WI: MacArthur Captured on Bataan

You've piqued my curiosity. Why do you believe this to be the case?

McArthur was always a political General in it for himself (and screwing Aussies)—which of course made his ruling Japan the biggest success of his career. He ran Japan through the local elites, he protected the Emperor from consequences by throwing Tojo under the bus, he basically treated Japan pretty well given the circumstances. Obviously the long-term consequences of letting Japan off the hook, the muzzled press, and only partial deconstruction of the zaibatsu all came back for revenge—but the short-term was that Japan quickly rose to be an industrial power and it was able to do so because of how lenient overall McArthur was, and how good he was at the political side (Edit this, and various minor changes: not to take away in any respect how brilliantly Japan’s government exploited that turning point to turn Japan into an incredibly successful country in a shockingly short amount of time).

There are plausible replacements that might do as well as McArthur, but I don't know internal American military politics circa 1945 so I don’t know who’d be likely. McArthur also saved millions of starving Japanese through prompt and large food delivery network infrastructure—Japan was on the edge and sometimes over into famine conditions for years after the end of the war.

Then of course the Americans abandoned their plans for Japan because Korean War / communism (incidentally also a key element in sinking left-wing opposition in Japanese internal politics for a while) and left their societal reengineering half-finished because now they needed Japan as an ally. So that didn’t help much in long-term matters but also meant America now needed/wanted a strong Japan to fight the USSR and because of McArthur the Japanese elites were cool enough with Americans to get on the Cold War train.
 
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McArthur was always a political General in it for himself (and screwing Aussies)—which of course made his ruling Japan the biggest success of his career. He ran Japan through the local elites, he protected the Emperor from consequences by throwing Tojo under the bus, he basically treated Japan pretty well given the circumstances. Obviously the long-term consequences of letting Japan off the hook, the muzzled press, and only partial deconstruction of the zaibatsu all came back for revenge—but the short-term was that Japan quickly rose to be an industrial power and it was able to do so because of how lenient overall McArthur was, and how good he was at the political side. There are plausible replacements that might do as well as McArthur, but I don't know internal American military politics circa 1945 so I don’t know who’d be likely. He also saved millions of starving Japanese through prompt and large food delivery network infrastructure—Japan was on the edge and sometimes over into famine conditions for years after the end of the war.in.

My Suggestion is Nimitz rather than MacArthur overseeing the Occupation.
 
Well, I'd imagine no Philippines campaign in 1944-45, which makes for a hairy post war situation there but a less bloody one during.

It would seem, at first blush, that Nimitz would win the Formosa-versus-Luzon argument, since he no longer has a foe with anything like the cachet that MacArthur did.

The problem is, Formosa was a very tough nut to crack, and staff studies kept coming back to that conclusion.

I think there's at least a possibility that the U.S. goes to Luzon after all - but opts out of retaking most of the rest of the archipelago (as MacArthur insisted upon doing).
 
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The problem is, Formosa was a very tough nut to crack, and staff studies kept coming back to that conclusion.

I think there's at least a possibility that the U.S. goes to Luzon after all - but opts out of retaking most of the rest of the archipelago (as MacArthur insisted upon doing).

My thoughts pretty much. Once the US liberates one main Phillipines island the PI Army can be revived and kill Japanese in the rest of it. In the S Pac I don't see entirely waiving away the 1943-44 offensives. Thats neither likely nor desirable. They did draw off Japanese strength to a side theatre and attrition it away. But, the same could have been done more efficiently had the operations been run from the start as a economy of force diversion. The defeat of the Japanese on New Guinea, and the isolation of Rabaual. could have been done. Operations to appear threatening to the Indonesian oil industry and draw of Japanese strength. Better use of the Austrailans & New Zealanders, and reducing the overall cost in material of the aggregate operations would be the goal. If you can avoid ramping up the amphibious fleet in the 1943 S Pac, and reduce substantially the amount of cargo shipping needed to sustain operations it gets the war in general a step ahead.
 

Driftless

Donor
It would seem, at first blush, that Nimitz would win the Formosa-versus-Luzon argument, since he no longer has a foe with anything like the cachet that MacArthur did.

The problem is, Formosa was a very tough nut to crack, and staff studies kept coming back to that conclusion.

I think there's at least a possibility that the U.S. goes to Luzon after all - but opts out of retaking most of the rest of the archipelago (as MacArthur insisted upon doing).

IF in the universe without Mac and the Philippines remain a target, would the US initial landings be somewhere else other than Leyte? Much of the archipelago is mighty rugged, so the Japanese defenders had good ground to work with, but if I recall, Leyte didn't have the guerrilla forces as much developed as other islands and doesn't have the best geography for airfields. Perhaps, as you note, the US goes straight for Luzon?
 
My Suggestion is Nimitz rather than MacArthur overseeing the Occupation.

Nimitz would have hated the job.

At the end of the war, he seemed mainly interested in retirement. He agreed to be CNO, but only on condition that he serve a single two year term.

If Truman insisted, Nimitz likely reluctantly obeys; but I'd be surprised if he stays in the job for the duration.

Perhaps we need to spend time thinking about which army general draws the Southwest Pacific command in Dugout Doug's place. Eisenhower? Patch? Stilwell? Someone else?
 
Perhaps, as you note, the US goes straight for Luzon?

Well, early planning focused on Luzon. It seems more likely, especially in context of an overall strategy that values the Philippines mainly as base for closing the ring on the Japanese Home Islands and cutting off its bases in the DEI/Malaya - Luzon is adequate to that mission. Leyte was a very late call. (The plan to that point had been to land on Mindanao, of course, but that was very much the result of MacArthur's role; he clearly had in mind a forced liberation of the entire archipelago from the very start, even if he soft-pedaled it to FDR and the Chiefs.)

Also, while MacArthur was the channel for political pressure to redeem the Philippines, that pressure would still have existed even without him - and not just from the Filipinos. Securing Luzon, with Manila, is likely enough to address that lobby.
 
My thoughts pretty much. Once the US liberates one main Phillipines island the PI Army can be revived and kill Japanese in the rest of it. In the S Pac I don't see entirely waiving away the 1943-44 offensives. Thats neither likely nor desirable. They did draw off Japanese strength to a side theatre and attrition it away. But, the same could have been done more efficiently had the operations been run from the start as a economy of force diversion. The defeat of the Japanese on New Guinea, and the isolation of Rabaual. could have been done. Operations to appear threatening to the Indonesian oil industry and draw of Japanese strength. Better use of the Austrailans & New Zealanders, and reducing the overall cost in material of the aggregate operations would be the goal. If you can avoid ramping up the amphibious fleet in the 1943 S Pac, and reduce substantially the amount of cargo shipping needed to sustain operations it gets the war in general a step ahead.

Agreed on every point.

And with any other likely general, that's very likely what would have happened.

They'd get fewer headlines, of course... But it would have been better for the overall war effort. Also better for ANZAC relations.
 
McArthur was always a political General in it for himself (and screwing Aussies)—which of course made his ruling Japan the biggest success of his career. He ran Japan through the local elites, he protected the Emperor from consequences by throwing Tojo under the bus, he basically treated Japan pretty well given the circumstances. Obviously the long-term consequences of letting Japan off the hook, the muzzled press, and only partial deconstruction of the zaibatsu all came back for revenge—but the short-term was that Japan quickly rose to be an industrial power and it was able to do so because of how lenient overall McArthur was, and how good he was at the political side (Edit this, and various minor changes: not to take away in any respect how brilliantly Japan’s government exploited that turning point to turn Japan into an incredibly successful country in a shockingly short amount of time).

There are plausible replacements that might do as well as McArthur, but I don't know internal American military politics circa 1945 so I don’t know who’d be likely. McArthur also saved millions of starving Japanese through prompt and large food delivery network infrastructure—Japan was on the edge and sometimes over into famine conditions for years after the end of the war.

Then of course the Americans abandoned their plans for Japan because Korean War / communism (incidentally also a key element in sinking left-wing opposition in Japanese internal politics for a while) and left their societal reengineering half-finished because now they needed Japan as an ally. So that didn’t help much in long-term matters but also meant America now needed/wanted a strong Japan to fight the USSR and because of McArthur the Japanese elites were cool enough with Americans to get on the Cold War train.


Gotcha. I agree with what you wrote too.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
McArthur was always a political General in it for himself (and screwing Aussies)—which of course made his ruling Japan the biggest success of his career. He ran Japan through the local elites, he protected the Emperor from consequences by throwing Tojo under the bus, he basically treated Japan pretty well given the circumstances. Obviously the long-term consequences of letting Japan off the hook, the muzzled press, and only partial deconstruction of the zaibatsu all came back for revenge—but the short-term was that Japan quickly rose to be an industrial power and it was able to do so because of how lenient overall McArthur was, and how good he was at the political side (Edit this, and various minor changes: not to take away in any respect how brilliantly Japan’s government exploited that turning point to turn Japan into an incredibly successful country in a shockingly short amount of time).

There are plausible replacements that might do as well as McArthur, but I don't know internal American military politics circa 1945 so I don’t know who’d be likely. McArthur also saved millions of starving Japanese through prompt and large food delivery network infrastructure—Japan was on the edge and sometimes over into famine conditions for years after the end of the war.

Then of course the Americans abandoned their plans for Japan because Korean War / communism (incidentally also a key element in sinking left-wing opposition in Japanese internal politics for a while) and left their societal reengineering half-finished because now they needed Japan as an ally. So that didn’t help much in long-term matters but also meant America now needed/wanted a strong Japan to fight the USSR and because of McArthur the Japanese elites were cool enough with Americans to get on the Cold War train.


How Japan turned out is only a problem if you are a) a stickler for punishment, b) disappointed it was not reformed into a socialist state c) not reformed into an imitation America or d) not reformed into a libertarian state.

The problem that brought Japan to America’s attention, its militarism, was cured for several generations.

Whatever dislike about what Japanese think or say, Japan in its actions, has been nothing but a peaceful and productive member of international society for the last seventy years.
 
How Japan turned out is only a problem if you are a) a stickler for punishment, b) disappointed it was not reformed into a socialist state c) not reformed into an imitation America or d) not reformed into a libertarian state.

The problem that brought Japan to America’s attention, its militarism, was cured for several generations.

Whatever dislike about what Japanese think or say, Japan in its actions, has been nothing but a peaceful and productive member of international society for the last seventy years.

Eh, I can't agree with that point A of that assessment. I'm hardly a stickler for punishment, but in the case of Imperial Japan, we seem to have held a double standard in some ways. We hung quite a few Nazi's (rightfully so) but let far, far too many of the Japanese military get away. Had we held more aggressive war crimes trials I think at least some of the anger other Asian nations still hold toward Japan would have been ameliorated. Not to mention a hell of a lot of veterans in the US, particularly those who ended up as POW's.
I agree with the rest of the assessments though.
 
I've read that their was some controversy into what General Homma's involvement in the Bataan death march was and that his trial after the was unfair. Do you think that if MacArthur hasn't been around Homma would have actually received a fair trial, or would it end the same way?
 
I've read that their was some controversy into what General Homma's involvement in the Bataan death march was and that his trial after the was unfair. Do you think that if MacArthur hasn't been around Homma would have actually received a fair trial, or would it end the same way?

Probably the same way.

Ironic: Homma and Yamashita both seem to have been more moderate generals - Homma was semi-retired because the IJA felt he was too soft on the Filipinos, while Yamashita actually tried to stop his troops running riot, the big argument in his trial wasn’t whether he’d ordered what happened but if he should be held responsible as the officer in command - yet they got executed, while Unit 731 - who seem to have been particularly sadistic serial killers with medical degrees and government funding - got away scot-free
 
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