WI Mao tried to bargain harder with Stalin in 1950?

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
In OTL when the PRC was established it adopted a foreign policy orientation of "lean to one side", the side of socialism (and the USSR) against imperialism.

During Mao's visit, and negotiations for the Sino-Soviet alliance, signed in Feb 1950,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_Treaty_of_Friendship,_Alliance_and_Mutual_Assistance he adopted the position of asserting Chinese interests and demands in most cases, but deferring to the USSR in cases where Moscow was insistent, to avoid any breakdown in talks.

As a result, the new PRC acceded to Soviet economic and military privileges in Manchuria and Xinjiang.

What if the PRC held out against Soviet demands, seeking near-term reversion of Soviet privileges in Cinese infrastructure (railways and ports) and enterprises. Could Beijing have gotten an alliance treaty on better terms for itself?

Would the result have been a prolonged secret, tense stalemate through 1950 with an agreement not being made?

Could Kim Il-Sung get Stalin and Mao's blessing for an invasion of South Korea under such circumstances?

Could it become worse than stalemate or impasse, with Soviet filibustering against China's border regions or Mao resorting to nonalignment or outreach to the west? Could this result in China's UN membership?

....a similar question applies to later Sino-Soviet bargaining over bailing out North Korea.

Could the PRC have made it a condition of entering the Korean War that Stalin yield Soviet concessions in China? At least parts of it far from the battlefront like Xinjiang? [If engaging the US in war in Korea, there could be some security and deterrent benefit to China of there being highly visible Soviet interests and facilities in Manchuria]. Could Mao at least have received Soviet arms and supplies for free?

How far could and would Stalin be willing to go to assert the primacy of Soviet and his own interests. What results could he get if he considers Mao's hard bargaining intolerable and seeks to punish Mao for it?

Now before everyone points out that Mao was in the USSR and vulnerable to Soviet arrest during the negotiations over the alliance (and an arrest or assassination during Mao's visit would *not* be risk-free move for Stalin), one could surmise that if Mao is really trying to drive a harder bargain he can do so from the greater safety of Chinese territory, using emissaries and the telephone.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I'll suggest the most probable results -

Stalin is pissed at Mao, but does not try to overthrow him because he knows it is not practical under the circumstances. Also, unlike the Tito case, he does not bring his criticism of Mao out into the open, because he feels it is beneficial vis-a-vis the west to keep any Sino-Soviet disputes hidden at this time, and it is safer to have the west believe they are allied.

Most likely result is that Soviets sign an alliance with the PRC and in doing so set up a 2 or 3 year timetable to pull out of Chinese concessions. However, Stalin may skimp more on aid to the PRC, for example, slowing down the armed forces (and naval) training and reequipping plan for the PRC. Also, Stalin likely continues to say "hell no" to Kim Il-Sung's proposals to invade South Korea, because he's much less confident in Mao's cooperativeness in case of reverses.

From his end, despite hard bargaining, Mao probably figures its more consistent with his rhetoric, with deterring imperialists and internally signaling a "clean break" with China's past to stay publicly pro-Soviet. He's just more insistent on earlier addressal of Chinese national goals.

second most likely is that there is no alliance agreement because negotiations are stalemated, but there's a lesser agreement (friendship treaty) and both sides conceal the contentiousness of the talks. Stalin is equally unlikely to authorize North Korea's attack under these circumstances.
 
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