Hello all,
Imo it was in no small part due to just luck that CV-2 and CV-6 were not in port, certainly CV-6 was due to be there on the morning on the 7th. So indeed for maximum effect, sinking CV-2 and CV-6 at their berths would be far more important in the short them that those tank farms etc. Now that i think of it, and reading that the fuel tank farm and drydocks etc. were not on the IJN priority target list, looks like this whole hoo-hah about the tanks and drydocks is purely something that gained traction in hindsight, maybe even after the war (just like the fact that if the DoW was delivered in time this would have somehow changed the US public's attitude toward Japan and the war; i have made the case some time back that this would not have been the case, the propaganda would simply slightly changed it's "story" to be sold, but it would be just as visceral). After all, what good would be pristine fuel tanks farms and drydocks if the bulk of the Pacific fleet BBs AND CVs are at the bottom of the ocean on the 7th?
Anyway, as this topic is about what the IJN could have done to maximize the effects of their strike, how about being one day late for whatever reason? It's something that could have easily happened imo. CV-6 would be in port, and as i understand it, some of the BBs were always going out for maneuvers during the week. So on Monday morning, there would be several BBs just exiting port and one juicy CV berthed. Any idea what were the peacetime ship movement plans for that Monday?
Not sure how CV-2 can be taken out as well, likely it would have delivered the planes it carried for Midway and would be on it's way back. Maybe things might be a bit different on Monday and CV-2 is directed right in the path of the retreating Kido Butai. Things could go several ways from there, but for the purpose of this ATL if CV-2 is summarily clobbered by D3A and B5Ns from SIX IJN carriers, then that would be a catastrophe for USN. Even worse if torpedo magnet CV-3 Saratoga swallows 2 or 3 torpedos from one of the IJN subs around after it arrives off PH, either being sunk outright or being under repairs for even longer than in OTL! So then you have just CV-5,7 and 8 in the Pacific to do the initial pinprick raids, Coral Sea, Midway and if the leadership is very adamant about it, the Dollittle raid as well. Something will give being so stretched, if for whatever reason even one of them is not available for Midway, this hugely increases the likelihood of an IJN victory, losing there will butterfly away Guadlacanal at the very least. If they still do the Tokyo attack they lose or do not contest Coral Sea. All in all 1942 an 1943 could be a lot harder and bloodier for the americans in the Pacific, and who knows what repercussions all this would have in the ETO.
In summary, in the best case scenario for them the IJN could outright sink 2 or 3 CVs and 3 or 4 BBs, which could not be raised and repaired if they are sunk in open waters (the BBs), or would likely be too smashed up to worth rebuilding (the CV-6). They might lose at least twice as many aircraft in the process but if this would prevent the disaster at Midway it would have well worth it in the short/medium term.