WI napoleon captures the British army in the battle of waterloo and destroys the Prussian army

Well he was trying to drying English support and was frustrated because the other rulers do not collaborate enough (yes, that backfired spectacularly but was more or less the only way who Napoleon was able to see for getting the English to a damned peace table).
Well, one may describe this approach to subduing Britain as “self-inflicted wounds”. And surely kicking the Austrians out of Italy or tailoring the Duchy of Warsaw out of Prussia or annexation of Oldenburg (offense to AI) were not directly related to Britain.
 
For your information almost all the wars against Napoleon were started by the Coalitions against him (and when he was the first to start, was only because he was trying to obtain something who he hoped would stop Great Britain once for all).
Why should anyone else have any interest in "stopping Britain"? And stopping her from doing what exactly?

Britain wasn't interested in continental possessions, so the most anyone had to fear from her victory was annexation of an offshore island or two, and maybe (though in the event we didn't) another onshore base or two similar to Gibraltar. OTOH defeat by Napoleon could (and frequently did) lead to French annexation of huge slabs of territory.

We didn't need to be loved - just to be seen as the lesser evil. And when the alternative was Napoleon, that was easy
 
Why should anyone else have any interest in "stopping Britain"? And stopping her from doing what exactly?

Britain wasn't interested in continental possessions, so the most anyone had to fear from her victory was annexation of an offshore island or two, and maybe (though in the event we didn't) another onshore base or two similar to Gibraltar. OTOH defeat by Napoleon could (and frequently did) lead to French annexation of huge slabs of territory.

We didn't need to be loved - just to be seen as the lesser evil. And when the alternative was Napoleon, that was easy
You forgot to add that for quite a few continental countries Britain was economically important as importer of their raw (and some processed) materials, aka, source of gold. OTOH, France in that sense was pretty much irrelevant and was mostly exporter of the “luxury items”.

Nappy was seriously trying to turn France into a substitute of the Britain economically but this was not working because France could not consume the available materials and could not produce the manufactured goods on the scale offered by Britain. Ditto for the “colonial goods”: Britain had more of them to offer and France simply did not have enough colonies and ships (*) to compete even if there was no war. Neither was Nappy offering something like the XIX century EU, aka, an open continental market, because his main goal was to protect and promote exclusively French economic interests.

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(*) In the early XIX Russian direct trade with Britain amounted to 15-30% of the imports-exports but, AFAIK, at least 80% of the total imports-exports had been carried by the British ships.
 
You forgot to add that for quite a few continental countries Britain was economically important as importer of their raw (and some processed) materials, aka, source of gold. OTOH, France in that sense was pretty much irrelevant and was mostly exporter of the “luxury items”.
I recall a passage In (I think) a biography of Talleyrand, to the effect that the Battle of Waterloo was *not* won on the playing fields of Eton, but rather "on the ledgers of the Banque de France".
 
Even if while being on Elba Nappy suddenly became a completely new man (who, however, just kicked the sh-t out of the Brits and Prussians but never mind), nobody would believe him.

I have very serious doubts that the Brits would capitulate just for the purpose of “saving” their army because Nappy was not going to start killing the POWs and those who matter (officers and generals) would be living comfortably in France. Defeat by Napoleon definitely would not come as a shock (OTL victory was considered almost a miracle), the Navy was there guarding the homeland and there were continental allies marching to deal with the Ogre.

As for the rest of the allies, they were ready to accept the casualties: this consideration did not stop them in 1813-14.

By the end of May, the total armed forces available to Napoleon had reached 198,000 with 66,000 more in depots training up but not yet ready for deployment. Approximately 100,000 had been deployed on the main front (Armée du Nord).

The immediately available coalition armies for the main front numbered 742,000. Besides the Great Powers, most of the German states contributed.

So if Wellington’s Army of Flanders (93,000) is completely destroyed and Blucher is defeated suffering heavy losses of, say, 15-20,000 out of his 116,000 while Napoleon did not loss a single soldier (😂), the Allies still have the numeric odds much better than at Leipzig and they had 2 ready reserve armies, Russian and Prussian.

Additionally the allies had:
Swiss Army 37,000
Astro-Sardinian Army of Upper Italy 50,000
Austrian Army of Naples 23,000
Anglo-Sicilian Army
Prussian Reserve Army (3 corps)
Russian Reserve Army (2 army corps, grenadier division and Reserve Cavalry Corps)
Portuguese troops (12-14,000)
2 Spanish armies in a stage of mobilization
Danish and Hanseatic contingent




But if coalition falls apart, Prussia is #1 on Nappy’s list and if coalition falls apart due to the prussian “betrayal” Prussia is on its own. Not to mention that at that time the Prussians hated not just Nappy but the French in general and did not behave well in France so that they’d expect retribution in kind. Alexander is seemingly the least motivated except that he was dead set on destroying Nappy and on this he was backed up by the Russian public sentiment. Austria, just as Prussia, would expect retaliation in the case of Nappy’s victory.

Nappy was beaten in 1814 after a series of victories in 1813 and 1814 so how would it be different in 1815? The formula for victory was known and little changed. If anything, it was worse for Nappy because some of the marshals did not join him in 1815.

So to whom Nappy could appeal with some believable proposals? And why would anybody believe these proposals?
You make some good points. It can be argued if Napoleon was sinner or sinned against. I'd say a bit of both. Most coalitions declared war on France but could point to French provocations while France could just as legitimately point to coalition actions to justify its position.

What is a clear fact is that Napoleon was unable to play well with others and both his allies and defeated nations were never reconciled to French dominance as they were brutally exploited afterwards. But this is merely a difference in degree. Other major powers were usually just as predatory,

As to the campaign of 1815, war is never just a matter of adding numbers. Otherwise, both the First and Second World Wars would have gone very differently. Hell, just the Battle of France in 1940 could never have been won by Germany if you just looked at the numbers.

All the minor nations of Europe would join whoever was winning. That's what minor nations do. Most sided with Austria or Prussia in the early 1800s before switching to France and then switching back again after the 1812 disaster. And if France was triumphant in 1815, they'd be pro-French again. Secondly, several of them had done pretty well under French control like Bavaria, and faced being trimmed down by Prussia and Austria so their allegiance to the coalition wasn't that strong. Just looking at Bavaria, it actually had a long history of siding with France against German opponents.

Then there is the notion that Napoleon couldn't be trusted (anymore) so no point in dealing with him. That's just fiction IMO. Any treaty is only viable as long as it can be enforced and its useful. Russia broke its agreement with France to exclude British trade in 1811 which precipitated the 1812 Russian invasion. Was Alexander a pariah as a result? Both Prussia and Austria broke their treaties with France in 1812/1813 without losing all their diplomatic credibility. Nations perfectly understood the value of diplomacy and how the game was played.

The reason for not wanting to negotiate with France in 1814 and 1815 was that the allies knew they had the means to defeat Napoleon at the time as long as they remained united and thus didn't have to negotiate. If Napoleon defeated Wellington and Blucher, likely knocking Britain and perhaps Prussia out of the war, that calculation changes.

I have the feeling that some people feel the defeat of Wellington and the loss of ~40,000 British soldiers would have a negligible effect. I disagree. By 1815, Wellington was the dominant British military leader as well as a coalition figurehead. His defeat would demoralise the coalition and the loss of the British troops would kick Britain out of the war just as much as the Norwegian fiasco in 1940 ended Chamberlain's rule and a defeat at Dunkirk would have knocked Britain out of the war. Sure, there were more soldiers back in Britain and in the US (although the best had been sent to Belgium) but it is the morale effect that matters. You don't have to kill or capture every soldier to defeat a nation, just administer a major shock. Battles seldom inflicted more than 25% casualties on the defeated army. Even during a vicious war such as the Second World War, the German armed forces of 15 million "only" lost around 4 million in dead or POW and they were decisively defeated in every sense of the word. So losing 40,000 troops out of perhaps 150,000 available would be a major disaster. Wellington himself repeats in his own letters the importance of low casualties or the war party will lose political support and how he commanded Britain's only army in the Peninsular and how he couldn't afford to take risks.

I have already said that while the coalition still had additional troops beyond the two armies close to the border, I doubt that they are willing to put everything on the board. I believe there are several reasons for that. Firstly, logistics. There are simply limits to how many troops can be fed in any given area in pre-industrial times as Napoleon found out when one-third of his humongous army starved before even reaching Borodino. Then there is the importance of British funding. British money underpinned the coalition against Napoleon. Without it, neither Prussia, Austria or Russia could afford to fight the war with sufficient numbers.

But most importantly, all coalition partners had been enemies at some point in the not too distant past. They were unlikely to leave themselves vulnerable by sending in all their reserves against Napoleon. Napoleon might be a danger but he wasn't the only threat around. If you add that each nation was jealous of each other's gains and everyone resented Britain for grabbing the lion's share of the loot (one reason they were all eager to stick Britain with the bill), it makes for a rather unstable alliance.
There is a reason why Napoleon always said he'd rather fight a coalition than join one.

Just as I think Napoleon couldn't have won if the 4 main armies had invaded France in July 1815, I don't think the two remaining armies would have won or even continued the fight if Napoleon wrecked Wellington and Blucher first.
 
Well, if we assume as stipulated that the British army is surrounded and surrendered, this means that the Prussians have a chance to get away reasonably easily because Nappy simply can’t advance in two directions simultaneously and as per your scenario Napoleon concentrates on the Brits while Blucher is not marching to their rescue after the Ligny.
So Nappy has approximately 200,000 field troops (plus 100,000 in the garrisons) .
Blucher still has approximately 100,000, Austrians 210,000 and Russians 150,000 with a clear intention not to get engaged until they get together.

Nappy had up to 300,000 raw recruits in training (not sure if he had enough weapons). At least in 1814 French manufactures could not produce enough muskets .

Prussia had approximately 100,000 experienced soldiers in the reserve (V, VI, VIII corps) plus landwehr. The Russians probably could bring up at least extra 100,000 experienced troops. Can’t find anything about the Austrians.

So the allies had immediate overall numeric advantage and probably would not be worse off in the midterm.

What Nappy was short of at that time were the army level commanders. Davout was in Paris, Soult was not too good as a chief of staff and at least during Waterloo campaign Ney was his top field commander which would be funny if it was not tragic. So the allies could repeat the previous campaign and keep beating his marshals disregarding Nappy’s local successes.
With British subsidies, Sweden could bring ~30-40 000 men as well if Napoleon advances into Germany. I agree with the general sentiment - the new coalition is united, has enough men and by now the experience and werewithal to outlast Napoleon even if he wins a myriad of tactical victories. Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain all know that the key to winning against Napoleon is to simply outlast him, which they can do.
 
With British subsidies, Sweden could bring ~30-40 000 men as well if Napoleon advances into Germany. I agree with the general sentiment - the new coalition is united, has enough men and by now the experience and werewithal to outlast Napoleon even if he wins a myriad of tactical victories. Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain all know that the key to winning against Napoleon is to simply outlast him, which they can do.
You are right about the coalition being able to win if they outlast Napoleon but how realistic is that under these conditions?
In Tsouras book, the British are crushed (so not a tactical victory) so they will be out of the war. That means the funding for the others dries up.

So arguing that Sweden could bring 30,000 troops to bear with British funding is meaningless as there wouldn't be any British funding. And would those 30,000 men be the same troops Bernadotte was too afraid to actually commit in 1813 because losses would cost him his throne?
 
You are right about the coalition being able to win if they outlast Napoleon but how realistic is that under these conditions?
In Tsouras book, the British are crushed (so not a tactical victory) so they will be out of the war. That means the funding for the others dries up.

So arguing that Sweden could bring 30,000 troops to bear with British funding is meaningless as there wouldn't be any British funding. And would those 30,000 men be the same troops Bernadotte was too afraid to actually commit in 1813 because losses would cost him his throne?
While the British were highly in debt in 1815, they did have trust and access to the markets, the French did not. There'll be plenty of British funding for the coalition. They did not reach the level of debt during the Napoleonic War that they did during the 7 years' war, so there were more to be milked out of the British Empire.

The Allied army at Waterloo was 25 000 British and 6 000 men from the King's German Legion. The British had plenty of other troops they could raise - their army peaked at 250 000 men in 1813. Even if they lose the entire army under Wellington, they can raise at leasy 4 more of those if they just go to their 1813 levels and maintain garrisons. The war in America has ended and the troops there can be moved back.

Outlasting Napoleon is very likely - they just need to keep in the war, like they did 1813-1814, despite several French victories - they have larger economies and can raise much larger armies than the French, and Napoleon can't be everywhere at once.

As OTL showed us, the first defeat Napoleon suffers his entire Empire unravels. The Coalition only needs to stay in the fight and keep pressuring him like they did 1813-1814, which was their plan. I have a hard time seeing how the French are going to counter that.
 
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I feel we are not on the same page here. You keep bringing up (reserve) numbers to reduce the impact of the fictional defeat at Waterloo/Ligny which indeed favour the coalition to argue that Napoleon could not ultimately win while I try to extrapolate the political ramifications of such a defeat at Waterloo.

How about 1812? Napoleon had numbers on his side against the Russians.
How about the Peninsular War? The French greatly outnumbered Wellington and the Spanish armies.
With your view on numbers, surely Napoleon would easily have won those campaigns. Especially since he could call up many more soldiers if necessary.

Numbers are not decisive. Logistics, funding and political will are far more important. Sure, the British Army fluctuated between 100,000 and 250,000 men during the Napoleonic Wars but what they sent to Belgium in 1815 was what they had to spare. It represented their best effort and a huge investment in men and capital, especially if you include the subsidies they were offering the other continental powers.

Having that destroyed can’t be argued away with claiming there’s more where that came from. It means that a certain policy/strategy has failed. It means that its supporters are discredited and will be replaced, as happens in every political system.

When the first coalition pushed back the defending French armies, the moderates were replaced by extremists. When France was reeling in 1799, Napoleon saw his chance to overthrow the democratic government. When Austria lost in 1805, reformers came to power. When Prussia lost in 1807, reformers came to power. When Napoleon lost in 1814, Louis was restored.

Military defeat leads to political instability and change. And new leaders want peace and stability to secure their regime, not continue a war which their predecessors botched. I think this is the major change that will impact the rest of 1815 and which will dampen the coalition’s ardour.

Following the story, Napoleon has crushed Wellington and Blucher’s army. He is still facing the Russian and Austrian main armies by July. By 1815, all armies are pretty equal in quality and the allies don’t have a great numerical superiority unless they wait for reserves to come up but that would allow Napoleon to strengthen his grip on France and raise more troops too. The area of operations (Eastern France) is much smaller in scale than in 1812 and 1813 so there is less chance of the Trachenberg plan working as Napoleon leads the main army and there likely aren’t secondary French armies in the main theatre. There are also quite a few troops who used to serve under Napoleon before in the coalition forces. Wellington feared that the Dutch and Belgians would switch sides which they didn’t but troops being less than enthusiastic it is not unlikely if Napoleon starts winning battles again. All in all it doesn’t sound like a winning scenario for the coalition to me.

Maybe that’s why Waterloo is so famous? It ended a half-way decent chance for Napoleon to rebuild his Empire?
 
The difference between 1815 and the earlier days is that the Coalition countries have caught up with French military innovation. They use grand batteries, the corps and division system, staff planning, marching tables, indpendent command and have learned how to disengage and retreat and keep their forces together in the case of a defeat, knowing that if they keep in the field, their numbers will tell eventually. They are also about as good as the French themselves at manouvre warfare, which Blücher giving Grouchy the slip after Ligny and arriving at Waterloo to support Wellginton, with Grouchy nowhere to be found.

The advantage in quality that the French held earlier is almost completely gone.

Even if Napoen wins at Waterloo and crushes the Prussians, he only has parity in northern France - the Spaniards and Portuguese will be coming across the Pyrenees come Spring 1816 (they were mobilising, but more slowly than the rest of the Coalition), Britain will raise another army and either put it in Iberia or Hannover to link up with other armies. The Austrians, Prussians and Russians will hold the Rhine and northern Italy while they await the Spaniards, Portuguese, Swedes and further raised reserved from Austria and Russia.

France lacks the strength to destroy any part of the Coalition and faces the same problems as 1813-1814 - concentrare to attack somewhere, and their enemies can attack elsewhere. Even if Napoleon's position is strengthened by a triple victory (Ligny, Waterloo and the Prussians), he's still alone against the whole coalition, which is very, very determined to take him down.
 
You are right about the coalition being able to win if they outlast Napoleon but how realistic is that under these conditions?
In Tsouras book, the British are crushed (so not a tactical victory) so they will be out of the war. That means the funding for the others dries up.

So arguing that Sweden could bring 30,000 troops to bear with British funding is meaningless as there wouldn't be any British funding. And would those 30,000 men be the same troops Bernadotte was too afraid to actually commit in 1813 because losses would cost him his throne?
An idea that after defeat the Brits would capitulate is rather unconvincing because the reason for capitulation is absent. An argument that some author wrote scenario based on that premise is neither here nor there unless you can provide a convincing motivation.

The Brits still have contingents here in there including Anglo-Sicilian “Army” intended for landing in the Southern France. There were up to 12,000 Portuguese trained by Wellington (whom he was planning to add to his army) and over 700,000 allied troops, a big part already had experience of the Napoleonic wars, some on both sides (as various German contingent). With the odds 7:1 the allies were practically doomed to win strategically. Perhaps the British destruction would even produce some hidden gloating because it would make the Brits less self-assured and bossy during the continued talks in Vienna.

Taking into an account that most of these armies had been fully equipped, the British subsidies were not critical. Actually, they were important but not critical even before: the bulk of the expenses had been paid by the coalition participants with the resulting fiscal problems after the war (devaluation. of the paper currency). And they did not need Britain as a motivator: an idea that the Perfidious Albion was a sole initiator of the anti-Napoleonic coalition is laughable.
 
I feel we are not on the same page here. You keep bringing up (reserve) numbers to reduce the impact of the fictional defeat at Waterloo/Ligny which indeed favour the coalition to argue that Napoleon could not ultimately win while I try to extrapolate the political ramifications of such a defeat at Waterloo.

How about 1812? Napoleon had numbers on his side against the Russians.
How about the Peninsular War? The French greatly outnumbered Wellington and the Spanish armies.
With your view on numbers, surely Napoleon would easily have won those campaigns. Especially since he could call up many more soldiers if necessary.

Numbers are not decisive. Logistics, funding and political will are far more important. Sure, the British Army fluctuated between 100,000 and 250,000 men during the Napoleonic Wars but what they sent to Belgium in 1815 was what they had to spare. It represented their best effort and a huge investment in men and capital, especially if you include the subsidies they were offering the other continental powers.

Having that destroyed can’t be argued away with claiming there’s more where that came from. It means that a certain policy/strategy has failed. It means that its supporters are discredited and will be replaced, as happens in every political system.

When the first coalition pushed back the defending French armies, the moderates were replaced by extremists. When France was reeling in 1799, Napoleon saw his chance to overthrow the democratic government. When Austria lost in 1805, reformers came to power. When Prussia lost in 1807, reformers came to power. When Napoleon lost in 1814, Louis was restored.

Military defeat leads to political instability and change. And new leaders want peace and stability to secure their regime, not continue a war which their predecessors botched. I think this is the major change that will impact the rest of 1815 and which will dampen the coalition’s ardour.

Following the story, Napoleon has crushed Wellington and Blucher’s army. He is still facing the Russian and Austrian main armies by July. By 1815, all armies are pretty equal in quality and the allies don’t have a great numerical superiority unless they wait for reserves to come up but that would allow Napoleon to strengthen his grip on France and raise more troops too. The area of operations (Eastern France) is much smaller in scale than in 1812 and 1813 so there is less chance of the Trachenberg plan working as Napoleon leads the main army and there likely aren’t secondary French armies in the main theatre. There are also quite a few troops who used to serve under Napoleon before in the coalition forces. Wellington feared that the Dutch and Belgians would switch sides which they didn’t but troops being less than enthusiastic it is not unlikely if Napoleon starts winning battles again. All in all it doesn’t sound like a winning scenario for the coalition to me.

Maybe that’s why Waterloo is so famous? It ended a half-way decent chance for Napoleon to rebuild his Empire?
An idea that Napoleon i. 1815 had the numbers comparable to those of the allies is absurd. He was facing attack on the multiple fronts and his Army of the North amounted to approximately 100,000 at the start of the campaign. Even if he did not suffer any losses while defeating and forcing capitulate the Brits and delivering a serious defeat to Blucher (an idea of the annihilation of the Prussians AND capture of the Brits is plain silly: he did not have necessary numbers), he is still outnumbered at least 6:1 and scenarios based upon the assumption that the allies would just sit still waiting to be defeated one by one clearly ignoring experience of 1814. Nappy’s methods were well-known and strategy for dealing with them was defined, tested and proved to be successful. The same goes for the logistics: worked in 1814. Comparison with Russia and Spain are irrelevant due to the seriously different circumstances.

An argument that the troops which earlier served under Napoleon are going to switch sides is a purely wishful thinking. These troops had been voluntarily changing sides switching from Nappy to the Allies in 1813-14 because everybody was fed up with him. Building a coherent grand strategy based upon that assumption is unrealistic.
 
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All the minor nations of Europe would join whoever was winning. That's what minor nations do. Most sided with Austria or Prussia in the early 1800s before switching to France and then switching back again after the 1812 disaster. And if France was triumphant in 1815, they'd be pro-French again.
Only if he is *consistently* successful. One battle won't be enough.

All these minor powers had seen him win Dresden in 1813 and Montmirail in 1814, and yet go down to defeat just the same. He'd need to win several more battles for them to consider defecting, and even than it's doubtful, as each battle sees more of his veterans killed, until he is again reliant on half trained (and poorly armed) schoolboys.

Then there is the importance of British funding. British money underpinned the coalition against Napoleon. Without it, neither Prussia, Austria or Russia could afford to fight the war with sufficient numbers.
Funding would continue regardless of what happened at Waterloo. We'd kept it up in the past despite setbacks, and there's no reason for a defeat iin 1815 to change policy any more than on in 1813 or 1814 - indeed a lot less, as we've seen Allied armies reach Paris once already, and know that he ain't invincible.


You are right about the coalition being able to win if they outlast Napoleon but how realistic is that under these conditions?
In Tsouras book, the British are crushed (so not a tactical victory) so they will be out of the war. That means the funding for the others dries up.
How are the British "crushed"? Lossing an army in Belgium is a disappointment, but does notheing to give Napoleon command of the Channel, so Britain is stil immune from invasion. So she is still in the war and funding continues unchanged
 
You make some good points. It can be argued if Napoleon was sinner or sinned against. I'd say a bit of both. Most coalitions declared war on France but could point to French provocations while France could just as legitimately point to coalition actions to justify its position.

What is a clear fact is that Napoleon was unable to play well with others and both his allies and defeated nations were never reconciled to French dominance as they were brutally exploited afterwards. But this is merely a difference in degree. Other major powers were usually just as predatory,

As to the campaign of 1815, war is never just a matter of adding numbers. Otherwise, both the First and Second World Wars would have gone very differently. Hell, just the Battle of France in 1940 could never have been won by Germany if you just looked at the numbers.

All the minor nations of Europe would join whoever was winning. That's what minor nations do. Most sided with Austria or Prussia in the early 1800s before switching to France and then switching back again after the 1812 disaster. And if France was triumphant in 1815, they'd be pro-French again. Secondly, several of them had done pretty well under French control like Bavaria, and faced being trimmed down by Prussia and Austria so their allegiance to the coalition wasn't that strong. Just looking at Bavaria, it actually had a long history of siding with France against German opponents.

Then there is the notion that Napoleon couldn't be trusted (anymore) so no point in dealing with him. That's just fiction IMO. Any treaty is only viable as long as it can be enforced and its useful. Russia broke its agreement with France to exclude British trade in 1811 which precipitated the 1812 Russian invasion. Was Alexander a pariah as a result? Both Prussia and Austria broke their treaties with France in 1812/1813 without losing all their diplomatic credibility. Nations perfectly understood the value of diplomacy and how the game was played.

The reason for not wanting to negotiate with France in 1814 and 1815 was that the allies knew they had the means to defeat Napoleon at the time as long as they remained united and thus didn't have to negotiate. If Napoleon defeated Wellington and Blucher, likely knocking Britain and perhaps Prussia out of the war, that calculation changes.

I have the feeling that some people feel the defeat of Wellington and the loss of ~40,000 British soldiers would have a negligible effect. I disagree. By 1815, Wellington was the dominant British military leader as well as a coalition figurehead. His defeat would demoralise the coalition and the loss of the British troops would kick Britain out of the war just as much as the Norwegian fiasco in 1940 ended Chamberlain's rule and a defeat at Dunkirk would have knocked Britain out of the war. Sure, there were more soldiers back in Britain and in the US (although the best had been sent to Belgium) but it is the morale effect that matters. You don't have to kill or capture every soldier to defeat a nation, just administer a major shock. Battles seldom inflicted more than 25% casualties on the defeated army. Even during a vicious war such as the Second World War, the German armed forces of 15 million "only" lost around 4 million in dead or POW and they were decisively defeated in every sense of the word. So losing 40,000 troops out of perhaps 150,000 available would be a major disaster. Wellington himself repeats in his own letters the importance of low casualties or the war party will lose political support and how he commanded Britain's only army in the Peninsular and how he couldn't afford to take risks.

I have already said that while the coalition still had additional troops beyond the two armies close to the border, I doubt that they are willing to put everything on the board. I believe there are several reasons for that. Firstly, logistics. There are simply limits to how many troops can be fed in any given area in pre-industrial times as Napoleon found out when one-third of his humongous army starved before even reaching Borodino. Then there is the importance of British funding. British money underpinned the coalition against Napoleon. Without it, neither Prussia, Austria or Russia could afford to fight the war with sufficient numbers.

But most importantly, all coalition partners had been enemies at some point in the not too distant past. They were unlikely to leave themselves vulnerable by sending in all their reserves against Napoleon. Napoleon might be a danger but he wasn't the only threat around. If you add that each nation was jealous of each other's gains and everyone resented Britain for grabbing the lion's share of the loot (one reason they were all eager to stick Britain with the bill), it makes for a rather unstable alliance.
There is a reason why Napoleon always said he'd rather fight a coalition than join one.

Just as I think Napoleon couldn't have won if the 4 main armies had invaded France in July 1815, I don't think the two remaining armies would have won or even continued the fight if Napoleon wrecked Wellington and Blucher first.
Most of what is written has little to do with 1815 and the rest clearly assumes that the whole Napoleonic Wars had been caused by the Brits.

No relevant numbers and explanations are provided to explain how exactly with less than 100,000 Napoleon is going to defeat between 500 and 600,000 of the first echelon allied troops (not to mention at least 100,000 in the active reserve) and repel the invasion. coming from all sides.

An idea that Wellington’s defeat would have a devastation psychological effect on the rest of the allies is one more “it is all Britain” perception. By the start of campaign he was, indeed, lauded for his victories in Spain but he was not an iconic figure on whom all expectations had been based. Neither was the army under his command. Waterloo came as a surprise: nobody expected that Nappy would be beaten that fast and the troops had been marching. Alexander would be probably gloating: he offered Wellington to add the 2nd Russian Army to his troops and the Duke refused.

The same for Blucher: he was in charge of one of two Prussian armies and nobody expected him to beat Napoleon. Causing some losses and retreating toward the main allied force would be just fine.

As for the smaller theater, in 1814 the fighting was happening in France and the theater proved to be big enough for the allies to outmaneuver Napoleon and take Paris while he was winning the pointless tactical victories elsewhere.

Now, as far as the logistics is involved, I would recommend some caution when you are bringing up the examples. In 1812 Napoleon did not lose 30% of his army due to the starvation. There were numerous reasons for the non-battle losses but starvation was not one of them: the French were OK with the food supplies even in Moscow and Napoleon left a number of the supply depots on his march Eastward, the biggest one in Smolensk. Most of these reasons would be absent during campaign in France.
 
Now, as far as the logistics is involved, I would recommend some caution when you are bringing up the examples. In 1812 Napoleon did not lose 30% of his army due to the starvation. There were numerous reasons for the non-battle losses but starvation was not one of them: the French were OK with the food supplies even in Moscow and Napoleon left a number of the supply depots on his march Eastward, the biggest one in Smolensk. Most of these reasons would be absent during campaign in France.
Yes, dysentery, typhus and diphteria were the big killes of Napoleon's army in Russia.
 
Yes, dysentery, typhus and diphteria were the big killes of Napoleon's army in Russia.
Plus exhaustion, plus massive desertion. Not to mention that the road from Vilnius to Moscow is much longer than from Belgium to Paris, that, unlike Russia, the numerous good quality roads had been available, that the climate is milder, that, unlike situation in 1812, the allies generally knew how to take care of their forces, that the Northern France had a much more dense population than Russian territory on Napoleon’s route, etc.
 
The difference between 1815 and the earlier days is that the Coalition countries have caught up with French military innovation. They use grand batteries, the corps and division system, staff planning, marching tables, indpendent command and have learned how to disengage and retreat and keep their forces together in the case of a defeat, knowing that if they keep in the field, their numbers will tell eventually. They are also about as good as the French themselves at manouvre warfare, which Blücher giving Grouchy the slip after Ligny and arriving at Waterloo to support Wellginton, with Grouchy nowhere to be found.

The advantage in quality that the French held earlier is almost completely gone.

Even if Napoen wins at Waterloo and crushes the Prussians, he only has parity in northern France - the Spaniards and Portuguese will be coming across the Pyrenees come Spring 1816 (they were mobilising, but more slowly than the rest of the Coalition), Britain will raise another army and either put it in Iberia or Hannover to link up with other armies. The Austrians, Prussians and Russians will hold the Rhine and northern Italy while they await the Spaniards, Portuguese, Swedes and further raised reserved from Austria and Russia.

France lacks the strength to destroy any part of the Coalition and faces the same problems as 1813-1814 - concentrare to attack somewhere, and their enemies can attack elsewhere. Even if Napoleon's position is strengthened by a triple victory (Ligny, Waterloo and the Prussians), he's still alone against the whole coalition, which is very, very determined to take him down.
realistically if the allies distrust each other could the numbers sent to fight napoleon have been lowered by 1/3 to 1/2 at least if they mistrust each other enough specially if Napoleon play his cards rights like In the book causing the Austrians and Russians to hold back their troops and Prussian part of their troops because of Napoleon leaking plans of UK plans to create a alliance against Prussia and Austria to maintain the balance of power during congress of Vienna causing mistrust and fears of betrayal by their fellow allies
 
realistically if the allies distrust each other could the numbers sent to fight napoleon have been lowered by 1/3 to 1/2 at least if they mistrust each other enough specially if Napoleon play his cards rights like In the book causing the Austrians and Russians to hold back their troops and Prussian part of their troops because of Napoleon leaking plans of UK plans to create a alliance against Prussia and Austria to maintain the balance of power during congress of Vienna causing mistrust and fears of betrayal by their fellow allies
They may mistrust each other, but they all hate Napoleon far more. The OTL response, with some 700 000 men being ready within two months tell its story. Even if you remove 100 000 of them, the rest will be coming, and if you remove them, the Coalition will raise more troops. They'll defeat Napoleon first and bicker later, just like 183-14.
 
realistically if the allies distrust each other could the numbers sent to fight napoleon have been lowered by 1/3 to 1/2 at least if they mistrust each other enough specially if Napoleon play his cards rights like In the book causing the Austrians and Russians to hold back their troops and Prussian part of their troops because of Napoleon leaking plans of UK plans to create a alliance against Prussia and Austria to maintain the balance of power during congress of Vienna causing mistrust and fears of betrayal by their fellow allies
It seems that the book is full of the crappy ideas because in a reality it was other way around: each of the main allied forces agreed to commit 150,000 but in a reality Russians committed 200,000 and Austrians at least the same number. Nobody would believe that Britain is going to make a pact with Napoleon and it looks like the author does not understand a fundamental perception difference between the Bourbons and Nappy. The Bourbons were accepted as an equal party at Vienna but Nappy was Enemy #1.
 
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