WI: MacArthur doesn't advance towards the Yalu River

I don't have the sources to hand so I'm only going by memory, but just to muddy the waters a bit, I wonder if this would be a whole-of-government decision rather than just MacArthur.

As I say, this is from memory (though I can find sources to discuss if this becomes important), but I'm pretty sure that while MacArthur's official orders were not to proceed north if he believed there was a Chinese intervention forming up, he was also effectively told by Truman or Marshall basically that he was free to go north.

I suppose the first potentially interesting POD is why they decide not to advance north. Is China's effort at deterrence treated more seriously for some reason? Is the intelligence better? Is MacArthur just less rash? Maybe the Soviets take a more aggressive posture than they did historically, which in turn leads China to be more aggressive in helping the north?

Second, logically, if MacArthur decides not to advance north to the Yalu River then he must decide some other line will become the main objective. So the first obvious thing is that probably we skip a few bloody steps and arrive at the stalemate that the war had settled into after 1951 anyways, maybe along the existing line, maybe somewhere north.

Third, obviously, this probably precludes the fallout in terms of proposals to nuke China, embarrassment over failing to predict the intervention, etc. that ended MacArthur's career. In turn, Truman won't be saddled with controversy over firing MacArthur and the following stalemate. So that raises the question of what happens in the 1952 elections. Without the baggage of the war, does Truman decide to run for re-election and defeat Eisenhower?
 
Checking my copy of Fehrenbachs 'This Kind of War' the following points emerged: 1. The ROK government & Army were uninterested in US policy and orders. They continued to advance north with short pauses for logistics improvements.

2. The Chinese government dropped a hint or two to the US that they would intervene 'if' US combat units advanced north of the 38th paralle.

If Ferhenbach is correct on this the the recovering ROK Army & NKPA remnants are free to shoot it out all the way north to the Yalu as they are inclined and able. The US/UN forces would pass ammo to the ROKs as they sat taking their ease around Seoul, & the Chinese would do the same north of the Yalu.
 
Would Ike even run though, if the Korean War had been reduced to a lower-level fight between the South and North Koreans north of the 38th?
 

Zharques

Donor
Would Ike even run though, if the Korean War had been reduced to a lower-level fight between the South and North Koreans north of the 38th?
Ike was under heavy pressure from both parties to run for president due to his popularity as a war hero, and I don't forsee any normal post-WWII POD that Ike doesn't run in some way.
 
Checking my copy of Fehrenbachs 'This Kind of War' the following points emerged: 1. The ROK government & Army were uninterested in US policy and orders. They continued to advance north with short pauses for logistics improvements.

2. The Chinese government dropped a hint or two to the US that they would intervene 'if' US combat units advanced north of the 38th paralle.

If Ferhenbach is correct on this the the recovering ROK Army & NKPA remnants are free to shoot it out all the way north to the Yalu as they are inclined and able. The US/UN forces would pass ammo to the ROKs as they sat taking their ease around Seoul, & the Chinese would do the same north of the Yalu.
This is probably what I was misremembering as MacArthur's orders versus his expectations.

Given this information MacArthur really can't stop the Chinese intervention to the extent that the north ever requires it, because the decision to try for gains beyond the 38th parallel may not truly be in his hands.
 
I think the key point in Feherenbachs account is the Chinese were not going to intervene if the battle were only a Korean fight. What they did not want was a US controled army close to their Industry in. Manchuria.
 
There was a thread a while ago about the British proposing that the UN advance to the Chongchon river and dig in. This advance would bring a large portion of North Korean farmland under UN control. The thread mention having UN units patrolling in the other side of the river into what was left of North Korea. I am sure that if the South Korean's wanted to do the patrols, the UN would let them.
 
I think the key point in Feherenbachs account is the Chinese were not going to intervene if the battle were only a Korean fight. What they did not want was a US controled army close to their Industry in. Manchuria.

Based on Chinese decision-making in anticipation of an American push north.

Although I honestly don't know that the South Koreans on their own could seriously press that far north, I imagine China might well decide as matters went on, in this scenario, that an American proxy force on their border wasn't very desirable either.
 
Probably not, but they were rebuilding the NKPA, so it would have been down to two difficult to control proxy armies. The ROK would likely have had UN air support, the NKPA Chinse volunteers, tho probablly not the entire 300,000+ sent OTL.
 
2. The Chinese government dropped a hint or two to the US that they would intervene 'if' US combat units advanced north of the 38th paralle.

Not just drop a hint, they outright told India about their intentions to intervene if UN forces continue north (ROKA was free to continue) and asked the message be delivered to the US.


Probably not, but they were rebuilding the NKPA, so it would have been down to two difficult to control proxy armies. The ROK would likely have had UN air support, the NKPA Chinse volunteers, tho probablly not the entire 300,000+ sent OTL.

I agree, so it would be Chinese Civil War Electric Boogaloo. North Korea (before establishment of DPRK) was one of the bigger reason for CCP winning, since it provided most of the early volunteer force (some of them going all the way down to Hainan, and these veterans formed a significant portion of KPA),, food, resources, and whatnot.
 
Not just drop a hint, they outright told India about their intentions to intervene if UN forces continue north (ROKA was free to continue) and asked the message be delivered to the US.
And somewhere along the way, the message either wasn't delivered or wasn't believed.

IIRC, MacArthur was flat told not to go north of 38 for fear of PRC intervention.

So, if he listens, & it ends up a Korean CW (of sorts), with the southern border of NKor (presumably) something like 40 North, what happens to the "rump" NK after they get tired of shooting each other? How long does it, can it, survive?
 
And somewhere along the way, the message either wasn't delivered or wasn't believed.

IIRC, MacArthur was flat told not to go north of 38 for fear of PRC intervention.

So, if he listens, & it ends up a Korean CW (of sorts), with the southern border of NKor (presumably) something like 40 North, what happens to the "rump" NK after they get tired of shooting each other? How long does it, can it, survive?
Losing pyongyang, I don't think DPRK would survive 1991.
 

bguy

Donor
IIRC, MacArthur was flat told not to go north of 38 for fear of PRC intervention.

That's incorrect. The U.S. government sought and obtained a UN Resolution authorizing UN forces to occupy North Korea prior to UN forces crossing the 38th Parallel, so MacArthur was authorized to do that.
 
That's incorrect. The U.S. government sought and obtained a UN Resolution authorizing UN forces to occupy North Korea prior to UN forces crossing the 38th Parallel, so MacArthur was authorized to do that.
I do recall him getting a stop order, & ignoring it, tho. So where, or when? In ref approaching (or crossing?) the Yalu?
 
Wasn't Mac's big blunder his failure after Inchon to encircle and destroy/capture the NK army south of the 38th? As I recall he focused instead on clearing Seoul while the NK army escaped north. Maybe, while UN forces trapped the NK army, he should have sent the ROK troops north to capture Pyonygyang, then US/UN fortifing along the 38th. That would have left the NK leadership with no option but to surrender, since not even Mao would attempt a southern advance toward a fully prepared and "eager" foe. A new UN agreement could then be set to move the DMZ north of Pyongyang. But giving the Chinese the buffer they wanted south of the Yalu.

Ric350
 
The logical place to stop is about the waist of Korea, north of Pyongyang. Hold there, and also Wonsan on the east coast you can establish a line not too broken by mountains in the middle and not so long as to make the troop density too thin. If the Chinese do decide to intervene, their movement south will be too obvious for even MacArthur to ignore. Establishing a new demarcation line at that point with a new DMZ leaves a rump North Korea, but most industry and a large chunk of the population is now part of the ROK.
 
Maybe, while UN forces trapped the NK army, he should have sent the ROK troops north to capture Pyonygyang, then US/UN fortifing along the 38th.
That sounds sensible.

It makes me think, couldn't the U.S. have essentially said to the ROK, "It's your country, if you want it back, you do the fighting." Give them air support, transport, fire support, weapons & ammo, MASHes, so forth, but let them do the heavy lifting. Was the ROK Army capable? Large enough?
The logical place to stop is about the waist of Korea, north of Pyongyang. Hold there, and also Wonsan on the east coast you can establish a line not too broken by mountains in the middle and not so long as to make the troop density too thin.
My thinking exactly. (BTW, I've seen this very idea offered as a serious scholarly proposal.)
 
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