WI: more Soviet involvement in China during the 20s and 30s

So I've been reading more about the Soviet involvement in Mongolia and Sinkiang, both of which were almost Republics of the USSR during the pre-war period. It has gotten me wondering about what might happen if the USSR got more involved in China either before or after the China-Japan war started. For example an attempt to turn Manchuria into a Socialist state either before the Japanese make their move or after the Japanese had turned Manchuria into a puppet. Or if the Soviets had gone after Tibet or Inner Mongolia. Or even tried to nibble at the Chinese heartlands (highly unlikely IMO - such a course of action would be very costly and have little chance of success - even in a situation where "success" was defined mostly in ideological terms).

How might the world react if they did?

Japan almost certainly ends up in a war with the Soviets if the Soviets preempt them in Manchuria and certainly ends up in a war if the Soviets try to take Manchuria from them after 1931. What are the chances of a Japanese-Soviet war shaping up if the Soviets restrict their efforts to Inner Mongolia and Tibet?

What about the reaction of the Chinese Communists and the KMT? I am inclined to think both would protest, but fight against the Soviets, unless they intervened in the Chinese heartlands themselves. On the other hand, a three cornered war between China, the Soviets and the Japanese where each was fighting the other would make for a very interesting ATL...

What is the reaction of the rest of the world likely to be? I suspect that most of Europe and the Americas would condemn the Soviets with words, but take no action against them. Britain might be the exception, but I can't see the British doing anything beyond giving covert aid to anti-Soviet forces if the Soviets went into Tibet. This could, however, mean the Soviets don't become a member of the League of Nations. Might that have any knock-on effects?

And what sort of effects would a Soviet-Japanese war in the 1930s have on the rise of Hitler and WW2?

fasquardon
 
An old soc.history.what-if post of mine:

***


In 1929, though, when the Young Marshall [Zhang Xueliang or Chang Hsueh-liang,] attempted to oust the USSR from its participation in the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Soviets struck back, and in a short, undeclared war forced the Chinese to restore the status quo), Stalin seems to have had very ambitious plans (or at least fantasies) indeed for Manchuria. From an October 7 letter to Molotov:

"There will be a lot of trouble with China. By the way, I think it's time
to think about organizing an uprising by a revolutionary movement in
Manchuria. The isolated detachments being sent to Manchuria to perform
isolated tasks of an episodic nature are a good thing, of course, but they
are not enough. We have to go for bigger things now. We need to organize
two double regiment brigades, chiefly made up of Chinese, outfit them with
everything necessary (artillery, machine guns, and so on), put Chinese at
the head of the brigade, and send them into Manchuria with the following
assignment: to stir up a rebellion among the Manchurian troops, to have
reliable soldiers from these forces join them (the others should be sent
home after removing the officer corps), to form into a division, to occupy
Harbin, and, after gathering force, to declare Chang Hsueh-liang
overthrown, establish a revolutionary government (massacre the landowners,
bring in the peasants, create soviets in the cities and towns, and so on).
This is necessary. This we can and, I think, should do. No
'international law' contradicts this task. It will be clear to everyone
that we are against war with China, that our Red Army soldiers are only
defending our borders and have no intention of crossing into Chinese
territory, and if there is a rebellion inside Manchuria, that's something
quite understandable, given the atmosphere of the regime imposed by Chang
Hsueh-liang. Think about it. It's important."

Lars T. Lih and others (eds), *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936*, p. 182. http://books.google.com/books?id=B4WLvA5-9hQC&pg=PA182

As Lih notes in his Introduction, "This revolutionary daydream seems atypical of the cautious Stalin, and there is no indication anything was done with it." http://books.google.com/books?id=jjzopxC9ICYC&pg=PA35 If Stalin were really to have tried this, Japan would almost certainly have used force to oppose Stalin's "revolution from abroad" in Manchuria (and of course unlike OTL's 1931, Japan could have plausibly argued that it was fighting *for* China in Manchuria). Still, maybe there was a bit more of the romantic revolutionary in Stalin than is generally acknowledged...

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/Q92QV65IFOk/vwJR4wfkvb0J
 
Still, maybe there was a bit more of the romantic revolutionary in Stalin than is generally acknowledged...

Fascinating! I wonder why Stalin didn't pursue it - did he decide he was being too romantic, did internal affairs divert him or did someone else dissuade him?

I wonder if the White Russian community was as pro-Soviet in Manchuria as they were elsewhere...

And Japan and China being allies against the Soviet Union would be pretty interesting. I can't help but think the Japanese would piss off China by blatantly abusing them at the same time though...

fasquardon
 
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