WI: More civilian deaths in the 1927 Nanjing Incident

First things first: THIS IS NOT A THREAD ABOUT THE 1937 NANJING MASSACRE! The PoD deals with the aftermath of Chinese Communist forces taking Nanjing in 1927. See Wikipedia's article here --->http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_Incident

When it became clear in late March, 1927, that the Communist forces were going to be able to take the city, Nationalist troops began a disorderly retreat from the city. A number of troops (according to the Wiki article, about 10,000) were not able to leave the city, and began looting the foreign-owned homes and businesses in the city. Both the British and Japanese consuls were killed during the rioting. Japan, Italy, France also each saw one naval officer murdered. During the riots, foreign men, women, and children were set upon by crowds of Chinese rioters and beaten. When the Communist troops arrived, some of their uniformed soldiers executed the American Vice President of Nanjing University. After the Communist army had mostly secured control of the city, units began attacking the Standard Oil buildings where many foreign civilian families had taken refuge. Naval ships from the US, UK, Japan, France, Italy, and Holland helped evacuate their nationals from the city. At least some of these ships were fired upon from the shore during this process.

The presence of these ships, and the quick evacuations, kept causalities relatively light among the foreign community. The PoD I want to explore, then, is what happens if the ships aren't there as quickly as they were in history? What if bad weather delays the arrival of many of the larger ships? What if word does not get out about the timing of the Communist force's march on the city? If the foreign merchant community cannot be evacuated in time, it is likely that it will suffer much greater losses. How would world opinion react to the death of a few hundred American, European, and Japanese civilians in anti-foreign riots? Most importantly, how will the powers react if it seems as though China is locked in a civil war where neither side intends to honor China's treaties, and both sides will target foreign nationals in their midst?
 
The lack of interest may be due to our lack of knowledge. You were probably hoping that Hendryk would give you the answer but, alas, he may have decided that we need to look at the effects on policies of Britain, the USA and Japan as well as at Chinese politics. Another issue is that there are likely to be significant differences in the consequences of civilians being killed by communists compared to the consequences of clashes between KMT units and foreign forces or KMT forces murdering foreign civilians.
To start, we can look at British policy. Within the British government over the period 1925-7, a battle had been won by mostly UK based civil servants who wanted the low cost option of assuming that the KMT and Communists would split and that a deal could be made with the KMT preserving British business interests against British China hands such as Sidney Barton who favoured a militant defence of British interests in China. Slightly later, there was a conflict between officials who believed that the main threat to British interests in Asia was Communism and the USSR against those who believed that the main threat was Japan. The second group gained the ascendency after 1931. I am not sure how inevitable this was. The influence of Alexander Cadogan who was British Ambassador to China from 1933 to 1936 and subsequently head of the Foreign Office was significant from 1933. Cadogan was not especially pro-Japanese, referring to them as “little yellow dwarf slaves”, and seems to have believed that they had a detailed plan to take all of East Asia. However, the previous ambassador, Miles Lampson, was on very good terms with his US counterpart and British and US policy tried to keep in step through the negotiations in the Early Thirties as both gave up their citizens extraterritorial rights despite strong opposition from the local British community. British policy tended to assume that supporting a central Chinese government would be good for British interests and, for example, various loans were made to the KMT government. As it turned out, the result of the unification of China was actually very bad for British business as it led initially to a Sino-Japanese War while in 1945 the KMT showed no desire to assist British business in China and after 1949 the PRC was even less helpful.
Had Communists killed a larger number of British civilians, it might have made the British more hostile to the USSR and thus slightly more sensitive to Japanese concerns as Japan might have seemed a counter balance to Soviet influence. It probably would not have radically shifted British policy except that the officials who “allowed it to happen” might have been replaced with unpredictable consequences. Had KMT forces been seriously involved in the incident, there is a potential for a more serious rethink. In retrospect, the ideal British policy was to become invisible and avoid any action disturbing Chinese, Japanese or American opinion, which was difficult given the size of the British Empire. However, it does seem that Britain might have adopted a policy of insisting that it could do nothing in China unless both Japan and the USA agreed, which should avoid most requests for action. Without British financial support, a KMT government would have needed either better relations with Japan than OTL or loans from America. The US State Department would have been keen for the US to supply such loans but, unlike the British case, would have depended on American bankers, who knew that if anyone had a large quantity of money, lending it to China had always been an easy way of losing it.
American policy towards China had a much longer time horizon than British policy. America looked forward to the emergence of a unified Christian China which would require the help of American business to modernise. Many Americans learnt about China via lectures given by returning missionaries. Thus the effects of the violence on the views of American missionaries might be important. It is hard to imagine US policy changing simply because it was looking so far ahead. It is notable that US investments in Japan were four times as large as those in China, so that a less millennial viewpoint could potentially cause some changes. However, a pragmatic US policy seems as unlike as a rational Japanese policy.
The events in China may have slightly contributed to the fall of the Wakatsuki cabinet in Japan (mostly due to the financial crisis of 1927) and the new Tanaka government adopted a more aggressive defence of Japanese interests, as promised during the election campaign, sending three Shandong Expeditions over 1927-8 with the last leading to the Jinan Incident. However, OTL Japan was unwilling to commit its forces to defeat the KMT Northern Expedition. By 1928, many in the Japanese Kwantung army wanted to separate Manchuria from China. Tanaka, who had a long acquaintance with Zhang Zuolin and was aware of the American view that China should remain united, was willing to retain Zhang as ruler of Manchuria. However, Colonel Komoto Daisaku had Zhang killed by blowing up his train as he withdrew towards Manchuria.
If many Japanese civilians are killed during 1927, we can expect a strong Japanese military reaction. The death of 12 Japanese was enough to spark the Jinan Incident and perhaps about 5,000 Chinese deaths. Again it matters whether the Communists or the KMT are blamed. However, it is possible that Japan will defend Zhang's position in North China and prevent any Chinese unification. How that would change subsequent Japanese policy on Manchuria is hard to predict.
 
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