The actual counter to that kind of attack, in a well run military?Well unless the Germans can somehow figure out a way to neutralise a totally impregnable fortress they are screwed I mean OTL showed that concrete and guns are all that is needed to stop a mechanised advance cold forever with no possible counter.
I mean what are they going to do land glider troops with explosives on top of it?![]()
The actual counter to that kind of attack, in a well run military?
Shell the fortress! With airburst only, of course.
...that is quite astonishingly Francophobic. It misrepresents the very real strength of the French military of the time - in the 1930s it was an open question which was strongest in the world, the French or the Soviet Union - and also misrepresents both the relative industrial balance and the nature of the Blitzkrieg victory.Super Heavy artillery also does the job. I mean its not like the Germans are going to sit still while this is happening if the French put everything into building super fortresses then the Germans will work that into their plans. I mean super heavy guns or specialised shells are a lot cheaper than fortifications.
Of course the true flaw in the plan is that France still thinks its a great power. If it builds this line then its admitting to itself and all its allies that it isn't and can't even pretend to protect a (at the time) close ally from attack never mind the half dozen weak countries that for time were tied to France before realising Paris wouldn't lift a finger to help them.
The issue is that the French during the 30's were rather short on young men. The decline of the birth rate during the first WW and after it meant that many of the reservists were older and would take longer to mobilize and diminish French industry because they would need to leave their jobs.It misrepresents the very real strength of the French military of the time - in the 1930s it was an open question which was strongest in the world, the French or the Soviet Union
...that is quite astonishingly Francophobic. It misrepresents the very real strength of the French military of the time - in the 1930s it was an open question which was strongest in the world, the French or the Soviet Union - and also misrepresents both the relative industrial balance and the nature of the Blitzkrieg victory.
Actually - you know how the Maginot Line fortifications work, right? There's the interval divisions as well. It's not just a bloody huge fort and nothing else.
Also how long it takes a super heavy gun to set up to firing position. We're talking a week or so, with a nine round salvo occupying an entire day.
That could have been adressed relatively easily. After all, it was the whole point of fortification lines, as sanctuarizing both territory and troops from too important losses.The issue is that the French during the 30's were rather short on young men.
But then that comes with the issue of actually being able to mobilize those troops and be able to project them to France. Having the money to do so is also a problem. It wasn't until 1937 that the French economy started to pick back up, and the Maginot Line was a huge drain, trying to expand it to the English Channel would have put an even bigger stress on the economy. They wouldn't be able to fund having such a large army. The French troops in May of 1940 didn't have very good moral, their living conditions were poor, they weren't being paid much at all. The conditions would be worse with more troops and less money.Colonial mobilization, (even in 1944, in a pretty much bad shape, there was enough to rise 1,5 million. It'd expect something at least similar in a far better situation), among other things, could have compensated for that.
Which was done, IOTL, in 1944 where ressources weren't exactly being stellar. Granted, we're talking of an american-equipped army for most of it, but it was technically feasible at the point the age problem wouldn't have been that of a blow especially with a sound defensive strategy.But then that comes with the issue of actually being able to mobilize those troops and be able to project them to France.
I completly agree : see my first post on this thread.It wasn't until 1937 that the French economy started to pick back up, and the Maginot Line was a huge drain, trying to expand it to the English Channel would have put an even bigger stress on the economy.
With the situation in 1939/40? I agree. But most of the blame must be pulled on how French army was structured and lead, with a lot of wasted opportunity, or sheer waste.They wouldn't be able to fund having such a large army.
The Maginot line forts were set up covering one another to do exactly this. Of course, they also had their own organic mortars, and the interval divisions were tasked with counterattacking and clearing any forces that did break through onto the top of the fortifications, although the French were expecting that to be conventional infantry divisions rather than a handful of paratroopers.The actual counter to that kind of attack, in a well run military?
Shell the fortress! With airburst only, of course.
Umm... not always - digging a deeper hole and pouring more concrete on the top of it isn't exactly expensive, and there is a very real upper limit to how big a shell you can build and still have it work. Also, this isn't 1918 where you've only really got a two dimensional threat - the French have the ability to attack any really big guns (which can't run or hide - they take days to put together and produce such a big bang that locating them is a doddle) from the air, and conversely the Germans could potentially build an analogue to Tallboy or Grand Slam and attack them from the air. This isn't a simple weapon/armour problem, it's much more complex than that. The Maginot line forts aren't one big blockhouse, but a complex network of tunnels with blast doors and the like within them stretching over a very large area - bombarding them will degrade them but you won't get a golden BB knocking them out.Super Heavy artillery also does the job. I mean its not like the Germans are going to sit still while this is happening if the French put everything into building super fortresses then the Germans will work that into their plans. I mean super heavy guns or specialised shells are a lot cheaper than fortifications.
in 1929 when they started work on it? France was widely thought to have the most powerful army on earth at the time, and certainly the most modern. Who else was there? Germany was still disarmed, the US was a joke and the UK were only interested in the colonies.Of course the true flaw in the plan is that France still thinks its a great power. If it builds this line then its admitting to itself and all its allies that it isn't and can't even pretend to protect a (at the time) close ally from attack never mind the half dozen weak countries that for time were tied to France before realising Paris wouldn't lift a finger to help them.
It did something else too. It channeled the German attack so that it had to come through Belgium - guaranteeing that the UK would come into the war on the French side, and vastly simplifying the French defensive plans while ensuring that any fighting would be on Belgian rather than French soil. Indeed, if Gamelin hadn't been a complete moron then the Maginot line would probably be regarded as a masterstroke. He was explicitly warned by his 2IC that the Dyle-Breda plan was very vulnerable to a German attack through the Ardennes and ignored the warning because the two didn't get on politically (see To Lose a Battle: France, 1940 by Alistair Horne for details of the meeting or indeed my timeline in my signature to see how it should have gone).Thing is, it wasn't intended to be a complete border. It was concieved to blockade the eastern border and harbours troops in this zone in order to prevent the northern front being surrounded without main reinforcements.
Not only a complete border would have implied skyrocketing costs, but it would have been a really, really bad diplomatical move : as in telling Belgians "Well, you're on your own, now. Good luck with whatever threat come into you"
Probably not even then. What should (could) they have done instead?This is one of those ideas that works if you have 75 years of hindsight.
Indeed. Anna Lacroix-Riz's Le Choix de la Défaite is quite interesting as well, while from a more political-focused point of view.(see To Lose a Battle: France, 1940 by Alistair Horne for details of the meeting or indeed my timeline in my signature to see how it should have gone).
I think going for the original conception of a "broken" line, with opening gaps between fortified lines would have been both less costly, and may have forced staff to either being partially changed or at least to get adapted a bit to military realities.Probably not even then. What should (could) they have done instead?