WI: Muskets used instead of Rifles in ACW?

loughery111

Banned
Yeah, not familiar with military supply systems are you? For example, you include ammunition dropped off at companies that was left in the box, not issued to troops and recovered by the Commissariat as "fired". You make the ridiculous assumption that every soldier fired away their entire supply of ammunition and was not resupplied. In fact, every ammunition pouch would be filled constantly, and the troops would always be expected to have 60 rounds, they would end the battle with full pouches.

Oh, yes, he's the one not familiar with 18th century logistics... :rolleyes:

I'd love to see a citation for this. It seems a remarkable waste of manpower, when a tenth that number would be sufficient to hand out new allotments of ammunition as the previous allotment was nearly consumed.
 
Is this accurate?
I would definitely read Strachan, because it will correct a lot of your initial impressions. It’s a lot easier for books to dismiss the army of the Crimea as not having changed in 40 years than to explain how the 1833 drill book introduces the concept of independent fire and all infantry being trained as light infantry, to discuss the trial of a breech-loading cavalry carbine in 1841 or the conversion of the 7th Dragoon Guards into mounted infantry in 1843, or to explain the introduction of the Boxer fuse and the artillery ranges at Shoeburyness. That’s not even to mention the administrative reforms- the short service enlistment trialled with the Army Service Act of 1847, the restriction of flogging in 1846, the examinations introduced for promotion to lieutenant and captain in 1849 and 1850 respectively, or the 1846 introduction of compulsory schooling.

Strachan concludes that “In practice, the British army’s problems between 1815 and 1854 were as much those of innovation as of stagnation. British military thought was more active and more sustained than ever before in the history of the army. The troops that sailed in 1854 were not short of ideas, but they had not ranked them: they had no settled doctrine. Colonial obligations made it extraordinarily difficult for commanders to anticipate and plan.”

That higher lethality might have something to do with the Civil War being a protracted ideological war, where most European wars of the timeperiod were limited, short wars with one real battle and nothing else after.
Nice try, but as the most cursory reading of the post trail will confirm, I was talking about the difference between the rate at Vittoria and the rate in the Crimea.
their aiming was somewhere around Star Wars stormtroopers because they had little familiarity with firearms.
If you keep claiming it, I’ll keep posting it:
"Practical training fell into two classes: target and position drill, judging distances, the manufacture of cartridges, and the cleaning of the rifle formed one part; in the other came target practice, including firing singly, file-firing, and firing in extended order, with skirmishing as an optional extra. The recruit was allowed an extra twenty rounds a year to be fired from a rest, giving him 110 rounds in all. A precise scale of practices and drills to be carried out within a year, with the number of rounds to be expended in each specified. Each shot fired was to be registered and returns for every practice were to be handed in."
Hew Strachan, "From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology, and the British Army, 1815-1854", Cambridge University Press, 1985, p52

Feel free to come forward with some comparable information for the contemporaneous Union and Confederate armies- something more than a vague allusion to the fact that “all American soldiers knew how to hunt” would be nice. Look into it too closely and you might get a shock, though. For instance, the 13th Massachusetts mustered into service in August 1861 but didn’t hold their first target practice until the spring of 1864.
 
My source is The Bloody Crucible of Courage, a book that had a lot of comparative studies of the US military relative to the Crimean Conflict, the Sepoy Mutiny, and the 1862 and 1866 wars as sources to draw from. The assertion was that the difference between US and CS armies was not very noticeable as far as both and European armies, that tactics remained mostly Napoleonic bar adoption of trench warfare and wires in said trench warfare, and that if there were any major differences it was the greater rural nature of the 1860 US, North and South, relative to European states.

It also noted that the US Civil War is less a watershed than it's made out to be, and that the only major tactical and strategic changes were in 1864-5. The link here is to the book itself, and I apologize for not having chapter and verse citations:

http://www.amazon.com/Bloody-Crucible-Courage-Fighting-Experience/dp/0786715634/ref=pd_sim_b_4
 
I apologize for not having chapter and verse citations:
That's fine, I own it. Given that you claim:

What I've read indicates the British attended the Imperial Stormtrooper Marksmanship Academy worse than anyone else.
This suggests that you've read the book highly selectively- or, taken to its logical conclusion, that you haven't read it at all. Witness:

“As soon as the British adopted their version of a Minie rifle, the Enfield rifle, they encountered a similar need for a systematic approach to rifle training, and the School of Musketry was established in 1853 at Hythe. Attendees were given a 2 ½-month course of instruction similar to that at Vincennes, except that the British even more strongly emphasized the practice of range estimation.” P34

“The Indian rebels at the start of hostilities were unaware of the new long-range threat. However, they soon learned they were in mortal danger as long as they were in a thousand yards of an expert shot.” P49

“During his own lecture, Dixon of the Royal Artillery had pointed out that it is comparatively easy to train individuals to achieve very accurate fire on a firing range.” P52

“The first and most notable of these attempts is provided by the First and Second Regiments of Sharpshooters. The soldiers accepted into these regiments spent months laboriously mastering the same system that had been taught at Hythe and Vincennes, learning to estimate the range in order to properly site their weapons, an essential precognition for accurate fire. The accomplishments of this corps the next year in front of Yorktown are some of the most impressive instances of highly accurate long-range fire.” P269

I’ll also do you a favour and produce that comparative on Union musketry from a book you claim to have read. On p144 Nosworthy notes that “All too frequently, the men entered their first campaign without having had any training or practice on how to use their weapons. This was especially true among northeastern regiments, where most men had never handled a musket before mustering into service.” On p145, he subsequently describes what happened when 40 soldiers of the Fifth Connecticut fired at a barn at the range of a hundred yards.

“The men were sadly disappointed when they checked the results of their seemingly fearsome fire. Only four bullets had found their way to the building, though it was 20 feet long and 15 feet wide. Of these, only a single bullet hole was within the height of a line of infantrymen.”

I happen to have the musketry return for 1859, the year that the British army changed its year-end assessment to make it harder. The average individual score for firing at a target 16ft by 6ft at 400 yards with 10 rounds was 9.89 (3 points for a bull, 2 for an inner and 1 for an outer).

I also now appreciate that your contention that American soldiers were more natural with a rifle comes almost verbatim from pp588-93. Unfortunately what you may not have noticed is that Nosworthy prefixes the quote from Wilford with the caveat "before the adoption of the formal firing techniques at Hythe": it therefore has nothing whatsoever to do with the capabilities of the British army of the 1850s and 1860s which, as readily available sources attest, is an entirely different beast.
 
That's fine, I own it. Given that you claim:


This suggests that you've read the book highly selectively- or, taken to its logical conclusion, that you haven't read it at all. Witness:

“As soon as the British adopted their version of a Minie rifle, the Enfield rifle, they encountered a similar need for a systematic approach to rifle training, and the School of Musketry was established in 1853 at Hythe. Attendees were given a 2 ½-month course of instruction similar to that at Vincennes, except that the British even more strongly emphasized the practice of range estimation.” P34

“The Indian rebels at the start of hostilities were unaware of the new long-range threat. However, they soon learned they were in mortal danger as long as they were in a thousand yards of an expert shot.” P49

“During his own lecture, Dixon of the Royal Artillery had pointed out that it is comparatively easy to train individuals to achieve very accurate fire on a firing range.” P52

“The first and most notable of these attempts is provided by the First and Second Regiments of Sharpshooters. The soldiers accepted into these regiments spent months laboriously mastering the same system that had been taught at Hythe and Vincennes, learning to estimate the range in order to properly site their weapons, an essential precognition for accurate fire. The accomplishments of this corps the next year in front of Yorktown are some of the most impressive instances of highly accurate long-range fire.” P269

I’ll also do you a favour and produce that comparative on Union musketry from a book you claim to have read. On p144 Nosworthy notes that “All too frequently, the men entered their first campaign without having had any training or practice on how to use their weapons. This was especially true among northeastern regiments, where most men had never handled a musket before mustering into service.” On p145, he subsequently describes what happened when 40 soldiers of the Fifth Connecticut fired at a barn at the range of a hundred yards.

“The men were sadly disappointed when they checked the results of their seemingly fearsome fire. Only four bullets had found their way to the building, though it was 20 feet long and 15 feet wide. Of these, only a single bullet hole was within the height of a line of infantrymen.”

I happen to have the musketry return for 1859, the year that the British army changed its year-end assessment to make it harder. The average individual score for firing at a target 16ft by 6ft at 400 yards with 10 rounds was 9.89 (3 points for a bull, 2 for an inner and 1 for an outer).

I also now appreciate that your contention that American soldiers were more natural with a rifle comes almost verbatim from pp588-93. Unfortunately what you may not have noticed is that Nosworthy prefixes the quote from Wilford with the caveat "before the adoption of the formal firing techniques at Hythe": it therefore has nothing whatsoever to do with the capabilities of the British army of the 1850s and 1860s which, as readily available sources attest, is an entirely different beast.

All right, so I'm wrong.
 
I would definitely read Strachan, because it will correct a lot of your initial impressions. It’s a lot easier for books to dismiss the army of the Crimea as not having changed in 40 years than to explain how the 1833 drill book introduces the concept of independent fire and all infantry being trained as light infantry, to discuss the trial of a breech-loading cavalry carbine in 1841 or the conversion of the 7th Dragoon Guards into mounted infantry in 1843, or to explain the introduction of the Boxer fuse and the artillery ranges at Shoeburyness. That’s not even to mention the administrative reforms- the short service enlistment trialled with the Army Service Act of 1847, the restriction of flogging in 1846, the examinations introduced for promotion to lieutenant and captain in 1849 and 1850 respectively, or the 1846 introduction of compulsory schooling.

Not to sound like someone stubbornly clinging to prejudice, but it sounds like a lot of these are in the process of "new ideas, not necessarily accepted ideas" - though the 1833 drill book one should have sunk in by the Crimean War as standard operating procedure, the others sound like experiments rather than new doctrine (ignoring the administrative reforms as flogging isn't a tactical issue). Still, clear signs of an army determined to be more than a copy of the previous generation, and with some pretty good ideas.

So I'll be sure to look into this book.

Strachan concludes that “In practice, the British army’s problems between 1815 and 1854 were as much those of innovation as of stagnation. British military thought was more active and more sustained than ever before in the history of the army. The troops that sailed in 1854 were not short of ideas, but they had not ranked them: they had no settled doctrine. Colonial obligations made it extraordinarily difficult for commanders to anticipate and plan.”

That sounds like a situation where the army has not yet become a New Army, though not for lack of interest or even ability.

I would like to know (I'll get Strachan's book when I get a chance, but while I have your attention as a well-read expert, or at least informed amateur) how many of those things you mentioned in the first half of this sunk in though. For instance, converting the 7th Dragoon Guards to mounted infantry in 1841. Were they still mounted infantry in say, 1846? Was this the norm, or was this an exception to the usual attitude? Etc.

Experimenting is one thing, and a good sign. But its incomplete to just say such and such a thing was tried.

Picking this aspect just as an example of "so how much are the British really putting into these reforms, on an army-wide level".

Looking at the reforms related to the subject at hand -abolishing flogging is easier to order than greater marksmanship. Ammunition and gunpowder is expensive. And the Empire should be run on the cheap! Because properly supporting a military actually remotely relevant to the size of the Empire would be...

Okay, I can't do it. Not without being shamelessly Anglophobic, instead of merely sarcastic.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
I would like to know (I'll get Strachan's book when I get a chance, but while I have your attention as a well-read expert, or at least informed amateur) how many of those things you mentioned in the first half of this sunk in though. For instance, converting the 7th Dragoon Guards to mounted infantry in 1841. Were they still mounted infantry in say, 1846? Was this the norm, or was this an exception to the usual attitude? Etc.

All British cavalry were trained to fight dismounted as necessary. It was usually implemented in Canada and South Africa, occasionally elsewhere as required. Dismounted drill was generally taught during the winter, because you couldn't operate mounted for 5 months in the year in the UK. That had been the general pattern of cavalry training as far back as Cromwell.
 
All British cavalry were trained to fight dismounted as necessary. It was usually implemented in Canada and South Africa, occasionally elsewhere as required. Dismounted drill was generally taught during the winter, because you couldn't operate mounted for 5 months in the year in the UK. That had been the general pattern of cavalry training as far back as Cromwell.

So what happened in the Second Boer War? For that matter, this being the required pattern back to the Lord Protector requires some very good citations. I wasn't under the impression Britain was in the habit of maintaining large standing armies with lots of cavalry.
 
Yeah, not familiar with military supply systems are you? For example, you include ammunition dropped off at companies that was left in the box, not issued to troops and recovered by the Commissariat as "fired". You make the ridiculous assumption that every soldier fired away their entire supply of ammunition and was not resupplied. In fact, every ammunition pouch would be filled constantly, and the troops would always be expected to have 60 rounds, they would end the battle with full pouches.

I'll try explaining again, even more simply.

In that blog post, you agreed with Hensay that of the 1.35 million rounds distributed in the course of the battle, that only half were fired - 675,000. I never said that all 1.35 million distributed rounds were fired. I do not know why you thought so.

However, you just stopped there. Just 675,000 rounds fired. Did it not occur, that as the soldiers were being re-supplied, the rounds that the re-supplied rounds were replacing had to go somewhere? Say, into a musket? So I will repeat - any realistic calculation of ammunition expenditures would add the .675 to the 1.35, bringing the number to 2 million.

Also, the idea that, at the close of battle, every man in the army magically had a full pouch of 60 rounds simply does not hold up to scrutiny. By definition, weren't some of those men engaged in combat and firing away just before the end of combat? Wouldn't they have somewhat less than a full pouch at the end of the battle? Logic dictates that re-supply continued after the battle was over, and that 1.35 million rounds distributed was likely insufficient to fully supply the depleted army.

Anyone reading my post without looking for a strawman to attack would not think I said that all 60 rounds per man were fired, to a man. I specifically criticized Henesay's assumption that it was so, and stated that his number was to high. However, given that it was common for individual soldiers or even units, especially skirmishers, to deplete their entire 60 round supply in battle, his number of 3.675 million is likely much, much closer to the mark than yours of .675, which appears to be based on a misundertsanding of Henesay's footnote.
 
Kind of like reading a Treadgold book.

Thinking about it more, this reminds of the Freakonomics guys, especially in their second book. Here's their method:

1. Take a contrarian position
2. Select evidence that supports your position
3. Ignore evidence that undermines your position
4. Invent evidence where none can be found
5. When criticized, create a strawman to attack
 
how many of those things you mentioned in the first half of this sunk in though. For instance, converting the 7th Dragoon Guards to mounted infantry in 1841. Were they still mounted infantry in say, 1846? Was this the norm, or was this an exception to the usual attitude? Etc.
When they returned from the Cape in 1848, there were complaints about the regiment's poor equitation- which the Inspector General of Cavalry ignored, recommending that additional infantry officers be drafted into the regiment instead. The regiment was an exception, however: the preference was to convert infantry or raise local regiments where required instead. And although the 1840s breech-loading carbine was a failure, subsequent experiments took place after the Crimea with more reliable weapons such as the Terry and the Sharps.

Although they cost less, the administrative reforms actually go hand-in-hand with the tactical ones- after all, the pioneers of light drill in the British army recognised that it was impossible to expect a soldier to use their initiative without humanising them to a degree. This is horrendously off-topic, however, and since the misconception which prompted me to bother logging has been corrected, I'll leave it at that.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
I'll try explaining again, even more simply.

In that blog post, you agreed with Hensay that of the 1.35 million rounds distributed in the course of the battle, that only half were fired - 675,000. I never said that all 1.35 million distributed rounds were fired. I do not know why you thought so.

However, you just stopped there. Just 675,000 rounds fired. Did it not occur, that as the soldiers were being re-supplied, the rounds that the re-supplied rounds were replacing had to go somewhere? Say, into a musket? So I will repeat - any realistic calculation of ammunition expenditures would add the .675 to the 1.35, bringing the number to 2 million.

Also, the idea that, at the close of battle, every man in the army magically had a full pouch of 60 rounds simply does not hold up to scrutiny. By definition, weren't some of those men engaged in combat and firing away just before the end of combat? Wouldn't they have somewhat less than a full pouch at the end of the battle? Logic dictates that re-supply continued after the battle was over, and that 1.35 million rounds distributed was likely insufficient to fully supply the depleted army.

Anyone reading my post without looking for a strawman to attack would not think I said that all 60 rounds per man were fired, to a man. I specifically criticized Henesay's assumption that it was so, and stated that his number was to high. However, given that it was common for individual soldiers or even units, especially skirmishers, to deplete their entire 60 round supply in battle, his number of 3.675 million is likely much, much closer to the mark than yours of .675, which appears to be based on a misundertsanding of Henesay's footnote.

If you wish to be slow, I'll be slower.

The 675,000 rounds comes from the fact that the Commissary issued 1,350,000 rounds, of which came back half full after resupply was complete. That is, the troops started the battle with 60 rounds apiece, fired some, were resupplied back to their full load, and the Commissary was down 675,000 rounds after collecting returns.

You are double counting, and making the assumption of the complete failure to replen after the battle.

If you were familiar with the British troops in the Peninsula you would know that they treated the 60 rounds in their cartridge box as a reserve. On going into action the troops would have 10 rounds each issued to put in their pockets where they were quicker to access. When engaged in a firefight details would constantly go back to the ammunition box the commissary dropped behind each company and continually stuff their pockets full of rounds. If the cartridge boxes were opened then supply was breaking down.

You have in fact double or even triple counted in places:

You count a round in the troops boxes before the battle
You count a round when it is issued by the Company Sergeant
You could a round when return by the Company Sergeant back to the Commissiary

It is simple - the army as a whole had 675,000 fewer rounds of ball-cartridge after the battle than before. The assumption is these were all fired. It is likely this is in fact an overestimate.

If you wish to go down the 1 in 459 road you should consult Hughes' Firepower, since when we have definite data we find the British hit with around 1 round in 20 at Albuera - i.e. roughly what they did at Inkermann.

Firefight ranges at Inkermann were on the same order as at Vittoria. Hit rates too. Now, if you wish to discuss skirmishing that is a completely separate issue, but in the main firefights there is no discernible difference.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Further, we have numbers for ammunition expenditure at Gettysburg. The average soldier that was engaged in combat (including Sgts and those less likely to fire) used ca. 20 rounds in the 3 days. Even the elite skirmishers of the 1st and 2nd USSS averaged 32 rounds in the whole battle: http://67thtigers.blogspot.com/2010/12/small-arms-ammunition-expenditure-at.html

You simply can't put that many rounds down a musket, rifled or smoothbore. They foul very quickly and are typically unusable after 5-20 rounds unless cleaned. The Prussian Muskets of the Napoleonic wars were particular examples, and the Prussian army eventually had to issue smaller balls because they typically jammed on the 2nd or 3rd shot.
 
If you wish to be slow, I'll be slower.

The 675,000 rounds comes from the fact that the Commissary issued 1,350,000 rounds, of which came back half full after resupply was complete. That is, the troops started the battle with 60 rounds apiece, fired some, were resupplied back to their full load, and the Commissary was down 675,000 rounds after collecting returns.

This claim appears nowhere in Henegan. Do you have a source for it - you know, other than your own blog?

You are double counting, and making the assumption of the complete failure to replen after the battle.
Actually, I am not.

If you were familiar with the British troops in the Peninsula you would know that they treated the 60 rounds in their cartridge box as a reserve. On going into action the troops would have 10 rounds each issued to put in their pockets where they were quicker to access. When engaged in a firefight details would constantly go back to the ammunition box the commissary dropped behind each company and continually stuff their pockets full of rounds. If the cartridge boxes were opened then supply was breaking down.
All this is complete true and completely irrelevant.

You count a round in the troops boxes before the battle
I do not. This is the second time you've made this allegation, after being explicitly told that I am, in fact, not counting every round in the ammunition pouches at the beginning of the battle. It is dishonest to say otherwise.

Henegan does in fact make this claim - I stated that I disagreed with him, as it is highly unlikely that every soldier expended every round with which he went into battle.

You count a round when it is issued by the Company Sergeant
I do not. Of re-supplied ammunition, I count only those rounds fired as those which Henesay says were fired.

You could a round when return by the Company Sergeant back to the Commissiary
Henesay never says that the rounds were returned. This claim comes entirely from you.

It is simple - the army as a whole had 675,000 fewer rounds of ball-cartridge after the battle than before. The assumption is these were all fired. It is likely this is in fact an overestimate.
This is incorrect.

Nowhere in the text does it state that .675 million rounds were returned. Nowhere does it state that only .675 million rounds were fired. Henesay's number was in fact 3.675 million. If Henegan intended to write that .675 million rounds were returned, as you believe, why did he also write that the 3 million rounds issued before the battle were expended?

In sum:

Henegan: 3.675 million rounds fired
A guy with a blog: .675 million rounds fired

Henegan was present at the scene, and had firsthand knowledge of the battle and the ammunition supply. The guy with the blog leanred what he knows about the ammunition supply from reading Henegan. By misunderstanding one statement of Henegan's (that half of the re-supplied ammunition of fired) and ignoring another (that 3.675 million rounds were fired), the guy with the blog has decided that he knows better than the guy who was there.
 

loughery111

Banned
the guy with the blog, who has all the credibility of a North Korean historian, given his previously expressed views on 19th century warfare, has decided that he knows better than the guy who was there.

Fixed that for you.

67th, view it as an insult if you please, but I trust your conclusions on anything pertaining to this era roughly as far as I can throw a 3' cube of lead. :rolleyes:
 

67th Tigers

Banned
This claim appears nowhere in Henegan. Do you have a source for it - you know, other than your own blog?

It is. Pg 345. Do the maths.

Henegan does in fact make this claim - I stated that I disagreed with him, as it is highly unlikely that every soldier expended every round with which he went into battle.

I do not. Of re-supplied ammunition, I count only those rounds fired as those which Henesay says were fired.

These are contradictory statements. If you can't see that then we have a problem. Your argument does not flow.

Nowhere in the text does it state that .675 million rounds were returned. Nowhere does it state that only .675 million rounds were fired. Henesay's number was in fact 3.675 million. If Henegan intended to write that .675 million rounds were returned, as you believe, why did he also write that the 3 million rounds issued before the battle were expended?

In sum:

Henegan: 3.675 million rounds fired
A guy with a blog: .675 million rounds fired

Henegan was present at the scene, and had firsthand knowledge of the battle and the ammunition supply. The guy with the blog leanred what he knows about the ammunition supply from reading Henegan. By misunderstanding one statement of Henegan's (that half of the re-supplied ammunition of fired) and ignoring another (that 3.675 million rounds were fired), the guy with the blog has decided that he knows better than the guy who was there.

Yes. I do. For a start, read some reviews of Henegan, he is not entirely accurate in his recollections.

Simply:

Henegan: 3 million rounds in the cartridge boxes of the infantry - assume all fired. 1.35 million issued from stores - half fired, half returned after battle (or abandoned if you want to believe that) = 3.675 million (147 rounds per man in 3 engaged divisions). the infantry end the day with empty cartridge boxes.

"Some guy with a blog" suggests that if the infantry were being constantly resupplied, then the resupply = firing. 675,000 rounds issued and not returned = 675,000 rounds fired. Yes, it is a dodgy assumption because it does not allow for spoilage or other loss and so *overestimates* the firing. Indeed, the few accounts we have of ammunition resupply (see Muir, pg 83) show resupply was constant. Moreover, the average ammunition expenditure in a 18th/ 19th century battle is 20 rounds per man engaged. Even with repeaters (see Prussian expenditures, which are ca. 30 rounds per man for the entire Franco-Prussian war).

Or possibly the Army was marching around after the battle with empty cartridge boxes since it was never resupplied. They'd need resupplying on that day, from Henegan's stocks. Funny that.

There are only three possible outcomes:

1. Reject all figures outright as too flawed to draw any conclusion.

2. Accept 3.675m, which you have already rejected as flawed.

3. Accept 0.675m, which you dispute.

Given your statements above you must go with (1), which prettymuch ends the debate.
 
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