Yes the essential thing was to reduce power to the good engine immediately so as to maintain control followed quickly by feathering the dead engines' propeller and dumping any external load. Much would depend on the length of the runway as to whether you can stop the plane in time or at least run off the end at a less than ruinous speed. As long as the over run isn't a building or treeline. If one can't stop safely than a single engine go around is necessary. Training is everything.
Yes the essential thing was to reduce power to the good engine immediately so as to maintain control followed quickly by feathering the dead engines' propeller and dumping any external load. Much would depend on the length of the runway as to whether you can stop the plane in time or at least run off the end at a less than ruinous speed. As long as the over run isn't a building or treeline. If one can't stop safely than a single engine go around is necessary. Training is everything.
I understand your disappointments. Right now they are in a bit of a "grey area" in the single-engine procedures. The final process for handling engine-out on take off wasn't developed until '43-'44 OTL and wasn't included in the standard pilot's manual until a late '44 or even early '45 revision. In fact, in the Pilot's Manual for P-38D,E,F,&G I have, the "Engine Failure on Take-Off" information is marked as last revised on 1 September 1943 and still uses the instruction:
LeVier started to demonstrate his single-engine flying to combat groups in early '44 precisely because they hadn't had good training in that area and so the pilots new to the type were having quite a few issues with it.
As for the in-flight procedure and the landing procedure--those came right from the memories of P-38 pilots (having the flight leader talk the trainees through engine feathering and re-start procedures) and from the P-38 H, J, L Pilot's Manual (admittedly a 15 September 1944 revision). Regarding single-engine landings, the manual explicitly sates:
I know it doesn't show-case LeVier's abilities at all, but this is early in the development of the proper single-engine procedures and we will see him showing his skill in the future.
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You did a great job on the translation. Do you know if the Russian version of the Renault 6P the Voronezh MV-6 engine was supercharged?
That airplane could've benefitted from a little more wing area I think. And a little more horsepower. The estimated top speed of 420 MPH looks fishy. Unless that's in a dive.
Imagine a situation where an American version of a SAM-13 with Ranger 440s are built as a cheap "Air Militia/Air Guard" fighter in response to war jitters caused by the beginning of WW2 in Europe.
Can I add the link to your article in the Fokker D23 thread?
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OTL there were several proposals for cheap interceptors to be produced in mass numbers out of non-strategic materials and using light, cheap low powered engines. Bell made one and Preston Tucker had a similar proposal. The Tucker was never constructed and the Bell, which didn't come out in test-flyable form until pretty late in the war (which is why it had a high number, XP-77) offered no advantage over existing models, was distinctly inferior in every parameter and also dangerously flimsy as well, killing a number of test pilots.
The Tucker design looked kind of cool in a throwback sort of way, having a triangular fuselage cross section.
Fans of rather poorly written AH specialized around technology may have read Rowan Patridge's ZRS, a novel of an alternate world where airship proposals popular OTL in 1930 are followed through with by the WWII era, so that the USN has a number of large rigids which are coming to be regarded as light aircraft carriers, the British have followed through with their Empire scheme so an upgraded form of R101 is plying the air ways between Britain and Australia by way of Indonesia and Singapore in 1941, and the Hindenburg is still airborne and in the hands of the Kriegsmarine as late as 1942. Action centers around an Australian Naval officer attached to the USS Long Island, a rigid airship largely following the design of the OTL USS Akron and Macon, but somewhat longer and wider (and with some ATL features highly dubious in application IMHO). The characters and plot are melodramatic and as I say the technical stuff is often pretty wooly. One of the most egregious errors I would point out to the author if he had shown any slight interest in getting feedback is, though, IMHO a matter of terminology.
You see, Partridge correctly observes that if the USN were to adopt the Rigid program beyond the two prototypes Akron and Macon, and follow through, they most surely would develop some specialized airplanes to hook on to them, and as the decade advanced the old Curtis Sparrowhawk biplanes would have necessarily been rendered obsolete. One way to get an airship-carrier specialized model would be to adapt a standard Naval airframe to specialized conditions--lighten it by getting rid of fixed retractable landing gear for instance; lighten it generally out of necessity--thus a version of the Avenger IIRC (or whatever dive-bomber was current in 1941) was developed. Being specialized for airship hook on operations, its Naval designation added the letter "Z" to the end to indicate its adaption to an LTA platform.
Well and good. That took care of the attack/bomber component of the small flight wing. What about the patrol/interceptor component? Partridge, in his wisdom, decided that the OTL Bell XP-77 would be quite suitable as an airship based defensive interceptor. He argued, perhaps soundly, that the typical engine overheat problems the plane exhibited OTL would be largely matters of takeoff and landing, but an airship hook on version would not suffer this; then the lightness and very high maneuverability of the platform would come into play making it a formidable defensive weapon for the airship. Partridge just skates right past the fact that OTL Bell did not have the inferior version that actually flew ready to do so until April 1944, and indeed the Army did not commission the program until 1942--but has a version of these fighters operational as the defense of the Naval rigids in commission already in December 1941--which I think implies the Navy, not the Army, commissioning the program in 1938 or earlier. Obviously the world of fighter design was quite different in 1937 and '38 than it was in 1942.
But worst of all--Partridge has Navy fighter pilots flying Navy planes from a Navy airship, but the fighters are still called P-77 anyway! I think it goes without saying the USN in the WWII period would sooner see all its vessels sunk and every aircraft downed then tolerate the use of Army designations for Navy aircraft! Also of course no aircraft that was ready for service in 1941 would have such a high number in the Army as P-77. It is freaking tragic though that Partridge did not adopt a consistent naval designation for the proposed ATL earlier Bell airship-based fighter, and here's why:
If in fact in the ATL, Bell had been commissioned as early as say late 1937 to develop such an airplane for the Navy, and had found themselves designing essentially the same plane but better somehow, for hook-on operations from an airship exclusively, and in that role it proved acceptable and was purchased and every airship fighter pilot transitioned over to them by December 1941...the general class of aircraft would be Fighter, which in the Navy was sensibly designated with an F (as opposed to Army, which used F for reconnaisance planes, presumably F standing for "Fotographic!"). The next set of characters in a Navy plane designation indicate which in the numerical series of aircraft of that type the Navy had procured from its particular maker. Thus, the second fighter purchased from Grumman, the famous Hellcat, was F2F. For various goofy and contingent reasons, the letters used to designate a given manufacturer were rarely matched up to the first letter of the company's widely known name. Voight was given U, hence the F4U Corsair; Grumman got F while Goodyear (whose FG was a version of the F4U) got G, and so on. As it happened, Bell company got the letter L, and OTL its first offering to the Navy in the fighter category was of course the XFL, "Airabonita," a navalized version of the P-39, contract for test prototype awarded in June 1938. If they were to submit their offering for the Airship based interceptor after the Airabonita the light fighter would be F2L (number one being omitted).
But we could reasonably assume the order was reversed and it was the light fighter, in response to a request for proposals in 1937, that was chosen for development first. This would make the airship parasite fighter the first Bell model chosen and assuming its testing leads to a contract for operational use as it clearly had in Partridges's ATL...we would then have, bearing in mind a suffix added to designate its use in the specialized context of airship launch and landing for airship defense, with LTA being generally designated with a Z....
FLZ. Clearly destined to be known to its pilots and detractors alike as either FLIES...or FLOOZY!
Partridge really should not have overlooked this.
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Going back more to the post I am responding to, if the purpose of using light engines like the Ranger is to save money and weight to allow the production of vast swarms of thousands of cheap interceptors to be produced quickly, why on Earth would they double up engines? Using two engines where one might do is a classic way of making an extra expensive gold plated airplane--it was in fact one of the major reasons the P-38 was neglected and ignored once wartime hit hard OTL--with numbers a much desired criterion, a two engine plane was strongly disfavored.
To be sure, the light cheap aircooled engines, Rover, Franklin and all those, were limited in power. Two engines might prove to be necessary for adequate performance.
However, what is to prevent any manufacturer ready and willing to use two engines instead of one from adopting the conventional solution of putting one engine on each wing, freeing up the nose for a gun battery as with the P-38--or Mosquito, which such a side-engined plane would more closely resemble? It should be pretty straightforward to devise some solution or other making the engines counterrotate, and for P-38 experience to tell the designers which way to make the props spin (Bottom in or bottom out?)
I don't see any reason why they'd want to arrange two engines in a pushme-pulliya arrangement. Admittedly it allows contrarotation of engines without any engineering changes whatsoever (just install the rear one backwards, the rear prop will now automatically spin in the other direction, which has aerodynamic as well as gyroscopic advantages--to be sure the propeller has to be a different model, with reversed blades, but so it must be with the side by side props too, or contraprops turning on the same axis, anyway.
The ultimate development here is to use four engines, two each mounted on each wing in a shared nacelle, to turn each one half of a contraprop arrangement, with the option of shutting down one each in the pair and gearing the abandoned contraprop half to the other one that is still driven by the still running engine. Now we have the ultimate prop efficiency, use of four light and possibly cheap and simple engines, the ability to cut out half the power for long range/endurance economy cruise combined with competitively high power for combat by switching on all four engines, and a clean weapons pod in the nose. So, one might get the performance of a 2000 HP fighter with the cruise/loiter economy of a 1000 hp set.
A few preliminary notes regarding this next chapter.
First, it is not very exciting. There is no dialogue and no action. It is simply a broad-scope engineering and development update from Hall Hibbard's point of view laying out some of the developments being worked on by various groups associated the the P-38.
Second, and most importantly, regarding the engine issues discussed in this chapter, I know this is a contentious subject which we have belabored much throughout this thread. We have NOT reached the point of identifying Lead Separation problems yet as I had read a few weeks ago (although I stupidly did not save the source and cannot find it again) that the 8AF P-38 groups did not start using the Lead-rich fuels until November/December '43 and those were introduced as part of the standardization of Grade 100/130 fuel between US and British sources (104/150 was introduced in March of '44 as far as I can tell). Prior to that, the P-38's were having problems related to the British fuel additives causing condensation in the induction system. I have read, variously, that this problem was resolved by the manifold re-design, by re-porting the intakes, and/or by the switch to TEL fuel (which may have then introduced the lead separation problem). The whole thing is damn confusing and inconsistent between several sources. So, what I settled on here was a bit of "artistic licensing" to allow me to relate the current problems to those experienced in the ATL XP-38J testing and propose several solutions which may, or may not, help solve the immediate problem but which do set the stage to provide earlier solutions to other problems not yet identified. Please, try to understand that although I have tried to keep this TL as grounded in reality as possible, in this case there is some divergence largely because no one is real clear on exactly what the "reality" was.
Third, regarding the boosted Ailerons...well, I looked up the Patents to get the dates of their first installation, the name of their inventor, and their basic operation. You can see for yourself by looking up US Patents 2424901 A & 2591871 A.
Post to follow.
First, it is not very exciting. There is no dialogue and no action. It is simply a broad-scope engineering and development update from Hall Hibbard's point of view laying out some of the developments being worked on by various groups associated the the P-38.
Second, and most importantly, regarding the engine issues discussed in this chapter, I know this is a contentious subject which we have belabored much throughout this thread. We have NOT reached the point of identifying Lead Separation problems yet as I had read a few weeks ago (although I stupidly did not save the source and cannot find it again) that the 8AF P-38 groups did not start using the Lead-rich fuels until November/December '43 and those were introduced as part of the standardization of Grade 100/130 fuel between US and British sources (104/150 was introduced in March of '44 as far as I can tell). Prior to that, the P-38's were having problems related to the British fuel additives causing condensation in the induction system. I have read, variously, that this problem was resolved by the manifold re-design, by re-porting the intakes, and/or by the switch to TEL fuel (which may have then introduced the lead separation problem). The whole thing is damn confusing and inconsistent between several sources. So, what I settled on here was a bit of "artistic licensing" to allow me to relate the current problems to those experienced in the ATL XP-38J testing and propose several solutions which may, or may not, help solve the immediate problem but which do set the stage to provide earlier solutions to other problems not yet identified. Please, try to understand that although I have tried to keep this TL as grounded in reality as possible, in this case there is some divergence largely because no one is real clear on exactly what the "reality" was.
Third, regarding the boosted Ailerons...well, I looked up the Patents to get the dates of their first installation, the name of their inventor, and their basic operation. You can see for yourself by looking up US Patents 2424901 A & 2591871 A.
Post to follow.
@Shevek23. I can't agree with your description of the P-38 as neglected and ignored. The P-38 was in such high demand the War Production board would not permit interruptions to the production lines to implement a significant improvement to the airplane.
Regarding your comments on the pusher puller planes have you had a chance to read the thread I started recently about the Fokker D23? The same questions you raise here are addressed to some degree in that thread.
Regarding your comments on the pusher puller planes have you had a chance to read the thread I started recently about the Fokker D23? The same questions you raise here are addressed to some degree in that thread.
Ch.22 - Too Many Balls in the Air (Oct 1943)
12 October 1943
Burbank, California, USA
Hall had to admit, he was impressed.
When the order came through more than four months ago to send the “Swordfish” P-38 to Nashville so Vultee could use it as a basis for a two-seater variant of the airplane he was expecting an almost exact copy of the tested design. Instead, the engineers had thrown the long-nose Lightning concept out the window and developed an entirely new gondola for a two-seat pilot-trainer version of the airplane.
In the introduction to the design to proposal they stated a number of deficiencies in the Swordfish which would make it poorly suited as a P-38 trainer. Primary among them was that with the pilot moved so far forward the view and feel from the cockpit was altered too much from the standard single-seat P-38. Associated with that was that the Swordfish had a different Center of Gravity, different trim characteristics, different ground-handling—including, most critically, altered take-off and landing behavior.
The design examination continued with an overview of the changes in internal and external structures between the standard P-38 and the Swordfish test-plane. All of the differences meant that only a small percentage of parts and panels could be inter-changed between the two which would add complexity to both manufacture and repair.
Instead, Vultee was proposing a new extended two-seat gondola of their own design using as many existing structures and panels as possible. To accomplish this, they started with keeping the primary pilot in the same location, directly in front of the main spar and placed the second seat between the aft and main spar. The rear, instructor, pilot then sits directly on top of the rear wing structure with a small well cut behind the main spar for his feet and the rudder pedals. This small foot well interferes with the span-wise stiffening corrugations through about two-and-half feet of the upper center wing section so, to compensate, they added diagonal braces which go forward from the rear of the well structure sides to a vertical brace extension from the center of the main spar. This vertical extension then doubles as a bulkhead between the two cockpit sections and serves as a framework from which the rear instrument panel is secured.
The canopy uses the same three sections: forward, rear, and center; but, the center piece is re-framed to remove the sliding mechanism and to hinge from the right side. Between the center section and the rear glass is a plug over the main-spar and vertical extension followed by another right-hinging center piece for the rear cockpit. The rear cockpit canopy then merges with the same contour of the rear glass as the standard airplane.
The new framing on the center Plexiglas extends on the top to change the profile of the glass to better streamline the new junction between the two center canopies. This faring interferes with visibility directly above the pilot’s head, but it is only a minor concern for a training aircraft and a small price to pay to use the existing form for the glass instead of developing a whole a new piece for each section.
The rear of the gondola is then extended about three feet from the standard one-place P-38, accomplished by added a fuselage plug and new skin panels below the rear cockpit. The underside of the gondola is completely unchanged all the way back to the fuselage plug behind the trailing edge of the center wing assembly and terminates in the same tail-cone as the standard airplane, complete with the egress ladder. The plug has several spring-closed hand and foot holds to enable the pilots to get from the ladder—now farther rear—to the wing surface.
Since most of the added weight is planned to be placed between the two main spars, and thus within the Mean Aerodynamic Chord, the only change in aircraft balance that would need to be accommodated is the rear-ward shift of the gondola’s tail cone and the lack of forward armament in the nose. To compensate for these changes, the nose-cone is planned to be replaced with one slightly longer and built with heavy steel and integrated weights. In addition, the hydraulic reservoirs and pumps will be moved from below the radios to in front of the forward bulkhead in the rear of the nose compartment. Any additional shifts in the center of gravity that may be identified from flight-testing can then be added either in the nose-compartment (to shift balance forward) or within the fuselage plug (to shift balance aft).
The end result was a two-seat version of the P-38 which largely duplicated the primary pilot’s experience of the airplane while still accommodating the second pilot in similar comfort. That Vultee achieved this while re-using more than 80% of the existing assemblies was quite impressive, even by Hall Hibbard’s high standards.
The news from Niagara, or more properly from Wheatfield, New York, was just as good. Bell had spent the last three months converting one of the assembly lines to P-38 production and were now ready to start working on their first few test aircraft. In typical fashion, the first handful of planes would be used more to test and tweak the assembly and manufacturing processes than to build real usable aircraft, but it is was an essential step to getting their facility moved into full production. They were not exactly ahead of schedule, but they were running good and getting where they needed to be to get combat-quality aircraft flowing before Christmas—perhaps even as soon as Thanksgiving.
His own designers were also hard at work. Kelly Johnson had sequestered many of Lockheed’s best in a rented circus tent to work on a Secret project ordered by the Air Tactical Service Command (ATSC). Hall, Kelly, and Court Gross were three of only seven people at Lockheed who actually knew what the project was—most of the men working on it were given specific components and sub-assemblies to work on to specifications set forth by Johnson and his core team of four. The order was to deliver a new fighter prototype by November 23rd but the kicker was that this fighter would powered by a British Halford H-1 B centrifugal jet.
A few weeks ago, a representative from the Navy had tried reaching Dick Pulver but was mistakenly transferred directly to Irv Culver in Kelly Johnson’s circus tent—which was unfortunately downwind of a plastics factory. Culver picked up with an informal, “Skonk Works, inside man Culver.” After some initial confusion the call was sent back to Pulver and Hall had later heard all about it. Apparently, Culver and some of the other senior engineers working in the sequestered group thought it was funny to poke fun at the awful smell from the plastics factory by referring to the popular “L’il Abner” comics. Hall agreed, it was funny, but not very professional so he had Johnson deal with it who promptly fired Culver (Culver came back the next day and as far as Hall knew was still working on the project without another word said about being fired).
Progress on the new jet fighter was going well, even though the ATSC still had not sent the official order for the airplane. With access to all of Bell’s work on their P-59 “Airacomet” to go off of as well Kelly Johnson’s previous work on the in-house developed L-133 they were well ahead plan and were expecting to have the completed prototype within a month. Hall was anxious to see the completed product.
Prior to being shunted over to Johnson’s secret team in the “Skonk Works,” Culver had proposed an interesting solution to Compressibility Stalls in the P-38. Although the NACA redesign in the Model 422 had increased the dive limits of the airplane to acceptable combat speeds, the stalls were still occasionally occurring at high altitude in power-on dives and were thus still a problem. Hall heard that most of the new fast fighters were running into the same issue, too, that between Mach 0.78 and Mach 0.8, depending on the plane, the planes would become unstable in some manner with both his P-38 and Republic’s P-47 suffering dives as a result. Culver came up with the idea of fitting 58 inch span by 8 ½ inch chord Dive Recovery Flaps to the mid-chord of outer wings, directly outboard of the engine nacelles. These flaps were to be electrically operated to drop 40 degrees into the airstream on the underside of the wings to change the pressure gradient during high speeds and enable recovery from a compressibility stall.
Ralph Virden had tested a P-38H with these Dive Recovery Flaps installed in a powered dive from 30,000 feet and was able to successfully recover from a Mach 0.83, about 585 mph, dive at 22,000 feet. He reported tail buffeting at those speeds but he was able to maintain vertical control throughout the dive. Further testing revealed that the DRFs provided an overall increase to the average Critical Mach of the airplane by about Mach 0.034, or just over a 4% increase from an unmodified airplane. The Air Force, however, did not see them as essential equipment so they refused permission to produce a retrofit kit for existing airplanes but have given Lockheed the “go-ahead” to add them to future production block so long as it does not interfere with factory output.
In July, General-Electric’s new B-33 turbo was added to P-38H production in what the AAF called the P-38H-15-LO. This new turbo increased the critical altitude of the airplane by several thousand feet and provided a matching performance increase at high altitudes. These Block-15 airplanes were even now starting to arrive in Europe to outfit some of the nascent P-38 Fighter Groups still waiting for airplanes.
On the production line, the final block of 450 P-38’s ordered from the 1942 Budget Year, beginning with AC# 42-103979, were starting to roll off the factory floor as P-38H-18-LO and were almost identical to the Block-15 but had a streamlined landing light installed in the left-wing leading edge instead of the old retractable light the previous airplanes used.
Once that order was complete, they would begin production of Block-20 P-38H’s which were still being finalized and modified according to feedback coming directly to Hall from Tony LeVier, who was stationed with the 78th Fighter Group in England. Some of the requests, such as that for a unified engine control system locking the throttles to the speed and mixture levers, were pretty major and would most likely wait for either a later block or more likely the next major model. Others were more achievable and were being developed by the P-38 Team.
One request was procedural rather than technical and Hall had forwarded it on Milo Burcham and his team to figure out. That was for revised single-engine emergency handling on take-offs. It was a problem which had plagued the P-38 since its introduction but the USAAF had passed on spending resources tackling it with the reasoning that mishandling was a result of pilot error. Now, LeVier had sent word that it was a procedural problem related to the stated actions in the standard Pilot’s Manual and that a better process needed to be developed. From what Milo had relayed to Hall, LeVier and several pilots of the 78th were working on procedures to apply immediately in the field at the Group level but that they wanted review and assistance from the Flight Testing team back in California.
The most recent request, just arriving to Hall the previous week, was related to a rash of engine failures that the 78th and 55th Fighter Groups had started to experience as they were training for high-altitude bomber escort missions and—for the 78th—starting to make their first short range sorties into France and the Dutch Netherlands. The repeated problem seemed to be that the alcohol-based fuel octane booster used in England was vaporizing and causing the humidity in the air to condense and even freeze at high altitude. Hall was not sure there was anything he could do directly about the fuel additives—that would be for the Army to figure out—but LeVier had relayed that the ground crews were recommending come manner of temperature regulation to keep ice from forming in the induction system as well as either insulation or some manner of vapor barrier to keep the fuel lines from icing.
Neither solution sounded likely to Hall. He felt that this was a fuel supply issue rather than an engineering issue and that his groups’ resources would be better spent on other items. The obvious solution to the problems would be to change the octane booster additives in the fuel from alcohol based to Tetraethyl Lead (TEL), which he heard was happening anyway, and that being the case, Hall was inclined to respond that the problem is the Air Force’s rather than Lockheed’s. A recent preliminary report from Col. Kelsey in Ohio, however, had mentioned similar problems with the XP-38J they had been testing.
Hall had been surprised when news came through that the AAF had abandoned the Allison F15 engines in favor of an engine originally intended for the Bell P-63 which had been hastily field adapted to F-Series standards and fit into the XP-38J airplane at Wright Field. This new engine included Allison’s first production Water Injection system which in testing was discovered to cause condensation on the water lines and in the induction system at low boost settings. The chemists explained that because the alcohol vaporizes so quickly it causes a rapid decrease in temperature which in a humid environment can readily fall below the dew point and cause condensation. Under cold and humid conditions, such as at high altitude over the Great Lakes or in Western Europe, that condensation would freeze and cause ice buildup—which was exactly what Tony LeVier was reporting from England with the alcohol-rich fuel.
Since Kelsey indicated that the USAAF would continue pursuing installation of Water Injection he had directly requested Lockheed research solutions to the problem. The issue of condensation on the lines and freezing valves could be easily solved by insulating the water-methanol lines in the Water Injection installation. With the proposed water tank installation location, directly next to the engine nacelles in the first section of the outer-wing leading edge, the water lines will only be a few feet long and could handle the insulation without difficulty. When it came to LeVier’s problem with alcohol in fuel, the insulation was more problematic because of the total length of all the fuel lines in the airplane made this an ill-suited solution. With the plan to move to TEL additives to the fuel, Hall was doubly convinced to ignore the line-condensation problem for the time being.
The problem of induction condensation was both simpler and more complex at the same time. What made it simpler was that all they needed to avoid the condensation was a way to keep the critical surfaces of the intake manifold and induction system above the dew point so the condensation would never form. What made it difficult was managing the temperatures in such a way that it would not increase the charge air temperature to such an extent as to cause detonation.
His engine installation mechanics were now working directly with engineers from Allison on the problem. Allison had determined through testing that the induction condensation was likely caused by uneven heating and fuel-air distribution in the intake manifold, which they were already working to redesign.
Another solution was to find a way to control the minimum temperature of the charge air using the existing carburetor air temperature sensor and existing inter-cooler installation. Although this would not help with the fuel-air distribution problems in the intake manifold it could help keep the induction charge temperature sufficiently high to prevent the condensation problem. Thus, the engineers were working out a way to ensure the air is not over-cooled in cold-air conditions.
The combat groups with the 8th AF were reporting the problem even with the inter-cooler shutters completely closed, that when flying in air colder than -30° F they were discovering that the charge air was not warm enough to prohibit condensation. This meant that they needed to find another way to keep the charge air temperature above a critical point through other means.
A junior mechanic on the engine installation team had the idea of simply covering the inter-cooler inlet with a piece of cardboard, as was commonly done to cover the radiators of automobiles during the cold winters back in his home in Levina, Montana. Lockheed had no way of testing this from Burbank so Hall and joined with the Allison group in sending the recommendation over to LeVier to see if it helps at all. If it does, then Hall will need to divert some resources to developing a more permanent and fully integrated system to enable control of the inter-cooler inlet duct.
The final option, which LeVier was reportedly exploring himself, was to experiment with higher manifold pressure settings using lower engine speed as a way to maintain a sufficiently warm induction charge to avoid condensation while cruising. The Allison representatives had balked at the idea as unsafe, and considering the revealed shortcomings on their current manifold design, Hall was prone to support them, but LeVier had insisted that based on Kelsey’s and Col. Cass Hough’s tests the previous winter on the manifold pressure limits at full power, these new P-38H’s with their F17 engines should not have any trouble running under such conditions.
Hall would just have to wait and see what develops regarding those issues.
Of all the problems the P-38 had experienced during its development and over its first two years of combat, the only one that had not yet been fully addressed was the slow initial roll rate. This was mentioned, repeatedly, in most of the Air Corps and later Air Force assessments and always accompanied by requests to find ways to improve the airplane’s rate of roll; but, it had never been as high a priority as other problems with the airplane. Now, with all of the those other problems solved (for the most part), Hall was able to apply some resources into finding a way to increase the P-38’s roll and reduce the aileron load, especially at high speed.
Previously, the idea had been tossed around to use hydraulics to control the ailerons but in every application they considered they ran into three main problems with the idea: that the pilot would receive no feed-back from the control surfaces and therefore was likely to apply too much force and overtax the ailerons; that there was no way for the system to self-center—that is, to automatically return to a “neutral” position when the control yoke was released; and, that in order for it to work the primary control cables would need to be removed which would prevent emergency control in the event of hydraulic failure. These issues prevented Lockheed from simply installing hydraulic servos to the ailerons connected directly to the yoke.
In July, one of the engineers, Bob Richolt, had dedicated himself to solving the problem by designing a new type of hydraulic servomotor. He finally came up with a design utilizing a pressure valve of his own design which would allow the hydraulic actuator on the ailerons to increase the force applied by the pilot to the yoke rather than simply taking the entire load. This allows an installation which still uses the standard control cables but which multiplies the force on the ailerons from these cables and reduces the force required by the pilot to deflect the surfaces.
Bob had completed his designs and the initial test installation was completed on August 9th. The hydraulic “boosters,” as the flight engineering team were now calling them, were installed on the aft-side of the outer-wing main spar, at approximately mid-span of the ailerons. The installation includes two of the booster servomotors per side, one connected to the “up” control cable, and one to the “down” control cable, by bell cranks which increase the pilot’s force through a push/pull-rod to the aileron.
Milo Burcham himself took the modified plane up on a few test flights in August and September and after some adjustments to the pressure valve settings and changes in the bell crank diameters was able to report back that the control forces required to roll the airplane at all airspeeds were reduced and that at high airspeeds, in excess of 250 IAS, the forces were reduced to less than 20% of the forces required without boosting. At 250 IAS, the initial roll rate of this modified airplane increased from 50 degrees per second to 135 degrees per second; and, at 350 IAS, from 30 degrees per second to an astounding 200 degrees per second.
Bob Richolt was now finalizing his design drawings and specifications so they could be filed for patents and sent out to an appropriate sub-contractor for series fabrication. Meanwhile, a second airplane was fitted with the refined design to be sent off to the Air Technical Service Command for testing and approval by the AAF. Once Hall received the official acceptance from the Army, Lockheed would be able to plan for their integration to assembly in a future P-38 production block.
Another project demanding his attention was the XP-38J, for which he had recently received a revised specification. The biggest change was in the power plant with the move away from the F15R/L engines to a new engine to be developed by Allison based on the E21R with Water-Methanol Injection. This new engine, depending on its final specifications but expected to reach around 2000 bhp, would likely require a purpose-built propeller with a higher specific thrust than that offered even by the three-blade Hamilton-Standard Hydromatic.
Curtiss Electric caught wind of the XP-38J and of the new power projections for the up-rated Allison and had already contacted Lockheed with a proposal to build a four-blade electric high-activity similar to the one used on some P-47’s. Of course, Lockheed was already working with Hamilton Standard as well on a similar Hydromatic, so Hall found himself in the enviable position of being able to ply each contractor off the other. The War Production Board representative at Lockheed had approved Hall to submit formal R.F.P.’s to each company and depending on the tested results hinted that they may approve production from both Curtiss Electric and Hamilton Standard.
Hall Hibbard looked through everything on his desk, amazed at just how many projects his teams were juggling at the moment, and realized that he was over-due for a vacation.
Burbank, California, USA
Hall had to admit, he was impressed.
When the order came through more than four months ago to send the “Swordfish” P-38 to Nashville so Vultee could use it as a basis for a two-seater variant of the airplane he was expecting an almost exact copy of the tested design. Instead, the engineers had thrown the long-nose Lightning concept out the window and developed an entirely new gondola for a two-seat pilot-trainer version of the airplane.
In the introduction to the design to proposal they stated a number of deficiencies in the Swordfish which would make it poorly suited as a P-38 trainer. Primary among them was that with the pilot moved so far forward the view and feel from the cockpit was altered too much from the standard single-seat P-38. Associated with that was that the Swordfish had a different Center of Gravity, different trim characteristics, different ground-handling—including, most critically, altered take-off and landing behavior.
The design examination continued with an overview of the changes in internal and external structures between the standard P-38 and the Swordfish test-plane. All of the differences meant that only a small percentage of parts and panels could be inter-changed between the two which would add complexity to both manufacture and repair.
Instead, Vultee was proposing a new extended two-seat gondola of their own design using as many existing structures and panels as possible. To accomplish this, they started with keeping the primary pilot in the same location, directly in front of the main spar and placed the second seat between the aft and main spar. The rear, instructor, pilot then sits directly on top of the rear wing structure with a small well cut behind the main spar for his feet and the rudder pedals. This small foot well interferes with the span-wise stiffening corrugations through about two-and-half feet of the upper center wing section so, to compensate, they added diagonal braces which go forward from the rear of the well structure sides to a vertical brace extension from the center of the main spar. This vertical extension then doubles as a bulkhead between the two cockpit sections and serves as a framework from which the rear instrument panel is secured.
The canopy uses the same three sections: forward, rear, and center; but, the center piece is re-framed to remove the sliding mechanism and to hinge from the right side. Between the center section and the rear glass is a plug over the main-spar and vertical extension followed by another right-hinging center piece for the rear cockpit. The rear cockpit canopy then merges with the same contour of the rear glass as the standard airplane.
The new framing on the center Plexiglas extends on the top to change the profile of the glass to better streamline the new junction between the two center canopies. This faring interferes with visibility directly above the pilot’s head, but it is only a minor concern for a training aircraft and a small price to pay to use the existing form for the glass instead of developing a whole a new piece for each section.
The rear of the gondola is then extended about three feet from the standard one-place P-38, accomplished by added a fuselage plug and new skin panels below the rear cockpit. The underside of the gondola is completely unchanged all the way back to the fuselage plug behind the trailing edge of the center wing assembly and terminates in the same tail-cone as the standard airplane, complete with the egress ladder. The plug has several spring-closed hand and foot holds to enable the pilots to get from the ladder—now farther rear—to the wing surface.
Since most of the added weight is planned to be placed between the two main spars, and thus within the Mean Aerodynamic Chord, the only change in aircraft balance that would need to be accommodated is the rear-ward shift of the gondola’s tail cone and the lack of forward armament in the nose. To compensate for these changes, the nose-cone is planned to be replaced with one slightly longer and built with heavy steel and integrated weights. In addition, the hydraulic reservoirs and pumps will be moved from below the radios to in front of the forward bulkhead in the rear of the nose compartment. Any additional shifts in the center of gravity that may be identified from flight-testing can then be added either in the nose-compartment (to shift balance forward) or within the fuselage plug (to shift balance aft).
The end result was a two-seat version of the P-38 which largely duplicated the primary pilot’s experience of the airplane while still accommodating the second pilot in similar comfort. That Vultee achieved this while re-using more than 80% of the existing assemblies was quite impressive, even by Hall Hibbard’s high standards.
The news from Niagara, or more properly from Wheatfield, New York, was just as good. Bell had spent the last three months converting one of the assembly lines to P-38 production and were now ready to start working on their first few test aircraft. In typical fashion, the first handful of planes would be used more to test and tweak the assembly and manufacturing processes than to build real usable aircraft, but it is was an essential step to getting their facility moved into full production. They were not exactly ahead of schedule, but they were running good and getting where they needed to be to get combat-quality aircraft flowing before Christmas—perhaps even as soon as Thanksgiving.
His own designers were also hard at work. Kelly Johnson had sequestered many of Lockheed’s best in a rented circus tent to work on a Secret project ordered by the Air Tactical Service Command (ATSC). Hall, Kelly, and Court Gross were three of only seven people at Lockheed who actually knew what the project was—most of the men working on it were given specific components and sub-assemblies to work on to specifications set forth by Johnson and his core team of four. The order was to deliver a new fighter prototype by November 23rd but the kicker was that this fighter would powered by a British Halford H-1 B centrifugal jet.
A few weeks ago, a representative from the Navy had tried reaching Dick Pulver but was mistakenly transferred directly to Irv Culver in Kelly Johnson’s circus tent—which was unfortunately downwind of a plastics factory. Culver picked up with an informal, “Skonk Works, inside man Culver.” After some initial confusion the call was sent back to Pulver and Hall had later heard all about it. Apparently, Culver and some of the other senior engineers working in the sequestered group thought it was funny to poke fun at the awful smell from the plastics factory by referring to the popular “L’il Abner” comics. Hall agreed, it was funny, but not very professional so he had Johnson deal with it who promptly fired Culver (Culver came back the next day and as far as Hall knew was still working on the project without another word said about being fired).
Progress on the new jet fighter was going well, even though the ATSC still had not sent the official order for the airplane. With access to all of Bell’s work on their P-59 “Airacomet” to go off of as well Kelly Johnson’s previous work on the in-house developed L-133 they were well ahead plan and were expecting to have the completed prototype within a month. Hall was anxious to see the completed product.
Prior to being shunted over to Johnson’s secret team in the “Skonk Works,” Culver had proposed an interesting solution to Compressibility Stalls in the P-38. Although the NACA redesign in the Model 422 had increased the dive limits of the airplane to acceptable combat speeds, the stalls were still occasionally occurring at high altitude in power-on dives and were thus still a problem. Hall heard that most of the new fast fighters were running into the same issue, too, that between Mach 0.78 and Mach 0.8, depending on the plane, the planes would become unstable in some manner with both his P-38 and Republic’s P-47 suffering dives as a result. Culver came up with the idea of fitting 58 inch span by 8 ½ inch chord Dive Recovery Flaps to the mid-chord of outer wings, directly outboard of the engine nacelles. These flaps were to be electrically operated to drop 40 degrees into the airstream on the underside of the wings to change the pressure gradient during high speeds and enable recovery from a compressibility stall.
Ralph Virden had tested a P-38H with these Dive Recovery Flaps installed in a powered dive from 30,000 feet and was able to successfully recover from a Mach 0.83, about 585 mph, dive at 22,000 feet. He reported tail buffeting at those speeds but he was able to maintain vertical control throughout the dive. Further testing revealed that the DRFs provided an overall increase to the average Critical Mach of the airplane by about Mach 0.034, or just over a 4% increase from an unmodified airplane. The Air Force, however, did not see them as essential equipment so they refused permission to produce a retrofit kit for existing airplanes but have given Lockheed the “go-ahead” to add them to future production block so long as it does not interfere with factory output.
In July, General-Electric’s new B-33 turbo was added to P-38H production in what the AAF called the P-38H-15-LO. This new turbo increased the critical altitude of the airplane by several thousand feet and provided a matching performance increase at high altitudes. These Block-15 airplanes were even now starting to arrive in Europe to outfit some of the nascent P-38 Fighter Groups still waiting for airplanes.
On the production line, the final block of 450 P-38’s ordered from the 1942 Budget Year, beginning with AC# 42-103979, were starting to roll off the factory floor as P-38H-18-LO and were almost identical to the Block-15 but had a streamlined landing light installed in the left-wing leading edge instead of the old retractable light the previous airplanes used.
Once that order was complete, they would begin production of Block-20 P-38H’s which were still being finalized and modified according to feedback coming directly to Hall from Tony LeVier, who was stationed with the 78th Fighter Group in England. Some of the requests, such as that for a unified engine control system locking the throttles to the speed and mixture levers, were pretty major and would most likely wait for either a later block or more likely the next major model. Others were more achievable and were being developed by the P-38 Team.
One request was procedural rather than technical and Hall had forwarded it on Milo Burcham and his team to figure out. That was for revised single-engine emergency handling on take-offs. It was a problem which had plagued the P-38 since its introduction but the USAAF had passed on spending resources tackling it with the reasoning that mishandling was a result of pilot error. Now, LeVier had sent word that it was a procedural problem related to the stated actions in the standard Pilot’s Manual and that a better process needed to be developed. From what Milo had relayed to Hall, LeVier and several pilots of the 78th were working on procedures to apply immediately in the field at the Group level but that they wanted review and assistance from the Flight Testing team back in California.
The most recent request, just arriving to Hall the previous week, was related to a rash of engine failures that the 78th and 55th Fighter Groups had started to experience as they were training for high-altitude bomber escort missions and—for the 78th—starting to make their first short range sorties into France and the Dutch Netherlands. The repeated problem seemed to be that the alcohol-based fuel octane booster used in England was vaporizing and causing the humidity in the air to condense and even freeze at high altitude. Hall was not sure there was anything he could do directly about the fuel additives—that would be for the Army to figure out—but LeVier had relayed that the ground crews were recommending come manner of temperature regulation to keep ice from forming in the induction system as well as either insulation or some manner of vapor barrier to keep the fuel lines from icing.
Neither solution sounded likely to Hall. He felt that this was a fuel supply issue rather than an engineering issue and that his groups’ resources would be better spent on other items. The obvious solution to the problems would be to change the octane booster additives in the fuel from alcohol based to Tetraethyl Lead (TEL), which he heard was happening anyway, and that being the case, Hall was inclined to respond that the problem is the Air Force’s rather than Lockheed’s. A recent preliminary report from Col. Kelsey in Ohio, however, had mentioned similar problems with the XP-38J they had been testing.
Hall had been surprised when news came through that the AAF had abandoned the Allison F15 engines in favor of an engine originally intended for the Bell P-63 which had been hastily field adapted to F-Series standards and fit into the XP-38J airplane at Wright Field. This new engine included Allison’s first production Water Injection system which in testing was discovered to cause condensation on the water lines and in the induction system at low boost settings. The chemists explained that because the alcohol vaporizes so quickly it causes a rapid decrease in temperature which in a humid environment can readily fall below the dew point and cause condensation. Under cold and humid conditions, such as at high altitude over the Great Lakes or in Western Europe, that condensation would freeze and cause ice buildup—which was exactly what Tony LeVier was reporting from England with the alcohol-rich fuel.
Since Kelsey indicated that the USAAF would continue pursuing installation of Water Injection he had directly requested Lockheed research solutions to the problem. The issue of condensation on the lines and freezing valves could be easily solved by insulating the water-methanol lines in the Water Injection installation. With the proposed water tank installation location, directly next to the engine nacelles in the first section of the outer-wing leading edge, the water lines will only be a few feet long and could handle the insulation without difficulty. When it came to LeVier’s problem with alcohol in fuel, the insulation was more problematic because of the total length of all the fuel lines in the airplane made this an ill-suited solution. With the plan to move to TEL additives to the fuel, Hall was doubly convinced to ignore the line-condensation problem for the time being.
The problem of induction condensation was both simpler and more complex at the same time. What made it simpler was that all they needed to avoid the condensation was a way to keep the critical surfaces of the intake manifold and induction system above the dew point so the condensation would never form. What made it difficult was managing the temperatures in such a way that it would not increase the charge air temperature to such an extent as to cause detonation.
His engine installation mechanics were now working directly with engineers from Allison on the problem. Allison had determined through testing that the induction condensation was likely caused by uneven heating and fuel-air distribution in the intake manifold, which they were already working to redesign.
Another solution was to find a way to control the minimum temperature of the charge air using the existing carburetor air temperature sensor and existing inter-cooler installation. Although this would not help with the fuel-air distribution problems in the intake manifold it could help keep the induction charge temperature sufficiently high to prevent the condensation problem. Thus, the engineers were working out a way to ensure the air is not over-cooled in cold-air conditions.
The combat groups with the 8th AF were reporting the problem even with the inter-cooler shutters completely closed, that when flying in air colder than -30° F they were discovering that the charge air was not warm enough to prohibit condensation. This meant that they needed to find another way to keep the charge air temperature above a critical point through other means.
A junior mechanic on the engine installation team had the idea of simply covering the inter-cooler inlet with a piece of cardboard, as was commonly done to cover the radiators of automobiles during the cold winters back in his home in Levina, Montana. Lockheed had no way of testing this from Burbank so Hall and joined with the Allison group in sending the recommendation over to LeVier to see if it helps at all. If it does, then Hall will need to divert some resources to developing a more permanent and fully integrated system to enable control of the inter-cooler inlet duct.
The final option, which LeVier was reportedly exploring himself, was to experiment with higher manifold pressure settings using lower engine speed as a way to maintain a sufficiently warm induction charge to avoid condensation while cruising. The Allison representatives had balked at the idea as unsafe, and considering the revealed shortcomings on their current manifold design, Hall was prone to support them, but LeVier had insisted that based on Kelsey’s and Col. Cass Hough’s tests the previous winter on the manifold pressure limits at full power, these new P-38H’s with their F17 engines should not have any trouble running under such conditions.
Hall would just have to wait and see what develops regarding those issues.
Of all the problems the P-38 had experienced during its development and over its first two years of combat, the only one that had not yet been fully addressed was the slow initial roll rate. This was mentioned, repeatedly, in most of the Air Corps and later Air Force assessments and always accompanied by requests to find ways to improve the airplane’s rate of roll; but, it had never been as high a priority as other problems with the airplane. Now, with all of the those other problems solved (for the most part), Hall was able to apply some resources into finding a way to increase the P-38’s roll and reduce the aileron load, especially at high speed.
Previously, the idea had been tossed around to use hydraulics to control the ailerons but in every application they considered they ran into three main problems with the idea: that the pilot would receive no feed-back from the control surfaces and therefore was likely to apply too much force and overtax the ailerons; that there was no way for the system to self-center—that is, to automatically return to a “neutral” position when the control yoke was released; and, that in order for it to work the primary control cables would need to be removed which would prevent emergency control in the event of hydraulic failure. These issues prevented Lockheed from simply installing hydraulic servos to the ailerons connected directly to the yoke.
In July, one of the engineers, Bob Richolt, had dedicated himself to solving the problem by designing a new type of hydraulic servomotor. He finally came up with a design utilizing a pressure valve of his own design which would allow the hydraulic actuator on the ailerons to increase the force applied by the pilot to the yoke rather than simply taking the entire load. This allows an installation which still uses the standard control cables but which multiplies the force on the ailerons from these cables and reduces the force required by the pilot to deflect the surfaces.
Bob had completed his designs and the initial test installation was completed on August 9th. The hydraulic “boosters,” as the flight engineering team were now calling them, were installed on the aft-side of the outer-wing main spar, at approximately mid-span of the ailerons. The installation includes two of the booster servomotors per side, one connected to the “up” control cable, and one to the “down” control cable, by bell cranks which increase the pilot’s force through a push/pull-rod to the aileron.
Milo Burcham himself took the modified plane up on a few test flights in August and September and after some adjustments to the pressure valve settings and changes in the bell crank diameters was able to report back that the control forces required to roll the airplane at all airspeeds were reduced and that at high airspeeds, in excess of 250 IAS, the forces were reduced to less than 20% of the forces required without boosting. At 250 IAS, the initial roll rate of this modified airplane increased from 50 degrees per second to 135 degrees per second; and, at 350 IAS, from 30 degrees per second to an astounding 200 degrees per second.
Bob Richolt was now finalizing his design drawings and specifications so they could be filed for patents and sent out to an appropriate sub-contractor for series fabrication. Meanwhile, a second airplane was fitted with the refined design to be sent off to the Air Technical Service Command for testing and approval by the AAF. Once Hall received the official acceptance from the Army, Lockheed would be able to plan for their integration to assembly in a future P-38 production block.
Another project demanding his attention was the XP-38J, for which he had recently received a revised specification. The biggest change was in the power plant with the move away from the F15R/L engines to a new engine to be developed by Allison based on the E21R with Water-Methanol Injection. This new engine, depending on its final specifications but expected to reach around 2000 bhp, would likely require a purpose-built propeller with a higher specific thrust than that offered even by the three-blade Hamilton-Standard Hydromatic.
Curtiss Electric caught wind of the XP-38J and of the new power projections for the up-rated Allison and had already contacted Lockheed with a proposal to build a four-blade electric high-activity similar to the one used on some P-47’s. Of course, Lockheed was already working with Hamilton Standard as well on a similar Hydromatic, so Hall found himself in the enviable position of being able to ply each contractor off the other. The War Production Board representative at Lockheed had approved Hall to submit formal R.F.P.’s to each company and depending on the tested results hinted that they may approve production from both Curtiss Electric and Hamilton Standard.
Hall Hibbard looked through everything on his desk, amazed at just how many projects his teams were juggling at the moment, and realized that he was over-due for a vacation.
I really didn't. Most of how it looks now is thx to somebody else. Look at the page history for the original... It wasn't unreadable, but I wasn't thrilled with it. You can see that version here (with the WP templates non-functional... I was too lazy to take them out.
)No clue. You can post a message on the talk page of the WP editor who did the rewrite, if you want. Better still, ask on the article talk page (discussion page).
Wing IDK, hp for sure. Except, it looks like it wasn't ever intended to be more than "proof of concept", unless I'm misreading. (Could be the Sovs didn't have better engines available for it at the time, IDK.)
I actually imagine this being Kelly Johnson's entry for the interceptor competition instead of the P-38.
It's the only solution more radical.Absolutely. With only one proviso: a request that anybody who has sources with more info shut up about any mistakes & go fix it. (
) That's how it got in decent shape: I put up a frame & canvas, & somebody better detailed it.Some writers don't know how to do research.
An interesting commentary, but I'd disagree with the FLZ: I'd say FZL-1 or ZFL-1 (fighter, airship, or airship fighter); maybe FL-1Z (except "airship launch" isn't a mission modifier in the way "missile equipped" is, but...)
Quick question: did he use the "trapeze" recovery system? (I've considered airship *CVs & I think I've got a better way, but I don't want to mention it...
)Okay, end of derail.
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EverKing, I like a good fight as well as anyone, but I have to tell you that you took a lot of data and made it readily understandable to a layman like me....well done!!!!!
I can't wait to see that the J and potentially K and L models do!!!
I can't wait to see that the J and potentially K and L models do!!!
I reallyI actually imagine this being Kelly Johnson's entry for the interceptor competition instead of the P-38.
Attachments
Wiseass.
(I want the scorpion tail. Then again, I always want the scorpion tail...)Another excellent update, as usual.
Why doesn't that surprise me...?
That could lead to fatal fuel starvation.
(Not unlike the jetliner that suffered a similar problem with its Rolls TFs.)Or run the fuel lines next to hot exhaust pipes or something...
You mean condensation and icing of the fuel lines? Indeed it could and according to my mystery/missing source, it did.
That would only help that portion of the line. If you look at the entire fuel system in the P-38 it is just not practical to heat all the lines.
Here's the system adopted in 1922, continued in use until 1962 after which all services standardized on a modified version of the Army/USAF system.
To quote the relevant bits:
Patridge knew to add something to the special model of the attack plane, and chose to add a Z after where there would be the dash for the minor modification, to indicate airship modified subtype. It most definitely would not be ZFL as that would imply the fighter itself was an airship! It clearly would not be FZL either since that interposes the specializing modifications between the Mission and the Design Number/Manufacturer block. Although I suppose you could make the case that since the Bell airplane was designed and accepted solely for the mission of an airship based plane, it would logically be appended to the main Mission designation, coming after the F making it clear it is an HTA fighter for an airship, not an LTA fighter! However I think it makes the most sense to put the specialty modifier at the end, and I think there may be OTL precedent, as in the example given. Partridge put it at the end for a modification of a standard carrier/landplane and in theory another version of the Bell plane could have been made to operate from a deck--though it would require an unlikely improvement in the engine and cooling system.
Given it was not customary to use a 1 for the design number, so the first plane of a particular mission type a particular company sold to the Navy (as with Goodyear's edition of the Corsair, simply FG) I don't see why they'd put a 1 after the dash.
So where I went wrong was that it should be FL-Z, which merely makes the "floozy" reading more obvious. I wonder whether the author did do that, and decided the Navy would never let something be designated Floozy? "Flies" is also possible and would be more forced by -1Z. It would also be funny if improvements to the design enabled the pilot to ditch on the ocean with a good chance of it staying afloat for later retrieval by an airship after the battle...then we would surely need the dash and a number 2 before the Z--FL-2Z or "flutes," read as "floats"!
I want the damn Floozy damn it! It would fit perfectly with the personality types the author put in their cockpits anyway.
Quick question: did he use the "trapeze" recovery system? (I've considered airship *CVs & I think I've got a better way, but I don't want to mention it...
Okay, end of derail.
Yeah, I had better get off this sidetrack myself. Feel free to PM any interesting recovery to airship notions you have; I have pretty much stuck with trapeze variants myself, and think there might have been a way to allow recovery of aircraft with minimum airspeed much higher than airship airspeed.
@EverKing. Thanks for the new chapter.
How difficult would it have been to develop a door or a shutter placed at the front of the engine nacelle at the intercooler inlet to close off all airflow into the intercooler? Along with the rear shutter it's seems like the simplest way to precisely control the charge temperature so as to avoid other problems.
The increased roll rate with the aileron boost is phenomenal. At 350 indicated it could do 200 degrees of roll in one second? That's a full roll in under 2 seconds. Wow. Good thing Lockheed built them strong.
The two-seater looks impressive. Someone is going to look at the TP-38 and see a night fighter. More room in the lengthened rear for radar equipment. A roomier cockpit for the radar operator. Enough room in the nose for 4 20mm cannon. The Night Lightning.
How difficult would it have been to develop a door or a shutter placed at the front of the engine nacelle at the intercooler inlet to close off all airflow into the intercooler? Along with the rear shutter it's seems like the simplest way to precisely control the charge temperature so as to avoid other problems.
The increased roll rate with the aileron boost is phenomenal. At 350 indicated it could do 200 degrees of roll in one second? That's a full roll in under 2 seconds. Wow. Good thing Lockheed built them strong.
The two-seater looks impressive. Someone is going to look at the TP-38 and see a night fighter. More room in the lengthened rear for radar equipment. A roomier cockpit for the radar operator. Enough room in the nose for 4 20mm cannon. The Night Lightning.
I do. I'm sad to hear it.You mean condensation and icing of the fuel lines? Indeed it could and according to my mystery/missing source, it did.
It was a notion...
I should say, & IDK if this applies to avgas (tho I'd bet it does), jet fuel has a "critical temperature" where ice crystals form. What the problem was in the London incident was, there was a place the ice could "stack up" & plug the fuel line. (So long as it was flowing, ice crystals weren't an issue.) So if it was possible to heat (or keep warmer than the "critical temperature") any spots where ice might collect, bob's your uncle: you don't need it for the entire fuel system.
It was, AIUI, desirable to keep fuel from "soaking" at critical (low) temperatures, so a small amount of fuel tank heating would be good--but, if I understand correctly, not essential.
It might make more sense. My thinking is based on the SBD: mission is "scout bomber"; this fighter is distinct from a "landplane".
As to why the "-1", AIUI, the first model built is the "-1" (so the 1st production F4U is the F4U-1). If, instead, it's effectively "F4U-0", you're right--but I don't think you are. Now, you're right, the first Vought fighter is the FU... (
And the Marines immediately ordered a second variant...)
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marathag
Banned
As to why the "-1", AIUI, the first model built is the "-1" (so the 1st production F4U is the F4U-1). If, instead, it's effectively "F4U-0", you're right--but I don't think you are. Now, you're right, the first Vought fighter is the FU... (
FU - 1-2pOB; 220hp Wright J-5 (supercharged R-1790); span: 34'4" length: 24'5" load: 694# v: 147/x/53 range: 430. On wheels or a single-float for catapult launches—the last fighter so equipped. Used primarily for training. ALSO SEE UO.
FU-1 1927 = 1p fighter-scout. POP: 20 converted from UO-3.
FU-2 1927 = 2p trainer converted from FU-1. POP: 14.
Wait for it....
Indeed, and those numbers came straight from http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/p-38/p-38j-roll.jpg
Could be. The problem they are currently experiencing isn't so much ice crystals in the fuel itself but rather condensation from atmospheric humidity forming due to vaporative action freezing valves, etc. Once they move to standard 100/130 fuel with TEL this will be less of a problem in the lines but over-cooled charge air could still cause condensation (and lead separation) in the induction system...but Draconis can see where I am heading to help solve that.
I have been reading the Fokker D23 page.
You have probably noticed I tend to write really long posts. Part of the reason I do this is that I don't like to be misunderstood so I tend to want to cover every contingency. This bothers some people I have had to notice!
EverKing has done a bang-up job of finding the POD and doing the spadework to make the P-38 even more popular, iconic and essential. Relative to his ATL, its potential to serve as a bomber escort in the European Theatre was shortchanged, and one reason I've seen given for it was that as a twin engine aircraft it was more expensive than bringing the Mustang on line. Still there was a hiatus in which large numbers of US bombers were lost that should have been escorted, and also I suppose we dialed back the bombing more than we wanted to because of the hazard. Had it been possible to employ the Lightning as interim escort, the US bombing effort might have fared somewhat better. (To be sure, I don't believe that bombing, especially early in the war, was a cost-effective way to wage the war. However it was psychologically necessary to try to bring the war to Germany in the long years between Dunkirk and D-Day, and I do not believe the Western Allies had a serious option to invade the European mainland much before the summer of '44. Oh, some sort of landing could be attempted, but it would be slaughtered and driven back into the sea. Anyway British and American flyboys had convinced themselves that bombing would promote the Allied cause, and so right or wrong they were determined to do it, and it would have been better then for the missions to go in escorted).
Again, my comments about pusher-pullers being an odd choice was in the context of their being recommended in the context of a "cheap "Air Militia/Air Guard" fighter" in the USA. We did in fact consider a lot of them; besides the Tucker and the Bell, Douglas also was going to make a high altitude version (well, anyway it had a very wide thin wing like a sailplane, I suppose maybe instead of high altitude to facilitate climb with low power, and very good maneuverability at low speeds--for dogfighting). All of them were conventional tractor prop arrangements, although Tucker was going to put the engine in back of the pilot as on the P-39, and like the Airacobra run the prop with a drive shaft and also run a cannon through the propeller center.
Pusher-puller is odd for cheap desperation throwaway Zerg Rush interceptors because it uses two engines and thus halves the number of aircraft swarming the foe. The decision has already been made not to go for high performance in terms of maximum engine power (which is generally how we actually did wind up winning the air war to be sure--not only could the USA afford the industry to make the planes and spare parts, we could afford to burn the avgas, having access to naturally high octane petroleum deposits in great quantity from Long Beach). Why then double down on engines, and if you do that, why not simplify design with the familiar practice of putting engines in nacelles on the wings, by all means make them counterrotate if that is easy enough? Lots of American designs were laid out like that and for a fighter, as with the Mosquito it frees up the nose to become a killer gun platform, as on the Lightning or Mossie fighter versions (night fighters, mostly).
Before seeing a pusher puller, I think maybe we might have had better luck with single engine pusher designs as one poster on that thread recommends. It is even possible, though difficult and goofy, to have a pusher where a single spar for the tail empennage comes out from its center and thus avoid twin-boom design, although twin boom worked well enough on many designs, including some X planes with just the pusher and bullet-like central pod arrangement I am alluding to. But in 1931 Vickers came up with a single-boom jutting from the middle of the propeller design for mounting the "COW" gun, which was some kind of heavy cannon developed by Coventry ordinance works. That's a goofy looking plane! I forgot about the pyramidal cage of reinforcing struts. As a biplane with fixed landing gear I don't suppose that exoskeleton did a lot of harm.
Anyway if we did get some pusher designs working they'd surely be very high powered, expensive things, designed for very fast speeds and massive firepower in the unimpeded nose, and if not relying on twin booms for a tailplane would have to develop some more unconventional yet approaches, like approximating delta wings or canards--and these were exactly the sorts of designs that were appearing in advanced US projects, few of which got past the X stage, for good reasons unfortunately, often including that pesky engine cooling problem. Which may have had solutions but we were doing pretty well with conventional layouts so these odder concepts were let slide for the most part, and then eclipsed by jet designs.
