WI: Napoleon does not invade Russia, partitions Turkey with Alexander: geopolitical effects?

[GauchoBadger]

I mostly intend for this to be a catch-all thread about the effects of a Napoleonic victory in Western and Central Europe, with Russia mostly left alone.
I propose a PoD in Napoleonic France managing to defeat the British navy in the Adriatic at the Battle of Lissa in 1811, allowing the buildup of troops in the French Dalmatian departments to continue unabated. Napoleon Bonaparte and Tsar Alexander of Russia go a-conquering in the Balkan peninsula, dividing the spoils after the fighting is done. Influence over the peninsula is divided in half -- France gets the west, Russia gets the east.
This big extension of the border between France and Russia ultimately dissuades Napoleon from thinking that invading Russia would be a good idea, and when Alex breaks with the Continental System, Napoleon mostly leaves him alone. Is this feasible? Or did the Continental Blockade make Napoleon's downfall inevitable?
If it can happen, then now let's think about subsequent events in this scenario...
-All of Spain will likely be prostrate, what with the French Army not being stripped away for marching on Russia. What effect does the lack of a restoration of Ferdinand to the Spanish throne have on the Spanish-American Wars of Independence? Do Bolivar, San Martín and Belgrano attain better success? What happens to Mexico?
-Russia, not having been invaded and raided by Napoleon, retains some of its pre-1812 muscle. Could they go on an earlier conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia, perhaps expanding their borders further south than OTL? Their threatening posture towards India might still cause worry among the British, especially if they've cooperated with Napoleon over splitting the Ottoman Empire, so there's the possibility that an earlier "Great Game" might still happen. Could Japan still be propped up by Britain as a counterweight to Russian ambition in the far east?
-Africa? For how long can Britain keep France and her quislings bottled up in the Mediterranean? With the OE collapsing, would Mehmet Ali of Egypt try for an earlier bid to independence? Would TTL's Egypt lean more towards France or Britain?
-The United States? Who are they likely to ally with ITTL?

 

[Derek Pullem]

Ok -some problems.

Russia was already involved in a war against the Turks - it started in 1806 and spluttered on until 1812 (just before Napoleon invaded). They hadn't really achieved much until 1811.

A PoD of a French invasion of the Balkans from Dalmatia instead of preparing to defeat Russia is possible but wouldn't need a PoD at Lissa to achieve it. Lissa was 3 vs 6 frigates - if the French decided to make a play in the Eastern Med again the British med fleet would sortie with circa 50+ ships available to them, more than a dozen of them ships of the line. So any campaign will need to rely on land communications

The distance from Venice to Athens is approx 1800 km compared to 1200 km from Warsaw to Moscow. So the Grand Army of 1811 will need to travel 50% further than its equivalent of 1812. Assuming a similar pace (and it's much easier to march in Russia in summer and autumn than in the Balkans) Napoleon might reach Athens by the end of 1811. His army won't be able to redeploy until late 1812 buy which time Salamanca has happened. This assumes that the Turks collapse in Europe and Napoleon suffers limited casualties - this is unlikely and more likely is that he will need all of 1812 to rebuild his forces. By which time Spain is close to collapse.

As for the Ottomans collapsing - that is unlikely unless Napoleon remains in the Balkans in 1812 - in which case he's lost all of Spain. More likely the Turks will retain Anatolia. Egypt is irrelevant if the French don't have a fleet. Russia proved incapable of defeating the Ottomans in Europe and the Caucasus at the same time on many occasions.

Even if Napoleon does manage an 1813 campaign in Spain the casualties will begin to mount up and unless Russia is prepared to be his guard dog in Eastern Europe (unlikely if they are still engaged in Turkey), this risks another coalition war against Prussia and Austria.

So I don't think the scenario is credible unless Russia is a willing ally to Napoleon at the expense of all other interests with other nations.

 

[Emperor Casey]

I wonder if Napoleon would create a client Greek nation and what territory he would give it if the Balkans were to fall.

 

[Tanc49]

So I don't think the scenario is credible unless Russia is a willing ally to Napoleon at the expense of all other interests with other nations.

Would an alliance of France and Russia be able to defeat any British effort in the Black Sea? I'd assume Constantinople would be a good enough prize to accept the Continental System

 

[wcv215]

The distance from Venice to Athens is approx 1800 km compared to 1200 km from Warsaw to Moscow.

Venice is 1300 km from Venice.

 

[Rognvald]

Venice is 1300 km from Venice.

Uh... do you mean Athens? Unless this is a dystopian megacity Venice.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Venice is 1300 km from Venice.

If you mean Athens I went by current major roads.

If you think Napoleon and his army can fly like a crow to Athens then 1300 km it is

 

[wcv215]

Uh... do you mean Athens? Unless this is a dystopian megacity Venice.

Right, forgot the Venetians don’t want that advertised.

If you mean Athens I went by current major roads.

If you think Napoleon and his army can fly like a crow to Athens then 1300 km it is

Current major roads aren’t super relevant though. I was looking at a route which involved the coast of the Adriatic though.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Current major roads aren’t super relevant though. I was looking at a route which involved the coast of the Adriatic though.

Remember you have to defeat the Turks too so hugging the coast is not going to win the campaign.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Would an alliance of France and Russia be able to defeat any British effort in the Black Sea? I'd assume Constantinople would be a good enough prize to accept the Continental System

A Russia gaining that much power and territory, and Nappy being that much more overextended, has no need to fear French opposition and could just give Paris a "No Thanks, what are you going to do about it?" response. There's a big issue: France needs to maintain a position distinctly above Russia to be able to enforce her desired system in Europe, which allowing them to chew up the Ottomans destroys

 

[Tanc49]

A Russia gaining that much power and territory, and Nappy being that much more overextended, has no need to fear French opposition and could just give Paris a "No Thanks, what are you going to do about it?" response. There's a big issue: France needs to maintain a position distinctly above Russia to be able to enforce her desired system in Europe, which allowing them to chew up the Ottomans destroys

It's a short term gain to enforce the blocus. Once GB is on its knees, Russia can move in Central Asia more freely, get bits of India or a warm water port

 

[FillyofDelphi]

It's a short term gain to enforce the blocus. Once GB is on its knees, Russia can move in Central Asia more freely, get bits of India or a warm water port

As opposed to the much closer, much more security-relevent, much wealthier and much more historically and culturally salient areas closer to home, which they will of course forever allow to remain under the domination of France out of politeness? Napoleon and Alexander had an "alliance"; more a vague toleration of one another, out of mutual temporary convenience, with Russian interests being FAR more in Eastern and Southern Europe than in India (Who's only at the end of a long, empty difficult to fully seure and control march through the steppes and mountains of Centeral Asia), and Britain is hardly a contendor to Russian hegeomony over Europe (her real goal) and a threat to her vital security and economic interests, while France most certainly is. Napoleon and Alexander both know the other are their main relevent threat and rival, and they both know this: Russia dident want to overly agitate France after Napoleon's crushing successes during the Years of Victory while her army and budget were strained and she haden't had time to build back up, since France and her sphere could beat her if they focused all their efforts in the East in that case, while France wanted Russia to not poke around in Eastern and Southern Europe and start nibbling away at the edges of her power base/convince Austria to defect while he was nailing down his flank in the south-west by conquering Portugal and getting a client on the throne of Spain. Long-term, France can't tolerate Russia being hyper-powerful and they know this, which means allowing them to eat up huge swaths of new territory is suicidial forgien policy in all but the shortest term, especially since it comes at the cost of destroying the one other potential balancing force he could align with to check against a Russian challange to his continental Empire in the future (Britain being driven to their knees).

Oh, if I were Russia I'd take this deal, but Napoleon (Especially with Talleyrand whispering in his ear) would have to be drinking lead paint to offer it. Forgein policy decesisions have to take into account the long-term impacts, and Napoleon knows his system can only be maintained so long as it isen't challanged by more force than he can counter. That's why he implemented the Continental System in the first place; to try to drive Britain into reaching a permanent settlement and not subsidizing an army up to oppose him every few years and he could have the normal, peaceful conditions in order to consolidate his new European Order and similarly force to the other powers to accept the permenant shift in the balance of power (Austria being in a secondary status, Prussia knocked out of the game, Russia having a hard border of her influence in the North and West to halt her century of so of advances, ect)

 

[longsword14]

which means allowing them to eat up huge swaths of new territory is suicidial forgien policy

How does allowing Russia to partition the Turks make them any stronger when Napoleon too will get his slice ?

 

[FillyofDelphi]

How does allowing Russia to partition the Turks make them any stronger when Napoleon too will get his slice ?

... because Russia is less overextended and so can absorb the area with less of an internal fuss, is in a much better cultural and physical position to economically and legally integrate the area into her sphere, will be projecting far more influence an control over Austria and thus will be sucking them out of French gravity, their slices are naturally more secure based on location, and Constantinople, the mouth of the Danuble, rich Dobruja,ect. is far more valuble than Dalmatia and Bosnia? To say nothing of the fact that Turkey as now neutralized, which removes a potential bother that tied down Russian resource but not French and therefore frees up Russia more to project power elsewhere.

 

[alexmilman]

Ok -some problems.

Russia was already involved in a war against the Turks - it started in 1806 and spluttered on until 1812 (just before Napoleon invaded). They hadn't really achieved much until 1811.

Absence of an early success on land was to a great degree due to the fact that fighting Napoleon (and post-Tilsit preparations to fighting a new war against him) consumed substantial part of their resources. Obviously, an earlier peace and/or an active French participation in a war against the Ottomans could produce the better results even if strictly because the Ottomans are now facing a 2 front war. In that scenario Istanbul could be taken within 3 - 4 months (in 1829 Russian troops crossed Danube on May 7th and took Adrianople on August 22nd and in planning war of 1877/78 Obruchev was assuming approximately the same time table).

Not achieving much does not apply to the naval operations: in OTL Senyavin captured the island of Tenedos and established blockade of Istanbul in 1807 with the resulting food riots and deposition of Selim III. The Ottoman attempts to lift a blockade resulted in their defeats in the battles of the Dardanelles and Athos. So basically the necessary naval component of the invasion was accomplished. Russian fleet engaged on the Med had 10 ships of the line so if it is being joined by a substantial French squadron (as per thread condition), the British domination of the Agean is anything but granted especially in the case of the early fall of Istanbul allowing Russians to pull extra ships from the Black Sea.

The distance from Venice to Athens is approx 1800 km compared to 1200 km from Warsaw to Moscow. So the Grand Army of 1811 will need to travel 50% further than its equivalent of 1812.

But the French already had a military presence on the Adriatic coast and war as it was described did not call for a Grand Army to be involved: 40 - 50K should be enough, taking into an account that the Russian troops are already engaged.

BTW, if you are counting distances as crow flies, then Warsaw - Moscow: 1,150km and Venice - Athens: 1,277km, practically the same (https://www.airmilescalculator.com/distance/vce-to-ath/).

Of course, in neither case the road was straight and I'm not quite sure why taking Athens would be a decisive event: if there is a joined Franco-Russian offensive the war is most probably over before the allies are reaching Athens/Istanbul because the Ottomans are forced to sue for peace (or because their European possessions are falling apart).

Nappy's personal presence is not absolutely necessary and he (as more or less implied in initial post) can concentrate on Spain.

 

[alexmilman]

Would an alliance of France and Russia be able to defeat any British effort in the Black Sea? I'd assume Constantinople would be a good enough prize to accept the Continental System

With Russian-held Straits, how exactly the Brits would get into the Black Sea? In 1807 they could not even reach Istanbul.

 

[alexmilman]

As opposed to the much closer, much more security-relevent, much wealthier and much more historically and culturally salient areas closer to home, which they will of course forever allow to remain under the domination of France out of politeness?

Well, taking into an account that, with an exception of Poland (questionable acquisition in the terms of security, historic ties and absence of troubles) and Finland (which had little to do with Nappy) the OTL Western Russian borders remained practically the same between Tilsit and 1914 while the major expansions did took place in the Central Asia and Caucasus, your argument is not 100% criticism free.

Napoleon and Alexander had an "alliance"; more a vague toleration of one another, out of mutual temporary convenience, with Russian interests being FAR more in Eastern and Southern Europe than in India (Who's only at the end of a long, empty difficult to fully seure and control march through the steppes and mountains of Centeral Asia),

India, of course, was more than a little bit on a fantastic side (which did not prevent the British politicians and general public from having something like a century of a national paranoia on that subject), but the Russian interests (judging by OTL) were exactly in "the steppes and mountains of Central Asia" which it kept conquering all the way into the reign of Alexander III. The same goes for the expansion in Caucasus region. The "interests" in Southern Europe were pretty much fantasies related to Slavophilia (which would come later) or just plain good imperialism which ended up with acquisition of a tiny Bessarabia.

and Britain is hardly a contendor to Russian hegeomony over Europe (her real goal)

Surely, hegemony over Europe was not a real of imaginable Russian goal prior to 1814 and it was never close to being realized. As for Britain not being a contender on a continent, surely it was as had been demonstrated in Vienna. Actually, if Britain was not deeply interested in the continental affairs there would be no obvious reason for breaking Peace of Amiens and financing the coalitions.

and a threat to her vital security and economic interests, while France most certainly is.

Let's put it this way, an attempt to harm the British economic interests caused attack on Copenhagen and Paul's assassination. Alexander was bending backwards not to hurt these interests (or to minimize a scope of "hurting" after Tilsit).

Napoleon and Alexander both know the other are their main relevent threat and rival, and they both know this: Russia dident want to overly agitate France after Napoleon's crushing successes during the Years of Victory while her army and budget were strained and she haden't had time to build back up, since France and her sphere could beat her if they focused all their efforts in the East in that case, while France wanted Russia to not poke around in Eastern and Southern Europe and start nibbling away at the edges of her power base/convince Austria to defect while he was nailing down his flank in the south-west by conquering Portugal and getting a client on the throne of Spain. Long-term, France can't tolerate Russia being hyper-powerful and they know this, which means allowing them to eat up huge swaths of new territory is suicidial forgien policy in all but the shortest term, especially since it comes at the cost of destroying the one other potential balancing force he could align with to check against a Russian challange to his continental Empire in the future (Britain being driven to their knees).

Actually, with the exception of the Polish issue (which was an "objective" factor) there was very little in the terms of confronting interests: Russia was not looking for the pieces of "Eastern Europe" because it either already owned them or they were a part of the Hapsburg Empire. Importance of the Russian exports to Britain as a major source of an income can't be underestimated but that's pretty much it. Strictly speaking, until after Tilsit and a major military buildup of 1810 - 12 Russia was not even "hyper-powerful" by the virtue of not having an army bigger than French (not to mention the French-based coalition).

What was important as an "individual" factor is Alexander's personal hate of Napoleon and, again, quite personal slavish attitude toward Britain which was going well beyond the economic factors.

Oh, if I were Russia I'd take this deal, but Napoleon (Especially with Talleyrand whispering in his ear) would have to be drinking lead paint to offer it.

Well, this was another "subjective" factor: Nappy also was an obsessive figure and as such never could stop pushing beyond the reasonable limits. He was ready to make that type of proposals but never ready to implement them even if they'd guarantee him a free hand where it did mattered, in Spain.

Forgein policy decesisions have to take into account the long-term impacts, and Napoleon knows his system can only be maintained so long as it isen't challanged by more force than he can counter. That's why he implemented the Continental System in the first place; to try to drive Britain into reaching a permanent settlement and not subsidizing an army up to oppose him every few years and he could have the normal, peaceful conditions in order to consolidate his new European Order and similarly force to the other powers to accept the permenant shift in the balance of power (Austria being in a secondary status, Prussia knocked out of the game, Russia having a hard border of her influence in the North and West to halt her century of so of advances, ect)

All very true but there was a tiny insignificant problem: impossibility to implement the Continental System in Europe which was too dependent upon the products manufactured in Britain and the revenues from the raw materials sold to Britain. France was not developed enough to act as British substitute so the system was doomed to fail if the Brits just can hold for long enough.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Well, taking into an account that, with an exception of Poland (questionable acquisition in the terms of security, historic ties and absence of troubles) and Finland (which had little to do with Nappy) the OTL Western Russian borders remained practically the same between Tilsit and 1914 while the major expansions did took place in the Central Asia and Caucasus, your argument is not 100% criticism free.

Might that have involved the fact that the Post-Napoleonic system was explicently set up so the Great Powers worked together to keep disruptions to the territorial and influence status quo in Europe to an absolute minimum, and given Russia couldn't compete with a continent set against her continued encroachment in unity without an ally or internal rivalries ripping at possability of organized opposition that was a route of expansion that was possible? Not so when Nappy is standing alone with everybody either hostile or beaten into place by intimidation and force rather than an acceptance of a new status quo.

India, of course, was more than a little bit on a fantastic side (which did not prevent the British politicians and general public from having something like a century of a national paranoia on that subject), but the Russian interests (judging by OTL) were exactly in "the steppes and mountains of Central Asia" which it kept conquering all the way into the reign of Alexander III. The same goes for the expansion in Caucasus region. The "interests" in Southern Europe were pretty much fantasies related to Slavophilia (which would come later) or just plain good imperialism which ended up with acquisition of a tiny Bessarabia.

See above for the basic idea of geopolitics as the art of the possible. And I seem to recall Russia making two attempts to make the Balkans hers by seeking rights of suzeranity/unilaterial internal interference in the Balkans in the first case (Crimes) and establishing a strong client under the Khedival model of the fig leaf of Ottoman Suzeranity in Bulgaria (76/San Stefano) which were only halted by Europe uniting to check her ambitions.

Surely, hegemony over Europe was not a real of imaginable Russian goal prior to 1814 and it was never close to being realized. As for Britain not being a contender on a continent, surely it was as had been demonstrated in Vienna. Actually, if Britain was not deeply interested in the continental affairs there would be no obvious reason for breaking Peace of Amiens and financing the coalitions.

Britain isent if France is too weak or unwilling to contest Russian desires, or so hostile to Britain she can't leverage the alternate power center in Europe to contest the Hegemony. British power on the Continent depends on no one overpowering figure/alliance emerging... which a Russia sucking in an isolated Austria most certainly would be. Theres a reason France kept trying to reach accomidation will Britain rather than crush them.

Actually, with the exception of the Polish issue (which was an "objective" factor) there was very little in the terms of confronting interests: Russia was not looking for the pieces of "Eastern Europe" because it either already owned them or they were a part of the Hapsburg Empire. Importance of the Russian exports to Britain as a major source of an income can't be underestimated but that's pretty much it. Strictly speaking, until after Tilsit and a major military buildup of 1810 - 12 Russia was not even "hyper-powerful" by the virtue of not having an army bigger than French (not to mention the French-based coalition).

What was important as an "individual" factor is Alexander's personal hate of Napoleon and, again, quite personal slavish attitude toward Britain which was going well beyond the economic factor

And when Russia makes a play to turn Austria? Everything pre-Tilst certainly gave France the impression there was nothing structurally in Russia that gave them any qualms about contesting France and Austria clearly being a reluctent partner who was happy to jump ship when it looked like there was an opening. Especially with Britain in the game and the Iberian Ulser bleeding, the French Alliance was shakey at best and Napoleon knew it: hense why he needed time to try to knit his new system together into something lasting. That means he can't be in a position where a major threat exists (since experience upto that point showed if it could go wrong,it would) and a looming Russia is just that thing.

Well, this was another "subjective" factor: Nappy also was an obsessive figure and as such never could stop pushing beyond the reasonable limits. He was ready to make that type of proposals but never ready to implement them even if they'd guarantee him a free hand where it did mattered, in Spain.

The treaties up until that point when not constantly end with close bayonets had been dirt. There's no reason to expect that Russia making a pinky promise not to mess with France wouldn't be ignored the second British gold and Austrian blood were made available.

 

[Xenophonte]

Well if you are looking for more or less fast campaign that would allow an way for France invade and attempt to force to the Ottomans in an decisive battle then the French Navy should control the Adriatic because IMO; the best place to start an invasion and to attempt to do an strategic campaign would be necessary, first, to conquer the Adriatic coast of the Otranto canal by taking Valona / Vlorë (with its large natural bay) with its important Ottoman naval base.

Because its taking in addition to guarantee the dominion of the Adriatic access (when dominating both borders) could provide a great base to France. Its taking in addition to guarantee the dominion of the Adriatic access (by dominating both shorelines) could provide a great base for France.

Besides that, I think, that the taking of Durazzo would be very useful, for its great importance for a terrestrial campaign. It is an even more important objective strategically because it would be possible to avoid a long campaign through the Balkans, against the Ottomans.

Also would be possible that the presence of the Napoleonic armies in the region could perhaps encourage / support rebellions in Albania itself and / or in Greece... It is essential because there begins the Egnatia Way, one of the most important of the few classic routes surviving and in good condition used by the Ottomans (since their first Balkan campaigns) and that I think could allow the rapid (for the time), transit and advance of troops, with their artillery... which, given the characteristics of the Napoleonic armies, their tactical preferences and especially his need for a quick campaign, in my opinion, could be fundamental in any campaign against Constantinople...

Of course once reached it would have to be besieged but since it is to be supposed neither the Russians nor the French can block it by sea ... they would have to try to bomb it until they manage to make a breach in its walls and try to take it by assault.