WI: Meade Swiftly Pursued Lee's Army After Gettysburg?

The main criticism of George Meade is that he failed to pursue Lee's army in the post-Gettysburg chaos, throwing away an opportunity to trap Lee against the Potomac, and letting him escape into Virginia. But really, what would have been the results if Meade swiftly (say within 3-4 days) pursued Lee's army? Would Meade have been able to catch up? If there was a Big Battle, given Lee's ability to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, Does he have a chance to win? If Meade was the victor, would it have been a decisive victory that shattered Lee's army as a fighting force? Who would have been most likely to die in this battle, on both sides? If it was decisive, how much of the Army of Northern Virginia would/ could have escaped? Would Meade have been able to invade Virginia in the aftermath, or would he need time to recover? If the latter, how soon could the losses of the Army of Northern Virginia be made good, and from where would men be transferred? What would be the political effects of such a battle, either a Union or Confederate victory? Ultimately, would such a battle have fundamentally altered the course of the war?
 

Moglwi

Monthly Donor
There was a very good timeline written about that can not rember name of title or writer wis it had been finished
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
If you're assuming a POD no earlier than July 3, then the Union army wasn't in any state to conduct a pursuit. It has to be kept in mind that the Army of the Potomac was just about as crippled by Gettysburg as was the Army of Northern Virginia, having suffered massive casualties. There was also a great deal of disorganization, as the units of the various corps were hopelessly intermingled with one another and time was needed to sort everything out. I personally think that Meade did as well as he could. Some have suggested that Meade should have launched a determined attack when he came up against Lee's position at Williamsport on July 12. That could simply have led to a bloody repulse.

Now, if you have some POD that does result in the utter wrecking of the Army of Northern Virginia in Pennsylvania, then the war might well be over before the end of 1863.
 
If you're assuming a POD no earlier than July 3, then the Union army wasn't in any state to conduct a pursuit. It has to be kept in mind that the Army of the Potomac was just about as crippled by Gettysburg as was the Army of Northern Virginia, having suffered massive casualties. There was also a great deal of disorganization, as the units of the various corps were hopelessly intermingled with one another and time was needed to sort everything out. I personally think that Meade did as well as he could. Some have suggested that Meade should have launched a determined attack when he came up against Lee's position at Williamsport on July 12. That could simply have led to a bloody repulse.

Now, if you have some POD that does result in the utter wrecking of the Army of Northern Virginia in Pennsylvania, then the war might well be over before the end of 1863.

Although I agree it would have been difficult for Meade to pursue that quickly but it was more because he needed to reorganize than he was "Just about as crippled as Lee" . He certainly took a lot of casualties but Lee took even more and he had the smaller army. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gettysburg Meade lost a little under a quarter of his army while Lee lost around a third of his. Lee clearly came out of it more crippled than Meade.
 
Are there any cases of a Civil War army being totally routed and destroyed in the field? It is brought up but are there any OTL cases? I can't think of any, but I am far from an expert.
 
Are there any cases of a Civil War army being totally routed and destroyed in the field? It is brought up but are there any OTL cases? I can't think of any, but I am far from an expert.

Just Nashville, as noted. This is a period where the ability to chase down and destroy an enemy just wasn't there - cavalry are no longer powerful enough to ride roughshod over infantry, nor are they numerous enough to block the enemy's line of retreat and hold them up, nor can the infantry themselves give chase fast enough to catch and destroy the fleeing enemies.

Even Nashville required Hood to be outnumbered heavily and then split his forces to create a distraction, while being on the wrong side of morale and equipment. Even at that extreme, the escaped troops were able to reform somewhat.

The only way to lose an entire army, given the military technology available, is to prevent the enemy from escaping. In the field is simply impossible.
 

jahenders

Banned
The main criticism of George Meade is that he failed to pursue Lee's army in the post-Gettysburg chaos, throwing away an opportunity to trap Lee against the Potomac, and letting him escape into Virginia. But really, what would have been the results if Meade swiftly (say within 3-4 days) pursued Lee's army? Would Meade have been able to catch up? If there was a Big Battle, given Lee's ability to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, Does he have a chance to win? If Meade was the victor, would it have been a decisive victory that shattered Lee's army as a fighting force? Who would have been most likely to die in this battle, on both sides? If it was decisive, how much of the Army of Northern Virginia would/ could have escaped? Would Meade have been able to invade Virginia in the aftermath, or would he need time to recover? If the latter, how soon could the losses of the Army of Northern Virginia be made good, and from where would men be transferred? What would be the political effects of such a battle, either a Union or Confederate victory? Ultimately, would such a battle have fundamentally altered the course of the war?

Meade did have to deal with more than a little chaos and such, but he could have pursued. He'd want to be a little cautious to avoid "snatching defeat from the jaws of victory" by falling into a trap, but he could have moved faster than he did. Even if he wasn't able to get a general engagement, he could have hurried Lee more than he did, forced Lee to commit (and lose) some rearguard, and forced Lee to abandon more wounded, guns, and supplies.
 
Something to keep in mind is that Meade lost 3 corps commanders wounded or killed , another one was only in command a few days . and the killed and wounded ones were the most aggressive ones. The army also kept most of it's supplies about a day away to the east in case they had to retreat.
 
To be fair to Meade, the AotP had just fought a brutal battle in the July heat for three days. Was it in any condition to effective purse Lee after the battle?
 

jahenders

Banned
To be fair to Meade, the AotP had just fought a brutal battle in the July heat for three days. Was it in any condition to effective purse Lee after the battle?

It certainly wasn't in perfect condition, but it's worth remembering that the AoNV had fought an even more brutal battle in that heat so it wasn't exactly sprinting away.

BTW, I can certainly attest to that heat. A few years ago, we camped right near the kickoff point for Pickett's charge with the my son's scout troop o/a 2 July. We then walked from there to the high water mark and then to some of the other key sites. As we walked across that open field, it was HOT and I really felt for the soldiers that fought there (in much heavier clothes). I was also amazed at how hard it would be to lead a bunch of troops across that field saying, "OK, at this point artillery shells will start falling, then here musket balls will start hitting us heavily, then (if you make it through that) you'll come face to face with an angry Yank with mounted bayonet."
 
There was a very good timeline written about that can not rember name of title or writer wis it had been finished
There is also a much skimpier timeline which is also still struggling to see its next installment after a few years on the back burner. (sigh)

My take has been that Meade can pursue more closely, but cannot all-out engage the ANV at Williamsport before Lee establishes a strong perimeter. Remember that The ANV has a shorter distance to travel, and is falling back upon its own supply lines (albeit disrupted by Union raids on July 4). Meade cannot pursue directly with his entire army - too easy to slow them down with prepared defensive positions - and needs to force march units along other routes just to come close. Supply lines must be rerouted, and although this is one of the Union Army's greatest strengths, it still means that the AoP must resupply before making an assault - which is too bad as that gives Lee time to prepare a defense. The "best result" I see for Meade is that he inflicts many more casualties and captures a significant number of rebel troops when the withdrawal can finally begin the night of July 13-14.
 
Meade did launch a fairly aggressive and well conceived pursuit with what he had left.

He had an incompetent cavalry corps commander (Alfred Pleasonton), several battered corps( I, II, III, XI corps), one unharmed corps(VI corps), orders to screen Washington, damage to the AotP's command structure and a myriad of logistical issues.

Several PoDs would be needed to remedy these issues.
 
Were there any forces around Washington that (now the Capital was no longer in danger) could have been sent upriver to stop Lee recrossing the Potomac?
 
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Some of them were already sent to the army 3rd division 2nd corps and 3rd division 5th corps. Their was the Harpers Ferry garrison about 10000 men part of which did join the 3rd corps.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I think it's important to remember that, though Gettysburg is historically remembered as a tremendous Confederate defeat, this is us looking at it in retrospect and was not really apparent to the people at the time. Letters and journals of Confederate soldiers express disappointment that they didn't crush the Federals, but they clearly regarded the battle as more of a standoff than a defeat. And this was reflected in popular opinion as well. The following spring, the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia went into the 1864 campaign in fairly high morale.

Now, if Meade had somehow pursued Lee's army more effective and inflicted a clear and decisive defeat upon it, it would have had an impact far beyond whatever military concerns there might have been. Combined with the loss of Vicksburg, such a clear defeat would have been a crushing blow to Southern morale both in the Army of Northern Virginia and on the Confederate home front.
 
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