WI: Napoléon Had Had Kids By His Coronation

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I'm aware of these facts and quite agree that if there was more talent on the French side the battle of Aboukir could end up differently. But an admiral of a greater talent would not need general Bonaparte to tell him what to do, which was my main point on this specific subject.

My main doubts were about scenario in which the army left in Egypt with the fleet sailing away. An idea of sneaking the reinforcements on the merchant ships looks unreliable at best even if because the Brits would not have the moral (or any other) issues with intercepting such a traffic. OTOH, a fleet sailing with the reinforcements and supplies would have to face a high possibility of being caught by the Brits and forced to fight a major naval battle. With the French navy still being handicapped by the French Revolution, the risk of a defeat would be high.

Then, of course, goes an issue of the Suez Canal. 1st, this would be a long and complicated project and 2nd, if as you proposed the French are building the ships on the Red Sea, they don't need this canal at all (there was a thread dedicated to the pre-steam Suez canal). Of course, how they'll get the resources needed for such a task and the crews needed for the ships is a separate issue. Or why would they need them at all? A cautious Bonaparte would concentrate on solidifying control over Egypt with a minimal effort needed to secure border with Syria (no need for the OTL activities). But a really cautious Bonaparte would not come with that Egypt-India nonsense at all: he would concentrate on the realistic issues like fighting in Europe.

This is the literature I was talking about, this narrative was written by Charles S. Grant (see images) - sorry if it is blurry, just concentrate, read it slowly and you should be able to read it.

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Kaze

Banned
Even if Josephine or one of Napoleon's mistresses has children before his coronation, it might not end so well for them. Napoleon would likely still get himself bogged down in Spain and make a disastrous invasion of Russia - these two fates would have him defeated and the children would find themselves ---
1. dead, the allies might not want him to have his children to lay claim to their father's empire
2. house arrest until they died -- see Napoleon II's life
3. exiled to some inhospitable place
The only way to avoid 1 through 3 would be a Napoleonic victory in Spain and Russia, which would be in the matter of ASB. Of course the easiest way to avoid Spain and Russia would not going there in the first place, but Napoleon's enemies drew him there like a moth to the flames and snow.
 
Even if Josephine or one of Napoleon's mistresses has children before his coronation, it might not end so well for them. Napoleon would likely still get himself bogged down in Spain and make a disastrous invasion of Russia - these two fates would have him defeated and the children would find themselves ---
1. dead, the allies might not want him to have his children to lay claim to their father's empire
2. house arrest until they died -- see Napoleon II's life
3. exiled to some inhospitable place
The only way to avoid 1 through 3 would be a Napoleonic victory in Spain and Russia, which would be in the matter of ASB. Of course the easiest way to avoid Spain and Russia would not going there in the first place, but Napoleon's enemies drew him there like a moth to the flames and snow.
Both Spain and Russia are evitable in the right circumstances (Russia let Paul I live longer, Spain marry Ferdinand with a Bonaparte related girl)
 
This is the literature I was talking about, this narrative was written by Charles S. Grant (see images) - sorry if it is blurry, just concentrate, read it slowly and you should be able to read it.

It is still mostly unreadable but, hopefully, I got an idea. Scenario is based upon a series of the lucky events:

1. French fleet managed to escape and reach Toulon safely. IMO, this was quite possible with a little bit of luck.
2. After that escape the Brits sacked Nelson and pretty much gave up on the Mediterranean operations. While I think that the 1st was possible under the right set of the circumstances (missing the enemy once is unfortunate but the 2nd time it is a pattern and paying too much attention to the wishes of Lady Hamilton would be an addition argument not in his favor), I don't think that the whole British strategy was based solely upon Nelson. Actually, the funny thing is that Paul ordered Admiral Ushakov (who just took Corfu by a naval assault and participated in the allied operations in Southern Italy) to join the Brits at Malta but Ushakov was senior in rank to Nelson, and Nelson would be subordinate to him. Nelson disliked that very much, and therefore suggested dispatching the Russian squadron to Egypt instead (did not happen). So, potentially, you may have scenario under which the French fleet at Aboukir is facing Russians instead of the Brits, which, taking into an account Ushakov's record and the numbers, would not be necessary change to the better: at Abukir Nelson had 13 ships of the line, 1 fourth rate and 1 sloop-of-war; Ushakov's force (at Corfu) included 12 ships of the line and 11 frigates. However, it seems unlikely to me that the Brits would simply give up after the few offsets and without suffering a single defeat. If not Nelson, there would be somebody else and the British navy still had quality advantage over the French. To send supplies and reinforcements to Egypt the French still have to cross the Med and, with the Brits eventually capturing Malta (or even without it), these convoys could be intercepted. Anyway, with the Allies holding pretty much all Italy, communications are dangerous.
3. French land operations in Egypt/Syria are completely successful. IMO, could happen. Especially if the British fleet completely disappears from the Med and the French are free to send reinforcements.
4. The Brits are not as successful in India as in OTL (interestingly, author assumes that Wellseley is successful, how about having him beaten as well? ;)). Probably, may happen but, IIRC, in OTL Perron advised his employer against fighting the Brits even if this required disbanding of his Sepoy troops. There was no need for sending the "French advisers" because there were numerous French officers in charge of the Sepoy troops (which were French creation) but it is still unclear how exactly any French reinforcements would arrive in India because even under the best circumstances alliance (not quite clear why it would happen) with the Ottomans would not provide a land route to India or, to prevent the Brits from intercepting the French ships sailing from the Red Sea.
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It is still mostly unreadable but, hopefully, I got an idea. Scenario is based upon a series of the lucky events:

1. French fleet managed to escape and reach Toulon safely. IMO, this was quite possible with a little bit of luck.
2. After that escape the Brits sacked Nelson and pretty much gave up on the Mediterranean operations. While I think that the 1st was possible under the right set of the circumstances (missing the enemy once is unfortunate but the 2nd time it is a pattern and paying too much attention to the wishes of Lady Hamilton would be an addition argument not in his favor), I don't think that the whole British strategy was based solely upon Nelson. Actually, the funny thing is that Paul ordered Admiral Ushakov (who just took Corfu by a naval assault and participated in the allied operations in Southern Italy) to join the Brits at Malta but Ushakov was senior in rank to Nelson, and Nelson would be subordinate to him. Nelson disliked that very much, and therefore suggested dispatching the Russian squadron to Egypt instead (did not happen). So, potentially, you may have scenario under which the French fleet at Aboukir is facing Russians instead of the Brits, which, taking into an account Ushakov's record and the numbers, would not be necessary change to the better: at Abukir Nelson had 13 ships of the line, 1 fourth rate and 1 sloop-of-war; Ushakov's force (at Corfu) included 12 ships of the line and 11 frigates. However, it seems unlikely to me that the Brits would simply give up after the few offsets and without suffering a single defeat. If not Nelson, there would be somebody else and the British navy still had quality advantage over the French. To send supplies and reinforcements to Egypt the French still have to cross the Med and, with the Brits eventually capturing Malta (or even without it), these convoys could be intercepted. Anyway, with the Allies holding pretty much all Italy, communications are dangerous.
3. French land operations in Egypt/Syria are completely successful. IMO, could happen. Especially if the British fleet completely disappears from the Med and the French are free to send reinforcements.
4. The Brits are not as successful in India as in OTL (interestingly, author assumes that Wellseley is successful, how about having him beaten as well? ;)). Probably, may happen but, IIRC, in OTL Perron advised his employer against fighting the Brits even if this required disbanding of his Sepoy troops. There was no need for sending the "French advisers" because there were numerous French officers in charge of the Sepoy troops (which were French creation) but it is still unclear how exactly any French reinforcements would arrive in India because even under the best circumstances alliance (not quite clear why it would happen) with the Ottomans would not provide a land route to India or, to prevent the Brits from intercepting the French ships sailing from the Red Sea.
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I feel like I have the energy to make the case myself now. I have re-read the narrative with an analytical eye just for you.

Grant perceives that the fact that Nelson was able to find the French fleet was really lucky because they had managed to evade him for so long. For example, Nelson actually got to Alexandria first, after Napoleon had departed Malta. Nelson left on the 28th June, only for Napoleon to arrive on the 29th. (The French Fleet was slower than the British.)

Nelson gives Napoleon's military expedition to Egypt a reality feasibility check. Grant quotes Nelson’s letter to St Vincent directly:
  • “Upon their whole proceedings together with such information as I have been able to collect, it appeared clear to me, that either they were destined to assist the rebel Pasha and to overthrow the present government of Turkey, or to settle a colony in Egypt, and to open a trade to India by way of the Red Sea; for strange, as it may appear at first sight, an enterprising Enemy, if they have the force or consent of the Pasha of Egypt, may with great ease get an army to the Red Sea. And if they have concerted a plan with Tippoo Sahib to have vessels at Suez, three weeks, at this season, is a common passage to the Malabar Coast, when our India possession would be in great danger.”
Notice how Nelson himself reflects on such a plan to make a French colony in Egypt, “for strange, as it may appear at first sight”. Finally Nelson has fantastic forethought that if the French can get an army on the Red Sea, they can send French troops via Tippoo Sahib to India. What’s intriguing is according to a 13 February 1798 report by Talleyrand:
  • "Having occupied and fortified Egypt, we shall send a force of 15,000 men from Suez to India, to join the forces of Tipu-Sahib and drive away the English."
I think what is murky, is that if the French got away and reached Toulon I don’t think the same configured fleet would go back to Egypt. Why would you send the same fleet back after successfully expediting a military force to Egypt? My logic is that you give the fleet more ships of the line and transports because of this success, and this enables Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign to be successful. However, not everyone has that common sense. Anyhow, I think it would be imperative for Napoleon and his army to live off the Egyptian land regardless.

A number of foreign units we raised by Napoleon, which total up to 15,000 men.
  • Indigenous Guides – ‘Omar’s Company’
  • Legion Greque – (Brigade: includes infantry, artillery, Cavalry and the ‘Legion Cophte’)
  • Legion Maltese (raised in Malta)
  • Company of Syrian Janissaries a Cheval
  • The French army: 60,000 men
The French fleet can survive in either one or two ways. The first is Napoleon releases the fleet on the 31st July and Nelson misses it by one day again by arriving on the 1st August.

The second is how François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers anchored his fleet at Aboukir Bay and I quote:
  • "The French fleet lying off Akoukir was singularly ill-prepared to meet an enemy. The French position had all the potential to be a strong one - the fleet was in line, with its back to the coast, which should have rendered it impossible to turn, while to the north the forts of Aboukir itself and the island of Bequireres secured one end of the line. However, the fleet was anchored too far offshore, and the normal naval practice of closing the ships up and stringing cables between them (to prevent their line being penetrated) had not been followed."
If François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers had anchored properly then Nelson would have reacted differently and may not have tried to destroy the fleet because they were in a greater position. Notice the movement of Nelson's ships and how he got his ships behind the French line, mainly at the front, in the image below.

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The capture of Sidney Smith is based on that “In October 1798 he was appointed to the command of the "Tigre," 80, and was sent to the Mediterranean.” The French fleet leaves Aboukir bay on the 31st July. Either the French fleet catches Smith on return to France in the mid-Mediterranean, which is a difference of one to two months. Although Grant says Smith is captured by reinforcements going back to Egypt. However, if a French fleet does return to Egypt with reinforcements this would give Napoleon a chance of successfully besieging Acre even if Smith is not captured and is at Acre.

What is wholly ironic, is that Napoleon reminisced later in his life and said of Smith that: "That man made me miss my destiny". That is one heck of statement coming from Napoleon, I think even he knew on reflection. I feel his frustration.

In sieging Acre is it pretty plain sailing for Napoleon. He enters Damascus with people throwing flowers at him, the streets strewn with palms and people offering him gifts. However, at this point, it is not completely finished the Turks. The Turks muster 7,000 to 20,000 men and land at Aboukir and are commanded by Mustafa Pasha. The army has no cavalry. (The battle of Aboukir) Napoleon, of course, wins the battle and creates "French Egypt".

In conclusion, Napoleon making "French Egypt" was very much closer than everybody realises.
 
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I feel like I have the energy to make the case myself now. I have re-read the narrative with an analytical eye just for you.

Grant perceives that the fact that Nelson was able to find the French fleet was really lucky because they had managed to evade him for so long. For example, Nelson actually got to Alexandria first, after Napoleon had departed Malta. Nelson left on the 28th June, only for Napoleon to arrive on the 29th. (The French Fleet was slower than the British.)

Nelson gives Napoleon's military expedition to Egypt a reality feasibility check. Grant quotes Nelson’s letter to St Vincent directly:
  • “Upon their whole proceedings together with such information as I have been able to collect, it appeared clear to me, that either they were destined to assist the rebel Pasha and to overthrow the present government of Turkey, or to settle a colony in Egypt, and to open a trade to India by way of the Red Sea; for strange, as it may appear at first sight, an enterprising Enemy, if they have the force or consent of the Pasha of Egypt, may with great ease get an army to the Red Sea. And if they have concerted a plan with Tippoo Sahib to have vessels at Suez, three weeks, at this season, is a common passage to the Malabar Coast, when our India possession would be in great danger.”
Notice how Nelson himself reflects on such a plan to make a French colony in Egypt, “for strange, as it may appear at first sight”. Finally Nelson has fantastic forethought that if the French can get an army on the Red Sea, they can send French troops via Tippoo Sahib to India. What’s intriguing is according to a 13 February 1798 report by Talleyrand:
  • "Having occupied and fortified Egypt, we shall send a force of 15,000 men from Suez to India, to join the forces of Tipu-Sahib and drive away the English."
I think what is murky, is that if the French got away and reached Toulon I don’t think the same configured fleet would go back to Egypt. Why would you send the same fleet back after successfully expediting a military force to Egypt? My logic is that you give the fleet more ships of the line and transports because of this success, and this enables Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign to be successful. However, not everyone has that common sense. Anyhow, I think it would be imperative for Napoleon and his army to live off the Egyptian land regardless.

A number of foreign units we raised by Napoleon, which total up to 15,000 men.
  • Indigenous Guides – ‘Omar’s Company’
  • Legion Greque – (Brigade: includes infantry, artillery, Cavalry and the ‘Legion Cophte’)
  • Legion Maltese (raised in Malta)
  • Company of Syrian Janissaries a Cheval
  • The French army: 60,000 men
The French fleet can survive in either one or two ways. The first is Napoleon releases the fleet on the 31st July and Nelson misses it by one day again by arriving on the 1st August.

The second is how François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers anchored his fleet at Aboukir Bay and I quote:
  • "The French fleet lying off Akoukir was singularly ill-prepared to meet an enemy. The French position had all the potential to be a strong one - the fleet was in line, with its back to the coast, which should have rendered it impossible to turn, while to the north the forts of Aboukir itself and the island of Bequireres secured one end of the line. However, the fleet was anchored too far offshore, and the normal naval practice of closing the ships up and stringing cables between them (to prevent their line being penetrated) had not been followed."
If François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers had anchored properly then Nelson would have reacted differently and may not have tried to destroy the fleet because they were in a greater position. Notice the movement of Nelson's ships and how he got his ships behind the French line, mainly at the front, in the image below.

View attachment 455136

The capture of Sidney Smith is based on that “In October 1798 he was appointed to the command of the "Tigre," 80, and was sent to the Mediterranean.” The French fleet leaves Aboukir bay on the 31st July. Either the French fleet catches Smith on return to France in the mid-Mediterranean, which is a difference of one to two months. Although Grant says Smith is captured by reinforcements going back to Egypt. However, if a French fleet does return to Egypt with reinforcements this would give Napoleon a chance of successfully besieging Acre even if Smith is not captured and is at Acre.

What is wholly ironic, is that Napoleon reminisced later in his life and said of Smith that: "That man made me miss my destiny". That is one heck of statement coming from Napoleon, I think even he knew on reflection. I feel his frustration.

In sieging Acre is it pretty plain sailing for Napoleon. He enters Damascus with people throwing flowers at him, the streets strewn with palms and people offering him gifts. However, at this point, it is not completely finished the Turks. The Turks muster 7,000 to 20,000 men and land at Aboukir and are commanded by Mustafa Pasha. The army has no cavalry. (The battle of Aboukir) Napoleon, of course, wins the battle and creates "French Egypt".

In conclusion, Napoleon making "French Egypt" was very much closer than everybody realises.
I don't know, the French ability to evade the British was more to do with just how hard it is to find a ship in the middle of the sea then on any skill of the Frenchs part, I highly doubt that they would catch Sidney even if they looked for him, and I doubt the French leaving would be as ezey as the British know where they are and where they are going, which the lake of that was more important then anything else in slowing the French to get to egipt in the first place.
 
I don't know, the French ability to evade the British was more to do with just how hard it is to find a ship in the middle of the sea then on any skill of the Frenchs part, I highly doubt that they would catch Sidney even if they looked for him, and I doubt the French leaving would be as ezey as the British know where they are and where they are going, which the lake of that was more important then anything else in slowing the French to get to egipt in the first place.

Very true, but if Napoleon can get Acre, that's what was standing between French eviction and French Egypt.

Statistically talking:
  • Battle of the Nile and Smith getting to Acre: British victory
  • French Fleet escapes but Smith gets to Acre: Tossup - depends on French reinforcements etc. 50/50
  • French Fleet escapes and Smith is caught: French victory
  • French Fleet anchors properly but Nelson attacks. The defensive line repulses the British and the battle rages for days. (maybe longer than over 3 as it did.) The French counter-attack upon the British retreat to penetrate the defensive line and through an exhausted and damaged British fleet, the French encircle the British and pick them off, winning the Battle of the Nile. As a result, Smith cannot get to Acre because of French dominance in the east med: French victory, French strategic and tactical naval victory
 
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Very true, but if Napoleon can get Acre, that's what was standing between French eviction and French Egypt.

Statistically talking:
  • Battle of the Nile and Smith getting to Acre: British victory
  • French Fleet escapes but Smith gets to Acre: Tossup - depends on French reinforcements etc. 50/50
  • French Fleet escapes and Smith is caught: French victory
And the French are still stuck in Egypt/Syria with their supplies and reinforcements being dependent on luck (the French fleet may or may not avoid destruction by the Brits when it sails again with the reinforcements) rather than a solid communication line. Yes, they can keep staying in Egypt and general Bonaparte may keep sending reports about his plans to sail to India (or to the North Pole) but in a reality they are not going anywhere because sailing to India would require construction of the numerous ships on the Red Sea and supplying these ships with the experienced crews (and the crews are already in France). Plus, sending any significant contingent anywhere means leaving Egypt more vulnerable to the Ottomans and Brits.

The people in Egypt and Syria may initially greet the conquerors but as soon as the French start confiscating food and do their usual looting, the sentiments are going to change as were the cases elsewhere. In a meantime tens of thousands of experienced troops and a number of good generals are absent on the battlefields of Italy and Germany and the French armies are being defeated.

The expedition was a foolish idea to start with and Napoleon’s claim that the whole gigantic plan failed just because of a single British officer is one of his usual over dramatizations (how about one more Brit, certain Horatio Nelson? How about the Ottomans not capitulating? How about a very low probability of being able to sail for India in the best case scenario?etc.). Let’s face the obvious fact that Nappy was extremely reluctant to acknowledge his strategic failures and tended to attribute the failures to some insignificant factors (preferably out of his control) rather then fundamental faults of his own planning. Take his description of Essling: it is not even a defeat but an absence of a glorious victory is due to the fact that a single bridge had been destroyed by the Austrians. Should not a military genius or at least his chief of staff,if he is marginally competent, to think about building more then one bridge? The same with Egypt. It was a fundamental flop (based upon a lot of ambitions, inadequate knowledge and abstract ideas) but no, it was just unlucky case of a single British officer arriving at a wrong place in a wrong moment. Sorry, if a general situation was OK, a genius artilleryman like Bonaparte surely could overcame this specific problem.
 
So which of the Children grows up to be the black sheep, wastrel and general disappointment to the Emperor? What happens to said child?
 
And the French are still stuck in Egypt/Syria with their supplies and reinforcements being dependent on luck (the French fleet may or may not avoid destruction by the Brits when it sails again with the reinforcements) rather than a solid communication line. Yes, they can keep staying in Egypt and general Bonaparte may keep sending reports about his plans to sail to India (or to the North Pole) but in a reality they are not going anywhere because sailing to India would require construction of the numerous ships on the Red Sea and supplying these ships with the experienced crews (and the crews are already in France). Plus, sending any significant contingent anywhere means leaving Egypt more vulnerable to the Ottomans and Brits.

The people in Egypt and Syria may initially greet the conquerors but as soon as the French start confiscating food and do their usual looting, the sentiments are going to change as were the cases elsewhere. In a meantime tens of thousands of experienced troops and a number of good generals are absent on the battlefields of Italy and Germany and the French armies are being defeated.

The expedition was a foolish idea to start with and Napoleon’s claim that the whole gigantic plan failed just because of a single British officer is one of his usual over dramatizations (how about one more Brit, certain Horatio Nelson? How about the Ottomans not capitulating? How about a very low probability of being able to sail for India in the best case scenario?etc.). Let’s face the obvious fact that Nappy was extremely reluctant to acknowledge his strategic failures and tended to attribute the failures to some insignificant factors (preferably out of his control) rather then fundamental faults of his own planning. Take his description of Essling: it is not even a defeat but an absence of a glorious victory is due to the fact that a single bridge had been destroyed by the Austrians. Should not a military genius or at least his chief of staff,if he is marginally competent, to think about building more then one bridge? The same with Egypt. It was a fundamental flop (based upon a lot of ambitions, inadequate knowledge and abstract ideas) but no, it was just unlucky case of a single British officer arriving at a wrong place in a wrong moment. Sorry, if a general situation was OK, a genius artilleryman like Bonaparte surely could overcame this specific problem.

This emphasises how prevalent chaos theory really is in relation to reality, all the chance and small margins are just crazy. As a historian I believe Napoleon got it completely wrong, I think he should have been more diverse in what he wanted in order for his actions to have a more widespread and global impact. He single-handedly could have dominated Europe, restored French India, create a near east colony, and explore French Louisiana. I believe he concentrated too much on Europe and eventually got wrapped up in this greedy, selfish, ignorant, arrogant and crazy idea that he could unite Europe and I think Josephine not having children played a defining part in any outcome regardless. You know this book I have has 10 different scenarios of how Napoleon could have behaved differently given the chance and how he could have turned out differently as a result. Out of all the scenorios, this is most likely because all of the scenarios are out of his influence, remit, hands and authority. (literally) This is the only scenario where he has some influence on determining his life, that is why I like it so much.

If Napoleon wanted to unite a large majority of Europe he could have used French Egypt and India geographical locations to fight against the British. Ultimately however it would require a large naval battle to aid to him. And we all know how bad he was with naval warfare, despite being recommended as a naval officer.

However, I ain't moaning about him losing the Egyptian campaign. The guy went mad and gave me loads of battles to study which might not have happened.:love:
 
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So which of the Children grows up to be the black sheep, wastrel and general disappointment to the Emperor? What happens to said child?

Considering Napoléon's standards (and how easily he seems to have shaken off family members - Lucien and Louis during the empire, his scathing attacks on them in his memoirs etc), might I venture any or all of them?

Both Spain and Russia are evitable in the right circumstances (Russia let Paul I live longer, Spain marry Ferdinand with a Bonaparte related girl)

With kids of his own, might Napoléon offer Hortense? I know you said Borghese was as high as a Bonaparte could get at the time, but the fact that Eugène managed to get a king's daughter (two were considered, Auguste of Bavaria and Maria Amelia of Naples) plus the general view of Europe's royals that the Beauharnais were preferable to the Bonapartes.
And my reason for thinking this is ISTR once in an encyclopedia (ICR the name) that while Godoy was trying to negotiate a marriage between Fernando and a daughter of Louis XVI, Fernando was interested in a niece of Napoléon's. Now, the dates don't line up, since Madame Royal was the only daughter of Louis XVI (and she wed in 1799), when most of Nap's daughters were still in single digits. By the time a niece would've been acceptably aged, Madame Royal was married nearly a decade with no kids. Which makes me wonder if they didn't confuse it, and mean a niece of Louis XVI (i.e. actually Marie Antoinette, since Louis had none), which is what Maria Antonia of Naples was.

dead, the allies might not want him to have his children to lay claim to their father's empire
2. house arrest until they died -- see Napoleon II's life

In a bio of Napoléon's I read, they said that while in an earlier time, Reichstadt would've been quietly poisoned, "in this more enlightened era, however, the task of

Never had so small a child been so great an embarrassment. All the glories, all the menace of the Bonaparte name were now concentrated in this little child. What was to be done with him? Several centuries earlier he [Reichstadt] would probably have been poisoned; in these more enlightened times, a more subtle means of minimising his importance had to be devised. Luckily he was still young enough to be moulded into whatever form was considered advisable, and to this end their grandfather, Emperor Francis, spurred on by the shrewd Prince Metternich directed his energies.

Now, obviously, a kid who is a teenager is probably going to be a little bit more difficult to reschool as Reichstadt was OTL. But I doubt very much that they will outright murder them. Admittedly, they don't have a dynastic connection like Reichstadt, but there would be enough backers (if Alexander I has an interest in his daughter being French empress, he's going to advocate Napoléon abdicate (a la Franz II with Reichstadt OTL); Napoléon's eldest daughter is probably wed internationally, so provided her husband is important enough, that might also stay everyone's hand at forcing an outright deposition/countenancing a murder). The Bourbons are essentially an unknown quantity, whereas with a Bonaparte Europe's learned to "live with" if not "like" the idea. But, if worst comes to worst, they'll probably be sent down to St. Helena with dad. Or some place equally remote
 
@JonasResende: yes, that was most likely a mistake between Louis XVI and Ferdinand IV...
If Spain is so interested in making such match with Napoleon’s family so early Hortense will most likely get it...
Someone like Borghese was the best who Napoleon can get at the time of Pauline’s OTL second wedding but if someone apparently out of reach is interested and want that match is pretty likely who Napoleon will say yes. When Napoleon planned Eugene’s wedding his power was considerably higher than that he had when Hortense’s married (to Louis). If Hortense was widowed (by Louis or another husband) in the period of the highest power of Napoleon she would most likely remarry to either Ferdinand VII of Spain or Ferdinand of Austria (former GrandDuke of Tuscany and brother of the Emperor).
 
And the French are still stuck in Egypt/Syria with their supplies and reinforcements being dependent on luck (the French fleet may or may not avoid destruction by the Brits when it sails again with the reinforcements) rather than a solid communication line. Yes, they can keep staying in Egypt and general Bonaparte may keep sending reports about his plans to sail to India (or to the North Pole) but in a reality they are not going anywhere because sailing to India would require construction of the numerous ships on the Red Sea and supplying these ships with the experienced crews (and the crews are already in France). Plus, sending any significant contingent anywhere means leaving Egypt more vulnerable to the Ottomans and Brits.

The people in Egypt and Syria may initially greet the conquerors but as soon as the French start confiscating food and do their usual looting, the sentiments are going to change as were the cases elsewhere. In a meantime tens of thousands of experienced troops and a number of good generals are absent on the battlefields of Italy and Germany and the French armies are being defeated.

The expedition was a foolish idea to start with and Napoleon’s claim that the whole gigantic plan failed just because of a single British officer is one of his usual over dramatizations (how about one more Brit, certain Horatio Nelson? How about the Ottomans not capitulating? How about a very low probability of being able to sail for India in the best case scenario?etc.). Let’s face the obvious fact that Nappy was extremely reluctant to acknowledge his strategic failures and tended to attribute the failures to some insignificant factors (preferably out of his control) rather then fundamental faults of his own planning. Take his description of Essling: it is not even a defeat but an absence of a glorious victory is due to the fact that a single bridge had been destroyed by the Austrians. Should not a military genius or at least his chief of staff,if he is marginally competent, to think about building more then one bridge? The same with Egypt. It was a fundamental flop (based upon a lot of ambitions, inadequate knowledge and abstract ideas) but no, it was just unlucky case of a single British officer arriving at a wrong place in a wrong moment. Sorry, if a general situation was OK, a genius artilleryman like Bonaparte surely could overcame this specific problem.
Well the hole expedition was made becuse the French geopolitical position was in not a good position, when power is a zero sum game non of the other nations where not going to take Frances new power lying down, and they could keep contesting French power as long as Briton can keep paying to do that, France needs to get brition to exept the new European order but can't attack them directly, so then napolion gets to hit them in the only place where it would hurt, indea, iven if it's unlikely as invading England, but France needs to do something and the French navy has had better luck then anything in the metranian.
 

Kaze

Banned
Considering Napoléon's standards (and how easily he seems to have shaken off family members - Lucien and Louis during the empire, his scathing attacks on them in his memoirs etc), might I venture any or all of them?



With kids of his own, might Napoléon offer Hortense? I know you said Borghese was as high as a Bonaparte could get at the time, but the fact that Eugène managed to get a king's daughter (two were considered, Auguste of Bavaria and Maria Amelia of Naples) plus the general view of Europe's royals that the Beauharnais were preferable to the Bonapartes.
And my reason for thinking this is ISTR once in an encyclopedia (ICR the name) that while Godoy was trying to negotiate a marriage between Fernando and a daughter of Louis XVI, Fernando was interested in a niece of Napoléon's. Now, the dates don't line up, since Madame Royal was the only daughter of Louis XVI (and she wed in 1799), when most of Nap's daughters were still in single digits. By the time a niece would've been acceptably aged, Madame Royal was married nearly a decade with no kids. Which makes me wonder if they didn't confuse it, and mean a niece of Louis XVI (i.e. actually Marie Antoinette, since Louis had none), which is what Maria Antonia of Naples was.



In a bio of Napoléon's I read, they said that while in an earlier time, Reichstadt would've been quietly poisoned, "in this more enlightened era, however, the task of



Now, obviously, a kid who is a teenager is probably going to be a little bit more difficult to reschool as Reichstadt was OTL. But I doubt very much that they will outright murder them. Admittedly, they don't have a dynastic connection like Reichstadt, but there would be enough backers (if Alexander I has an interest in his daughter being French empress, he's going to advocate Napoléon abdicate (a la Franz II with Reichstadt OTL); Napoléon's eldest daughter is probably wed internationally, so provided her husband is important enough, that might also stay everyone's hand at forcing an outright deposition/countenancing a murder). The Bourbons are essentially an unknown quantity, whereas with a Bonaparte Europe's learned to "live with" if not "like" the idea. But, if worst comes to worst, they'll probably be sent down to St. Helena with dad. Or some place equally remote


Actually I suspect Napoleon II was "helped into the grave" - his death by pneumonia that lead into TB seemed rather "convenient", I would not put it past Metternich to help it along. By reasoning is that in 1831, Franz was given command of an Austrian battalion, but he never got the chance to serve in any meaningful capacity - it seemed that Franz was military minded much like his father and if he got command, who knows...
 
Actually I suspect Napoleon II was "helped into the grave" - his death by pneumonia that lead into TB seemed rather "convenient", I would not put it past Metternich to help it along. By reasoning is that in 1831, Franz was given command of an Austrian battalion, but he never got the chance to serve in any meaningful capacity - it seemed that Franz was military minded much like his father and if he got command, who knows...

I wouldn't put it past Metternich. But then again, the real Metternich is not necessarily the Metternich of history. I think it was his son who said (when editing his father's memoirs), "my father wanted to be known in Europe as the man who had outwitted Napoléon". Metternich himself wrote in his memoirs:

I do not think it was a good inspiration of Napoleon’s which called me to functions which gave me the opportunity of appreciating his excellences, but also the possibility of discovering the faults which at last led him to ruin and freed Europe from the oppression under which it languished.
Napoléon didn't have a high opinion of Metternich's talents. At a court function while Metternich was still ambassador to France, he unceremoniously ditched Metternich onto the queen of Naples saying "Entertain this simpleton, we are wanted elsewhere."
Now, Metternich in his memoirs points out that his "simpleton" appearance was an act, and little more. But considering that the memoirs are written after the fact, I can't help wonder how honest they are. They seem very "pat on the back" to me.
 
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