WI: McClellan's 1862 Overland Campaign

What if McClellan had launched an overland campaig in 1862 rather than the Peninsula Campaign of OTL? Let's say Lincoln just refuses McClellan's idea of the Peninsula Campaign, or perhaps the CSS Virginia is more successful and thus, transporting troops is too risky for the moment. How would McClellan have initiated such a campaign and how successful would he have been? Keep in mind that Joseph E. Johnston would have been the Confederate commander for the time being. Thanks.
 
If McClellan is forced to adopt an overland campaign because Lincoln overruled his preferred peninsula strategy that would make their relationship even more distrustful than it was OTL. After all, even when Mac was given what he wanted he still found ways to convince himself that people were out to sabotage his success. This will inevitably hurt his performance since he already thinks he's being set up to fail.

If he moves south he might opt for Burnside's general strategy of moving southeast towards Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock hoping to flank Johnston. If Johnston can get any sizable force there to block the advance of the Army of the Potomac I think McClellan gives up, albeit without the bloodbath that was OTL Fredericksburg.
 
Frankly speaking, the Union is gonna have a far more difficult time getting to Richmond through by overland. The primary issue is logistics. I’ve stated it many times before and I’ll say it again:

There were only three routes the Army of the Potomac could realistically take:

a) The Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac (RF&P) Railroad which ran from the north past Aquia Landing, a key Union supply base when it was held by the Federal troops, through Fredericksburg and directly towards Richmond. Aside from being the most direct route, it also could handle the most volume of the two railroad routes. This was the route taken by Hooker and Burnside.

b) The Orange and Alexandria Railroad. However, it handled notably less volume than the RF&P, and had another notable disadvantage; it led away from Richmond. Charlottesville was about as close as it could lead towards Richmond. The Lincoln administration liked this route because it did keep the AotP more or less between Lee and D.C. Most of the AotP generals, particularly McClellan's adherents (for example Sedgwick), disliked this route however.

c) The Peninsula-James River route.
McClellan and Sedgwick considered it the "true" line of operation to take Richmond; this route enabled the Union army to be secure on the flanks, and to be supplied by sea from the Union navy. However, the Peninsula route was inherently somewhat vulnerable to being bottle-necked, and just as importantly, McClellan's failed campaign using this route poisoned it politically in the eyes of the Republicans. Still, strictly in military terms, McClellan was quite probably correct to see this as the best route.
So we can strike out the Peninsular route, leaving us two railroad routes to follow. Now, the thing is that Aquia Landing (the main supply depot for the RF&P railroad) was burned by the Confederates in 1861 and again in March 1862 and needs at least one month’s worth of preparation to repair and restore to working condition.

In the meanwhile, the O&A railroad is in major need of an upgrade and repair. The Confederates tore up the railroad when they withdrew and the capacity could not support the Army of the Potomac at its full strength. Even in 1864 Grant only briefly considered moving toward Charlottesville. The move had the advantage of fighting in relatively open ground against the Confederates. However, a large detachment of troops were needed to cover a lengthy supply line and the mission had to be done with “the supplies and ammunition we started with", hinting that the railroad was still insufficient to supply the Army of the Potomac.

As far as I can see, there is no campaign in spring, just a lot of railroad building for a summer campaign. I would note that McClellan did try the Orange & Alexandria Railroad route in the aftermath of the Maryland Campaign. Overall, McClellan thought poorly of the route (supply issues were a constant in operations), and believed that the Peninsula was the "true route" of operations for the Army of the Potomac. Instead, he thought of changing his route of operations to that of the RF&P Railroad and then change his base to move onto the Peninsula and then the James River, something similar to Grant's plan in 1864.
 
If Johnston can get any sizable force there to block the advance of the Army of the Potomac I think McClellan gives up, albeit without the bloodbath that was OTL Fredericksburg.

Does this possibly include the fact that Johnson will have 5 men for every one of McClellans?
 
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