WI: Manstein appointed Commander-in-Chief East in January 1944

The claims being made in this thread about the incompetence of late-war German intelligence (at least on the Eastern Front) and its supposed tendency to misestimate the Soviet Union have no basis in reality. For example, from Ostkrieg page 383 "The Soviets, Gehlen's unit calculated, had lost 1.2 million men (killed and taken prisoner) just in the last four months of 1943, as against 243,743 Germans, but the frontline strength of the Red Army had grown to 5.5 million troops. In addition, annual Soviet drafts produced three times more recruits than the Germans were able to, while the Soviet Union had gained (and Germany lost) 600,000 men in the recovered territories. Finally, in an ominous sign of the growing interconnection of the various strategic fronts, Gehlen estimated that Germany had to divert at least 30 percent, and usually more, of its total strength to OKW theaters, while the Soviet Union diverted only 7 percent to its Far East sector." Furthermore, intelligence did assist German commanders during this period. For example, conveniently enough given the OP, regarding Manstein from page 396-7 "Much to his surprise, however, when discussions resumed at the evening conference, not only was Manstein treated with outward friendliness by Hitler, but he was also given permission for a breakout... The field marshal now hurried back to his headquarters to prepare an operation that would not only save the First Panzer Army but also deal his old adversary, Zhukov, one final surprise... Zhukov, assuming that German forces would attempt to break out to the south, had placed the bulk of his forces in that direction. Manstein, however, realized that any breakout to the south would have to cross a double line of enemy forces... Instead, the field marshal proposed a breakout to the west that would be the shortest route to the German front, cut across enemy supply lines, and, perhaps most importantly, take the Russians completely by surprise... armed with intelligence that confirmed his suspicions about enemy dispositions, Manstein ordered the breakout to the west to begin on 28 March. As the operation began that morning in a blinding snowstorm that provided cover, it soon became apparent that the Germans had achieved complete surprise. Not only were enemy positions quickly overrun, but the next day Zhukov also continued dispatching units to the south, evidently unaware of Manstein's intention. Not until 1 April did he recognize his mistake, but by then it was too late."
 
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There are two things that I'm absolutely certain of

I think, therefore I am

And

That whenever @wiking and @ObsessedNuker enters in the same thread there will be a fight between both

:v

Now, now, there are some things we have come to an agreement about. Like a Soviet attack in '41 being an utter boondoggle of the lack of Hitler meaning no WW2.

The claims being made in this thread about the incompetence of late-war German intelligence (at least on the Eastern Front) and its supposed tendency to misestimate the Soviet Union have no basis in reality.

Nonsense. For example, the relationship between German intelligence staffs and their commanders I have been discussing in this thread is directly spelled out in German field regulations:

Hitler's Spies said:
"The I c [intelligence officer] is subordinated to the I a [operations officer] and is his helper in working up the enemy picture.

Estimating the enemy picture is a matter for the commander in cooperation with the chief of staff or the I a.

The judgement of the enemy situation always proceeds fromthe command authorities, not from the I c alone."

Even your supposed example of the Germans being right actually is an example of a misestimation: Gehlen's estimate is roughly between a half-million to a million short on the number of Soviet troops committed against the Germans and the Soviet draft actually produced four times the number of recruits then the Germans. You'll note that in your quote that Stephen Fritz doesn't say Gehlen was right.

With your other example, that Manstein was right happened inspite of intelligence rather then because of it and your example really shows this. Manstein made an assumption (albeit a reasonable one) and his intelligence service confirmed it. In this case he happened to assume correctly and was. Had he assumed incorrectly, as he had before with Citadel, at 4th Kharkov, at the D'niepr, and at Kiev, his intelligence would have confirmed that assumption instead... and he would have suffered a humiliating defeat, like he had with Citadel, at 4th Kharkov, at the D'niepr, and at Kiev. It's a case of a operational commander making an educated guess based on personal intuition and being right, not a case of him coming to a decision based on solid German intelligence analysis.
 

Deleted member 1487

like he had with Citadel, at 4th Kharkov, at the D'niepr, and at Kiev.
Each of those was lost because of greater Soviet reserves and capacity to absorb losses than the German forces were able to inflict. He wasn't out generaled, he was outgunned and intelligence had nothing to do with it. Nor did Soviet operational superiority, it came down to replacement capabilities and numbers, which the Soviets had more of.
 
There are two things that I'm absolutely certain of

I think, therefore I am

And

That whenever @wiking and @ObsessedNuker enters in the same thread there will be a fight between both

:v
I am reminded of Michael Moorcock's series of books about the Eternal Champion. Doomed to fight an endless series of conflicts for "Good" against the similarly immortal Champion of "Evil" in many guises and forms. Not that I'd wish to accuse either of our fellow members of being on the side of evil. Just that they take at all times diametrically opposed positions!
 
Each of those was lost because of greater Soviet reserves and capacity to absorb losses than the German forces were able to inflict. He wasn't out generaled, he was outgunned and intelligence had nothing to do with it.

Purile nonsense, as an examination of each of those examples reveal:

First, Citadel, where Manstein was twice wrong: first, he believed he he was facing Soviet divisions where he faced entire armies. Second, even after his advance had bogged down he thought all the Soviet reserves were committed, utterly unaware that fresh Soviet armored forces were preparing to come down on his failing spearheads' flanks. He was only saved from the consequences of this second belief by Hitler putting his foot down and overruling him.

4th Kharkov: Manstein believed that the Soviets would be unable to go over to the offensive after the massive bloodletting at Kursk. As a result, he dispersed his forces or misdeployed his remaining panzer forces and was overly lack-a-daisal in prioritizing the resupply and refit of his forces. When the Soviet offensive broke, he was caught totally flat-footed. Only the dumb luck of having an SS Panzer Corps preparing to leave for Sicily put it in the right place and time to be turned around and blunt the Soviet tank armies to prevent the total annihilation of the German defenders of Kharkov, even then they could not hold the line and were forced into a humiliating and costly withdrawal.

The D'niepr: Soviet infantry forces managed to secure a modest bridgehead on the edge of the Pripyet Swamp in a location the Germans believed was impassible to large mechanized or shock forces. They exploited this by maeneuvering a tank army into the bridgehead, hid it there, convinced Manstein the attack was coming out of the larger and more obvious Cherkassy bridgehead to the south, then launched the attack. They smashed through the surprised German forces, enveloped and captured Kiev, cleared out the German defense of the northern D'niepr beyond repair, and even managed to get as far as Zhitomir before running out of steam.

The Zhotomir-Kiev counteroffensive: Manstein failed to recognize Soviet preparations for their winter offensive and launched a offensive that retook Zhotomir and destroyed a deception force. Believing he had actually destroyed the Soviet assault forces, he was still preparing fantastically over-grandiose plan to retake Kiev when the Soviet winter offensive broke and destroyed the remains of the German defensive line along the central D'niepr, encircling the German forces at Korsun in the process.

Again and again Manstein was deceived by Soviet generals as to the timing, location, and aims of their offensives thereby leaving the Germans. This is the textbook definition of being outgeneraled. Without that, the above victories would have, at best, been smaller in scale and, at worst, wouldn't have happened at all.

Moving beyond Manstein, we can find further examples of late-war German intelligence failures. Bagration is the most obvious, with the Germans misidentifying the location of the Soviet offensive by a thousand kilometers, but there are others. 2nd Jassey-Kishinev for instance: that saw the German general in charge of the sector reported he only expected a minor attack by small forces only a day before a million Soviet men and a thousand tanks fell on him. The operation led to the annihilation of the entire Romanian Army and the 6th Army, the death or capture of close to 500,000 Germans and Romanians (or just ~200,000 Germans if we ignore the Romanians), and took Romania out of the war. Soviet losses were 13,000 irrecoverable, and 50,000 more injured - extremely light losses for an operation of this size, for any nation.

Moving forward further, in January 1945 when Guderian told Hitler he was massively outnumbered, facing odds of five to one, he was actually fooled by Soviet deception plans. Actual Soviet strength was only a little more than half that - the rest were dummy formations.
 

Deleted member 1487

Purile nonsense, as an examination of each of those examples reveal:

First, Citadel, where Manstein was twice wrong: first, he believed he he was facing Soviet divisions where he faced entire armies. Second, even after his advance had bogged down he thought all the Soviet reserves were committed, utterly unaware that fresh Soviet armored forces were preparing to come down on his failing spearheads' flanks. He was only saved from the consequences of this second belief by Hitler putting his foot down and overruling him.
Again decided by numbers; he didn't have access to information that was unknown to the rest of the German military due to lack of recon assets, Soviet use of landlines to limit German access to sigint, Soviet counter espionage. How is any of the Manstein's fault? He was acting with the best knowledge he had access to. Plus his reserves were stripped from him to aid First Panzer Army and help out in Italy.

4th Kharkov: Manstein believed that the Soviets would be unable to go over to the offensive after the massive bloodletting at Kursk. As a result, he dispersed his forces or misdeployed his remaining panzer forces and was overly lack-a-daisal in prioritizing the resupply and refit of his forces. When the Soviet offensive broke, he was caught totally flat-footed. Only the dumb luck of having an SS Panzer Corps preparing to leave for Sicily put it in the right place and time to be turned around and blunt the Soviet tank armies to prevent the total annihilation of the German defenders of Kharkov, even then they could not hold the line and were forced into a humiliating and costly withdrawal.
Again can't fault him for lack of access to information. The Soviets were good at hiding that information and there was a limit to what German intelligence could find out due to Soviet counterespionage efforts, signals discipline, and lack of German aerial recon due to Soviet fighters and Soviet forces keeping away from tactical depths where they could penetrate and moving by night. His forces were stripped from him for other fronts and to shore up the situation on the Mius, which was critical and he had to intervene on to maintain the front; once again a function of Soviet numbers that they were able to rebuild their forces from Kursk and attack on the Mius while moving up rebuilt formations. It wasn't a lacksidasical attitude toward rebuilding his forces, there was just limited access to replacements and no time to rest them, they were rushed from one crisis to the next tanks to Soviet numbers yet again. Again the Germans were stretched on all fronts and it was lucky the SS Panzer Corps hadn't left yet, but the decision to move them out was Hitler's, not Manstein's.

The D'niepr: Soviet infantry forces managed to secure a modest bridgehead on the edge of the Pripyet Swamp in a location the Germans believed was impassible to large mechanized or shock forces. They exploited this by maeneuvering a tank army into the bridgehead, hid it there, convinced Manstein the attack was coming out of the larger and more obvious Cherkassy bridgehead to the south, then launched the attack. They smashed through the surprised German forces, enveloped and captured Kiev, cleared out the German defense of the northern D'niepr beyond repair, and even managed to get as far as Zhitomir before running out of steam.
Again the Soviets had breached the line is so many places due to their vast numbers that the Germans had to prioritize which bridgeheads got the first attention and in the circumstances the swamp one wasn't priority; the Soviets were able to exploit that as German forces were crushing other bridgeheads. Again the Soviets had so many forces they could put units into all bridgeheads and attack out of the ones the Germans couldn't screen. Not an issue of master deception or generalship, just a function of having much greater numbers than their opponent. Again not Manstein's fault, he did the best he could with what he had. Had he tried to go after the swamp bridgehead the Soviets would have exploited the Cherkassy one. Damned if he did, damned if he didn't.

The Zhotomir-Kiev counteroffensive: Manstein failed to recognize Soviet preparations for their winter offensive and launched a offensive that retook Zhotomir and destroyed a deception force. Believing he had actually destroyed the Soviet assault forces, he was still preparing fantastically over-grandiose plan to retake Kiev when the Soviet winter offensive broke and destroyed the remains of the German defensive line along the central D'niepr, encircling the German forces at Korsun in the process.
That is one way to put it, but not the right way:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kiev_(1943)
Both sides had suffered heavy losses. The casualty ratio was fairly balanced, though the Soviets lost slightly more than the Germans. With the recapture of Zhitomir and Korosten the 4th Panzer had gained some breathing room. With Vatutin halted, Stavka released substantial reserves to his First Ukrainian Front to regain momentum.

The Soviets defeated the German counteroffensive, but were stalled and due to the Germans shooting their bolt and failing to destroy superior numbers of Soviet troops at Kiev, the Soviets decided to put their reserves where the Germans weren't, yet again a function of numbers. There was no deception force, it was over 200k Soviet forces and they defeated 70k counterattacking Germans, though that stopped Vatutin from being able to advance any furthers.

Again and again Manstein was deceived by Soviet generals as to the timing, location, and aims of their offensives thereby leaving the Germans. This is the textbook definition of being outgeneraled. Without that, the above victories would have, at best, been smaller in scale and, at worst, wouldn't have happened at all.
Not really deception when you outnumber your enemy everywhere, they waited for the German reserves to commit and then released their reserves where the Germans weren't. Again a function of having superior numbers.

Moving beyond Manstein, we can find further examples of late-war German intelligence failures. Bagration is the most obvious, with the Germans misidentifying the location of the Soviet offensive by a thousand kilometers, but there are others. 2nd Jassey-Kishinev for instance: that saw the German general in charge of the sector reported he only expected a minor attack by small forces only a day before a million Soviet men and a thousand tanks fell on him. The operation led to the annihilation of the entire Romanian Army and the 6th Army, the death or capture of close to 500,000 Germans and Romanians (or just ~200,000 Germans if we ignore the Romanians), and took Romania out of the war. Soviet losses were 13,000 irrecoverable, and 50,000 more injured - extremely light losses for an operation of this size, for any nation.
With Bagration the Soviets pumped a bunch of Tank Armies into North Ukraine, the Germans moved troops their to match them; then the Soviets deployed units from their strategic reserve that the Germans didn't even know existed and caught the Germans by surprise. Again the function of having massively superior numbers and German reserves peeled off in France to counter the Normandy landings. Frankly if the Soviets didn't even bother with deception the fact that they had several tank armies and put them on two widely spaced fronts, while the Germans only had enough to counter one set, would have had a similar effect. It's just a function of overloading your enemy while your allies do the same on the opposite side of Europe. In Romania again it was huge masses of Soviet reserves existing behind the Red Wall of Smersh and lack of German aerial recon ability that enabled that. They were able to outnumber the Germans on all fronts simultanouesly while millions of Americans and Brits in France and Italy did the same. That isn't some great generalship, it's call sitting on the enemy with your overwhelming force and their lack of ability to do even basic recon and intelligence work as their military collapses.

Moving forward further, in January 1945 when Guderian told Hitler he was massively outnumbered, facing odds of five to one, he was actually fooled by Soviet deception plans. Actual Soviet strength was only a little more than half that - the rest were dummy formations.
And that is impressive when the German army and economy effectively ceased to function? They had no way of doing any actual estimates of Soviet forces other than rudimentary SigInt and what they could see in front of them; they had no ground or aerial recon elements left to see anything. At that point it's like saying 'hey we fooled the Iraqi army in 1991 about our intentions and numbers!'.
 
Nonsense. For example, the relationship between German intelligence staffs and their commanders I have been discussing in this thread is directly spelled out in German field regulations:

So the intelligence officer would present information to the commander and they'd work out a picture of the opposing force. This proves what exactly?

Even your supposed example of the Germans being right actually is an example of a misestimation: Gehlen's estimate is roughly between a half-million to a million short on the number of Soviet troops committed against the Germans

Do note that the number was an estimate of Soviet "frontline strength," not the total on the Eastern Front including reserves.

and the Soviet draft actually produced four times the number of recruits then the Germans. You'll note that in your quote that Stephen Fritz doesn't say Gehlen was right.

Oh please. Blaming the Abwehr for not producing perfect estimates (assuming that the "four times," for which you did not provide a source, is actually correct) is completely meaningless given that its target was a tightly controlled, geographically spread out, totalitarian police state. The point stands that German strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union by this point in the war was hardly the mess you were making it out to have been.

With your other example, that Manstein was right happened inspite of intelligence rather then because of it and your example really shows this. Manstein made an assumption (albeit a reasonable one) and his intelligence service confirmed it. In this case he happened to assume correctly and was. It's a case of a operational commander making an educated guess based on personal intuition and being right, not a case of him coming to a decision based on solid German intelligence analysis.

It's a case of him coming to a right decision with the help of accurate information, which was why I said "intelligence did assist German commanders during this period."

Had he assumed incorrectly, as he had before with Citadel,

German intelligence was aware that Citadel was unlikely to succeed. From Ostkrieg page 342 quoting Gehlen directly "The Russians have anticipated our attack... [The enemy] has built many positions... and has done everything he can to absorb our blow early on. It is therefore hardly likely that the German attack will break through. Given the sum total of ready reserves at the disposal of the Russians it is not to be expected that Citadel will lead to such a high level of losses for him that his intention to choose the proper moment [for an attack] will be unrealizable because of insufficient strength... I hold the intended operation to be a totally decisive mistake." That such estimates weren't widely distributed is ultimately a function of the muddled command structure Hitler went out of his way to set up and therefore his fault, not Manstein's.

at 4th Kharkov, at the D'niepr, and at Kiev, his intelligence would have confirmed that assumption instead... and he would have suffered a humiliating defeat, like he had with Citadel, at 4th Kharkov, at the D'niepr, and at Kiev.

As wiking has said, he had no choice whatsoever in his actions during those battles, by the time he committed his reserves to counter the Soviet "diversionary" offensives, they were on the verge of achieving major breakthroughs which would have made the Axis defenses completely untenable.
 
Again the Soviets had breached the line is so many places due to their vast numbers that the Germans had to prioritize which bridgeheads got the first attention and in the circumstances the swamp one wasn't priority; the Soviets were able to exploit that as German forces were crushing other bridgeheads. Again the Soviets had so many forces they could put units into all bridgeheads and attack out of the ones the Germans couldn't screen. Not an issue of master deception or generalship, just a function of having much greater numbers than their opponent. Again not Manstein's fault, he did the best he could with what he had. Had he tried to go after the swamp bridgehead the Soviets would have exploited the Cherkassy one. Damned if he did, damned if he didn't.
Actually for example German Author Paul Carell is crediting Soviets with moving tank armies massed around one possible bridgehead which didn't work out to other one closer to Kiev in such a matter it took Germans by surprise. This author was not blaming German defeat on Dnieper on overwhelming Soviet forces but on Soviet operational skills, maskirovka and unability of German commanders to detect the movements. Of course. He often in his books cherished soldiers and lower commanders for their ability to use opportunity they have seen and grab victory. Usually he credited German soldiers but on Dnieper he gave credit to Soviet sergeant((??? don't remember) who took bridgehead closer to Kiev, hold it against German counter attacks and by this allowed Soviets higher commander to find new location from which took attack. He again credited Soviets higher command for their ability to recognized change situation and not to stick to original plan but to use new opportunity, move their armies to different location and win. Something usually Germans were credited with. In his book he was saying that by 1943 Soviets learnt what they needed and actually overplayed Germans on battlefield. Of course Manstein was his hero, ;) Interestingly Paul Carell was Obersturmbannführer during WWII.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Actually for example German Author Paul Carell is crediting Soviets with moving tank armies massed around one possible bridgehead which didn't work out to other one closer to Kiev in such a matter it took Germans by surprise. This author was not blaming German defeat on Dnieper on overwhelming Soviet forces but on Soviet operational skills, maskirovka and unability of German commanders to detect the movements. Of course. He often in his books cherished soldiers and lower commanders for their ability to use opportunity they have seen and grab victory. Usually he credited German soldiers but on Dnieper he gave credit to Soviet sergeant((??? don't remember) who took bridgehead closer to Kiev, hold it against German counter attacks and by this allowed Soviets higher commander to find new location from which took attack. He again credited Soviets higher command for their ability to recognized change situation and not to stick to original plan but to use new opportunity, move their armies to different location and win. Something usually Germans were credited with. In his book he was saying that by 1943 Soviets learnt what they needed and actually overplayed Germans on battlefield. Of course Manstein was his hero, ;) Interestingly Paul Carell was Obersturmbannführer during WWII.
It wasn't simply numbers, but numbers allowed for the multiple bridgeheads, excess troops to move around, and by having more than their foe they could overload them with more than the could handle.
 

gaijin

Banned
It wasn't simply numbers, but numbers allowed for the multiple bridgeheads, excess troops to move around, and by having more than their foe they could overload them with more than the could handle.

If that were true the Soviets should have curb stomped the Germans in 1941. The numbers were massively in their favor.

The key point is not numbers, but numbers where it matters. The Soviets were able to identify weak spots in the German lines, concentrate forces there, keep those concentrations hidden and strike faster than the Getmans could react. For the local German troops on the ground it seemed like the Soviets had limitless numbers of troops. This was not actually true, all the Soviets had was the skill to create overwhelming local superiority. The way they did this was to strip other sectors.

This leads to a case of perception bias. We hear about these overwhelming Soviet attacks with tons of troops and material. This is not because the Soviets really outnumbered the Getmans that much. It's because the Soviets really outmaneuvered the Germans that much (just as the Germans had done with the Soviets in 41 and 42). What we don't hear is the other 80% of the front where there was only a mild Doviet superiority in numbers, parity, or even a German superiority. The reason you don't hear about these sectors is because post 1942 the Germans had neither the means not the intelligence to identify and attack these sectors without the Soviets noticing. Nothing happened in these sectors so they get overlooked thereby missing a very important fact: the reason the Germans were so outmaneuvered is not only because they couldn't find where the Soviet focus of attention was, they also couldn't find where the real weak spots were. In 41 and 42 they often could and that led to the Germans having the initiative.

The Germans lost not because they were outnumbered. They lost because they were outgeneraled, outsmarted, outmaneuver end and ultimately outfought. The Soviets took on the Wehrmacht in a pretty much one on one fight and kicked their faces in. Not that you would tell that if you base your opinion on the post war memories written by the German generals.
 
If that were true the Soviets should have curb stomped the Germans in 1941. The numbers were massively in their favor.

The key point is not numbers, but numbers where it matters. The Soviets were able to identify weak spots in the German lines, concentrate forces there, keep those concentrations hidden and strike faster than the Getmans could react. For the local German troops on the ground it seemed like the Soviets had limitless numbers of troops. This was not actually true, all the Soviets had was the skill to create overwhelming local superiority. The way they did this was to strip other sectors.

This leads to a case of perception bias. We hear about these overwhelming Soviet attacks with tons of troops and material. This is not because the Soviets really outnumbered the Getmans that much. It's because the Soviets really outmaneuvered the Germans that much (just as the Germans had done with the Soviets in 41 and 42). What we don't hear is the other 80% of the front where there was only a mild Doviet superiority in numbers, parity, or even a German superiority. The reason you don't hear about these sectors is because post 1942 the Germans had neither the means not the intelligence to identify and attack these sectors without the Soviets noticing. Nothing happened in these sectors so they get overlooked thereby missing a very important fact: the reason the Germans were so outmaneuvered is not only because they couldn't find where the Soviet focus of attention was, they also couldn't find where the real weak spots were. In 41 and 42 they often could and that led to the Germans having the initiative.

The Germans lost not because they were outnumbered. They lost because they were outgeneraled, outsmarted, outmaneuver end and ultimately outfought. The Soviets took on the Wehrmacht in a pretty much one on one fight and kicked their faces in. Not that you would tell that if you base your opinion on the post war memories written by the German generals.

This is a complete fantasy, as a cursory glance at the margins of overall numerical superiority shows. At no time from the third quarter of 1942 onward did the Red Army have anything less than 2:1 odds in its favor across the entire front. http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2011/11/strength-and-loss-data-eastern-front.html And in equipment, from East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany on pages 105-6 of the 23:2 volume of the Journal of Strategic studies "David Glantz's book From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations December 1942 to August 1943 lists the forces available to both sides during this crucial period. In the Donbas Operation of late 1942, the Soviets had only a 2 to 1 advantage in men but a 4 to 1 advantage in tanks. Later, after the Battle of Kursk when the Soviets broke through and finally retook Kharkov, they outnumbered the Germans by 3 to 1 in men and 5 to 1 in tanks. As late as January 1945, during the great Soviet offensive against Germany's Army Group Center in Poland, the Soviets only outnumbered the Germans by 2.8 to 1 in men, but had healthier advantages of 3.4 to 1 in artillery and 4.7 to 1 in tanks." If the Red Army had been remotely qualitatively equal to that of Germany, Army Group South would have been surrounded and destroyed in 1943. The fighting was taking place in open country which was perfect for mobile operations.
 

Deleted member 1487

If that were true the Soviets should have curb stomped the Germans in 1941. The numbers were massively in their favor.
What did I say?
It wasn't simply numbers, but numbers allowed for the multiple bridgeheads, excess troops to move around, and by having more than their foe they could overload them with more than the could handle.
Also the difference from 1941 was that the German army too had fallen apart and wasn't what it was in 1941, nor was it as strong in manpower, it had nowhere near the same air support, while Soviet T-34 production and access to LL was vastly higher. So it isn't simply raw numbers, it is also relative experience between the two sides, combat effectiveness ratios, and access to equipment. The Soviets had improved, but also had tremendously greater access to their best AFVs, air superiority, LL radios/trucks/food/explosives/AFVs/etc, while the the Germans had peaked and were on their downswing while fighting on other fronts after suffering massive losses there.

The key point is not numbers, but numbers where it matters. The Soviets were able to identify weak spots in the German lines, concentrate forces there, keep those concentrations hidden and strike faster than the Getmans could react. For the local German troops on the ground it seemed like the Soviets had limitless numbers of troops. This was not actually true, all the Soviets had was the skill to create overwhelming local superiority. The way they did this was to strip other sectors.
The reason the Soviets were able to identify and exploit weak spots in the German lines is having many more men than the Germans and being able to overload them. Sure, it isn't simply numbers, as I said earlier, but numbers were a critical element to the success of the Soviets, especially in wearing down the Germans from 1941-43. If the situation were reversed and the Soviets had their 1945 quality, but German 1943 numbers and the Germans had Soviet 1943 numbers and their 1944 quality how do you think that would have gone?

This leads to a case of perception bias. We hear about these overwhelming Soviet attacks with tons of troops and material. This is not because the Soviets really outnumbered the Getmans that much. It's because the Soviets really outmaneuvered the Germans that much (just as the Germans had done with the Soviets in 41 and 42). What we don't hear is the other 80% of the front where there was only a mild Doviet superiority in numbers, parity, or even a German superiority. The reason you don't hear about these sectors is because post 1942 the Germans had neither the means not the intelligence to identify and attack these sectors without the Soviets noticing. Nothing happened in these sectors so they get overlooked thereby missing a very important fact: the reason the Germans were so outmaneuvered is not only because they couldn't find where the Soviet focus of attention was, they also couldn't find where the real weak spots were. In 41 and 42 they often could and that led to the Germans having the initiative.
I'm actually going from the Soviet perspective. They kept up the pressure everywhere until they found spots (or made them) and used their reserves to plow right through them. In 1943 the Soviets had some 10 million men in the army on the Eastern Front or in the strategic reserve, the Germans had about 3 million with Axis minor allies. That's better than 3:1 for the entire front. Sure the Soviets were able to mass at the decisive point, but that decisive point was identifiable and all parts of the front screened by greater Soviet numbers, they could be at least 1:1 along every part of the front, but mass 5:1 or more numbers against the Germans or their allies at one point. That wasn't possible for the Germans, who had to strip other fronts to absurd levels just to be outnumbered on the main front. But again it isn't just manpower numbers that matter here, but also equipment numbers. The Soviets simply had much more of everything thanks to Lend-Lease and being able to focus on specific categories of weapons, weren't facing strategic bombing of industry in 1943 like German, and were only fighting on one front; German numbers in the East dropped off during the course of 1942-45 not simply due to casualties, but also due to constantly having to strip out units and deny replacements so that forces could be available to fight Britain and the US. By 1943 the German military had largely lost it's mobility in the East, didn't have enough men to man the front, and were facing a foe that managed to have more weapons/equipment and men in the field, so that the 1941-42 ratios no longer held.

In fact looking through David Glantz's "When Titans Clashed" the force ratios were never so much in the Soviet favor as in 1943 and later; in 1941-42 that Germans had much closer parity to the Soviets than they did by 1943, which was a factor of other fronts becoming active for the Germans, attrition, and Soviet mobilization of resources with the help of the Wallies with LL. So they finally put together a massive army that they never had the chance to do before, which is probably the single biggest reason the initiative switched in 1943: the Soviets had enough men and equipment to have numerical parity all along the front at a minimum and superiority where ever they wanted, plus are reserve as big as the entire German field army that could appear at will anywhere along the front. Meanwhile the Germans struggled just to sit and hold the front, never mind attack.

The Germans lost not because they were outnumbered. They lost because they were outgeneraled, outsmarted, outmaneuver end and ultimately outfought. The Soviets took on the Wehrmacht in a pretty much one on one fight and kicked their faces in. Not that you would tell that if you base your opinion on the post war memories written by the German generals.
They lost because they fought too many countries all at once and were at least outnumbered 5:1 in population from the direct combatants (not counting India or China), probably a similar amount in industry, and much more in overall raw material production. The 'outgeneraling, outsmarting, outmaneuvering, and outfighting' was a function of the enormous human and material superiority that could be and was brought to bear by 1943; the war became attritional the second the US stepped in and the Axis powers were not set up to win a war of attrition. With US industry weighing in in a big way the war was lost to the Axis, it was just a question of when. Soviet maneuver, firepower, and ability to mass at critical points was all a function of numbers and the material to actually use those numbers, which was lacking before 1943. The Soviet concept of how to use their military was certainly there by 1941, the lack of modern equipment in numbers, lack of time to organize, lack of communications equipment, etc. all took time to fix, which it was by 1943 when it all came together for the Soviets and then they couldn't lose with the coalition they had on their side.
 

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This is a complete fantasy, as a cursory glance at the margins of overall numerical superiority shows. At no time from the third quarter of 1942 onward did the Red Army have anything less than 2:1 odds in its favor across the entire front. http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2011/11/strength-and-loss-data-eastern-front.html And in equipment, from East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany on pages 105-6 of the 23:2 volume of the Journal of Strategic studies "David Glantz's book From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations December 1942 to August 1943 lists the forces available to both sides during this crucial period. In the Donbas Operation of late 1942, the Soviets had only a 2 to 1 advantage in men but a 4 to 1 advantage in tanks. Later, after the Battle of Kursk when the Soviets broke through and finally retook Kharkov, they outnumbered the Germans by 3 to 1 in men and 5 to 1 in tanks. As late as January 1945, during the great Soviet offensive against Germany's Army Group Center in Poland, the Soviets only outnumbered the Germans by 2.8 to 1 in men, but had healthier advantages of 3.4 to 1 in artillery and 4.7 to 1 in tanks." If the Red Army had been remotely qualitatively equal to that of Germany, Army Group South would have been surrounded and destroyed in 1943. The fighting was taking place in open country which was perfect for mobile operations.
That raises the question of what would have happened in Summer 1943 if instead of trying to build the Panther German industry just focused on building more StuG IIIs and Panzer IVs. Apparently two factories converted from Panzer III to Panther production in 1942, which would have instead much more easily and quickly started making StuG IIIs so that by Summer 1943 Panzer IV production could have doubled it's monthly output and StuG production perhaps 50% higher even in 1942 if greater Panzer IV production allowed for a phasing out of the Panzer III entirely for StuG production by the end of 1942. As it was by September 1943 only some 40% of German AFVs in the East were operational due to battle damage and wear and tear laying up the majority, which then were subsequently lost in the retreat to the Dnepr. Had replacements been available in quantities, cutting down the Soviet AFV advantage to 2:1 perhaps things would have gone differently. The retreat to the Dnepr cost the Germans very heavily in AFV losses in depots waiting for repairs, but also artillery and a wealth of other equipment, including trucks.
 
This is a complete fantasy, as a cursory glance at the margins of overall numerical superiority shows. At no time from the third quarter of 1942 onward did the Red Army have anything less than 2:1 odds in its favor across the entire front. http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2011/11/strength-and-loss-data-eastern-front.html And in equipment, from East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany on pages 105-6 of the 23:2 volume of the Journal of Strategic studies "David Glantz's book From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations December 1942 to August 1943 lists the forces available to both sides during this crucial period. In the Donbas Operation of late 1942, the Soviets had only a 2 to 1 advantage in men but a 4 to 1 advantage in tanks. Later, after the Battle of Kursk when the Soviets broke through and finally retook Kharkov, they outnumbered the Germans by 3 to 1 in men and 5 to 1 in tanks. As late as January 1945, during the great Soviet offensive against Germany's Army Group Center in Poland, the Soviets only outnumbered the Germans by 2.8 to 1 in men, but had healthier advantages of 3.4 to 1 in artillery and 4.7 to 1 in tanks." If the Red Army had been remotely qualitatively equal to that of Germany, Army Group South would have been surrounded and destroyed in 1943. The fighting was taking place in open country which was perfect for mobile operations.
1945 superiority in tanks and artillery is actually good example. From memories of Czechoslovak General Ludvik Svoboda in December 1944 Soviets ordered his tank brigade and almost all artilery Czechoslovak corps had to move to Poland. He even described variousw meassures taken to cover this move from Germans. I guess if they stripped allied force fighting at the time in Slovakia of heavy weapons they did the same to their own units.
 
That raises the question of what would have happened in Summer 1943 if instead of trying to build the Panther German industry just focused on building more StuG IIIs and Panzer IVs. Apparently two factories converted from Panzer III to Panther production in 1942, which would have instead much more easily and quickly started making StuG IIIs so that by Summer 1943 Panzer IV production could have doubled it's monthly output and StuG production perhaps 50% higher even in 1942 if greater Panzer IV production allowed for a phasing out of the Panzer III entirely for StuG production by the end of 1942. As it was by September 1943 only some 40% of German AFVs in the East were operational due to battle damage and wear and tear laying up the majority, which then were subsequently lost in the retreat to the Dnepr. Had replacements been available in quantities, cutting down the Soviet AFV advantage to 2:1 perhaps things would have gone differently. The retreat to the Dnepr cost the Germans very heavily in AFV losses in depots waiting for repairs, but also artillery and a wealth of other equipment, including trucks.

Any production devoted to the Panther in 1943 was a total loss given its unreliability. They would have been better off acquiring virtually anything else.

1945 superiority in tanks and artillery is actually good example. From memories of Czechoslovak General Ludvik Svoboda in December 1944 Soviets ordered his tank brigade and almost all artilery Czechoslovak corps had to move to Poland. He even described variousw meassures taken to cover this move from Germans. I guess if they stripped allied force fighting at the time in Slovakia of heavy weapons they did the same to their own units.

As wiking said, overall numerical superiority was essential for being able to move forces around at will in such a way. If the odds had been reversed, the Germans would have been able to do the same.
 
Moving beyond Manstein, we can find further examples of late-war German intelligence failures. Bagration is the most obvious, with the Germans misidentifying the location of the Soviet offensive by a thousand kilometers, but there are others. 2nd Jassey-Kishinev for instance: that saw the German general in charge of the sector reported he only expected a minor attack by small forces only a day before a million Soviet men and a thousand tanks fell on him. The operation led to the annihilation of the entire Romanian Army and the 6th Army, the death or capture of close to 500,000 Germans and Romanians (or just ~200,000 Germans if we ignore the Romanians), and took Romania out of the war. Soviet losses were 13,000 irrecoverable, and 50,000 more injured - extremely light losses for an operation of this size, for any nation.


I'm really starting to believe your live in the Kremlin, given the avalanche of inaccurate figures and facts you're dumping on this forum. As that seems to be your favorite place in the world this is hardly surprising of course. Russian revisionism.
 
I'm really starting to believe your live in the Kremlin, given the avalanche of inaccurate figures and facts you're dumping on this forum. As that seems to be your favorite place in the world this is hardly surprising of course. Russian revisionism.

You necroed a months old thread just to throw ad-hominems at me and baselessly shout "wrong" like Trump during the debates? That's... special.
 
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CalBear

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I'm really starting to believe your live in the Kremlin, given the avalanche of inaccurate figures and facts you're dumping on this forum. As that seems to be your favorite place in the world this is hardly surprising of course. Russian revisionism.
Why would you do this?

Thread is inactive for a couple months and you roll with an utterly pointless insult?

Don't do that.
 
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