WI MacArthur dies before Pearl Harbor?

burmafrd

Banned
Ol Doug gets full credit for how modern Japan is today. Now whether that is a plus or a minus is up to you.
 
Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't many US bases in the Pacific kept unfortified as per treaties that let the US have more ships but limited fortifications. The Japanese were free to fortify as they wished, yes?
 
Why destroy the fields?

Just sink the tankers, as IOTL.

Game Over.

By mid-1944, the submarine campaign is finally beginning to do just that. By the time of Luzon (1/45), the process is largely complete.
Except Borneo is not Ploesti. Once the Japanese oil fields are curbstomped, they stay curbstomped. They didn't have the resources to repair damage onsite. The Germans could draw by rail from all over Europe. So the question is: 1) Just a good sized raid of B-17's/B-24's(OTL) as soon as Darwin can be made operational, or 2) Wage a 30 month sub campaign until the wretched Mark XIV's are replaced and the teething problems of the successors are finally ironed out? I think it's just a matter of time and cost-effectiveness. Many of the Subs would be based in Australia as well (Freemantle). Bombers or subs for Australia? I say both.:D
 
Um, not really. Without MacArthur you don't have the political impetus but the US Army Air Corps under General Hap Arnold was adamant that only Australia was a proper base with which to make war against the Japanese Empire. Not for nothing was Darwin bombed 200 days straight. It was Japan's way of telling the Allies don't even THINK of establishing a strategic bombing base here. Darwin really was the best place in the world to bring LAND-based airpower against the Japanese oilfields in the Dutch East Indies. A Central Pacific strategy is all very well, but its mostly hit and run, or hit hard and stay.

Darwin, and for New Guinea all of Northern Australia, had to be employed as the natural "air springboard" to fight Japan. I know the SW Pacific strategy looks like a monument to MacArthur's ego. I'm certain HE felt that way. But just because a selfish man wants something, doesn't mean that there aren't perfectly sound reasons why he should get it.

What? The bombing of Darwin was not a Big Thing in Washington. There never were US strategic bombers based in Oz--you're thinking of China and the Marianas.

I know very little of General Arnold's plans for the SWPA to be the region that would act as a strategic airpower dagger to be thrust into Nippon's heart. Perhaps you could provide a link, a source?

And as for NEI oil, there was a little thing called the naval blockade of the Japanese Empire. Just because MacArthur doesn't make it to Oz in this scenario doesn't mean the submarine flotillas of the US, Britain and the Dutch won't put the stranglehold on Nippon's oil as they did in OTL.

The USN's strategy was very expensive and time consuming. Nimitz didn't plan on invading Formosa (A geographically tough nut to crack) until Jan 1946! The Philippines presented much easier terrain with a much friendlier native population, not to mention a well established army of guerillas. Possession of the Philippines meant American airpower could extend over 100% of the shipping lanes between Japan and its only source of oil.

Nimitz did have a viable plan to bypass the Philippines and head straight for Formosa or even the coast of China, then north to Okinawa in OTL even when he knew MacArthur was using all his political lobbying power to advance an alternate, two-pronged strategy. In a war without MacArthur the USN plan would be significantly advanced.

Once again, I have know idea where you get the idea that it (the navy's preference) was more 'expensive and time consuming' than what MacArthur did (how expensive and time consuming do you think the invasion of the entire PI was? And the Leyte invasion was originally scheduled for December, so that's a very good example of how timetables change. With no invasion of places like Biak in New Guinea you'd have plenty of resources to throw at Formosa/China in the second half of '44.)

Even with MacArthur dead, I'm sure men like Generals Eichelberger and Von Krueger would have told this to FDR just as MacArthur did OTL. Did you ever notice that except for Ike all the most German sounding named flag officers in the US were fighting in the Pacific? Didn't FDR trust them?

There is just no way that either of these officers would have the weight that MacArthur had with both Marshall and Roosevelt.

Mac's power was a result of his profile as the 'hero of Corregidor', as the guardian of the Philippine nation, as the former chief of staff for the entire US army.

Sorry, usertron2020, but you're wrong about the politics of the US war effort, and the strategy of the air war.
 
MacArthur was despised by the way he insisted on success to a time table in Papua, specifically so he could get the headlines ahead of the Marines on Guadalcanal. He told Eichelberger that if he won by Christmas he would "release his name to the press". He also disparaged the fighting ability of Australian troops when American troops were performing extremely badly, call purely Australian victories "Allied victories", but American victories were American victories.

Buna and Gona? I didn't realise those battles were 'sped up' as part of some contest with the Guadalcanal operation. Link, source?

I don't deny MacArthur was contemptuous of Australia's forces, that's bad enough. Though it was our very own Blamey who told Australian diggers straight to their faces that they'd run like rabbits--MacArthur was never guilty of anything like that.

As for Kingfisher, the area had been well and truly reconnoitered by Z Force, who were the people who put a timetable on the march. They knew when, where and how the PoWs were to be moved, and had mapped 3 drop zones, and the RAAF had flown recon missions to confirm them. It was kiboshed purely because Bug out Doug wouldn't release the transport aircraft and landing craft to insert and retrieve 1 Para.

I'm going to get along to my local library for some old tree resources about this, but this doesn't sound like the whole story.

There was one Sandaken survivor rescued by Australian special forces, but otherwise I don't recall reading about intelligence resources being on the ground thoughout the five months or so that the operation could have been mounted. The prison camp population was just never monitored over this time, which indicates that Blamey's staff didn't know what was going on there (the massacres, the death march).

The claim that the Dakota transports could only be supplied from the USAAF has been addressed and found wanting, IIRC. Supposedly this is a furphy put forward by Blamey to cover his arse postwar.
 

Larrikin

Banned
Timings

Buna and Gona? I didn't realise those battles were 'sped up' as part of some contest with the Guadalcanal operation. Link, source?

"US Army in World War II, VICTORY IN PAPUA, The War in the Pacific" , the US Army's official history. It's covered at the end of the book in the Review section

I don't deny MacArthur was contemptuous of Australia's forces, that's bad enough. Though it was our very own Blamey who told Australian diggers straight to their faces that they'd run like rabbits--MacArthur was never guilty of anything like that.

MacArthur flat out stated that he wanted American troops as Australian troops wouldn't fight. Not couldn't, wouldn't!



I'm going to get along to my local library for some old tree resources about this, but this doesn't sound like the whole story.

There was one Sandaken survivor rescued by Australian special forces, but otherwise I don't recall reading about intelligence resources being on the ground thoughout the five months or so that the operation could have been mounted. The prison camp population was just never monitored over this time, which indicates that Blamey's staff didn't know what was going on there (the massacres, the death march).

The claim that the Dakota transports could only be supplied from the USAAF has been addressed and found wanting, IIRC. Supposedly this is a furphy put forward by Blamey to cover his arse postwar.

You need to track down the stuff that has been written recently about Z Force, I had the luck to know a couple of them before they passed away. As for the aircraft and shipping for the withdrawal, that I got from the Ops Officer who planned the operation.
 
You need to track down the stuff that has been written recently about Z Force, I had the luck to know a couple of them before they passed away. As for the aircraft and shipping for the withdrawal, that I got from the Ops Officer who planned the operation.

How recently? This is what I've just found at my local library, in Borneo, Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage, by Kevin Smith, revised second edition, 2000, selfpublished, Armadale, NSW. All comments in italics are mine:

"Capt. Pat Lees of 'Z' Special Unit, formerly of 1 Australian Parachute Battalion, was sent to fly over Sandaken, in October 1944 as he recalls, to check the feasibility of parachute landings. Under heavy anti-aircraft fire, in a Mitchell bomber, he observed that the airstrip was considerably ravaged by bombing... he reported that a parachute landing was feasible." (p.355)
[Smith makes no mention of Services Reconnaissance Department, the organisation that ran 'Z', ever having put boots on the ground at the proposed assault sites.]

"In early March [1945, more than half a year after the rescue was first proposed] the new AGAS I operation at last inserted 'Z' Unit personnel fifty kms across Labuk Bay from the Sandaken Peninsula. The objectives of AGAS I included: '...obtaining and relaying to Ausralia the detailed intelligence essential for the planning of a combined airborne-naval operation on the POW camps in the area, aimed at effecting the rescue and withdrawal by sea of the prisoners...' In pursuit of this objective AGAS I spent a month ranging far and wide. Time was passing by. Despite the many radioed reports from AGAS I, the process of dissemination, both in Borneo and at S.R.D., was far too slow. Information gathered by the 'Z' Unit personnel was too often out of date when received... Information for final planning of KINGFISHER was just not coming together quickly enough." (p.361)

"Both Blamey and MacArthur had approved the planning. They did not withdraw that approval while prisoners lived. Other factors intervened to create a strong belief that the need for KINGFISHER no longer existed." (p.361/362)

"S.R.D. Intelligence report no.65 of 4th April 1945 stated, 'all signs indicate an enemy evacuation of Sandaken.' According to reliable information from a native chief in the Sugat area where AGAS I was located the Sandaken POWS had been moved to Jesselton and those unable to travel were shot. S.R.D. Intelligence report no.147 of 21st May 1945 stated unequivocally, 'there are NO PW left in SANDAKEN' [There were still hundreds of POWs at Sandaken. Command weren't certain what the truth was, as evinced by them sending an officer to recon the area in June]... KINGFISHER had collapsed long before any C47s were needed, it collapsed not because of a denial of aircraft but because of misleading information. The 1st Australian Corps then focussed attention upon a Ranau rescue [Ranau being the destination of the death march survivors], AGAS III, but that was also too little, too late." (p.362)

"In some quarters there has been much made of the 'project' status of KINGFISHER, as distinct from it being a military plan. To be sure there seems to have been no precise date ever really finalised for implementing KINGFISHER... There was indeed a plan, and somebody did indeed deny the opportunity for that plan to be implemented for the simple reason that S.R.D. was lethargic in its late 1944 planning" (p.363).

Anyway, for more on the he-said-she-said narrative (literally he-said-she-said, as this Australian War Memorial online journal article by Ooi Keat Gin relies on the argument of Lynette Ramsay Silver to tell us--"Blamey blamed MacArthur as an excuse to cover-up an SRD bungle in the gathering of accurate intelligence.") Selected quotes that go someway to corroborating what I believe is Smith's more lucid account:

"If the AGAS report is to be believed, and there is no apparent reason to doubt its veracity [personally I do doubt its veracity, just look at Smith RE Operation AGAS not being terribly effective], why then was no attempt... made to effect the planned rescue of the Sandakan POWs – that is, implement Operation KINGFISHER? KINGFISHER, conceived sometime in mid-1944, proposed a rescue plan of POWs in Sandakan by a paratroop unit. The probable reason for aborting KINGFISHER has been hotly debated, with arguments ranging from a conspiratorial cover-up that implicated Australia's military elite to MacArthur's non-cooperation in providing vital support for the operation...

However, Major Chester, the leader of AGAS party, was well aware of SRD's shortcomings. He confided with Sergeant Wong Sue, telling him 'You know what they're going to do? Blamey's going to shift the blame for all their bungling onto MacArthur'. Chester, however, was unable to challenge Blamey in 1947; he died of blackwater fever at Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu) in August 1946. Nor was there much the Chinese Wong Sue could do at the time to dispute Blamey's claim."
 
Were there ever any plans to land US troops in Korea in 1945? The USN had mastery of the Pacific that they could pick and choose where to land in the second half of 1944 on.

If the Philippines are not chosen, Korea might be a good possibility. It does not seem to be as defended as Okinawa and Taiwan.

Could double landings at Inchon and Wonson be made, a defensive line made and then force all resistance South to be crushed against the sea.
 

Larrikin

Banned
z Force

How recently? This is what I've just found at my local library, in Borneo, Australia's Proud but Tragic Heritage, by Kevin Smith, revised second edition, 2000, selfpublished, Armadale, NSW. All comments in italics are mine:

I've read it, and I hate to say it, but the conversations I had with Z Force people, and with said ops officer disagree with Smith.

So do the records I got to see when I worked with Army Records in the late 80s.

As far as I am aware there are still a considerable amount of Z Force records still classified, as the contents are still relevant today. Much of Smith's stuff was anecdotal and as I said, contradicted by anecdotal stuff I was getting 15-20 years earlier, and by the records, mainly personnell, that I saw and worked with.
 

Caspian

Banned
I'm reading Experience of War, by Kenneth S. Davis (1965), and the author mentions an incident during the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Task Force 44, under command of Rear Admiral John Crace, was detached from Fletcher's Task Force 17, and sent to attack the Japanese task force sent to invade Port Moresby. It was attacked by Japanese aircraft, but suffered no damage. Shortly afterwards, the task force was again attacked, but this time by several American bombers operating under MacArthur's command - again, no damage was inflicted upon the ships.

According to Davis, MacArthur's headquarters prohibited discussion of the incident, and refused to "accept the plans subsequently drawn up by the American commander of 'MacArthur's Navy (Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary) to improve Army pilots' recognition of naval vessels." (page 203).

This may be a small incident, and maybe it didn't have many lasting repercussions, but it also smacks further of MacArthur's egoism, and certainly doesn't reflect well on his leadership abilities.
 
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 established the 5:5:3 ratio of battleships between the USN:RN:IJN as well as other restriction on larger gunships (battle cruisers & heavy cruisers). As part of the sweetener to get the Japanese to go along with this (they were very unhappy) was an agreement concerning fortification of pacific holdings, primarily PI, Guam, Midway, wake for the U.S. & the Marianas & other islands the Japanese acquired from Germany as part of the WW1 spoils. Unsurprisingly the Japanese secretly evaded this and restricted foreigners travel to their mandates, the U.S. congress loved the idea of reducing military related spending, and even after the treaty was kaput in the 1930's did not begin to make any attempt to upgrade these area until very late in the game.

For example, Wake was being fortified & garrisoned even as Pearl Harbor happened & a significant number of civilian construction workers were among the POWs when Wake surrendered.

Having said that, there is still a great deal that could have been done before PH by MacArthur to improve the situation in the PI that would not require large amounts of money. Of course everything after 12/7/1941....

Dont forget that another reason the USA did not want to spend a lot of $$ in the PI was that independence as scheduled for 1946.
 

Cook

Banned
If MacArthur had died early we’d have missed out on this gem;

Gen. Macarthur: “If you were an American I’d have you shot!”
Gen. Blamey: “If I were an American I’d shoot myself!”
 
Ol Doug gets full credit for how modern Japan is today. Now whether that is a plus or a minus is up to you.

Just the other day I was talking with a friend about variations on GHQ/SCAP. He doesn't get all the cred - Article 9 was a Japanese initiative from Kijūrō Shidehara, for example.

A lot of this is going to depend heavily on the butterflies.

Best case scenario is a shorter war (less economic damage), no CCP victory in 49 (SCAP doesn't need to worry about the great communist takeover), and a SCAP stacked with more New Dealers. In this case, SCAP doesn't have to focus as much on getting the economy geared back up and doesn't end up as nearly as afraid of the unions, socialists, and communists, and Japan ends up with more liberalisation and democritization.

Worst case scenario is a prolonged war, a punitive SCAP, and communist controled China and Korea, and Japan divided the US and Soviets.
 
I've read it, and I hate to say it, but the conversations I had with Z Force people, and with said ops officer disagree with Smith.

So do the records I got to see when I worked with Army Records in the late 80s.

As far as I am aware there are still a considerable amount of Z Force records still classified, as the contents are still relevant today. Much of Smith's stuff was anecdotal and as I said, contradicted by anecdotal stuff I was getting 15-20 years earlier, and by the records, mainly personnell, that I saw and worked with.

Really, Smith quoting numbered SRD intelligence reports is anecdotal, yet you writing that the SRD had sent a Z Unit to recon the actual landing sites isn't anecdotal? Can you back up that particular claim?

The bibliography of Kevin Smith's book shows that he had access to papers stored at the National Archives in Canberra for KINGFISHER, SRD, the Allied Intelligence Bureau, and AGAS I through V. (BTW, I don't understand why Z Unit reports are either still classified, or held independently of SRD reports--Z was a tactical outfit, not an intelligence organisation AFAIK.)

Smith has a pretty solid case here. If he is wrong about the total lack of recon and humint assets in the Sandaken area before March '45, and the poor quality of the intelligence collected in the succeeding months, then either (a.) he is wilfully distorting the record, or (b.) he has been given disinformation--and has been successfully duped--by both the National Archives and the veterans he interviewed for his chapter about KINGFISHER, as he doesn't give any indication that there is a huge wealth of classified material out there that will disprove his thesis about Australian intelligence doing absolutely nothing for months on end during the last year of the war. I have no reason to believe him capable of (a.), while (b.) is blatantly conspiratorial.

The other published work about KINGFISHER is Athol Moffitt's Project Kingfisher: The Terrible Story of the Massacres of the Sandakan POWs in Borneo - and the Secret Plan for a Rescue That Never Happened. Moffitt was a warcrimes prosecutor for the Allies after WWII, a fairly important man, yet he is also a proponent of the (for want of a better expression) conspiracy theory about MacArthur deliberately allowing the POWs to be slaughtered. I feel this subject has more than a whiff of the Brisbane Line Controversy about it--it sounds like a WWII urban myth.

But I'll have to get a copy of Moffitt's book to find out for certain.

(BTW, Smith's book, which he self published, went to two editions. That's pretty good for an Australian author. I wonder if that's because he was successful in reaching out to those WWII buffs who wanted to read a truthful account of these events?)
 
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 established the 5:5:3 ratio of battleships between the USN:RN:IJN as well as other restriction on larger gunships (battle cruisers & heavy cruisers). As part of the sweetener to get the Japanese to go along with this (they were very unhappy) was an agreement concerning fortification of pacific holdings, primarily PI, Guam, Midway, wake for the U.S. & the Marianas & other islands the Japanese acquired from Germany as part of the WW1 spoils. Unsurprisingly the Japanese secretly evaded this and restricted foreigners travel to their mandates, the U.S. congress loved the idea of reducing military related spending, and even after the treaty was kaput in the 1930's did not begin to make any attempt to upgrade these area until very late in the game.

For example, Wake was being fortified & garrisoned even as Pearl Harbor happened & a significant number of civilian construction workers were among the POWs when Wake surrendered.

Having said that, there is still a great deal that could have been done before PH by MacArthur to improve the situation in the PI that would not require large amounts of money. Of course everything after 12/7/1941....

Dont forget that another reason the USA did not want to spend a lot of $$ in the PI was that independence as scheduled for 1946.
IIRC, both sides were 'prevented' from militarizing their bases. I don't know if the Japanese jumped the gun, and started doing it in secret beforehand, but they did pull out of the Treaty, and thus were able to do it legally after that. The US was then free to fortify her islands, IIRC, but chose not too because money was too tight. And Guam, e.g., was so far out that it would be tough to defend it properly.

I agree with the Philippines comment. Why put money into bases you're going to lose soon anyway.

By '41, the US changed her mind and, as you say, was doing massive work on Hawaii, Philippines, Wake and Midway, it's just that it was too late to very effective.
 
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