He identifies without any evidence a difference between Fascism and National Socialism and then uses this supposed ideological difference between the two to explain the military prowess of Germany vis a vis Italy.
Firstly, the idea that National Socialism did not identify its enemies by the contradictory "strong but weak". If anything, National Socialism had more of this in their ideology in Italian Fascism. The corruption and decadence of Britain and France, the "old" civilizations of the West, who had kept Germany down during the Weimar Period. The "betrayal" by Jews and their controlling of money and industry- combined with their scientifically discovered deficiencies, mentally, morally and physically. The oppression of ethnic Germans by sub-human Slavs and so on.
Italy, meanwhile, still had a lot of left fascism in some of its thought- old ideas of "international fascism" as holdovers from its syndicalist roots, even if Mussolini attempted to remove some of these strains of thought. There was much less of a sense of betrayal and encirclement, and much less of a denigration of outside forces. There was indeed even some romanticism towards the British during the early years. Italian Fascism was in fact, quite a bit less bitter, without as many examples of the strange "strong but weak" contradictions that abounded in National Socialism.
Secondly, the idea that ideological differences alone can account for the differences between the militaries of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. It shows a lacking ignorance of history. More on this in a second....
Thirdly, the idea that political ideology affects one's mental capacity as he appears to be implying is ridiculous. Italian Fascists were not bombastic provincials who thought they could conquer the world alone, regardless of the fact that they saluted the Duce. They weren't imbeciles because of their fascist ideology.
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Now, as to why the Germans did better than the Italians- and there are many reasons, there are really only a few places where ideology can be said to come into the mix- and it was ideological decisions with more underlying causes.
The purging of the officer corps and the institution of the Blackshirt Ras. Why didn't the SA do the same in Nazi Germany? Well, it wasn't just an ideological reason, even if you think Italian Fascism had a bigger chip on its shoulder.
The Italian Army had much less of an institutional presence than that of the German Army, a lot less respect in society and much less of a true tradition among officers and enlisted alike. There, was for example, no real professionalism among the Italian General Staff and much less of an intensive planning focus, which had been the core of Prussian reforms for quite a time.
In addition, the Italian officer corps was quite a bit more actively political in Italy- and, almost as if taking a cue from South American countries, it often leaned to the center-left (whereas the Army the Nazis inherited had a center to far-right political orientation)
There was also the oppressive use of the Italian Army- oddly reminescent of the strike-breaking of the US Army, actually. The early Fascists opposed, for example, the displacement of tenant farmers by the Italian Army prior to the March on Rome (admittedly, they changed their tune later, but that isn't what matters) The Germans had very few examples like that to contend with.
Interestingly, the purging of the officer corps did have one positive effect- the Fascists actually paid attention to language differences, and promoted a number of Southern Italians through the ranks, whereas the pre-Fascist army generally ignored language issues among and, despite Southern Italians being more common in the enlisted ranks, generally possessed a Northern Italian officer corps. (And if you're wondering, Germany had paid attention to language differences since the beginning)
So, while it could be argued to be an ideological decision in the purging of the officer corps, there were a number of other factors. It was not just drooling dullard Fascism against suave, well-cut Nazism.
Moving on, their decisions of where to expand. The Germans had the arguably more logical Drive to the East, the repeat to the Western Front of WWI and so on. The Italians, meanwhile, had some very strange mishmash of Mediterranean and Balkans expansion which makes a lot less sense from any grand strategy viewpoint. Was this an ideological effect, the Fascists being too stupid to see the values of the places they wished to conquer?
Not really. The Nazis just happened to have better choices among their historical irredentists. Italians had long wanted to dominate the Mediterranean and Northern Africa and had some claims in the Balkans, Germans had long wanted to dominate Central Europe. Both of them merely carried on pre-existing irredentist claims. Its hardly the fault of Italian Fascists that their desires were stupid.
Then there's the doctrines of warfare that came to dominate their thinking. Germany pioneered the blitzkrieg. Italy muddled along without any seeming indication of some overarching idea of warfare. Why was that?
Well, again, one can point to the differences in military tradition between the two nations. But there is another effect that often goes ignored- the leapfrog effect.
Italy began the reformulation of Italian military strategy during the 1920s. Nazi Germany began theirs during the 1930s. A world of difference in military thinking.
Italy happened to latch on to the ideas of massive terror bombings and a war from the air- and tried to do so before the technology was really there. They were actually, a little bit too forward thinking there. Their attempts at naval rearmament were similarly hampered. By the time it was obvious their ideas and arms were outdated, they had exhausted much of their industrial capacity (which they had less of to begin with than Germany)
Germany, meanwhile, fell into a decade where a new doctrine of armored warfare was already attracting various adherents and where post-war developments were beginning to catch up to post-war ideas. They actually hit the right time. If they had latched on to the idea of armored warfare in the 1920s, as the Italians had done with a war from the air, they could have been saddled with outdated armor that didn't reach the expectations of theory.
There's really quite a bit more, but I feel I've put too much thought into refuting it already.