WI: May Coup Against Alexander of Serbia in 1903 Fails

In May 1903, a group of junior Serbian Army officers - led by Dragutin Dimitrijević ('Apis') who later masterminded the Black Hand's assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand - launched a Coup against the reigning King Alexander Obrenović of Serbia. They were dissatisfied with his constant scheming and intriguing to concentrate political power in his own hands; with his diplomatic closeness with Austria-Hungary and distance from the fellow Slavs in St. Petersburg; and with his marriage to an infertile widow, Draga Mašin. Draga's brothers were also in the army and very unpopular with their fellow officers, which was a problem since it was rumoured that Alexander was going to make one of them his heir.

The conspirators entered the royal palace and killed the King and Queen, plus her brothers and a couple of senior politicians. However, the attempt could very easily have failed: when they entered the royal bedroom, there was no sign of Alexander and Draga, and they were only found and slaughtered when one eagle-eyed assassin spotted the keyhole of a secret doorway into a panic room. Apis was also shot three times by a loyalist guard, but survived.

So let's say the Coup fails: the conspirators are all either arrested or killed, including Apis. What does the survival of Alexander mean for Serbia and the Balkans in general? I assume there would still be alt-Balkan Wars due to the weakness of the Ottomans and ethnic tensions between the Balkan states, but how would these be different with an Austrian-aligned Serbia? And from a monarchical standpoint, who follows Alexander as King of Serbia?

Dare I ask about the *First World War?
 
Interesting question. I've often wondered how the early 20th century would evolve with non or less nationalistic Serbia. To begin with, obviously no assassination of Franz Ferdinand, or at least no government backing for the Black hand. Second, I wonder if Austria would still unilaterally annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 if Serbia was Vienna's ally/puppet? Third, to the succession, according to a previous agreement, Prince Mirko of Montenegro, who was married to Natalija Konstantinovic, the granddaughter of Princess Anka Obrenović, an aunt of King Milan, would be proclaimed heir-presumptive in the event that the marriage of King Alexander and Queen Draga was childless. So we could see a an Serbian-Montenegrin union develop.
 
Interesting question. I've often wondered how the early 20th century would evolve with non or less nationalistic Serbia. To begin with, obviously no assassination of Franz Ferdinand, or at least no government backing for the Black hand. Second, I wonder if Austria would still unilaterally annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 if Serbia was Vienna's ally/puppet? Third, to the succession, according to a previous agreement, Prince Mirko of Montenegro, who was married to Natalija Konstantinovic, the granddaughter of Princess Anka Obrenović, an aunt of King Milan, would be proclaimed heir-presumptive in the event that the marriage of King Alexander and Queen Draga was childless. So we could see a an Serbian-Montenegrin union develop.

So would you say that Austria would let Serbia have Novi Pazar, and maybe the Serbian bits of Bosnia?

In which case, Serbia probably wouldn't be desperate for new territory to the south. Maybe they'd still join the Bulgarians and Albanian rebels in c.1912, but stick to the Kriva Palanta-Ohrid line?
 
From what I know of Alexander Obrenović, he seemed at best massively incompetent and at worst a self-centered, power-hungry, and inconsistent schemer. He was massively unpopular with the military and Parliament (at least the parts he didn't pack in his men), ruled erratically, and just didn't have popular support to survive. If the assassination failed Serbia would likely remain a backwoods until they found a way to ditch him and his supporters.

There would likely be another assassination attempt, with the Black Hand slithering about. The King and the Army would come to blows eventually, and in the long run its likely the Obrenović family would lose.
 
Very interesting potential PoD. All I know about this comes from reading Rebecca West, but a couple of questions arise.

If Serbia and Austria-Hungary remain close/ get closer, does that affect Croatian attitudes to the Dual Monarchy, and if so how?

Similarly, would it even be possible for an Obrenovic Serbia to stay friendly to Vienna - wouldn't there be more coup/ assassination attempts even with Apis dead?

Edit: ninja'd by Nofix
 
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From what I know of Alexander Obrenović, he seemed at best massively incompetent and at worst a self-centered, power-hungry, and inconsistent schemer. He was massively unpopular with the military and Parliament (at least the parts he didn't pack in his men), ruled erratically, and just didn't have popular support to survive. If the assassination failed Serbia would likely remain a backwoods until they found a way to ditch him and his supporters.

There would likely be another assassination attempt, with the Black Hand slithering about. The King and the Army would come to blows eventually, and in the long run its likely the Obrenović family would lose.

Aww, Nofix, can't you just let me handwave my Obrenovići? :p

I mean, the initial Black Hand have all been arrested in the Coup, so he's got a bit of breathing room there. And he'd already survived assassination attempts, so it isn't especially unreasonable for him to dodge a few more, just to make it interesting.

With an unpopular Government, morale in future wars would be lower, and gains fewer. So even if Alexander gets a boost from the Austrians giving him Novi Pazar and bits of Bosnia, would you say that the Serbians would do a lot worse in the *Balkan Wars?

Very interesting potential PoD. All I know about this comes from reading Rebecca West, but a couple of questions arise.

If Serbia and Austria-Hungary remain close/ get closer, does that affect Croatian attitudes to the Dual Monarchy, and if so how?

Similarly, would it even be possible for an Obrenovic Serbia to stay friendly to Vienna - wouldn't there be more coup/ assassination attempts even with Apis dead?

Edit: ninja'd by Nofix

This Croatian question is very, very interesting.
 
While I make no pretentions at military knowledge, I feel a Balkan War with Alexander Obrenović at the Helms has the likely hood of going very, very badly for Serbia. If he can somehow get the favors of a Great Power, it would help his country from being sidelined by Bulgaria as the premier Southern Slavic power (assuming the first Balkan War goes roughly the same, with the Ottomans being knocked out and Bulgaria making up the plurality of the troops).
 
So let's say the Coup fails: the conspirators are all either arrested or killed, including Apis. What does the survival of Alexander mean for Serbia and the Balkans in general? I assume there would still be alt-Balkan Wars due to the weakness of the Ottomans and ethnic tensions between the Balkan states, but how would these be different with an Austrian-aligned Serbia? And from a monarchical standpoint, who follows Alexander as King of Serbia?

The Constitution at the time of Alexander Obrenovic's death doesn't make it clear who should be the heir to the throne. Prince Mirko of Montenegro is just a distant possibility. Other than him, there's a distant cousin of the Obrenovic dynasty, Theodore Nikolic of Rudna (a minor Serbian-Hungarian noble)...and of course the Karadjordjevic family, but they would represent a more revolutionary change and aren't the topic of the thread.

However, it's also believed King Alexander planned to get a divorce some time in late 1903 and remarry. Not sure who he'd marry, but presumably his chosen heir would be a child from that hypothetical second marriage.

Alexander's plans for future foreign policy are not 100% clear, but we do know a few things. He was preparing for a future Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire. He apparently wanted to coddle Austria-Hungary by offering it political influence and economic hegemony over Serbia (favorable trade deals, partial control of Serbian railways, modernization of Serbian artillery by Skoda Works...); through this, and his connections in the Young Czech Party, he hoped to secure Austria-Hungary's support for Serbia, and especially agreement to Serbia's territorial expansion in the coming Balkan War. I have no idea if this plan would have worked or not.

If it does work...Serbia gets some new territories in the alternate Balkan Wars, but is subjected to a very inconvenient level of Austro-Hungarian hegemony. Also, it's even more dependent on Austria since her relations with Bulgaria and even Montenegro are probably bad. The Obrenovic dynasty is saved, for now...but the Serbian population living in Austria-Hungary will see little to no benefit from these developments, and there is still room for conflict. If an alternate WWI breaks out, Serbia will be neutral for the first year or two, although it may join the Entente if it looks like things are going bad for the CP. Joining the CP is nearly impossible.

If it doesn't work...it's probably time for a long overdue coup.

Ironically, the reign of the last two Obrenovics wasn't that bad for army morale and competence. That was one of the few things they didn't screw up (much). However, the Obrenovic's conservative, mostly non-democratic internal policy was unpopular. And their pro-Austrian orientation was even more cripplingly unpopular - in 1903, Austrophiles in Serbia are a small minority, and their numbers are getting smaller every year as more and more of them become disillusioned. So the lack of political stability and half-hearted support for the monarch is bound to slightly damage Serbia's war effort.
 
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However, it's also believed King Alexander planned to get a divorce some time in late 1903 and remarry.

Was this just going to be an arranged marriage to produce an heir, with Draga sticking around as de facto maitresse-en-tître, and her brothers still infesting the army and court?

Or was Alexander actually going to get rid of the whole pack?

If the latter, might announcing this save him from the coup?
 
Was this just going to be an arranged marriage to produce an heir, with Draga sticking around as de facto maitresse-en-tître, and her brothers still infesting the army and court?

Or was Alexander actually going to get rid of the whole pack?

If the latter, might announcing this save him from the coup?

The plan (if it was actually true) involved Draga being bought a house in Franzensbad, Bohemia and requested to spend as little time in Serbia as possible. So her and her family's presence at the court would come to an end.

Doing the divorce on time might save Alexander, but it could also just delay the coup. His inability to abandon his father's policies is what sank him, Draga was just a small addition to a much larger problem.
 
The Constitution at the time of Alexander Obrenovic's death doesn't make it clear who should be the heir to the throne. Prince Mirko of Montenegro is just a distant possibility. Other than him, there's a distant cousin of the Obrenovic dynasty, Theodore Nikolic of Rudna (a minor Serbian-Hungarian noble)...and of course the Karadjordjevic family, but they would represent a more revolutionary change and aren't the topic of the thread.

However, it's also believed King Alexander planned to get a divorce some time in late 1903 and remarry. Not sure who he'd marry, but presumably his chosen heir would be a child from that hypothetical second marriage.

Alexander's plans for future foreign policy are not 100% clear, but we do know a few things. He was preparing for a future Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire. He apparently wanted to coddle Austria-Hungary by offering it political influence and economic hegemony over Serbia (favorable trade deals, partial control of Serbian railways, modernization of Serbian artillery by Skoda Works...); through this, and his connections in the Young Czech Party, he hoped to secure Austria-Hungary's support for Serbia, and especially agreement to Serbia's territorial expansion in the coming Balkan War. I have no idea if this plan would have worked or not.

If it does work...Serbia gets some new territories in the alternate Balkan Wars, but is subjected to a very inconvenient level of Austro-Hungarian hegemony. Also, it's even more dependent on Austria since her relations with Bulgaria and even Montenegro are probably bad. The Obrenovic dynasty is saved, for now...but the Serbian population living in Austria-Hungary will see little to no benefit from these developments, and there is still room for conflict. If an alternate WWI breaks out, Serbia will be neutral for the first year or two, although it may join the Entente if it looks like things are going bad for the CP. Joining the CP is nearly impossible.

If it doesn't work...it's probably time for a long overdue coup.

Ironically, the reign of the last two Obrenovics wasn't that bad for army morale and competence. That was one of the few things they didn't screw up (much). However, the Obrenovic's conservative, mostly non-democratic internal policy was unpopular. And their pro-Austrian orientation was even more cripplingly unpopular - in 1903, Austrophiles in Serbia are a small minority, and their numbers are getting smaller every year as more and more of them become disillusioned. So the lack of political stability and half-hearted support for the monarch is bound to slightly damage Serbia's war effort.

Thank you very much for this well-thought-out response. Just a few questions:

1) Do you know anything about this Nikolic guy?
2) Leaving aside the question of whether A-H would have supported Serbian interests in the *Treaty of London, do you think it would be plausible for A-H to give Serbia bits of Bosnia and their interest in Novi Pazar?
3) What gauge railways did Serbia use? I know A-H had a number of competing standards which led to economic stagnation in some regions and chaos during WW1 mobilisation across the board. What railway links did Serbia have pre-War?
4) Why would relations with Montenegro deteriorate? I was under the impression that they were always close.
5) Why are you so sure that Serbia won't join the CP? Maybe the general populace is against them, but ITTL either Alexander and Co would have made themselves politically dominant, or they'd have been couped as in OTL. So if we assume the former, they could declare war on whoever they liked, surely?
 
1) Do you know anything about this Nikolic guy?

Not much, I'm afraid. Theodore was born in 1871. He was Prince Milosh Obrenovic's great-grandson through one of his daughters. Theodore's father was one of the few Serb deputies in the Hungarian parliament, and a known philanthropist and patron of culture, but very little is known about Theodore himself.
2) Leaving aside the question of whether A-H would have supported Serbian interests in the *Treaty of London, do you think it would be plausible for A-H to give Serbia bits of Bosnia and their interest in Novi Pazar?

Novi Pazar - probably. Bits of Bosnia - no idea. Archduke Rudolf entertained a plan like that, but he's long dead and I'm not sure anyone else in Austro-Hungarian government circles was anywhere close to his friendly attitude regarding Serbia.
3) What gauge railways did Serbia use? I know A-H had a number of competing standards which led to economic stagnation in some regions and chaos during WW1 mobilisation across the board. What railway links did Serbia have pre-War?
The main railway line roughly followed the Morava valley - From Belgrade to Nis, and there branching off to link up with Ottoman and Bulgarian railways. It was a standard 1435mm gauge.

I didn't know this stuff until I looked it up five minutes ago, but apparently there was around 660km of railway on Serbia's territory in 1903. Most of it on 1435mm gauge, but a few smaller branches used 760mm gauge instead.
4) Why would relations with Montenegro deteriorate? I was under the impression that they were always close.

Well, officially yes. Slaves to public opinion and all. But true relations between the Serbian and Montenegrin courts were quite frosty around ~1898-1903. Prince Nicholas of Montenegro thought that the Obrenovic dynasty is surely finished and wanted himself or his son to become the next King of Serbia. The Montenegrin princesses which married into the Romanov dynasty also intrigued against Alexander at the Russian court. And Alexander knew about all this, and never tried very hard to improve it.
5) Why are you so sure that Serbia won't join the CP? Maybe the general populace is against them, but ITTL either Alexander and Co would have made themselves politically dominant, or they'd have been couped as in OTL. So if we assume the former, they could declare war on whoever they liked, surely?
They could. But I think the consequences for their regime would be somewhere between "highly embarrassing" and "catastrophic". Also, I'm not sure Alexander would even want to join the CPs; he was pro-Austrian, but not ideologically so (unlike his father).
 

BooNZ

Banned
Alexander's plans for future foreign policy are not 100% clear, but we do know a few things. He was preparing for a future Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire...

From what I understand, covert Russian diplomacy played a strong hand in pulling together Bulgarian and Serbian states from 1904 onward (i.e. after Alexander's death). Prima facie the resulting secret Bulgarian-Serbian agreements were directed as much at A-H as the Ottomans. With Alexander still in place, it is doubtful anything resembling the OTL Bulgarian-Serbian agreements would even be possible.

With all due respect to the Serbian martial prowess, their chances against the Ottomans alone are not good, unless a great power can be pulled onto their side... The Balkan wars as we know them would be butterflied without the Russian sponsored Serbian-Bulgarian alliance.

Under Alexander, Serbian military actions would be limited to supporting on going insurgency in Macedonia - effectively a three-way between the Serb insurgents, Bulgarian insurgents and the Ottomans.
 
From what I understand, covert Russian diplomacy played a strong hand in pulling together Bulgarian and Serbian states from 1904 onward (i.e. after Alexander's death). Prima facie the resulting secret Bulgarian-Serbian agreements were directed as much at A-H as the Ottomans. With Alexander still in place, it is doubtful anything resembling the OTL Bulgarian-Serbian agreements would even be possible.

With all due respect to the Serbian martial prowess, their chances against the Ottomans alone are not good, unless a great power can be pulled onto their side... The Balkan wars as we know them would be butterflied without the Russian sponsored Serbian-Bulgarian alliance.

Under Alexander, Serbian military actions would be limited to supporting on going insurgency in Macedonia - effectively a three-way between the Serb insurgents, Bulgarian insurgents and the Ottomans.

Russian diplomacy and influence were important, but not decisive. The Ottoman Empire was seen as weak and the Balkan states all had extremely strong irredentist ambitions against it. OTL's Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek joint action was a natural product of those two things, and the survival of Alexander Obrenovic would not fundamentally change either of them.

So a Balkan War-type event would still be quite possible; even likely, I suspect. Of course, there would be differences: there will be much less mutual trust and coordination than in OTL, so the collective performance of the Balkan states is bound to be weaker. This Balkan War won't be as much of a curb-stomp, and the Ottoman Empire might keep (slightly) more territory.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Russian diplomacy and influence were important, but not decisive. The Ottoman Empire was seen as weak and the Balkan states all had extremely strong irredentist ambitions against it. OTL's Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek joint action was a natural product of those two things, and the survival of Alexander Obrenovic would not fundamentally change either of them.

So a Balkan War-type event would still be quite possible; even likely, I suspect. Of course, there would be differences: there will be much less mutual trust and coordination than in OTL, so the collective performance of the Balkan states is bound to be weaker. This Balkan War won't be as much of a curb-stomp, and the Ottoman Empire might keep (slightly) more territory.

I think you are somewhat understating the role of Russia in sewing together the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance - but I guess we can look at the surrounding environment...

The initial driver for the reconciliation between Serbia and Bulgaria around 1904 was Serbian desire/desperation to reduce reliance on A-H following the regicide, as Serbia looked to align itself closer to Russia. If like you say, Alexander was looking to appease A-H interests, it would be extraordinarily difficult to simultaneously lay the groundwork for a meaningful alliance with Bulgaria. More so, given than an unlikely alliance of minor Balkan states would threaten the interests of both the Ottomans and A-H.

While many minor Balkan states had claims against Ottoman territory and populations, many of those claims overlapped and were mutually exclusive. Such 'rivalry' was particularly strong between Serbia and Bulgaria, both coveting Macedonia and their insurgent clashes with each other illustrated the same. The Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek alliance was in no way 'natural', but a temporary and peculiar alignment of convenience that was years in the making. Without Russian backing, those minor states would be more likely to turn on each other than the Ottomans.
 
The Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek understanding was attempted or partially carried out so many times even before 1904-1912 that I can't help but call it 'natural'. Not that the Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek war over the spoils in 1913 wasn't natural, too. But most statesmen and parties in all three countries were aware that, while their goals may partially intersect, they will never achieve even a tiny fraction of those goals without mutual cooperation.

Though Alexander hoped to appease A-H, he wasn't committed enough to place their interests above his throne and his primary goals. As evidenced by his attempts to influence A-H policy through the Young Czechs and to build up connections with Britain.

Anyway, the war against the Ottoman Empire can happen even without a comprehensive system of alliances. If any one of the Balkan states is forced or motivated to intervene against the Ottomans, the others may be forced to jump in to make sure they get a share.
 
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The Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek understanding was attempted or partially carried out so many times even before 1904-1912 that I can't help but call it 'natural'. Not that the Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek war over the spoils in 1913 wasn't natural, too. But most statesmen and parties in all three countries were aware that without some kind of cooperation, they will never achieve even a tiny fraction of their goals.

Though Alexander hoped to appease A-H, he wasn't committed enough to place their interests above his throne and his primary goals. As evidenced by his attempts to influence A-H policy through the Young Czechs and to build up connections with Britain.

Anyway, the war against the Ottoman Empire can happen even without a comprehensive system of alliances. If any one of the Balkan states is forced or motivated to intervene against the Ottomans, the others may be forced to jump in to make sure they get a share.

As with the wars in the 1870s, with Bulgaria and Bosnia fighting for autonomy/independence and Serbia desperate for a slice of the pie (and shooting their wad a few years too early and getting sod all out of it).

Yet another question: with a relatively pro-Austrian Serbia (or at least non-committal during the opening stages of the *First World War) would the A-H Croats even want to be part of a Yugoslavian state after the collapse of the Empire? Could we see an independent Croat-Slovene-Bosniak Republic a la Czechoslovakia?
 
Yet another question: with a relatively pro-Austrian Serbia (or at least non-committal during the opening stages of the *First World War) would the A-H Croats even want to be part of a Yugoslavian state after the collapse of the Empire? Could we see an independent Croat-Slovene-Bosniak Republic a la Czechoslovakia?

That's an interesting question. Obrenovic Serbia would not look as attractive as its stronger and more democratic OTL counterpart. Serbs would gravitate to it by default, but other nations would be visibly less enthusiastic. And it's doubtful Alexander's regime would be thinking in pan-Yugoslav terms, either.

Of course, things were a bit complicated even in OTL. Pro-Yugoslavism in Croatia was mostly an intellectual, urban middle class thing. A bit more widespread in Dalmatia, but not much. The average peasant was usually Croatian-nationalist or Serbian-nationalist, but mostly apolitical and focused on what he viewed as his own economic interests (hatred of the "gentlemen" or "coat-wearers" as they were mockingly called: the landlords, bureaucrats, merchants and occasionally city people as a whole).

There were two other key factors which motivated the Croat leadership to not only agree with the creation of Yugoslavia, but do so in such a quick and unconditional manner:
1)Fear of Italy and its territorial ambitions along the Croatian coast.
2)Fear of their own people: massive bands of "Green Cadres" had risen up in the a huge wave of quasi-revolutionary unrest. The "Green Cadres" pillaged estates, manors and smaller towns, and made the countryside of Croatia pretty much ungovernable. This agrarian/socialist movement was largely spontaneous and had no unified organization whatsoever, but it was huge - as many as 200,000 people. The Croatian leadership feared that they and the "coat-wearer" classes as a whole might be swept away in a wave of rebellion, and saw inviting the Serbian army as the only way to restore order.

If such a scenario repeats itself, but Serbia can't or won't intervene...could be interesting. Maybe some coherent movement springs from the Green Cadres and friendly parties and creates a peasant Republic in Croatia. Or maybe the Croatian elites manage to preserve some of their position and political continuity by adopting elements of socialist and agrarian ideology. No idea what this means for Slovenia, though.
 
A surviving Obrenovic Serbia is quite unlikely, although a pro-Austrian Serbia would have interesting effects on the Balkan alliances. Austrophiles in Serbia were rare and unpopular given that Serbian interests either laid in Ottoman Empire or Austria-Hungary.

There will be another assassination attempt, and even if that fails and Obrenovic dies without heir, there might a be diplomatic crisis after the successor is unknown. Montenegrin claim to the throne might receive some backing from the great powers as a stabilizing solution, although a local noble might simply be 'found.' Serbia and Montenegro still get territory from the wars against Ottoman Empire, although the pattern of alliances that led to disastrous Second Balkan War might be changed.

Serbia joining the Central Powers would be quite unpopular and would have to require concessions at the expense of Austria-Hungary.

Yet another question: with a relatively pro-Austrian Serbia (or at least non-committal during the opening stages of the *First World War) would the A-H Croats even want to be part of a Yugoslavian state after the collapse of the Empire? Could we see an independent Croat-Slovene-Bosniak Republic a la Czechoslovakia?
A Bosniak Republic is not likely to exist, given that Bosniaks are not considered a people then. There was a Slovene-Croat-Serb state that existed as interim entity for a month before the Kingdom of SCS was established.

Given that Croatian national movement spawned the idea of Yugoslavism and Serbia is idolized as a possible Piemonte/Prussia of South Slavs in literature, the answer is a resounding yes. Every political option will argue for a joint state with other South Slavic peoples. All other political alternatives are a triarchy South Slavic state under the Habsburgs or the fantasy for a Croat dominated independent South Slavic state backed by Russia (entirely unrealistic ideas).

Peasants emerging as a independent political force happened only in the aftermath of the Great War and after great effort of Radic brothers to politically mobilize them - it was a complete surprise to everyone, even after the Green Cadre scare (everyone believed peasants will return to inertia).

A Southslavic state will be attempted in the aftermath of the Great War. Serbia will still be a technically victorious power, as it will either be the country that incites the war or joins it later on against Austria-Hungary.

If, by some unlikely miracle, Serbia is on the same side as Central Powers and loses, a southslavic state is still attempted, although this time it is more likely that Serbia and Montenegro are invited to join the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs since Serbia too will lose territory to Entente aligned balkan states.

Without Serbia being victorious, there is more room to negotiate the form of the future state unlike OTL and future state might end up a constitutional monarchy (if Serbian monarchy survives). A surviving State of SCS would be interesting although very implausible. For example, its quorum was only 33%, the president was a Slovenian, the seat of government was in Croatian Zagreb and so on... It has all the hallmarks of Weimar Republic idealistic inefficiency.

A bit more widespread in Dalmatia, but not much.
That doesn't sound quite right. Dalmatia is in fact the only region in A-H where Croatian nationalist and Yugoslav parties initially grew comparatively weaker, due to a strong local tradition of praising Dalmatian identity and Italian heritage. The Authonomashtvo movement opposed Dalmatia joining with Croatia and Slavonia (region in Croatia, not Slovenia), but was quashed after the Croatian nationalist party became the regime party. Census reports until the Great War show that regional identity movement stayed alive despite it being politically dead.

There will be still threats from anarchy (that Halagaz described) and someone will have to be invited to deal with the mess. The movement, although numerous on paper, is very disunited. Peasants are viewed as separate from ordinary urban citizens and vice versa. Now, they've been conscripted into a losing war in a conflict they barely understand and the state that did it fell apart. Its members are mostly the starving former conscripted soldiers looking to survive in state of uncertainty.

It would be impossible for them to coalesce even into a short lived peasant state without a previous leader (Radic brothers, OTL peasant leaders, would be tempted, but opposed to a peasant republic since they tried to politically educate and incorporate peasants into political life) so that would probably require an additional POD. There might be widespread riots, but I doubt they will unite or coordinate in order to establish their own Soviet or Peasant Republic. After they are put down, they will be forgotten by everyone except a select few (like Radic brothers).

Entente might leave it to Italy to put it down (with catastrophic consequences), but the new government likely invites help from neighbouring states, possibly evenly Czechoslovakia or Romania (avoiding countries with territorial aspirations), warning against a possibility of a third communist state, especially near the Magyar Soviet Republic.

The new Southslavic state ends up with concessions given to Italy and other countries, a compromise agrarian reform is attempted and eventually pushed through. In the new state, nationalists try to get support of the now politically relevant peasants, but so might the communists, a rivalry between Croatians and Serbians will reemerge, and things get fuzzy. The constitutions is likely a compromise that no one will like and there will be a strong impulse for a central authority. Perhaps even an quasifascist movement emerges, mimicking Italy and Germany and promising to restore the glory of 'Illyria.'

Although Serbian hegemony was quite problematic for first Yugoslavia, it overshadowed many other problems managing to eventually band disparate factions together. The new state will suffer from corruption, unpopular and opportunistic politicians and so on. I foresee that the main struggle in interwar Yugoslav state will be between a a possible national unity irredentist front and national agrarian-populist front. Of course, Croats and Serbs might simply just clash again but scales being a bit more balanced (Serbs will still be in advantage though). Croats becoming the main force behind agrarianism and Serbs behind irredentism.
 
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