WI: Murmansk Cut & Stalingrad Holds

Relatively short question here.
Given that Case Blue would've failed to achieve its primary goal of capturing the oilfields of the Caucasus intact, what if the Wehrmacht instead put all their efforts into strangling the USSR of as many resources as possible; i.e. settling for simpler push toward the Volga in 1942 in conjunction with a renewed push by Army Group North on Leningrad on the way toward the Murmansk rail line.

If I understand correctly, holding Stalingrad would have effectively cut the flow of oil to Moscow via the Volga by a significant degree, and of course severing Murmansk would have cut Lend Lease by a significant margin, at least via Western routes.

Thoughts?
 
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I believe the Ural river at the very top of the Caspian is navigable all the way to Uralsk with rail connections from there so tankers OTL went that way when the Volga was cut.

Persia and Vladivostok routes are still open, and the Murmansk route is unused often in 1942 anyway (or suffered heavy losses). So I think its more annoyance than vital.

Your concept is not a bad idea anyway though if it avoids the Stalingrad encirclement. In August the Germans should have probably just pushed to Maikop, afterward sending the mountain and light infantry and allied divisions to Tupase, Novarissk and the Taman peninsula, skipping the deep drive to Mount Elbrus, and the drive to Grozny, trying to do all of that was too much, most of the armor of Army Group A should have been pulled back to the Stalingrad pocket starting Mid August.

The OTL drive occupying the Taman peninsula and the whole length of the Don to Stalingrad was handy as the river was used as a supply line OTL, the Taman peninsula is a rich area worth denying to the Soviets and there is some oil about which they thought they could capture. OTL after mid August Army Group A's Panzers divisions were often in unfavorable terrain or poor supply situations, pulling out in late August means they might have been ready in October for the final push in Stalingrad or as a reserve for November. Probably could have at least pulled out 2 Panzer divisions and the Wiking motorized toward Stalingrad.
 

Deleted member 1487

Relatively short question here.
Given that Case Blue would've failed to achieve its primary goal of capturing the oilfields of the Caucaus intact, what if the Wehrmacht instead put all their efforts into strangling the USSR of as many resources as possible; i.e. settling for simpler push toward the Volga in 1942 in conjunction with a renewed push by Army Group North on Leningrad on the way toward the Murmansk rail line.

If I understand correctly, holding Stalingrad would have effectively cut the flow of oil to Moscow via the Volga by a significant degree, and of course severing Murmansk would have cut Lend Lease by a significant margin, at least via Western routes.

Thoughts?
They tried this IOTL to a degree; Nordlicht, the operation to take Leningrad and open the rail line to Finland, was attempted at the same time as Case Blue, but the Soviet offensive to relieve Leningrad caught them before they could attack the city, which meant the Germans instead expended their resources fighting off the Soviets and reclaiming critical ground around the city to maintain the siege. I had a thread a couple of years back about the Germans letting Sevastopol wither on the vine when they move on the Volga Caucasus and instead use the resources to launch Nordlicht a month or so sooner so that they preempt the Soviet effort and take Leningrad, while then enabling them to launch Case Blue sooner too, hard on the heels of their victories around Kharkov that summer.

ITTL though they'd be going for Case Blue I-III and leaving IV, the move into the Caucasus, for 1943. That would actually be best as Stalingrad would fall in August then instead of being somewhat set up to defend as of September when the move on the city was launched IOTL after a diversion of 4th Panzer Army south into the Caucasus.

IMHO that would have been the ideal combo for 1942 and put the Soviets in a very bad place, especially given that Stalingrad and Leningrad would fall and leave Stalin in a bad political position (even if only in his own mind), which could set up another round of purges and wasteful offensives that would burn up Soviet reserves uselessly.
 
IMHO that would have been the ideal combo for 1942 and put the Soviets in a very bad place, especially given that Stalingrad and Leningrad would fall and leave Stalin in a bad political position (even if only in his own mind), which could set up another round of purges and wasteful offensives that would burn up Soviet reserves uselessly.

Any chance this affects the overall strategic situation for the Germans going into 43 and 44? I assume it at the very least lengths the war, maybe to the point to where the Poliburo consider peace negotiations?
 

Deleted member 1487

Any chance this affects the overall strategic situation for the Germans going into 43 and 44? I assume it at the very least lengths the war, maybe to the point to where the Poliburo consider peace negotiations?
If Leningrad falls in 1942 and Uranus doesn't come off due to Stalingrad falling quickly, then of course the strategic situation is impacted. Heavily. Not sure if to the point that the Politburo seriously considers a peace deal, but it would mean a lot more pain for the USSR especially if Murmansk also falls or is at least isolated from the rest of the USSR in 1942. Iran would take months if not over a year to get big enough to replace the Murmansk route, which even then wouldn't fully be able to due to the extra distance shipping would have to travel to get there. Even when the Mediterranean opens up it is still quite a bit further and more serpentine than the Murmansk route. There is also then the huge problem for the USSR of losing the home of the revolution as well as the Axis having rail links between Germany and Finland, plus the Baltic Fleet being knocked out and Leningrad eventually being able to take Axis shipping into it. Not to mention freeing up a lot of manpower for the Axis that invested Leningrad and deleting a lot from the Soviet side. Stalingrad falling in August would also create a lot of issues for the Soviets especially if the Axis don't disperse their manpower and logistics by advancing into the Caucasus. I think in this situation you could prevent for a while at least the Soviet recovery of Ukraine, which means the manpower crunch as of 1943.
 
Cutting the railroad coming from Murmansk doesn't seem that hard, any place would do - but of course Stalin would try to repair things ASAP.

I used to think that an air attack on Baku might cripple the SU, but then again, even IOTL the oil production from there feel a lot. Though I don't know the reasons.
 
If Leningrad falls in 1942 and Uranus doesn't come off due to Stalingrad falling quickly, then of course the strategic situation is impacted. Heavily. Not sure if to the point that the Politburo seriously considers a peace deal, but it would mean a lot more pain for the USSR especially if Murmansk also falls or is at least isolated from the rest of the USSR in 1942. Iran would take months if not over a year to get big enough to replace the Murmansk route, which even then wouldn't fully be able to due to the extra distance shipping would have to travel to get there. Even when the Mediterranean opens up it is still quite a bit further and more serpentine than the Murmansk route. There is also then the huge problem for the USSR of losing the home of the revolution as well as the Axis having rail links between Germany and Finland, plus the Baltic Fleet being knocked out and Leningrad eventually being able to take Axis shipping into it. Not to mention freeing up a lot of manpower for the Axis that invested Leningrad and deleting a lot from the Soviet side. Stalingrad falling in August would also create a lot of issues for the Soviets especially if the Axis don't disperse their manpower and logistics by advancing into the Caucasus. I think in this situation you could prevent for a while at least the Soviet recovery of Ukraine, which means the manpower crunch as of 1943.

in replying to thread about use of Tirpitz came across following statistic

"By the end of 1941, early shipments of Matilda, Valentine and Tetrarch tanks represented only 6.5% of total Soviet tank production but over 25% of medium and heavy tanks produced for the Red Army. The British tanks first saw action with the 138 Independent Tank Battalion in the Volga Reservoir on 20 November 1941. Lend-Lease tanks constituted 30 to 40 percent of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease

IF Arctic Convoys ended or severely curtailed? would not predict fall of Moscow based on just that, but what would absence of that equipment mean for Soviet counterattacks?

simply put the Soviets would/could drain enough tanks to defend Moscow but Persian Route not in operation in time to replenish them for the earliest of their offensives?
 
in replying to thread about use of Tirpitz came across following statistic

"By the end of 1941, early shipments of Matilda, Valentine and Tetrarch tanks represented only 6.5% of total Soviet tank production but over 25% of medium and heavy tanks produced for the Red Army. The British tanks first saw action with the 138 Independent Tank Battalion in the Volga Reservoir on 20 November 1941. Lend-Lease tanks constituted 30 to 40 percent of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease

IF Arctic Convoys ended or severely curtailed? would not predict fall of Moscow based on just that, but what would absence of that equipment mean for Soviet counterattacks?

simply put the Soviets would/could drain enough tanks to defend Moscow but Persian Route not in operation in time to replenish them for the earliest of their offensives?

Thanks for the great quote. To answer your question, I suppose we just assume the counterattacks would still happen, though with a severe shortage in mechanized armaments?
Curious what @ObssesedNuker might have to say on this though if he finds the time
 
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