The post itself is classic ad hoc hypothesizing.
Kind of like reading a Treadgold book.
The post itself is classic ad hoc hypothesizing.
Yeah, not familiar with military supply systems are you? For example, you include ammunition dropped off at companies that was left in the box, not issued to troops and recovered by the Commissariat as "fired". You make the ridiculous assumption that every soldier fired away their entire supply of ammunition and was not resupplied. In fact, every ammunition pouch would be filled constantly, and the troops would always be expected to have 60 rounds, they would end the battle with full pouches.
Kind of like reading a Treadgold book.
I would definitely read Strachan, because it will correct a lot of your initial impressions. It’s a lot easier for books to dismiss the army of the Crimea as not having changed in 40 years than to explain how the 1833 drill book introduces the concept of independent fire and all infantry being trained as light infantry, to discuss the trial of a breech-loading cavalry carbine in 1841 or the conversion of the 7th Dragoon Guards into mounted infantry in 1843, or to explain the introduction of the Boxer fuse and the artillery ranges at Shoeburyness. That’s not even to mention the administrative reforms- the short service enlistment trialled with the Army Service Act of 1847, the restriction of flogging in 1846, the examinations introduced for promotion to lieutenant and captain in 1849 and 1850 respectively, or the 1846 introduction of compulsory schooling.Is this accurate?
Nice try, but as the most cursory reading of the post trail will confirm, I was talking about the difference between the rate at Vittoria and the rate in the Crimea.That higher lethality might have something to do with the Civil War being a protracted ideological war, where most European wars of the timeperiod were limited, short wars with one real battle and nothing else after.
If you keep claiming it, I’ll keep posting it:their aiming was somewhere around Star Wars stormtroopers because they had little familiarity with firearms.
That's fine, I own it. Given that you claim:I apologize for not having chapter and verse citations:
This suggests that you've read the book highly selectively- or, taken to its logical conclusion, that you haven't read it at all. Witness:What I've read indicates the British attended the Imperial Stormtrooper Marksmanship Academy worse than anyone else.
That's fine, I own it. Given that you claim:
This suggests that you've read the book highly selectively- or, taken to its logical conclusion, that you haven't read it at all. Witness:
“As soon as the British adopted their version of a Minie rifle, the Enfield rifle, they encountered a similar need for a systematic approach to rifle training, and the School of Musketry was established in 1853 at Hythe. Attendees were given a 2 ½-month course of instruction similar to that at Vincennes, except that the British even more strongly emphasized the practice of range estimation.” P34
“The Indian rebels at the start of hostilities were unaware of the new long-range threat. However, they soon learned they were in mortal danger as long as they were in a thousand yards of an expert shot.” P49
“During his own lecture, Dixon of the Royal Artillery had pointed out that it is comparatively easy to train individuals to achieve very accurate fire on a firing range.” P52
“The first and most notable of these attempts is provided by the First and Second Regiments of Sharpshooters. The soldiers accepted into these regiments spent months laboriously mastering the same system that had been taught at Hythe and Vincennes, learning to estimate the range in order to properly site their weapons, an essential precognition for accurate fire. The accomplishments of this corps the next year in front of Yorktown are some of the most impressive instances of highly accurate long-range fire.” P269
I’ll also do you a favour and produce that comparative on Union musketry from a book you claim to have read. On p144 Nosworthy notes that “All too frequently, the men entered their first campaign without having had any training or practice on how to use their weapons. This was especially true among northeastern regiments, where most men had never handled a musket before mustering into service.” On p145, he subsequently describes what happened when 40 soldiers of the Fifth Connecticut fired at a barn at the range of a hundred yards.
“The men were sadly disappointed when they checked the results of their seemingly fearsome fire. Only four bullets had found their way to the building, though it was 20 feet long and 15 feet wide. Of these, only a single bullet hole was within the height of a line of infantrymen.”
I happen to have the musketry return for 1859, the year that the British army changed its year-end assessment to make it harder. The average individual score for firing at a target 16ft by 6ft at 400 yards with 10 rounds was 9.89 (3 points for a bull, 2 for an inner and 1 for an outer).
I also now appreciate that your contention that American soldiers were more natural with a rifle comes almost verbatim from pp588-93. Unfortunately what you may not have noticed is that Nosworthy prefixes the quote from Wilford with the caveat "before the adoption of the formal firing techniques at Hythe": it therefore has nothing whatsoever to do with the capabilities of the British army of the 1850s and 1860s which, as readily available sources attest, is an entirely different beast.
I would definitely read Strachan, because it will correct a lot of your initial impressions. It’s a lot easier for books to dismiss the army of the Crimea as not having changed in 40 years than to explain how the 1833 drill book introduces the concept of independent fire and all infantry being trained as light infantry, to discuss the trial of a breech-loading cavalry carbine in 1841 or the conversion of the 7th Dragoon Guards into mounted infantry in 1843, or to explain the introduction of the Boxer fuse and the artillery ranges at Shoeburyness. That’s not even to mention the administrative reforms- the short service enlistment trialled with the Army Service Act of 1847, the restriction of flogging in 1846, the examinations introduced for promotion to lieutenant and captain in 1849 and 1850 respectively, or the 1846 introduction of compulsory schooling.
Strachan concludes that “In practice, the British army’s problems between 1815 and 1854 were as much those of innovation as of stagnation. British military thought was more active and more sustained than ever before in the history of the army. The troops that sailed in 1854 were not short of ideas, but they had not ranked them: they had no settled doctrine. Colonial obligations made it extraordinarily difficult for commanders to anticipate and plan.”
I would like to know (I'll get Strachan's book when I get a chance, but while I have your attention as a well-read expert, or at least informed amateur) how many of those things you mentioned in the first half of this sunk in though. For instance, converting the 7th Dragoon Guards to mounted infantry in 1841. Were they still mounted infantry in say, 1846? Was this the norm, or was this an exception to the usual attitude? Etc.
All British cavalry were trained to fight dismounted as necessary. It was usually implemented in Canada and South Africa, occasionally elsewhere as required. Dismounted drill was generally taught during the winter, because you couldn't operate mounted for 5 months in the year in the UK. That had been the general pattern of cavalry training as far back as Cromwell.
Yeah, not familiar with military supply systems are you? For example, you include ammunition dropped off at companies that was left in the box, not issued to troops and recovered by the Commissariat as "fired". You make the ridiculous assumption that every soldier fired away their entire supply of ammunition and was not resupplied. In fact, every ammunition pouch would be filled constantly, and the troops would always be expected to have 60 rounds, they would end the battle with full pouches.
Kind of like reading a Treadgold book.
When they returned from the Cape in 1848, there were complaints about the regiment's poor equitation- which the Inspector General of Cavalry ignored, recommending that additional infantry officers be drafted into the regiment instead. The regiment was an exception, however: the preference was to convert infantry or raise local regiments where required instead. And although the 1840s breech-loading carbine was a failure, subsequent experiments took place after the Crimea with more reliable weapons such as the Terry and the Sharps.how many of those things you mentioned in the first half of this sunk in though. For instance, converting the 7th Dragoon Guards to mounted infantry in 1841. Were they still mounted infantry in say, 1846? Was this the norm, or was this an exception to the usual attitude? Etc.
I'll try explaining again, even more simply.
In that blog post, you agreed with Hensay that of the 1.35 million rounds distributed in the course of the battle, that only half were fired - 675,000. I never said that all 1.35 million distributed rounds were fired. I do not know why you thought so.
However, you just stopped there. Just 675,000 rounds fired. Did it not occur, that as the soldiers were being re-supplied, the rounds that the re-supplied rounds were replacing had to go somewhere? Say, into a musket? So I will repeat - any realistic calculation of ammunition expenditures would add the .675 to the 1.35, bringing the number to 2 million.
Also, the idea that, at the close of battle, every man in the army magically had a full pouch of 60 rounds simply does not hold up to scrutiny. By definition, weren't some of those men engaged in combat and firing away just before the end of combat? Wouldn't they have somewhat less than a full pouch at the end of the battle? Logic dictates that re-supply continued after the battle was over, and that 1.35 million rounds distributed was likely insufficient to fully supply the depleted army.
Anyone reading my post without looking for a strawman to attack would not think I said that all 60 rounds per man were fired, to a man. I specifically criticized Henesay's assumption that it was so, and stated that his number was to high. However, given that it was common for individual soldiers or even units, especially skirmishers, to deplete their entire 60 round supply in battle, his number of 3.675 million is likely much, much closer to the mark than yours of .675, which appears to be based on a misundertsanding of Henesay's footnote.
If you wish to be slow, I'll be slower.
The 675,000 rounds comes from the fact that the Commissary issued 1,350,000 rounds, of which came back half full after resupply was complete. That is, the troops started the battle with 60 rounds apiece, fired some, were resupplied back to their full load, and the Commissary was down 675,000 rounds after collecting returns.
Actually, I am not.You are double counting, and making the assumption of the complete failure to replen after the battle.
All this is complete true and completely irrelevant.If you were familiar with the British troops in the Peninsula you would know that they treated the 60 rounds in their cartridge box as a reserve. On going into action the troops would have 10 rounds each issued to put in their pockets where they were quicker to access. When engaged in a firefight details would constantly go back to the ammunition box the commissary dropped behind each company and continually stuff their pockets full of rounds. If the cartridge boxes were opened then supply was breaking down.
I do not. This is the second time you've made this allegation, after being explicitly told that I am, in fact, not counting every round in the ammunition pouches at the beginning of the battle. It is dishonest to say otherwise.You count a round in the troops boxes before the battle
I do not. Of re-supplied ammunition, I count only those rounds fired as those which Henesay says were fired.You count a round when it is issued by the Company Sergeant
Henesay never says that the rounds were returned. This claim comes entirely from you.You could a round when return by the Company Sergeant back to the Commissiary
This is incorrect.It is simple - the army as a whole had 675,000 fewer rounds of ball-cartridge after the battle than before. The assumption is these were all fired. It is likely this is in fact an overestimate.
the guy with the blog, who has all the credibility of a North Korean historian, given his previously expressed views on 19th century warfare, has decided that he knows better than the guy who was there.
This claim appears nowhere in Henegan. Do you have a source for it - you know, other than your own blog?
Henegan does in fact make this claim - I stated that I disagreed with him, as it is highly unlikely that every soldier expended every round with which he went into battle.
I do not. Of re-supplied ammunition, I count only those rounds fired as those which Henesay says were fired.
Nowhere in the text does it state that .675 million rounds were returned. Nowhere does it state that only .675 million rounds were fired. Henesay's number was in fact 3.675 million. If Henegan intended to write that .675 million rounds were returned, as you believe, why did he also write that the 3 million rounds issued before the battle were expended?
In sum:
Henegan: 3.675 million rounds fired
A guy with a blog: .675 million rounds fired
Henegan was present at the scene, and had firsthand knowledge of the battle and the ammunition supply. The guy with the blog leanred what he knows about the ammunition supply from reading Henegan. By misunderstanding one statement of Henegan's (that half of the re-supplied ammunition of fired) and ignoring another (that 3.675 million rounds were fired), the guy with the blog has decided that he knows better than the guy who was there.