WI: More extensive U-boat campaign in WW1?

hipper

Banned
No, that is not correct. I provided multiple detail sources that you rejected. You instead had a single source of lower quality.

your description of the Admiralty monograph on the defeat of the U boat in two world wars as a single source of lower quality makes it hard to debate with you. Do you have a better source on UK shipping losses? Numerous naval historians have written about the U boat campaigns in both world wars, I'm not aware of any that claim that Convoy was not the decisive tactic against the U boats. Do you have any sources that do?

sniped things I'll deal with seperatly


OK, now to your convoy point. I went through the data month by month. While there are boat loads of British Admirals that like to talk how the convoys work and there are enthusiast who love to talk about how it works, it is just not supported by the data. Among the flaws.

  • If the Germans go with merchant warfare sooner, the counter technology just had not been developed. It would not be like turning a switch and the losses go down. And the data shows this to be true.
the Counter technology was Convoy which goes back to classical times, The Royal Navy had been using very large escorted convoys as a trade protection measure during the Napoleonic wars.
Before 1918 most escorts had only 2 depth charges, the effective weapon was the gun and the ram.
Aircraft escort is perhaps the onlyeffective anti U boat measure that would take time to develop


as to the effect of Convoy it was indeed like a switch.

listen to Karl Doneitz who may be assumed to know something of the topic

In the First World War the German U boat arm achieved Great successes; but the introduction of The Convoy system in 1917 robbed it of its opportunity to become a decisive factor. The oceans at once became bear and empty for long periods at a time the U boats acting individually would see nothing at all and then suddenly up would come a concourse of ships 30 or 50 Or more of them surrounded by a strong escort of warships of all types,

Read the whole thing here

https://www.amazon.com/Memoirs-Ten-Years-Twenty-Days/dp/0306807645

The data shows precisely that the introduction of Convoy and the reduction in losses are very well correlated. If you have meaningful contradictory data it would be worthy of academic attention.

  • Most of the gains come after the Americans join the war in force. Many of the gains relate to things like seizing interned German merchant shipping in neutral and formerly neutral ports. This effect is not due to the convoy system. It is due to more shipping. Some of the benefits are due to the USA enforcing restrictions on exports to Germany after joining the war. Some effects are due to the USA organizing the economy.
I'm not sure what you are discussing here, there were some gains of captured shipping after America joined the war, but I'm talking about
The reduction in shipping losses caused by the introduction of Convoy .


  • You like to look at stats of ships protected by convoys. These stats don't matter since the Entente never had enough DD to protect all the merchant shipping. It only matters to the extend the UK has enough warships to protect enough freighters to impact the sinkings per day per U-boat.
You don't need a destroyer to escort a convoy a trawler will do very well, see the French coal convoys for an example. destroyers were reqired for Ocean Convoy escort which reduced losses to "trifiling" levels only 45 ships per day arrived in the UK from the ocean trades, these were the ships that had to be protected by warships.

after the defeat of the attack on ocean convoys the U boats turned their attention to mostly unescorted costal shipping. These ships were progressively convoyed using minor vessels and increasingly air cover. Which was a very effective counter to U boats.


  • Finally, you ignore that convoying reduces the ability to ship by 1/3 due to lower speed and port inefficiencies. Even if an ASB gives the UK enough warships and fuel to protect all merchant shipping, the Entente loses the war faster. This 1/3 loss is actually much higher than the losses from my ATL which take many months to even begin to get close to this level. So even I am wrong on every single point above, if the UK convoys earlier and the USA does not enter the war earlier, the Entente have a severely impacted peformance.

You have identified a very real statistic. However the 1/3 drop in efficiency compares wartime Convoy to peacetime shipping performance,
it takes no account of delays on individually routed ships caused by the war. Ships often delayed in port if there were reports of U boats sinking ships in the vicinity. These delays reduced the efficency drop caused by convoys. Besides a ship sailing in Convoy is much more efficent than one that has been sunk
 

hipper

Banned
Logically, here is what you are saying. A ship coming over with enough ammo for a corp for a couple of weeks of combat is sunk. To say there is no impact on supplies on the war is to say that the British had 3000 tons of ammo production that they planned to have sitting idle. Then after the Admiralty learns of the sinking, the Admiralty orders the idle workers and equipment to produce the product.. This would mean the British Admiralty intentionally and repeatedly committed high treason.

OR

One has to believe the corp is notified of the ammo loss. The corp then reshuffles ammo withing the Army, and reduces the fire plans for the next few weeks. This reduction in artillery support has no impact on UK or German casualties. This would mean that the extra 15K or so shells that would have been fired would have wounded no Germans. Yet we know that ammo consumption at the high end produces casualties at a reasonably predictable pattern. i.e. XX dead per YY shells fired.

You have repeatedly confused two items.

A) Was the available UK production reduced by the U-boat merchant warfare campaign. This is clearly true. This is what I have repeatedly stated and went to exhausted lengths explaining and citing. Including writing a 60 page ATL if one includes the discussion

B) Did UK available resource increase as a result of the war effort? This is roughly what you argue. And this point is true, but it does not contradict the point A above on which I write ATLs. Sure, the conversion of civilian to military production line helped. Sure, the limiting or at least deprioritization of luxury goods helped. Sure, the army commanders did try to optimize ammo consumption. Sure, at times the extra rounds generate low casualties. But none of this has any bearing on my point above.


So for two final examples. There was a ship that stayed in port a extra few weeks in India because of the SMS Emden. Because this ship was late, the wool harvest in Australia was messed up. Because of this bottleneck, there was less wool, and less uniforms than planned. Second, take the example of the USA entering the war. While our troops took a while to arrive in quantity, it is clear the extra material support in 1917 helped Entente performance in the war. Beside possibly you, no one disputes this point. And quite frankly, besides British enthusiast in relation to WW1 and WW2, I have never seen anyone argue that losing supply convoy at sea or land or air bombardment has no impact on casualties or who wins the war.

My argument is not that shipping losses have no effect it is that they will have the same effect as they did historically.

For example if A Greater number of U boats are active against merchant shipping at the start of WW1 then losses will increase over historical levels

Two things will then happen.

War msteriel will be prioritised over civilian goods to keep the supply of war materiel at OTL levels.
When this becomes impossible to continue. Convoy will be introduced, with historical effects.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
My argument is not that shipping losses have no effect it is that they will have the same effect as they did historically.

For example if A Greater number of U boats are active against merchant shipping at the start of WW1 then losses will increase over historical levels

Two things will then happen.

War msteriel will be prioritised over civilian goods to keep the supply of war materiel at OTL levels.
When this becomes impossible to continue. Convoy will be introduced, with historical effects.

We just don't agree here. I agree that greater emphasis will be placed on prioritization. In my ATL, i gave the UK back 50% of the losses to this effect, but it can't be 100%. First that would require god like intellect, perfect discipline, and modern supercomputers. And even if this happened, the lack of "civilian goods" will lower production. A worker back then takes 3500 to 4500 calories per day. As their food ration is cut, they will work slower due to fatigue due to hunger. Next many of the "civilian" goods are supporting the war effort directly or indirectly. Fewer tools, oil, fodder, clothes will hamper production.

As to the convoy system, implementing earlier simply means not only a faster loss than OTL, it means a faster loss than if the Germans go only merchant warfare. UNLESS the USA enters the war earlier, and the benefit here is not due to the convoy system but the extra USA resources. Implementing the Convoy system has the same effect on the amount of freight move as sinking 1/3 of all merchant ships. Many criticize the UK for the slow implementation of the convoy system in both wars. And this makes for an easy scapegoat, but the UK was correct in waiting to implement the convoy system until the sinking rates were so high that they were force to implement.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
your description of the Admiralty monograph on the defeat of the U boat in two world wars as a single source of lower quality makes it hard to debate with you. Do you have a better source on UK shipping losses? Numerous naval historians have written about the U boat campaigns in both world wars, I'm not aware of any that claim that Convoy was not the decisive tactic against the U boats. Do you have any sources that do?

Yes, you are quoting a study. I am looking at the actual sinking rates. I am going one level deeper into the data. Basically, it is this scenario. You are quoting a widely know study. I am telling you that I spent hundreds of hours reviewing the data the study was based on, and your study is flawed. Or more accurately, the study is limited because the way your are projecting the study results produces an inaccurate model. The study you quote most often list losses in protected convoys. And this would be relevant if all or even the vast majority of merchant ships were in convoy's. But the UK did not achieve enough convoy escorting to break the U-boat effectiveness until after the war would have been won, if the USA does not enter the war.

the Counter technology was Convoy which goes back to classical times, The Royal Navy had been using very large escorted convoys as a trade protection measure during the Napoleonic wars.
Before 1918 most escorts had only 2 depth charges, the effective weapon was the gun and the ram.
Aircraft escort is perhaps the onlyeffective anti U boat measure that would take time to develop


as to the effect of Convoy it was indeed like a switch.

listen to Karl Doneitz who may be assumed to know something of the topic

In the First World War the German U boat arm achieved Great successes; but the introduction of The Convoy system in 1917 robbed it of its opportunity to become a decisive factor. The oceans at once became bear and empty for long periods at a time the U boats acting individually would see nothing at all and then suddenly up would come a concourse of ships 30 or 50 Or more of them surrounded by a strong escort of warships of all types,

Read the whole thing here

https://www.amazon.com/Memoirs-Ten-Years-Twenty-Days/dp/0306807645

The data shows precisely that the introduction of Convoy and the reduction in losses are very well correlated. If you have meaningful contradictory data it would be worthy of academic attention.

I do this as a hobby, not as a profession. If a WW1 professor is reading the board and wishes to contact me directly, I would welcome the to talk to him. The person can send me a PM. I have provide the source in prior links on the sinking rates based on U-boats days at sea. In my analysis, the focus on ships lost in convoys is not the appropriate way to review the data, and the people who just look at this through this lens have a flawed methodology. It is not that convoys don't work, it that they don't work in a simplistic method as you are defending. So lets do some round numbers for explanation.

Assumptions.

  • 18 million tons of shipping.
  • 3 month average round trip.
  • 1.3 loss in capacity due to convoying.
  • 100K tons of shipping built per month.

  • If neither side does anything, 6 million tons arrives a month. The formula for war goods available is 6,000,000 + (number of months) X (100,000)/3)
  • Or 6 million, 6.03 million, 6.06 million.
  • If the Germans sink 300,000 tons per month, the formula becomes 6,000,000 + (number of months) X (100,000-sinking rate/3)
  • 6 million, 5.93 million, 5.87 million.
  • If the UK convoys and thee convoys are 100% effective. 0.66X [6,000,000 + (number of months) X (100,000)/3)]
  • 4 million, 4.02 million, 4.04 million.
I wrote an ATL using a middle type scenario. I can write a ATL where the admiralty goes full convoy on day 1, and the war is lost much faster if we keep the same butterflies as my ATL. It takes most of the war to get to the effectiveness of the full convoy system. Roughly speaking the Germans would have to sink 6 million tons over the British shipyard building to reach the break even month.



I'm not sure what you are discussing here, there were some gains of captured shipping after America joined the war, but I'm talking about
The reduction in shipping losses caused by the introduction of Convoy .

You just can't ignore the additional of several million tons of additional merchant shipping to the Entente pool when calculating the impact. You are throwing out part of the formula, and it is a big enough number to have a major impact.

You don't need a destroyer to escort a convoy a trawler will do very well, see the French coal convoys for an example. destroyers were reqired for Ocean Convoy escort which reduced losses to "trifiling" levels only 45 ships per day arrived in the UK from the ocean trades, these were the ships that had to be protected by warships.

after the defeat of the attack on ocean convoys the U boats turned their attention to mostly unescorted costal shipping. These ships were progressively convoyed using minor vessels and increasingly air cover. Which was a very effective counter to U boats.

You have identified a very real statistic. However the 1/3 drop in efficiency compares wartime Convoy to peacetime shipping performance,
it takes no account of delays on individually routed ships caused by the war. Ships often delayed in port if there were reports of U boats sinking ships in the vicinity. These delays reduced the efficency drop caused by convoys. Besides a ship sailing in Convoy is much more efficent than one that has been sunk

The information that I have seen shows the 1/3 is between wartime conditions with compared to without convoy. Not peace time conditions. I actually double check this amount on a half dozen convoys and looked up the number of docks in port. It is mostly port inefficiencies, but it also speed. And zig zagging impacts too.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Yes, it should butterfly away Jutland unless the UK plans to try to bait out the High Seas Fleet. It does not really matter either way. My previous post explained the logic. I can write the ATL fairly easily. Let me make sure I have your assumptions.

  • You want the ship building schedules to remain unchanged.
  • You want countries to enter the war on time barring no other plausible outcome. This will make the effects of the USW clearer.
  • January 1, 1915, the Germans go full merchant warfare, but avoid the USW declaration.
  • USA does not enter war.
  • January 1, 1916, the UK goes to the full convoy system.
  • How many Q ships? Or how many more?
  • Canceling Salonika makes the ATL much, much bulker to write. I need to concentrate the effects in one sector. I propose all extra units used in whatever western sector the Germans were attacking in any given month once I have a spare corp or two.
  • Did I miss anything?

Are you interested in seeing this ATL? I will throw in ASB to speed writing, and so we can do technical issues only. If I did not lose too much in the harddrive crash, it should be easy to do.
 
Yes, it should butterfly away Jutland unless the UK plans to try to bait out the High Seas Fleet. It does not really matter either way. My previous post explained the logic. I can write the ATL fairly easily. Let me make sure I have your assumptions.

  • You want the ship building schedules to remain unchanged.
  • You want countries to enter the war on time barring no other plausible outcome. This will make the effects of the USW clearer.
  • January 1, 1915, the Germans go full merchant warfare, but avoid the USW declaration.
  • USA does not enter war.
  • January 1, 1916, the UK goes to the full convoy system.
  • How many Q ships? Or how many more?
  • Canceling Salonika makes the ATL much, much bulker to write. I need to concentrate the effects in one sector. I propose all extra units used in whatever western sector the Germans were attacking in any given month once I have a spare corp or two.
  • Did I miss anything?

Are you interested in seeing this ATL? I will throw in ASB to speed writing, and so we can do technical issues only. If I did not lose too much in the harddrive crash, it should be easy to do.

I at least am interested. Thank You.

Building schedules unchanged.
January 1st 1915 is fine (or Feb 4th or November 1914 or anytime around there)
USA does not enter
January 1st 1916 full convoy system
We can assume no more Q ship than OTL if that is easier (Q ships seem weird in convoy system unless they trail the convoy as a fake straggler)
Salonika is as OTL to avoid complications

Other aspects maybe:
A trickle of Merchant subs can continue (if that is really significant to be a factor I don't know)
American Belgian relief is still on in 17-18. (more food in German stocks)
Surely more American goods are going to make it to Germany through neutrals in 17-18 in this TL
Impact on Russia in 1917 of no USA entry? (almost have to assume OTL even though it really might have changed)
 

hipper

Banned
Yes, you are quoting a study. I am looking at the actual sinking rates. I am going one level deeper into the data. Basically, it is this scenario. You are quoting a widely know study. I am telling you that I spent hundreds of hours reviewing the data the study was based on, and your study is flawed. Or more accurately, the study is limited because the way your are projecting the study results produces an inaccurate model. The study you quote most often list losses in protected convoys. And this would be relevant if all or even the vast majority of merchant ships were in convoy's. But the UK did not achieve enough convoy escorting to break the U-boat effectiveness until after the war would have been won, if the USA does not enter the war.


I do this as a hobby, not as a profession. If a WW1 professor is reading the board and wishes to contact me directly, I would welcome the to talk to him. The person can send me a PM. I have provide the source in prior links on the sinking rates based on U-boats days at sea. In my analysis, the focus on ships lost in convoys is not the appropriate way to review the data, and the people who just look at this through this lens have a flawed methodology. It is not that convoys don't work, it that they don't work in a simplistic method as you are defending. So lets do some round numbers for explanation.

I like numbers let's look at the Actual shipping losses I've sourced my data from U boat net

Shipping losses in 1917 due to U boats

1917
Jan (222) Feb (328) Mar (413) Apr (516) May (413) Jun (433)
Jul (311) Aug (242) Sep (245) Oct (214) Nov (173) Dec (213)
3723 ships hit in 1917.

shipping losses peaked in April, Convoy was introduced in May, By August losses were 1/2 of the April peak. It's very rare in warfare to see such an obvious cause and effect.

Why do you think shipping losses dropped so rapidly in the second half of 1917
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I like numbers let's look at the Actual shipping losses I've sourced my data from U boat net

Shipping losses in 1917 due to U boats

1917
Jan (222) Feb (328) Mar (413) Apr (516) May (413) Jun (433)
Jul (311) Aug (242) Sep (245) Oct (214) Nov (173) Dec (213)
3723 ships hit in 1917.

shipping losses peaked in April, Convoy was introduced in May, By August losses were 1/2 of the April peak. It's very rare in warfare to see such an obvious cause and effect.

Why do you think shipping losses dropped so rapidly in the second half of 1917

You are going the data wrong. The independent variable with the largest impacts is "U-boats on patrol day". And what we have to look at is tons per ship day.
 

hipper

Banned
You are going the data wrong. The independent variable with the largest impacts is "U-boats on patrol day". And what we have to look at is tons per ship day.

Was there a big drop in Uboats on patrol between May and August 1917?
Also don't you think the drop in encounters between boats and merchant ships caused by convoy was more important than the numbers of uboats at sea. Donitz described the oceans as bare and empty after the introduction of convoy.

Regards Hipper
 
@BlondieBC

I have some questions on your 1/3 loss of capacity due to convoys calculation.

There would be lost capacity as ships waited in harbor to begin the convoying and that convoys could only move as fast as the slowest ship but would it really reach 1/3?

The uboat danger in WWI was largely limited to the area around the British Isles and the Mediterranean. WWI uboats had limited range and the Germans bases were in poorer locations than WWII. Outside of this zone, the danger would come from the few surface raiders the Germans managed to get to the high seas and little need to convoy

So how far out did WWI convoys go?

Wouldn't the port problems be limited to the British end?

What measures could the British take to ease the capacity problems in their ports?
 

ben0628

Banned
Perhaps if during ww1, the Germans built the 'milk cows' instead of standard extra U-boats, they could have done better
 

BlondieBC

Banned
@BlondieBC

I have some questions on your 1/3 loss of capacity due to convoys calculation.

There would be lost capacity as ships waited in harbor to begin the convoying and that convoys could only move as fast as the slowest ship but would it really reach 1/3?

The uboat danger in WWI was largely limited to the area around the British Isles and the Mediterranean. WWI uboats had limited range and the Germans bases were in poorer locations than WWII. Outside of this zone, the danger would come from the few surface raiders the Germans managed to get to the high seas and little need to convoy

So how far out did WWI convoys go?

Wouldn't the port problems be limited to the British end?

What measures could the British take to ease the capacity problems in their ports?

I have started working on a longer reply, but that could take days or weeks to get it finished. It is not so much it is complicated, but is more that it is lengthy. But to the highlights of the answers, from memory.

  • I don't think WW1 U-boats really had more range issues than in WW2. Both wars had shorter range U-boats that could not reach the USA.
  • The hunting of merchants was done largely along the UK coast as long as targets were available. If pressures become greater, they tended to expand their hunting zone. The U-boats did kills within sight of the US coastline, even earlier in the war.
  • The UK basically started convoys roughly at Suez, Gibraltar, and North American Ports.
  • The port problems would often be at both ends. If you happen to sail from a port without an issue (Argentina), you will have a situation at whatever port you assemble the ship at. So for example, if going from Melborne to London, you would end up waiting a few days in the Suez Canal to get a batch of ships together. Now on the return trip, you can of course race for Melborne once you hit the red sea.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Was there a big drop in Uboats on patrol between May and August 1917?
Also don't you think the drop in encounters between boats and merchant ships caused by convoy was more important than the numbers of uboats at sea. Donitz described the oceans as bare and empty after the introduction of convoy.

Regards Hipper

There is a longer reply coming.

You are take one variable out of a many variable equation, and only focusing on it. And it is not even the most important variable. The WW2 equivalent is focusing only on the introduction of long-range day-time escorts in the bomber campaign and ignoring flak, night fighters, new models of fighters, fuel shortages, etc. Or going to the eastern front, and trying to determine why the Soviets won, but only dealing with the T-34 tank.
 
Perhaps if during ww1, the Germans built the 'milk cows' instead of standard extra U-boats, they could have done better

For the Germans to do really well, they would need a combined arms approach. Uboats were great at hitting single ships but had limited convoys could provide protection. Convoys were usually protected pretty lightly and a strong cruiser could wreck havoc on one.

The Germans could have converted their merchant ships into raiders that would have range and could double as milk cows. They lacked good bases for this and their few colonial ports were quickly neutralized.

The biggest problem for the Germans is that they hadn't planned a sea denial war but stumbled into the strategy after the war
 

hipper

Banned
There is a longer reply coming.

You are take one variable out of a many variable equation, and only focusing on it. And it is not even the most important variable. The WW2 equivalent is focusing only on the introduction of long-range day-time escorts in the bomber campaign and ignoring flak, night fighters, new models of fighters, fuel shortages, etc. Or going to the eastern front, and trying to determine why the Soviets won, but only dealing with the T-34 tank.

You keep making the statement that Convoys were not the most important variable I suggest to you very strongly that it was.
The figures show that ships in convoy were not very vulnerable to u boat attack. In my opinion the convoys to the Netherlands shows this to best effect as these went right past the U boat bases in Belgum.

Another effect was to reduce the number of encounters between ships and U boats
The third effect was to increase the number of U boat casualties .

I'm still interested in your opinion on the reduction in losses to merchant shipping between May and September of 1917 it's a huge decrease and correlates with the introduction of Convoy on a wide scale.

Regards Hipper
 

hipper

Banned
For the Germans to do really well, they would need a combined arms approach. Uboats were great at hitting single ships but had limited convoys could provide protection. Convoys were usually protected pretty lightly and a strong cruiser could wreck havoc on one.

The Germans could have converted their merchant ships into raiders that would have range and could double as milk cows. They lacked good bases for this and their few colonial ports were quickly neutralized.

The biggest problem for the Germans is that they hadn't planned a sea denial war but stumbled into the strategy after the war

indeed they succeeded with this approach on the Scandinavian Convoys which required considerable escort from a Grand fleet squadron subsequently. However geography was against them, to be effective they needed raiders in the South west approaches which is hard with a ship based on the Jade.
 
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