had something to do with being childless and not wanting the Comte de Paris to be his heir, but that's just me. In all I think that if Napoléon II was able to flee Austria and find a country willing to give him asylum, he would be in a position to take advantage of events in France, whether they be in 1848, earlier, later, influenced by Bonapartists or by other opponents of the Orléans regime. Whether or no he would be successful would be up for debate, but Napoléon II would be more or less in the same position as his cousin was after his death in 1832.
 
People may have voted for Louis-Napoleon because he was the least bad candidate, but his Bonaparte name and relation to Napoleon I did have a major role it his election, as most sources both pro and anti Empire can show.

I wonder, to be perfectly honest, what these sources are giving what they said about Chambord and the Second Empire. No offense, but ones that have (maybe they're incomplete or wrong, that said) points many other factors.

That his name helped him is no question (it beneficed his cousins as well, but as well Murat's son) even if (once again), the Napoleonic mythos didn't have a deep popular basis yet (rather to be searched in Romanticist intelligentsia before Nappie III actively supported it, right since his election campaign).
But his name alone, in the absence of a Bonapartist party (or at least, if there was such, they were really well hidden and didn't even move a finger for Nappie's coups before 1851), wouldn't have been nearly enough without political, ideological and financial support from conservatives (especially in provinces where notables, particularly clergy, called to vote for him without real alternative proposed).

There was simply no real political hope for him before 1848, that he was ready to work as an engineer in Nicaragua at the same date. That's not really the description of someone having deep political hopes or a, even reduced (à la Bourbon) immediate political base.

And the same things that made Louis-Napoleon a successful candidate would also apply to his cousin as well.
What made Louis-Napoléon a successful candidate was that anyone that supported him, was thinking he was an idiot. To quote Thiers, a "crétin" that could be puppetized just the right time for a possible royalist restoration, or at least, keep the place warm for non-republican conservatives.

Giving the description of Napoléon II, willingly passing as a buffon may not be an accurate portrayal.

As for the July revolution, I would definitely argue against that.
Then we'd have to disagree.

Jean-Claude Caron said:
The conjugated action of both journalists, lead by Thiers particularly, and printers that protested against the suspension of freedom of press, students that provoked the first demonstrations, petty bourgeoisie and workers from suburbs, stroke by the crisis, republicans that proven being a large part of the battle, ended by a true revolution, in spite of the wait-and-see attitude of liberals that supported a maintain of Charles fearing a republican restauration

Not that the July revolution was planned hour by hour of course, and I should have been more precise when it came to "planned" : I should have said prepared, in the sense republicans were organized enough to prepare a takeover at the first serious opportunity. The republican influence, and let's say domination, over the revolution of July is well attested : liberals and Orleanists didn't really participated to these, until the threat of a republican takeover became quite real.

But for what mattered political parties, Republicans in the first half of the XIXth represented a major force (along with Orléanistes and Légitimistes), and Bonapartists simply didn't.


If he were to successfully flee to a different country (Switzerland, Belgium or the UK, for examples) I think something similar to the exiled entourages of the Bourbons and the Orléans.
You mean, something reduced politically-wise (in matter of direct political intervention), and without any other hope of being re-established except for foreign support?
Bourbons and Orléans could at least count on a political clientèle that existed since decades, and that beneficed a lot from their respective political takeover. Napoléon II would have nothing : I think the prowess of his cousin can point how much Bonapartist popular base existed in France at this point.

Furthermore, being outside Austria could allow real contacts to be established with Bonapartists in France.
Then again : which Bonapartists? Outside Bonaparte family itself (and I'm being generous, Louis Bonaparte and his brothers remained largely uninterested on politics), there wasn't such a thing as a Bonapartist party. It basically went into existence thanks to Louis-Napoléon's policies.

Remember the question wasn't what Napoléon II could do at the time of his death, but what could have changed with his survival.
I'm not saying your point : of course we're talking about changes, but it's not because you'd have such that his life would have been radically different (unless you plan a mystical vision on his death bed, then having him survive and makes huge changes, but that would be damn convenient).

That said, I think that we should focus on what characterized him, especially his interest on military matters. It could open him a political career, critically trough elections (a popular general called Napoléon could easily be elected in several departments as deputé). Depending on the political situation.

For example a 1848 crisis-like allowing him to pass as a skilled leader ( truthfully or not : propaganda is not there just for ornament), and then build a support from this. Without a Louis-Napoléon (that again, I'd think far less enthusiast about politics with his cousin still alive) in the way, and a more unstable but living on IInd Republic, there's room for that.

The big question being his capacity to takeover the republic, as his father. I think people would be more wary of someone that would have proved (or really insisted he had) skills, at the contrary of an idiotic yahoo (remember, it's basically how Nappie III was seen at first). I could see him being a political force but eventually depending of a larger party's support to advance (Legitimist being out of question, it arguably let the choice between Orléanistes fearing Republicans, or Republicans fearing Orléanistes).

Would that work?

Personally I'm a Legitimist at heart, support the rights of the Comte de Chambord and would love to do a TL later on about him.
Yay for ultra-reactionnary policies.

However, for the most part the Legitimists went dormant form the July revolution to the end of the Second Empire.
I'd disagree : if something, they were more active during the Second Empire. During July Monarchy, Legitimists basically did nothing, safe "guarding the flame", but during the Second Empire (or even the Republic), you had really some activity, with Chambord giving political circulars, and establishing a program.
Without the consigns he gave to not push for a too openly Legitimist activity, his party would probably have been broken by Nappie III, unable to stand locally, as appearing as a political threat.


But at no time did Chambord try to take advantage of the situation in 1848 to lead a restoration or in 1849 negotiate with the Party of Order dominated National assembly.
Chambord for the most part seemed content to remain in exile, never taking advantage of various opportunities. Although, personally I think it might have had something to do with being childless and not wanting the Comte de Paris to be his heir, but that's just me.

From what I know of him, it may be more related to the usual providentialism of Late Bourbons on their cause, rather than not caring. If something, it may be similar to Stuarts pretenders : still very about their rights, but not seeing a real way to resolve the situation without breaking with their principles.
 
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