WI Mussolini doesnot attack Greece in 1940?

In OTL Mussolini attacked Greece in 28 October 1940 hoping for an easy campaign to impress Hitler but he was deceived... He met with heavy resistanse and Italian attacks were repulsed... It was only 6 months later that he had to appeal to Hitler to come and clean up the mess he created...
WI Mussolini never took Ciano's advise to attack Greece?
Greece had declared its neutrality and PM Metaxas wasnt allowing any British to enter Greek territory because he was afraid that this might have provoked Hitler's wrath... However a rumour circulates till today that Metaxas was poisoned by British agents in 29 January 1941 so that his successor allow British troops to station in Greece...
How would WWII would evolve if no Italian and German forces were engaged in Greece? Any thoughts?
 
In OTL Mussolini attacked Greece in 28 October 1940 hoping for an easy campaign to impress Hitler but he was deceived... He met with heavy resistanse and Italian attacks were repulsed... It was only 6 months later that he had to appeal to Hitler to come and clean up the mess he created...
WI Mussolini never took Ciano's advise to attack Greece?
Greece had declared its neutrality and PM Metaxas wasnt allowing any British to enter Greek territory because he was afraid that this might have provoked Hitler's wrath... However a rumour circulates till today that Metaxas was poisoned by British agents in 29 January 1941 so that his successor allow British troops to station in Greece...
How would WWII would evolve if no Italian and German forces were engaged in Greece? Any thoughts?

Mussolini did not want to "impress" Hitler. The decision to attack Greece had to do with their relationship, yes, but what he actually wanted was to put the upstart back into his place, reaffirming his seniority in the alliance through success, a Bliztkrieg of his own. Additionally, there was the problem that Mussolini considered the Balkans his preserve, a place where Germany should not stir up trouble, at least not without his approval, and the German "military mission" to Romania was most definitely seen by Mussolini as Hitler poaching in his preserve.

Another point is that while the Greeks were neutral within reason, and while the instances of violation neutralities reported by the belligerent governor of the Dodecanese was clearly inflated, there were at least some instances in which the Greeks wer enot that eager to irritate the British by enforcing the a strict observance of territorial waters. That is, _prior_ to the Italian attack. Mussolini did want war, of course, so he really did not need a good casus belli when a wholly false one would have been more than enough for him.

That said, for the reasons above, it is unlikely Mussolini doesn't go to war with Greece.

Let's assume he doesn't. That would, in theory, be very good news for the Axis. Italian assets are freed up and at least a sizable part of them should go to North Africa. While the initial British breakthrough cannot certainly be avoided, the Beda Fomm debacle was a much closer run thing and it is possible that more Italian troops make a difference.

More importantly, the Germans don't need to get involved in Greece and, therefore, neither in Yugoslavia. While it is a myth that the Greek campaign caused an all-important delay for Barbarossa, it is undeniable that resources were dispersed with Marita-Merkur.

Even more importantly, if Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria can be kept neutral along with Turkey, that is a bastion of inviolable airspace protecting the Ploesti airfields from air attacks form the South, later in the war.

The only problem is that Mussolini _will_ be up to mischief anyway, for the very same reasons mentioned above. If this isn't directed against Greece, there is a high likelihood something will be fomented in Yugoslavia. Up until the time the Greek venture came to the fore of the so-called Italian "planning", there were plenty of troops, including some reasonably good motorized assets, ready for Yugoslavia in North-eastern Italy, and the Albanian front could be turned North instead of South. The Fascists had funded the Croatian nationalists for a decade or more.

Of course a Yugoslavian mess only, instead of Yugoslavia plus Greece, plus the need of recruiting Bulgaria, might be a better bargain anyway for the Axis. A shorter campaign, less waste of strength (including the fact that there's still a paratroop division usable in the East), and still something of a neutral buffer South of Ploesti.
 
Well no operation Mercury means that Hitler would have trusted more his airborne divisions and they could be useful in the attack against USSR... If Metaxas didnt die suddenly in 29 January 1941 British wouldnt have entered Greece so Hitler would simply told Mussolini "u fucked it u fix it" and attacked USSR in March/April 1941...
 
Bad things:
The Balkan campaign delayed Operation Babarossa. If it went earlier, chances are Moscow would have fallen. Although it wouldn't change the outcome of the war, it would have incurred drastically increased casualties. I have a 1000 page essay on that. Anyone care to read it?
 
Well no operation Mercury means that Hitler would have trusted more his airborne divisions

If by airborne you mean parachute-dropped, you can use the singular.

If Metaxas didnt die suddenly in 29 January 1941 British wouldnt have entered Greece so Hitler would simply told Mussolini "u fucked it u fix it" and attacked USSR in March/April 1941...

I have doubts about that "suddenly". In any case, it was only a matter of some more time. If anything, better to get rid of the weak flank _before_ being committed to Barbarossa.
 
Bad things:
The Balkan campaign delayed Operation Babarossa. If it went earlier, chances are Moscow would have fallen. Although it wouldn't change the outcome of the war, it would have incurred drastically increased casualties. I have a 1000 page essay on that. Anyone care to read it?

Not me. I already know the Balkan campaign did not delay Operation Barbarossa.
 
Not me. I already know the Balkan campaign did not delay Operation Barbarossa.

I doubt that Hitler wanted to attack USSR amidst heavy winter... Balcan campaign did delayed Barbarossa with disastrous effects... By not being busy attacking Greece Hitler could had attack USSR in late March and capture Moscow and the oil fields in Baku before winter arrives...
 
I doubt that Hitler wanted to attack USSR amidst heavy winter... Balcan campaign did delayed Barbarossa with disastrous effects... By not being busy attacking Greece Hitler could had attack USSR in late March and capture Moscow and the oil fields in Baku before winter arrives...

By that statement you show that you do not know enough about the Soviet _spring_ weather (yes, I wrote spring, not winter), and that therefore you literally do not know what you are talking about.

To make a long story short. Imagine going from your home to your school in 6 meters of snow. That's hard, but doable if you have the proper equipment. Say skis or snowshoes; or if you use a vehicle, an Aerosan or a tracked vehicle with exceedingly large tracks, say a T-34.

Now comes spring. The 6 meters of snow _melt_ and become 2 meters of mud. Now, even the T-34 has problems moving. Occasionally, a cold snap returns and freezes the surface of the bog, turning it into a skating rink. Then the thaw begins again. And more often than not, over that sea of mud, it rains.

Hitler was a stark raving lunatic, but even he would not have entered that place in _March_. Nor in April. An dpossibly not even in May.

Indeed, as a final nail to the coffin of this myth, look at the chronology of the orders. Barbarossa was postponed and postponed again, from May 15 (a date which had always come with a proviso of _"weather permitting"_!) to the end of May to mid June – mostly before the Balkan campaign was even in the cards. The German general's memoirs agree that it rained a lot in East Prussia and the Governatorate, that May, turning the roads into mud pools. It is likely that the Balkan campaign _contributed_ - together with the other much more important factor - to delaying Barbarossa from mid June to June 22 – a week at the very most.
 
I highly doubt if Hitler would be able to crash Soviet defenses and capture Moscow and Bacu and in 2,5 months... He simply needed more time and Balkan campaign delayed his plans... Even if USSR was completely unprepared to go to war 2,5 months for capturing Moscow and Bacu is too short period of time... Especially with potential danger if Greece decides suddenly to abandon neutrality and allow British to enter Greek soil... Hitler would have had his flank exposed then and Romanian oilfields would be an easy prey for RAF thus leaving Germans with lesser fuel than OTL... Moscow was Hitler's secondary target... Baku oilfields was his primary target and he had to capture them fast... I have served 2 years in the Army and saw how military men think about it...
 
I highly doubt if Hitler would be able to crash Soviet defenses and capture Moscow and Bacu and in 2,5 months... He simply needed more time and Balkan campaign delayed his plans... Even if USSR was completely unprepared to go to war 2,5 months for capturing Moscow and Bacu is too short period of time... Especially with potential danger if Greece decides suddenly to abandon neutrality and allow British to enter Greek soil... Hitler would have had his flank exposed then and Romanian oilfields would be an easy prey for RAF thus leaving Germans with lesser fuel than OTL... Moscow was Hitler's secondary target... Baku oilfields was his primary target and he had to capture them fast... I have served 2 years in the Army and saw how military men think about it...

So, are you taking back the outlandishly, extravagantly bad idea that Hitler could have attacked the Soviet Union _in late March_, or not? Have you noticed that months before any kind of Greek emergency, the German plan was to initiate the attack in mid-May?
Let's get clear on that point first.
 
So, are you taking back the outlandishly, extravagantly bad idea that Hitler could have attacked the Soviet Union _in late March_, or not? Have you noticed that months before any kind of Greek emergency, the German plan was to initiate the attack in mid-May?
Let's get clear on that point first.

Now you are talking... Mid-May could be enough time for Germans to reach Baku... Not Moscow... But Baku where the oilfields where... Barbarossa was delayed and Hitler's crucial mistake was that he had 2 targets at the same time...
 
Now you are talking... Mid-May could be enough time for Germans to reach Baku... Not Moscow... But Baku where the oilfields where... Barbarossa was delayed and Hitler's crucial mistake was that he had 2 targets at the same time...

Yes, mid-May was the initial date… wait for it… I already pointed it out… _weather permitting_. As in, if the weather allowed such an early start date.
Weather, as it usually would do in that part of the globe, would not permit. It was already an extraordinarily optimistic expectation, let alone "late March". And before the Greek entanglement, the date had already been postponed to the end of May. And then again to mid-June. As stated, the Balkan operations probably _contributed_, as in, they weren't the sole factor, to the last 1-week postponement.
Just for your curiosity, I'll inform you that in the winter of 1940 the coldest temperature ever was registered in Minsk, and the precipitations of the spring of 1941 in Insterburg were among the heaviest ever registered.

That cleared, you insist on this Baku objective. That's in your mind. You assume that the evidence for the idea that Germany should have attacked earlier – i.e., when the weather would have made a catastrophe of their first 30 to 60 days of operations – is… that they were going to Baku.
Could you please state your source? Who said, apart from you, that the German plan was to advance to Baku while fighting all the way, by the end of 1941?

And even if that was their objective, you'd still have a non-sequitur. Because even if that were true, the fact remains that the weather, not the Greek distraction, provided most of the delay, regardless of whether they were going to Moscow, Baku or just the Ukraine.
 
Indeed when it comes to time-delays the Balkan campaign merely meant a delay of 1 week for the Germans.

However there are some other interesting side effects if the Balkan campaign does not take place:


1. The german paratroopers are intact. This means the Germans may deploy them during Barbarossa, or perhaps later against the Soviets.
How about a German paratroop-drop in order to secure the Baku oilfields? Or perhaps German paratroopers being dropped into Stalingrad securing the city before the Soviets can make a fortress out of it?

2. Without German intervention in Greece and Yugoslavia, the entire southern flank is far more exposed.
a) Perhaps the Germans never deploy the Afrikakorps and the Italians simply surrender in North Africa? After all without Crete and Greece secured the entire supply line of any German attempt against Egypt is highly threatened.
b) The Dodecanese are toast. I see the Italians there having a very rough time against the British.
The question is whether the British would actually try to capture them, then use them as bomber bases to hit Romanian oilfields; or would they simply ignore them. The Italian garrisson there is completely cut off anyway.
c) Malta should be easier to defend. Convoys can now go from Egypt to Malta as well, without being in range of the Luftwaffe operating out of Crete.

3. Less troops deployed in the Balkans conducting anti-partisan duties, means more troops left for offensive actions. This could help the Germans in the long term.

4. Since the Jews in Greece are not exterminated like in OTL, you have a very large Jewish community in Greece after the war. Especially Thessaloniki had a majority population of Jews back in the 1930s. Perhaps Greece becomes a new safe haven for Jews after the Holocaust?
 
4. Since the Jews in Greece are not exterminated like in OTL, you have a very large Jewish community in Greece after the war. Especially Thessaloniki had a majority population of Jews back in the 1930s. Perhaps Greece becomes a new safe haven for Jews after the Holocaust?

That could be interesting, for sure, especially with Thessaloniki in that role (not too sure about Athens or even Ioannina (??)).
 
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