WI Molotov-Ribbentrop type pact between Germany and Russia before WW1 with A-H partition

So, this is a plan from before the 1866 conflcit, when presumably he had decided firmly on the kleindeustchland 'solution' to the German Question?

Not having read the book, I can't say for certain, but from the information Halagaz has presented of it, not at all. "Bismarck would have preferred to keep the Habsburg empire around as a junior partner and ally; but he was more than willing to split it up in case the first option doesn't work out - before and after 1866. He maintained links with Italy, Romania, Serbia, the Hungarian and Czech revolutionaries, all directed against the Habsburgs; and he even accepted the possibility of involving Russia in the partition."

Also, to the OP this "shackled to a corpse" quote you repeatedly throw up - you know that was attributed to Ludendorff (or Hindenburg, but as it's apocryphal we'll never really know) in 1916 - after two years of war?

While that specific quote may only date from after the start of the war (most sources I can find merely mention it as something which was commonly said in Berlin and not attributed to a specific person) awareness of A-H's decline was something which predated WW1.

The German (Prussian) military thought the A-H KuK Army would more than hold their own before hostilities began - hence the disposition of forces in 1914. It's only after two years of Conrad's (mis)management that that sentiment became the prevalent one.

The German disposition of forces in 1914 was not determined by A-H, it was determined by the gap between German and Russian mobilization times which, the German high command believed, allowed enough time for a quick victory over France before transferring the bulk of its forces from west to east.
 

Deleted member 94680

Not having read the book, I can't say for certain, but from the information Halagaz has presented of it, not at all. "Bismarck would have preferred to keep the Habsburg empire around as a junior partner and ally; but he was more than willing to split it up in case the first option doesn't work out - before and after 1866. He maintained links with Italy, Romania, Serbia, the Hungarian and Czech revolutionaries, all directed against the Habsburgs; and he even accepted the possibility of involving Russia in the partition."

By God, old Otto was a devious bugger, wasn't he? Shame this POD isn't earlier - with him still around, it'd be a piece of cake to come up with a diplomatic volte-face!


While that specific quote may only date from after the start of the war (most sources I can find merely mention it as something which was commonly said in Berlin and not attributed to a specific person) awareness of A-H's decline was something which predated WW1.

Awareness that lent itself to arrest that decline, not jump ship and abandon them completely. From Bismarck treating them gently after 1866 to the "blank cheque" in 1914, Germany was aware of A-H's weaknesses and wanted to support them through the tumult to regain their 'greatness'.


The German disposition of forces in 1914 was not determined by A-H, it was determined by the gap between German and Russian mobilization times which, the German high command believed, allowed enough time for a quick victory over France before transferring the bulk of its forces from west to east.

We're all familiar with the "War by Timetable", but I was more referring to the geographical dispositions of forces on the Eastern Front. If the OHL was so convinced that the KuK was useless in 1914, there's no way that the Moltke Plan would have had the 60/40 split that they did. Granted, a German Army on the defensive along the Prussian border would have held off the Russians - possibly indefintely - but that isn't much use if a second Russian Army is rolling up the Danube into Bavaria! The OHL was more than aware of the risks of a turned flank, so the A-H KuK had at least some role to play in the War. Reality showed how misplaced that faith was, but in 1914 the Germans saw defeating the Russians as a joint effort with the Kuk utilising only 40% of their own, larger, army. Hardly the actions of professional officer Staff with no faith in an ally.
 
So, this is a plan from before the 1866 conflcit, when presumably he had decided firmly on the kleindeustchland 'solution' to the German Question?

1866 was the end of the Austro-Prussian war, but not the beginning of Austro-Prussian friendship. The Austrian government would stay revanchist and hostile to Prussia for a few years after that. So Bismarck's plan was revived again and finally abandoned around 1871, when relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary stabilized.

Also, to the OP this "shackled to a corpse" quote you repeatedly throw up - you know that was attributed to Ludendorff (or Hindenburg, but as it's apocryphal we'll never really know) in 1916 - after two years of war? The German (Prussian) military thought the A-H KuK Army would more than hold their own before hostilities began - hence the disposition of forces in 1914. It's only after two years of Conrad's (mis)management that that sentiment became the prevalent one.

True - but even before the war, there were traces of the "shackled to a corpse" sentiment.

For example, the German government approached Russia in early 1905, proposing that Germany and Russia coordinate their behavior in case Austria-Hungary suddenly collapses. They considered A-H weak and unstable enough to crumble all by itself (and thus, not very reliable).
 

Deleted member 94680

I have read the truely sensible "alternate" alliance pre-WWI would have been a Austro-Russian accord.

Both had problems in the Balkans and an accord between the two would have been the best way to stabilise and neutralise the running sore that sapped so much of their strength.


For the life of me I can't remember where I read it though...
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I've quickly read over, what Google Germany allows me to read of this link
Bismarck and Mitteleuropa by Bascom Hayes is a fairly good source. Pages around 113,130, and 184 are especially relevant to this topic.
, unforunatly only until page 133, the latter one of page 180 might be of as much interest.

Beside that Bismarck seems to have been prepared too even discussed putting czechian Bohemia under prussian 'administration', to create a 'Greater German' solution to the then 'german question' including german Austria after some - by his very own agents - pushed revolutions in the rest of the Balkan (Hungary, Serbia, Romania).

What I've read is a very firm argument, that the Habsburg monarchy, Austria-Hungary in 1866 already was seen as a conglomerate, ripe of fall, whos main 'power' was its possible alliancing with France, Russia or even both (in worst case) but NOT as a power in itself anymore.
(Coupled with some 'fear',that after the 'buffer' of Habsburg might be gone, all of the Ottoman Empire Balkan problems would now be right before Germanys own door.)
And as far as I recollect the following years, A-H was never again rendered as much of a power in its own by german politicians as well as militarys. It was a sometimes usefull ally by counting in its raw mass, ... but with its balkanese troubles more of a nuisance.

Therefore, if some kind of ... understanding could be found with Russia (pls don't forget, that in the works of diplomacy - beside propagandistics - alliances at that time were usually rendered temorary arrangement by everybody), cooling and eventually leaving relations with France - for a "good prices" - I would still see such a german-russian 'understanding' in dividing A-H as a possible turn of history.
 
By God, old Otto was a devious bugger, wasn't he? Shame this POD isn't earlier - with him still around, it'd be a piece of cake to come up with a diplomatic volte-face!

One would think so!

Awareness that lent itself to arrest that decline, not jump ship and abandon them completely. From Bismarck treating them gently after 1866 to the "blank cheque" in 1914, Germany was aware of A-H's weaknesses and wanted to support them through the tumult to regain their 'greatness'.

That was the German reaction in OTL, but this is an AH forum. The idea here is that the German high command decides to take a different approach, which Bismarck himself had also kept in reserve.

We're all familiar with the "War by Timetable", but I was more referring to the geographical dispositions of forces on the Eastern Front. If the OHL was so convinced that the KuK was useless in 1914, there's no way that the Moltke Plan would have had the 60/40 split that they did. Granted, a German Army on the defensive along the Prussian border would have held off the Russians - possibly indefintely - but that isn't much use if a second Russian Army is rolling up the Danube into Bavaria! The OHL was more than aware of the risks of a turned flank, so the A-H KuK had at least some role to play in the War. Reality showed how misplaced that faith was, but in 1914 the Germans saw defeating the Russians as a joint effort with the Kuk utilising only 40% of their own, larger, army. Hardly the actions of professional officer Staff with no faith in an ally.

The scenario in the OP posits that the Russo-German agreement also includes a non-aggression pact. In any case, looking at the map provided by Magnum at the bottom of page 1, the border length between Germany and Russia doesn't actually increase by all that much.
 

Deleted member 94680

So what's the POD?

I'm sure there's plenty of candidates for a German Chief of Staff that shelves the idea of A-H as an ally (OTL it was a russophobe having control of the foreign ministry in the aftermath of the Bismarck sacking that terminated the dreikaiserbund after all) but how do you get round the grosseduestchland issue?

Many Prussians didn't want Austria (and their Catholic/Slavic populations) in the kaiserreich - hence "post-1866" passing off with relative ease.

So there now needs to be a POD that volte-faces the volte-face as it were.


There'll almost certainly be a war to divide the Hapsburg Monarchy. A "corpse" they may be, but they won't willingly give up 600-odd years of rule without a fight.
 
The easiest POD I can think of would be to have one of A-H's interminable Balkan disputes flare up into open war some time before OTL WW1, in which it does very badly. This heightens the German high command's perception of how little value it has as an ally and gets them thinking that finding an accommodation with Russia is safer than being aligned against both France and Russia at the same time. Another would be having an advocate of Greater Germany acquire a large degree of personal influence with Wilhelm II. From what I understand, he was a rather temperamental individual who could become very enthusiastic about ideas he took a liking to, such as his backing for naval construction.
 

Deleted member 94680

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Question

Mentions the ability for Austria minus it's non-German territory to join the empire at a later date. It is, however, the 1848 Liberal Germany that put that forward.

So... A-H gets embroiled in a Balkan cluster-f*** and splits apart. Germany and Russia agree to split the remains to "stabilise" the region?
 
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