WI: MacArthur is never born?

It wasn't all Mac though. It was also an unfounded belief in what some of our new "wonder weapons" could accomplish. Particularly the B-17 but also a force of modern submarines. Stimson and others held a view that even a relatively small number of B-17s could have a significant impact in the Far East. Similar to Churchill's view of what a couple of modern capital ships at Singapore could do. Obviously they were wrong but people were drinking that Kool Aid by the gallon in 1941.

I still see Mac as central in this, the thoughts of the others would have gone nowhere were the PI Army CoS not behind it. This is not to say another would not have gone the same route, but at this point my take is most of the candidates for the job would have been less optimistic than Mac.

There is the long shot possibility the preparation effort could have started sooner, or been more rapid. Having the forces in place i Dec 41 that were intended in April 42 would damage the Japanese offensive.
 
I still see Mac as central in this, the thoughts of the others would have gone nowhere were the PI Army CoS not behind it. This is not to say another would not have gone the same route, but at this point my take is most of the candidates for the job would have been less optimistic than Mac.

There is the long shot possibility the preparation effort could have started sooner, or been more rapid. Having the forces in place i Dec 41 that were intended in April 42 would damage the Japanese offensive.

I agree he was central, I am just pointing out that others poured gasoline on the fire that he started and that didn't help. Mac's promises combined with the overblown belief in new technologies (Clausewitz called these people irresponsible enthusiasts) created a toxic brew.
 
It's an interesting point, that early success, or more honourable defeat in the Philippines would so affect the war in Europe.

I don't agree with this theory one bit. A better defense of the Philippines is not going to force FDR and his brain trust into launching some half baked offensive across the Pacific that we did not have anywhere near the level of logistics support required to support it. As it was, in reality Bataan held out until April and Corregidor held out until May. The Philippines were the one place where the Japanese offensive got gummed up on any level although not to the extent that MacArthur's PR machine would have had everyone believe but when compared to how quickly they sliced through Malaya and the DEI, from a perception stand point the defense of the Philippines was the one thing for people to cling to.

A more competent defense of the Philippines means they hold out what one or two more months with those captured in the end being in better shape? Sorry, but that won't change the calculus in Washington. It may compel a couple of more stunts (Doolittle Raid type missions although not against the home islands) and some more aggressive raids around the periphery but it won't change grand strategy.

Besides, allocating more resources to the Pacific doesn't change the reality of the lack of infrastructure to support those resources in areas where we might go on the offensive.
 
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