WI: More extensive investment in Philippines defense in 1930s?

Is there any possibility of an American company forming a Philippine subsidiary to produce small arms?

As that would seem like a good opportunity for an enterprising American or two to make their money.
 

Driftless

Donor
A Philippine equivalent of the Sten? Something relatively inexpensive, ease of lower tech manufacturing, and ease of use by non-marksmen
 

marathag

Banned
A Philippine equivalent of the Sten? Something relatively inexpensive, ease of lower tech manufacturing, and ease of use by non-marksmen

This was what they came up with, even more crude
Filipinoslamfireshotgun1.jpg
From Swearengen's The World's Fighting Shotguns, pp. 36-7: "In their modern form, Philippine guerrilla guns are alleged to be the invention of Ensign Iliff D. Richardson, USNR, who improvised this type of firearm for his Leyte- based guerrilla band. It is suspected that an old- time Philippine Scout showed Richardson how to make the Paliuntod-type guns because they were identical to earlier models. . . The gun was loaded and fired by pulling the barrel out of the breech guide tube and inserting a shell into the breech end. The loaded barrel was then re-inserted into the receiver and aimed at a nearby target. Firing was accomplished by pulling the barrel forward a few inches, then abruptly slamming it smartly rearward against the fixed breechblock. This caused the stud firing pin to crush the shell primer, discharging the gun.Effective breechlocking occurred simply through the inertia of the rearward moving barrel. . .
 

Driftless

Donor
This was what they came up with, even more crude From Swearengen's The World's Fighting Shotguns, pp. 36-7: "In their modern form, Philippine guerrilla guns are alleged to be the invention of Ensign Iliff D. Richardson, USNR, who improvised this type of firearm for his Leyte- based guerrilla band. It is suspected that an old- time Philippine Scout showed Richardson how to make the Paliuntod-type guns because they were identical to earlier models. . . The gun was loaded and fired by pulling the barrel out of the breech guide tube and inserting a shell into the breech end. The loaded barrel was then re-inserted into the receiver and aimed at a nearby target. Firing was accomplished by pulling the barrel forward a few inches, then abruptly slamming it smartly rearward against the fixed breechblock. This caused the stud firing pin to crush the shell primer, discharging the gun.Effective breechlocking occurred simply through the inertia of the rearward moving barrel. . .

Serious low tech - a trip to the plumber's scrap pile.

Kinda the reverse of the old pump shotguns, where you could hold the trigger down continuously, and the gun would discharge when the bolt closed.... Step and repeat till the magazine was empty, or you were sitting on your backside with the barrel pointing in the air...
 
Mid 1941, there wasn't enough Arty to equip half of the requirement for a US Division, and that as it was was a mix of M1897, M1902, M1916 and M1917, plus around a dozen 155mm GPF howitzers. And Dugout Doug planned to use that manpower as a cadre for 10 more divisions.

Machine Guns was even worse, around 100 automatic weapons, and that was including BARs. An interwar US Infantry Division would have around 675.

Personally, I think they got a lot of condemned weapons, with people getting rich off of that by swapping junk for the good stuff sold elsewhere.

They never noticed, till they were took out of storage. There was zero training in operations above battalion, and the training rarely including shooting any weapons. It was a farce.

The US had plenty of spare WW1 era 37mm infantry guns around this time. Really obsolete for WW2 but better then nothing and man portable which is a plus in a country with little motor transport and rough terrain. I imagine that they would be capable of taking out IJA tankettes.
 

marathag

Banned
The US had plenty of spare WW1 era 37mm infantry guns around this time. Really obsolete for WW2 but better then nothing and man portable which is a plus in a country with little motor transport and rough terrain. I imagine that they would be capable of taking out IJA tankettes.

37 mm cannon, Model 1916, SA 17, SA 18, and SA 18 Model 1937
Caliber: 37 mm L/21

APHE projectile (armor piercing high explosive)
Weight: 0.5 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 338 m/s
Penetration: 8 mm at 400 m, angle 30°

APC projectile (armor piercing capped)
Weight: 0.39 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 600 m/s
Penetration: 18 mm at 400 m, angle 30°

AP projectile (armor piercing)
Weight: 0.5 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 600 m/s
Penetration: 21 mm at 400 m, angle 35°


More than just tankettes. at 100m at 0 degrees, could penetrate 37mm

The Type 97 Chi-Ha had 35mm on the gun mantlet, less everywhere else, mostly 20-25mm

Would have to be on the close side, but would beat shooting shotguns at them
 
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37 mm cannon, Model 1916, SA 17, SA 18, and SA 18 Model 1937
Caliber: 37 mm L/21

APHE projectile (armor piercing high explosive)
Weight: 0.5 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 338 m/s
Penetration: 8 mm at 400 m, angle 30°

APC projectile (armor piercing capped)
Weight: 0.39 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 600 m/s
Penetration: 18 mm at 400 m, angle 30°

AP projectile (armor piercing)
Weight: 0.5 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 600 m/s
Penetration: 21 mm at 400 m, angle 35°


More than just tankettes.

The Type 97 Chi-Ha had 35mm on the gun mantlet, less everywhere else, mostly 20-25mm

Would have to be on the close side, but would beat shooting shotguns at them

Yeah seems like a relatively cheap addittion the Phillipine arsenal that could have had a real effect. The US had tons of them in storage and they didnt end up being used for anything but training. They're not great but they're relatively light, small, and simple. Considering the relative lack of motor transport and rough terrain they seem perfect for the job. They'd add signifigantly to the small unit firepower.

Did they have effective HE or anti personnel shells?
 

marathag

Banned
Yeah seems like a relatively cheap addittion the Phillipine arsenal that could have had a real effect. The US had tons of them in storage and they didnt end up being used for anything but training. They're not great but they're relatively light, small, and simple. Considering the relative lack of motor transport and rough terrain they seem perfect for the job. They'd add signifigantly to the small unit firepower.

Did they have effective HE or anti personnel shells?

Obus explosif Mle1916 (HE)
Calibre : 37x94R mm
Weight of projectile : 0.555 kg (30g explosive)
Length of projectile : 109.5mm
V° = 367 m/s

Boîte à balles Mle1908 (canister)
Calibre : 37x94R mm
Weight of projectile : 0.550 kg (28x14.7mm hardened lead balls)
Length of projectile : 110mm

Boîte à balles Mle1918 (canister)
Calibre : 37x94R mm
Weight of projectile : 0.705 kg
Length of projectile : 110mm

US liked the canister round, so that why the 37mm AT gun had it.


From Tinian
The strange thing the Japanese did here was that they executed one wave of attack after another against a 37mm position firing cannister ammunition . . . .

That gun just stacked up dead Japanese . . . As soon as one Marine gunner would drop another would take his place. [Eight of 10 men who manned the gun were killed or wounded]. Soon we were nearly shoulder-high with dead Japanese in front of that weapon
 
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Along these lines PI asks for all Black units they can get especially artillery, coastal artillery, anti-aircraft and engineers to free up more PI scouts to establish another infantry regiment. Plays on racial idiocy of the day to gain reinforcements

Can't decide whether this idea is brilliantly amusing, or amusingly brilliant, but what a load of fleece to pull over the eyes of the shmucks at the pentagon and in congress...
I read through the later posts, well skimmed anyway, to see if someone else brought this up...but what makes anyone think there were any "black units" in existence whatsoever prior to their formation during WWII?

In the context of American racism it made sense to form such units during WWII, especially considering the nature of the Nazi foe in Europe. Obviously the best thing from our modern anti-racist perspective would have been to simply allow African Americans, and any other recruit of any ethnic background, to rise in the integrated ranks on an equal basis--as so many military veterans of the modern world like to claim--"in the Army we are all one color...green!" Yay for that, insofar as it is actually true, which I'm sure it is for lots--be nice to know if truly a majority or not, surely not entirely universal in truth yet either unfortunately. But probably "good enough for government work." By now.

This is the mid-1930s. There are people wise enough to know racism is ugly and at least suspect it is a sham, even though mainstream scientists are at this point on board with a consensus that "of course" racism has a scientific basis--at this point a true non-racist has to be defiant of the mainstream of respectable elite thought. Even someone who does believe that there are measurable discrepancies in average abilities between the racist can, if they are especially fair minded, believe that nevertheless people are or should be politically if not socially equal, as Lincoln proclaimed, and recognize people perceived to be of exceptional merit in the presumed less capable races. Other people who are not so deeply mesmerized by mainstream "things people know that ain't so" as Will Rogers contemporarily put it, defy academia and the powers that be in the status quo to recognize the comprehensive equality of their fellow citizens based on authentic interpersonal experience. There are rival schools of thought to the mainstream consensus--generally associated with the radical left in fact. Perhaps there are people who believe in racial equality on religious grounds though that is rowing the boat upstream, since most mainstream religious denominations made their peace with the American racial hierarchy long ago--still some may recall the authentic revulsion against it many a denomination started with. Perhaps some recall Harriet Beecher Stowe's shrewd and damning observation in Uncle Tom's Cabin nearly a century ago--eighty years ago at this point--- that if basic intelligence and general character really are racial things that differ between different breeds of humanity, then African Americans are essentially Anglo Saxons in such characteristics given the free manner in which white male slave owners availed themselves of the sexual services of the slave women they presumed to own, with consent quite irrelevant to the matter. Among the immigrant peoples making up the nation, at the expense of the few surviving Native Americans, no one has been here longer and worked more toward building modern America (this is true in 1937 or 2018) than African Americans; no one can be more American! All these possible approaches to an enlightened post racist mindset have examples and presence on the ground among white Americans.

But they don't hold majority sway in 1937! It would be nice to think the majority of white Americans who did accept and in some cases actively campaigned for white supremacy had some qualms or second thoughts or doubts or some flexibility in their minds on the subject, but the fact remained that when push came to shove there were limits to how far even people who thought of themselves as broad and fair minded dared rock this boat. And hard line racists were quite open and outspoken and politically dominant, and not just in the South either.

The experience of the Great War was that sending African Americans to war in US military uniform, even if they were restricted to lowly and inglorious support duties to avoid "confusing" them with adventures of military glory, was disruptive to Jim Crow norms back home. After all, they'd seen Gay Paree. They'd been part of the effort of the Americans to defend France, and even though French society is not free of racism either, it is a different kind of thing there than in the USA; grateful French people and Britons too treated them as fellow human beings without the "etiquette" of inferior subservience demanded of them back home. Many a black veteran was lynched or otherwise mistreated to "put them back in their places" when they came home and the African American community did not fail to learn lessons from all this.

So I do not know for sure, but I would be willing to bet that postwar the US military services, themselves controlled by officers and NCOs who would include racists of the outspoken type among them and among whom radicals on the other side would have to be most discreet if not ferreted out completely, were inclined to reimpose Jim Crow subordination within their own ranks, and any lax attitudes on their part would be corrected with orders from above demanded by the powerful Solid South Democrats of Congress. Whatever the officers and sergeants might have personally thought for whatever reason, they were under orders to racially discriminate, and be on the lookout against anything that might strengthen the pride and self worth of African American recruits. There were in the interwar years factors to mitigate this basic demand of an American society deeply committed to racial hierarchy--for instance the Republicans controlled the White House for most of the postwar generation, and they had not yet totally forgotten the legacy of Lincoln. By the 1920s few would stick their necks out far to annoy the Jim Crow and Klan types, and quite a few were deeply complicit in a more Northern style of bigotry of their own. But surely the military was less purged than it would be under southern Democratic leaders such as Wilson (whereas Wilson's hands had been tied by the need for a massive mobilization). Then the Democrats took over again, but under the New Deal coalition--FDR was hardly an activist for racial equality but he did court the votes of Northern urban African Americans. Again the effect is not so much action against institutionalized racism as much as tolerance of little deviations from the ideals of white supremacists.

But forming separate but equal African American divisions, with their own African American officers or even with all white officers, but anyway black sergeants, training them to perform all the military functions white soldiers do...could anything be better calculated to give the white supremacist establishment conniption fits? Especially in a time of Depression, when a military position, ill paid as it is, is clearly better than being completely unemployed and dependent on charity or the public dole? Surely moving African American recruits from their service positions as cooks and so forth to regular duties would merely lead to calls to muster the lot of them out and recruit more white soldiers from the long lines of applicants at recruiting stations to take their place? And yet separate units is hardly satisfactory to the overwhelming majority of African Americans (and what about other minorities--Latinos, Asians, shall each of the numerous subdivisions of humanity pre-WWII Americans were assured by most scientists and most religious leaders alike were separated by nature or by God's will each have their own divisions, or should all non-whites be shoved willy nilly into one great subdivision to be discriminated against equally?) and however many whites were on the spectrum of admitting something was seriously wrong with America's racist order--the latter at least might be divided on the question, but the former--well, actually separatism on the discriminated against side is not an unknown thing, but it makes sense mainly in the context of meaningful autonomy. If African Americans too would appreciate being in units with no white people around to look down on them and interfere with their own affairs, how militarily reliable are the units to fall into line obeying an all white command structure at whatever level the break is? How politically loyal to a federal republic that in some places disfranchises the lot of them by transparent subterfuges, in most places puts the power of the law behind gross discrimination that despite the "but equal" wording of Plessy v Ferguson's all white judge ruling is anything but equal and painfully separate, and in the best places for them they still suffer much informal mistreatment that the law can't be arsed to frown on in a colorblind manner? Clearly doing this is just asking for trouble of many potential kinds, some of which are dead certain, and for what political benefit to any politician? At most, some African American wards of voters in the North might appreciate it as a grudging and limited step forward, and a scattering of do-gooders in office whose net constituency support in this matter is likely to be shaky at best; if reelected it will more often be despite than because of this move and more likely they will be primaried out and if not, defeated at the general election precisely because of this. In this generation, in this decade, it is perfectly OK in polite white society to openly campaign against favoring African Americans in any way, and such appeals would fall on many receptive ears; those fighting back had better watch their words and implications because white supremacists will strike back hard and there are a broad array of reasonable arguments and observations any honest person would agree are true that nevertheless are deemed national fighting words that justify white supremacists in precipitate action, or anyway are mitigating excuses for behavior deemed bad, but "understandable." As To Kill A Mockingbird, set in this very decade, makes clear in the mouth of the second most sympathetic white character in it, after Scout herself, Atticus Finch, defending his African American client falsely accused of an "outrage," affirms the urgent need for tight social control and that any breach in the line of racial containment is accepted by all, himself apparently included, to lead to civil disaster. This state of ongoing racial war is deemed by the majority of the white national majority, north and south, to justify and demand the latitude given Southern states for severe measures.

I predict therefore that if you look for evidence of such separate but equal (or even separate and disadvantaged) uniformed units of African Americans trained for comprehensive competence in the full range of military battlefield service, you will look in vain. I have not attempted a search to disprove or prove this assumption of mine because I think it rests on pretty firm presumptions. I would be quite pleased and amazed to be proven wrong as it would raise the esteem I hold my nation in another notch, but while I would like to believe in an America that properly appreciated the value of its citizens, particularly the long serving and long suffering African Americans, we ought to have a grip on basic realism here. The only thing wrong with African American units is that they are not integrated with others on an equal basis as they ought to be; given separation as a hard fact, equal opportunity separately would be better than the reality I expect to find in real history.

The contingencies of WWII produced pressure to get rid of measures that handicapped us in winning the war, and opportunity for civil rights advocates to use that pressure to undermine the national party line and move at least grudgingly forward. The good fortune that African Americans and other minorities had in Harry Truman as FDR's postwar successor helped reinforce these steps forward and prevent as much backlash as otherwise might be expected after the war, but hardly all of it--indeed it was learning of such incidents of backlash that steeled Truman's resolve to affirm the human dignity of fellow citizens and especially fellow veterans of national service. And it cost him politically though not fortunately actual electoral victory--it certainly threatened it potentially.

There will be no African American units to post to the Philippines to be found.

What might be possible is to leverage white supremacist racism to back a scheme wherein US money is appropriated to build up the Filipino forces, by offering powerful Southern Congressional leaders the incentive of a plan to muster the existing African American recruits out of the military, in favor of either budget cutting or recruiting more whites for an all white services, and then facilitating the Philippine government recruiting these discharged servicemen along with others who had done a stint earlier or were veterans of the Great War to the Filipino forces; the soldiers would thus be removed from the USA presumably with their families and perhaps even cease to be US citizens, taking a new allegiance to the Philippines instead. Thus a category of African Americans the white supremacists looked to as potential troublemakers would be removed from the continent and sent off to fend for themselves far far overseas, in some non-white nation.

Even this is quite dubious on every level! Pragmatically, regular US forces will continue to serve at posts in the Philippines, and now they would be facing fellow American born English speaking counterparts of a third color in the local forces they are supposed to cooperate with, so African American trouble making is not totally ended; if the US forces are purged of any African Americans in their ranks, the form of trouble is less troublesome, but still some serious doubts about the rightness of American practices might be raised in at least some of these white American officers and service members called upon to rely on their non-white counterparts born in their own country but serving a new foreign flag. Some won't trust them and degrade cooperation, others will wonder instead about the reliability of their own fellow service members.

Then there is the whole question of how Filipinos would view African Americans, and whether that would change for better or for worse if great legions of them suddenly are living among them competing with native born Filipinos who blend in with the local culture, while among them are displaced Americans, and their wives and children too perhaps, trying to find a new place in a very strange to them climate and society that they are sworn to serve without actually knowing in advance if they can really make a home here comfortably. Since they are a minority here as well as back home, what advantage to the African Americans to exchange the devil they know for a possible new one they generally definitely do not? (There will have been some contact in advance, some African American recruits to the US military services will have had tours of duty in the Philippines, and Filipinos will have migrated to America to work in service positions generally, where African Americans will have met them. But all this is on a low scale, even among African American veterans, and few African Americans will have attempted to live under typical Filipino conditions that their new political masters will deem normal.

Naturally when being approached by Filipino recruiters in America, quite a few African American former service members, no matter how desperate being discharged in service of this scheme makes them, are going to have some shrewd questions about how well the Philippines can do against being attacked by the Japanese. I will deal in another post about how "unforeseen" and "unlikely" that contingency would be perceived in 1937, but I can preview it by saying "not very, to anyone with eyes open and ear to the ground." It is one thing to put yourself between your beloved home and war's desolation, quite another to take it on for a bunch of doomed strangers. African Americans have seen many a dubious scheme offered to them before and shrewdly wonder, if this gig is any good, how come white people aren't lining up for it. The question of whether this is tied up with the US forces bugging out makes it a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation; if Uncle Sam is keeping his hard won bases in the islands for our imperial power projection abilities, then the islands are a target for sure; if he walks away there might be neutrality or even alliance with Japan in the cards--and in an "Asia for the Asians Co-Prosperity Sphere," what is the place of African Americans exactly?

They might take the gig, hoping to prove something, or reasoning that no place can be worse than such a racist America. Or for a variety of other motives. But it is not a very appealing offer really.

And of course the question of funding hangs over it like a Sword of Damocles. While the black veterans remain on US soil the imagined coalition of white interest in this scheme remains motivated to fork over the cash, perhaps, assuming the scheme is not simply dismissed out of hand as a preposterously pointless expense. Once the veterans have made good on their side of the bargain, what is to stop Uncle Sam from pulling the plug, if they plan to cut and run from the islands? If they don't won't they favor white forces in US uniform over all others and leave the Philippines with a new expense to maintain eating into their meagre resources? In the long run, why should the USA go on subsidizing the Filipino military? In the context of the coming Cold War, that question may answer itself, but who anticipates that in this time frame?
 
More than anything else, before 1941 war with Japan was a hypothetical. Treated as a distant and avoidable event.

As I understand it, by the 1920s the USN at least had decided that the most likely and most challenging among likely conflicts they could anticipate and thus plan for would be precisely war with Japan. As for the expendibilty of Filipino bases, well, getting them was a major motive of the Spanish American War---very much in living memory in the 1930s, what with Smedley Butler having first gone into combat then as a minor and remaining active in the Corps as one of its top officers through most of the 1920s, with time off for various detached duties such as serving as Philadelphia Police Chief, and remaining quite active through the 1930s--his death was from a sudden and quite unexpected illness which had it not happened might have left him around through the '50s. The point being, abandoning the Philippines was a major about face, and as OTL demonstrates, even with the islands formally independent we kept the bases and nation very much in "our" sphere into the 1990s, nearly a century after the invasion. (First we were allies with the Filipino insurgency...that changed to invasion when we blew off their claims of sovereignty). The cost of holding the acquisition against long Filipino resistance dwarfed those of the Spanish American War that seized them. Many Americans were deeply invested in the place. But the American primary goal in first securing it was the same as Spain's many centuries before--as the nearest foot in the door of the China trade that could be feasibly acquired. In short while Americans did make money on the side exploiting the conquest as a colony, the primary purpose that brought us there in the first place was strategic.

In context then, we are a bit myopic focusing on decisions made in the later 1930s...a deeper question than "why write off the Philippines in 1937?" would be "where was the due diligence in providing adequately for its defense in the 1920s?" when Japan was first targeted by USN planners as the next big foe?

As it happens we have seen some excellent points raised, that explain why decisions that were bad with foresight seemed like smart ones at the time. The Republican mood in the '20s was to pinch governmental pennies, resenting the drunken splurges of the war crisis years and a general surge in the sweeping and often unaccountable and abused powers of Federal government, and holding the line against state government too is my impression. "The business of America is business!" proclaimed President Harding and the Navy (less than the Army, but still) was left to beg for scraps versus their wish list. Meanwhile as noted, apparently Japan was trusted diplomatically, and to be fair the civilian liberal regimes of pre-Depression years certainly looked pretty much on board with a post-"War to End All Wars" mentality, the "Spirit of Locarno" in Europe. Given the fragile (especially in retrospect) and somewhat meagre (if one were not an American capitalist) but still celebrated and appreciated prosperity of the later decade, there was little imminent reason to imagine major conflicts.

Fundamentally what protected the Philippines, assuming the USA maintained the strong interest that we in fact did historically OTL, would be the same thing that deters global thermonuclear war today--however feasible it might be for a second rate power like Japan to force their way in, the mere attempt should be sufficient to trigger all out war with the USA as a whole, and people like Yamamoto appreciated that if the USA decided to go all out to win a war, we'd pretty much inevitably do so and woe to the vanquished. Whether we could have gone head to head with say the Soviet Union and been sure of victory does not look like a slam dunk to me; against the British Empire I think it would come down to a matter of who had better morale (and it is a ridiculously far fetched scenario into the bargain even noting certain grievances, mostly British against the Yanks, that might irritate--but not, among sane persons, forecast an actual war). Any lesser power, and say France would number among these so this is no slight of Japan, would be doomed--assuming the Americans did not decide to just back off of course.

One thing I don't know about the determination that given the treaty barriers and time required to arm up the Philippines, their direct defense would be "infeasible," is to what degree this sober analysis was generally known, to the public, or how closely held a secret it would be if at all. If the US establishment was openly discussing their inability to defend then it would surely be quite dishonorable to toss the keys to an independent Philippines over their shoulder on the way out saying "lotsa luck, hasta now!" Besides, the forward bases in the islands we retained should be sufficient motive for us to be committed to their general defense, and the consideration that we would defend ought to go some distance toward reconciling any Filipino resentment with the continuation of the basing "agreement" we extorted from a compliant puppet government--turn what had begun as naked extortion into a genuine alliance in fact. Provided that the USA stood committed to, if unable to prevent invasion, at least not rest until we had belatedly defeated whatever power might dare to set the value of American honor and resolve at naught and forced them to disgorge.

In fact this is what did happen; having calculated that we could not prevent the islands from being overrun at least assuming Japan was determined to do so, we did in fact come back with a vengeance in the most literal sense some years later.
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With regard to the OP I still have to wonder--what sort of level of force did the American investigators into the question of "can we stop a Japanese invasion" estimate, in 1937 or whatever year the decision was made not to attempt it, would need to be based in the PI in order to stop a determined Japanese attempt at invasion? What would be the dollar cost of maintaining such an adequate-on-paper defense as a fraction--or multiple!--of combined War and Navy department budgets be?

What would be adequate defenses to repel a Japanese invasion, without worrying about the time it might take to build it up or how it would be funded, just game out the worst case estimated possible Japanese invasion they could imagine and keep adding stuff to the US/Philippine inventory on hand until it is sufficient to guarantee Japanese defeat, then what that is done, estimate cost and time to build it. With that in hand, how does the dollar cost and time to build compare to what American leaders were accustomed to thinking of in terms of spending?

I think there has to be a finite answer to this wargame question, because after all the USA itself was not deemed in danger of Japanese attack, not the lower 48 states I mean--CONUS. Now if the USA were totally pacifistic and had zero defenses, clearly the sheer distance of CONUS from Japan would not defend us; the Japanese could feasibly invade with finite and affordable forces. Since our defenses were not zero, the distance certainly attenuated Japanese strike ability while multiplying our defensive position to be sure. But look at Britain confronting Germany--from our comfortable Monday morning quarterbacking hindsight, we laugh people off the site if they seriously think Germany could possibly have invaded Britain and yet the Germans certainly managed to invade such offshore sites as Norway and Crete. We say, well duh, between the RN and the RAF, Sea Lion stands no chance. The same RN of course failed to interdict a German invasion of Norway of course! It is a different problem obviously. But what this tells me is, if you want to defend an island group against a formidable but finite foe, a finite amount of stuff ought to do it. It may be that treaties have hamstrung your ability to build certain kinds of defenses whereas say Britain bristled with them--but was it really so that Britain was protected by loads of fortified shore batteries? Was not more the case that between the sheer size of RN and RAF and their relatively easy short-legged defense mission, these forces were what protected Britain?

So--even granting that in 1937 Roosevelt inherits a bunch of liabilities due to our honoring a treaty the Japanese violated, so good shore batteries and the like had been foregone in the PI, I believe it must have been the case that if we were to deploy enough ships and airplanes on the islands, and use them intelligently instead of stupidly of course, these alone ought to stop a Japanese invasion cold before it could reach the beaches. I notice that Taiwan is in air striking range of Luzon, even Manila way down on the south of the island--though on the other hand to reach Manila they ought to have to run a gauntlet of northerly US airbases. Once the treaties were torn up, time was limited. But a certain number of airplanes of suitable quality, say P-40 type Curtiss models, perhaps mixed in with some of the fancier and more high priority warplanes in US inventory by 1941--P-38s, P-39 (not loved by Americans but much appreciated by Russians--and not just as a tank buster but as a fighter), reinforcing a strong naval task force whose task is to defend the islands against a worst case attack by Japan, should be sufficient to render the islands as invulnerable as Britain was. The USA had been seeking "a navy second to none" since before the Great War and had the economic means to build and crew such a navy; surely if the RN could make Britain unassailable despite the vast military resources Hitler could throw at such a nearby island, surely the USN could be just as competent. So it is a matter of figuring out just how large a reasonably proficient US stock of air and naval assets we'd need to commit to the mission, and then considering how large a share of the late '30s military establishment such a buildup would be, and how fast suitably advanced ships and aircraft could be placed there.

I see a lot of dismissal of the idea of defending the Philippines and accept that the mindset was not there to support the idea even if it were technically feasible, and I have no doubt making it feasible might possibly not be possible given time needed to construct the ships and planes, plus of course aircraft at least commissioned in say 1938 might be hopelessly obsolete by 1941. But consider for a moment the strategic advantage of resolving to hold the islands, assuming finite resources can accomplish this. First of all in hindsight we can see that despite the daunting and sweeping successes the Japanese enjoyed in 1942, they were fundamentally weak in a number of ways. Given that they did hold the Philippines their position in Indonesia and Southeast Asia generally was quite impressive, and in the Pacific generally. But if a Yankee-Filipino alliance manages to hang on in that archipelago, the Japanese at least would realize they would be in a hellishly exposed position if they managed to secure everything else they accomplished in that epic surge. They'd have control of Indonesia and its oil all right, but if not in air terms, in naval terms the Americans based in the Philippines would be terribly close. Australia, and still more New Zealand, would feel much safer than OTL. To the east the Japanese might control lots of small islands and threaten to interdict sea lanes connecting North America to the south Pacific fronts, but even assuming Americans are badly decimated in defending against the OTL planned invasion that was successful in our history but I suggest might be repelled in this one, they too would have suffered grievously, probably losing a huge percentage of everything they committed to taking the Philippines OTL. Even with the USN buttoned down in the islands under decimated air cover, our landplanes would create a perimeter around them, one in striking range of Taiwan in fact, that would require Japanese shipping to divert around it. Between the limited industrial capacity of the Philippines, decimation from the attack, the long and threatened supply line from North America and the ugly fact that despite the Allies owing to Japan the USA is in the war at all, still Roosevelt's priority is the Atlantic/European war, the "Europe first" policy greatly delaying putting American resources fully into Pacific commanders' hands. So if badly weakened in the initial attack, the local USN fleet, even augmented with Commonwealth forces, would be tied down trying to reinforce the air patrols.

Still the IJN would never know when the Allies might sally forth and do God knows what damage in what direction. If the Philippines hold, FDR cannot afford to totally neglect reinforcing them and using them as a strike base, because the successful defense would be the best news Americans in particular but the Allies in general have in December 1941; letting them fall later would be very bad political optics for Roosevelt. And not everything the high tech American forces require must come from America; Australia has some industrial capability, very little of course but some. Items can be shipped in from much closer than America, given the USA is a Commonwealth ally.

It might seem foolhardy to project major forces to the antipodes and leave the USA itself "vulnerable," but the whole point of conquering the Philippines in the first place was to secure a forward base in east Asia, and in fact the tremendous distance, which is no absolute defense in itself, does greatly multiply the worth of rather minimal continental defenses, allowing the USA to deploy forces far overseas and in the face of distant enemies.

We can tell in hindsight how important holding might be, but the question is could someone like Eisenhower make the case in 1937? Since as yet I have no idea what scale of mobile assets to make up for lack of shore batteries and so forth would be needed to make the Philippines defensible, it is a question mark rather than settled how much political influence to change the thinking in Washington would be needed. Obviously if a guaranteed total defense would double the USN budget, that is out of the question, and my guess is a compromise cut rate defense plan based on the notion that Japan cannot afford an all out attack and it would be more limited would still cost say half the comprehensive coverage estimate, and might still break the bank. Clearly President Roosevelt will be reluctant to tie down first rate or even second rate resources in this colonial backwater when he is preoccupied with facing down Hitler and worried that Britain will collapse and the Reich get control of all Europe, use their security in the west to double down in the east and break the USSR, and then with absolutely all of Europe including the Russian part under his thumb, he would have resources and time to develop such powerful forces to actually threaten the Americas despite our oceanic moats. In such a context he would not be easily moved to double down on defending a place many experts advise him is a lost cause.

So it would be again the technical question, how much defense, in the mobile and not treaty-bound form of aircraft and ships, would it take to make the defense pretty sure to be successful. Doubling the USN budget is not in the cardsl But how about a 20 percent increment versus OTL? If a modest enough expenditure can cover the necessary expansion, then surely Roosevelt as former Undersecretary of the Navy can follow classic naval strategy reasonably well, he could come to regard the expenditure as an investment he hopes will check and deter Japan from doing anything stupid while he concentrates on the Atlantic.
 
You do realize there were Black units that had been in continous existence since the 1870s right? The 10th Calvary regiment being the most famous.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffalo_Soldier
I did not know that they were not phased out early in the 20th century. Certainly Republican dominance in the Executive branch until Wilson's administration would tend to give them cover, but I figured there would be endless attrition such that despite resurgences during active periods of warfare, as I said I figured not just southern Jim Crow but general racism in the North as well would eventually terminate these.

I also said I would be glad to be proven wrong, and I am! I simply did not realize these units maintained tenacious existence. I certainly figured any left over by 1913 would be shut down by Wilson. Obviously now I was much mistaken and I am much better impressed.

This puts the suggestion of sending African American units to serve in the Philippines back on the table!
 
In context then, we are a bit myopic focusing on decisions made in the later 1930s...a deeper question than "why write off the Philippines in 1937?" would be "where was the due diligence in providing adequately for its defense in the 1920s?" when Japan was first targeted by USN planners as the next big foe?
I really, really encourage you to read the book War Plan Orange by Edward S. Miller, who gives a much lengthier and more thorough explanation of American strategy in the Pacific than I possibly can here, including information about the (non-)defense of the Philippines. However, I will note that several of your assumptions here are incorrect:
  • Naval planners had assumed that Japan would be the most likely enemy of the United States in the Pacific pretty much since 1898. By the 1920s, planning for a war between the United States and Japan was in fact well advanced.
  • The Philippines were written off not in the 1930s, but pretty much as soon as they were acquired (curiously enough), at least by the Navy (this bit is crucial!). In this respect, the 1920s stand out as a brief aberration where the Navy signed up with Army plans for defending the islands. Otherwise, though, it was always the Navy that was skeptical and the Army that was optimistic about the prospect.
The really fundamental issues with defending the Philippines were that it was a long ways away from all of the major fleet bases and production centers of the United States, and very close to the fleet bases and production centers of Japan--while, moreover, Japan controlled the Caroline and Marianas Islands (aside from Guam, of course) and therefore possessed many bases astride the most obvious line of advance from American bases in California to those in the Philippines. What this meant was that moving the fleet forward to the Philippines and trying to fight the Japanese there meant fighting them where they were strong and the United States was weak, an untenable and losing situation. So the Navy recognized that the Philippines and Guam simply could not reasonably be defended. Putting the fleet there ahead of war would be both provocative and likely to end up with the fleet shattered; leaving it in San Diego or Hawaii meant that a barrier of Japanese-controlled bases barred it from reaching the Philippines quickly enough to keep it from falling. No way to win.

I can see a couple of factors that could change this, but they're pre-1900 technically. First, the United States could get the Pacific islands of Spain after the Spanish-American war instead of leaving them for Spain to sell to Germany. This would turn virtually all of the Japanese bases in the entire Pacific into American bases, and mean that it would be much more plausible for the United States Navy to sail to the Philippines in relative safety and thence conduct a defense of the islands. Instead of facing the prospect of air and submarine attacks on that route, American aircraft and submarines would now be detecting and harassing any Japanese ships attempting to interfere with the fleet or its logistics train. Second, the Philippines could become independent in 1898 in a Cuba-like relationship with the United States. This regime would probably build up its own army and perhaps its own domestic weapons industry, and might be able to put up a more credible defense of the islands than the United States Army could. That might change the attitude of the Navy towards the probability of the Philippines falling.
 
So, a quick summary...

A PI Army of approx ten undersized divisions, with mostly older 1918 era weapons.

A PI air force of maybe 200 aircraft, older and relative light models. Maybe some P35 as the best of the lot.

A navy of coastal patrol boats, a sort of glorified Coast Guard

A functional logistics system, with depots matching the potential war plans.

A training establishment that can turn conscripts into basic riflemen in a couple months.

A much more complete group of auxiliary airfields and bases throughout PI.

Alone this does not have much more deterence that the forces of OTL. But assume the independence schedule is similar to OTL, the US is preparing a long term naval presence as OTL, and as the embargos lead to war as OTL the US has a military presence similar to OTL.

A mixed US corps of the remnants of the PI Div, a US 'division' of ground units from the US, similar to OTL.

A Far Eastern AF similar to OTL. The older obsolescent models are liable to be in the PI AF, & perhaps few more newer aircraft in the FEAF.

A USN Asiatic fleet similar to OTL.

A naval and army logistics/base setup similar to OTL

This combined creates a tougher military problem for Japan. The better logistics and base structure for the PI and US forces creates some depth to the defense, and staying power. As does the additional trained manpower in the PI Army. So, can Japan commit any larger or a more capable force for securing the PI ? OTL The US/PI ground forces held out a several months longer than Japans leaders expected. The instant destruction of the FAAF & the torpedo debut at Cavite were twin bits of luck. Does this PI+ defense change anything for Japan?
 
Weren't there treaty restrictions that forbade upgrading defenses of any of the American western Pacific bases? I thought that part of the Washington Naval Agreement the U.S. and the Japanese agreed to not upgrade their islands.

Yes,

Article XIX
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

(2) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.
The US did build 'Panama Mounts' - concrete emplacements for 6" guns without the guns so they were not 'fortifications':
pre_05_03.jpg
 
How much could the United States have invested in the defense of the Philippines in the 1930s, 1940, and 1941 before the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Could the Philippines have been reinforced more heavily, starting from the 1937 invasion of China by Japan, or was it not politically and financially possible to justify such an investment at the time?

My effort for a cost effective military is below. I operate under the assumption that it needs to be affordable in economic terms and politically acceptable. Historically much of the effort started in 1935 and progressed slowly, I assume there would be little political will to create a large force prior to this. I make the assumption that most equipment comes from the US, but efforts are made to have the capacity to build some rifles and ammunition locally by 1940.

1920s

The ground work needs to be laid early, in the 1920s the Philippine Scouts need to be enlarged. Instead of being 5000 strong it needs to be 10,000 with a reserve structure allowing the easy mobilisation of another 5000 veterans and reservists. This creates a nucleus of trained personnel. I assume this would be a light infantry formation, geared towards dealing with insurgents.

Parallel to the scouts a garrison brigade is needed to provide assorted security detachments around any ports and military facilities in the country with some coast watching/patrolling duties.

The beginning of a Navy is also needed, a couple of sloops, a dozen small torpedo boats and a various small boats could form a coast guard.

1930

Fears of Japanese aggression lead to the Philippine division consisting of three US infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and an artillery regiment. To supplement this it is decided to raise two additional independent Philippine Infantry brigades and Philippine cavalry brigade. These formations are trained in fighting a regular army rather than counter-insurgency work.

In 1935 things need to be a little more aggressively planned and acted upon than in OTL

The Army is decided to be two regular divisions and eight reserve divisions, plus a ‘cavalry’ division of which 1/3 is a reserve formation. The scouts will become an additional light infantry division.

By 1939 the two pre 1935 Philippine infantry brigades are expanded into functional divisions, and the reserve divisions have their equipment ready and have been trained up. The cavalry division is changed to have one brigade in light tanks. The US defence industry is deeply grateful for the orders of light artillery, mortars and assorted small arms. Most important is the early creation of training depots and a logistics structure to support operations in the area. Over the period up till 1939 ammunition is steadily stockpiled.

The Naval side sees orders for 36 modern PT boats and search aircraft. By 1939 it has a dozen, but faces a shortfall owing to the hostilities in Europe, the US agrees to make up the shortfall. By 1941 if you add the historic US Asatic surface and submarine fleet you have on paper quite a strong submarine deterrent and the ability to harass a landing force with numerous PT boats at night. In the event the torpedo problem is discovered this force is actually quite potent.

The airforce acquires assorted training aircraft by 1937 and mix of 100 soon to be obsolete planes by 1939. Really it is up to the US airforce to provide sufficient modern planes, assuming the airfields are built this could be 250 US fighter planes and 150 US bombers by the end of 1941. Assuming the installation of radar in early 1941 this is enough to hold out for some time.

In early 1941 the US reacts to Japanese misbehaviour by sending out an additional infantry division and several armoured brigades, along with various support formations (Coastal and regular Artillery and AA).

Late 1941

At this point there are effectively five regular divisions in the Phillipines and eight reserve divisions being mobilised. These are supported by the armoured and cavalry brigades and a substantial Air Force. Whilst Japan can take this on, it can’t really combine this with any other operations outside of China, and in this scenario the US might be able to resupply the Phillipines via the British or Dutch colonies. It is therefore conceivable that the war might be avoided, or if not that Japan could fail to take the Phipplines.
 
The problem with upgrading the defense of the Philopeans or any other forward location is that you have to be very careful not to put something in that will ultimately help your enemies. There is a time when your defense is not strong enough to keep your enemies out. So all you are doing is spending resources for no obvious gain and potentially providing resources to your enemy,

For instance say in 1939 the us startes building a modern small arms factory in order to equip the locals with guns. Odds are by the end of 41 the factory is up and running but has not provided enough weapons to keep Japan out, the end result is that you just gave Japan a nice new factory. The same holds true with equipment and even military bases or weapons emplacements. If your defenses can’t stop your enemy then potentially it could help them.

If you don’t believe me ask the French Nobility all those guns the stockpiled in Paris before the revolution just fell into the hands of the revolution and provided them with the weapons they used to take over during the revolution. They would have been a lot better off if those guns did not exist.

So you have to be carful of that. Either you need to be good enough to win or you have to make sure your stuff does not become there stuff,
 
Share these auxiliary fields with civil aviation as well. That incrementally helps the country develop communications and commerce.

Sort of relevant response...

From what I have read it seems that the US took over existing civilian airfields to get much of its facilities, so perhaps a decision by the civil authorities earlier to build up more airstrips for domestic commerce would be the way forwards. Given the limited roads and rail this is a plausible scenario, perhaps the goal is a more efficient poastal system.
 
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