WI Luftwaffe Develops into an Effective Anti-Naval Force

[Dr. Luny]

What if the Luftwaffe develops effective anti-shipping tactics and weapons? What would be necessary for this to occur? What are the effects on the war, particularly in the Mediterranean and Barents Seas? Can this give the Kriegsmarine some breathing room?

 

[PhilKearny]

The simplest POD would be to change Goering's beliefs. He would either need to believe that attacking shipping is more important or change his belief "that all that flies is mine," The latter would be needed to allow the KM to operate its own aircraft dedicated to naval warfare.

Another possibility would be for the KM to have more influence than in OTL so that the KM has an independent air arm.

 

[BlairWitch749]

There where effective LW Anti shipping specialists (Helbig and Rudel for sure)... the thing was that the LW wasn't good at it in 1939 and 1940 when it would have helped them the most. You need several changes to make this happen: the ju-88 not being delayed 6 months for dive bombing strengthening... the germans also have to fix their torpedo contact pistols, and they have to develop heavy airborne bombs (SC1000) radar or better scouting would help too... one reason so many of their strikes failed in 1939 and 1940 was they couldn't find the fleet even though they knew generally where it was

 

[Markus]

What if the Luftwaffe develops effective anti-shipping tactics and weapons? What would be necessary for this to occur? What are the effects on the war, particularly in the Mediterranean and Barents Seas? Can this give the Kriegsmarine some breathing room?

Not much. The Küstenflieger(naval recon) units equipped with Dornier flying boats sank a lot of smaller merchant ships in the North Sea during the Phoney War and one Ju-88 equipped wing had specialized in anti-ship tactics. They almost sank HMS Suffolk in April 1940. She was out of action for a year.

Even without torpedoes He111 could have been much more effective if the crews had made coordinated attacks from different directions and a low altitude.

By the way, even 250 kilo bombs are ok for killing cruisers and IIRC German air launched torpedoes had no reliability issues.

 

[CalBear]

The Luftwaffe didn't develop as a anti-ship force because attacking shipping is a specialized skill set that is best done with specilized equipment. For the most part it is low level (or dive bombing) and into isolated but concentrated AAA fire as each ship has the defensive forepower of a medium sized community. Low level attack was not a real common practice in WW II with the exception of tank killing and the occasional CAS until 1943 or thereabouts when CAS became a primary task for many "fighter" formations on all sides.

Even when ground orientated air forces did very well against shipping (the 5th Air Force being a prime example) it was with field modified or eventually factory altered versions of standard aircraft. The dropping of torpedoes is as much an art as it is a science, while the brutally effective skip bombing techniques in the SW Pacific were both an accidental discovery and about as specialized as things get outside of small formations dedicated to specific target sets (the USAAF 509th and Bomber Cammand's famed 617 Squadron being examples of such specialist formations). The key is practice and opprotunity. The Luftwaffe had limited access to both.

Had the Luftwaffe dedicated itself to the anti-shipping mission it would have suffered in other areas, likely ground attack and bomber interception. Improving the anti-shipping skills while losing other capacities would seem to be a bad trade overall.

 

[Riain]

CalBear, I read that the standard anti-ship attack profile of Malta based Blenhiems in 1940-41 was level approach at masthead height, flat-out and dropping bombs at point blank range. This very ballsy method of attack sank ships very well but took something like 30% losses.

 

[Bottlestein]

CalBear, I read that the standard anti-ship attack profile of Malta based Blenhiems in 1940-41 was level approach at masthead height, which sank ships well enough but took something like 30% losses.

This was roughly my understanding - that effective anti-shipping strikes early on were possible if one could absorb losses

 

[Graehame]

German air attack on Brit ships

PHILKEARNY
"The simplest POD would be to change Goering's beliefs."
Better yet, replace him with Kesselring. Goering was an incompetent know-it-all, no matter what his beliefs.
DR. LUNY
"Can this give the Kriegsmarine some breathing room?"
MARKUS : "Not much."
I'd submit that the availability of LW squadrons equipped & trained for long-range naval attack could have made a HUGE difference in facilitating the breakout of KM vessels into the N Atlantic. If the Bismarck had had a couple squadrons on call then she might well have survived.
CALBEAR
"The Luftwaffe didn't develop as an anti-ship force because attacking shipping is a specialized skill set..."
With all due respect, CalBear, the LW didn't develop as an anti-ship force because of poor cooperation between Goering & Raeder. Same reason the Graf Zeppelin never got finished. All of the equipment & training issues could have been overcome with the proper motivation.
"Had the Luftwaffe dedicated itself to the anti-shipping mission it would have suffered in other areas, likely ground attack and bomber interception."
Why in the world would that happen? If you establish anti-shipping squadrons & an anti-shipping school, that doesn't mean you shut down the ground attack & interception squadrons & schools.

 

[Astrodragon]

CalBear, I read that the standard anti-ship attack profile of Malta based Blenhiems in 1940-41 was level approach at masthead height, flat-out and dropping bombs at point blank range. This very ballsy method of attack sank ships very well but took something like 30% losses.

Wasnt much of the development of skip-bombing later in the ways to approach and attack the ships to reduce the losses? If known earlier, it could have been used for this type of attack to reduce losses to something sustainable.

 

[Just Leo]

Shouldn't that read more effective force? The Luftwaffe was responsible for sinking a great number of ships in a number of locations at various times. Countermeasures such as escort carriers, Beaus and Mossies, and quad Bofors addressed the losses. Beaufort torpedo bombers had the highest loss rate in the RAF. It's a dangerous occupation. But they had successes.

 

[Atreus]

[/I][/COLOR]I'd submit that the availability of LW squadrons equipped & trained for long-range naval attack could have made a HUGE difference in facilitating the breakout of KM vessels into the N Atlantic. If the Bismarck had had a couple squadrons on call then she might well have survived.

I doubt this bit. Denmark Straits, the key Swordfish attacks, the final battle of the Bismarck, all of these took place outside of the range of German aviation. Maybe the british have to stand a bit further off the coast of france, but i doubt that it makes a huge difference.

 

[Graehame]

originally posted by Graehame: "I'd submit that the availability of LW squadrons equipped & trained for long-range naval attack could have made a HUGE difference in facilitating the breakout of KM vessels into the N Atlantic. If the Bismarck had had a couple squadrons on call then she might well have survived."

ATREUS
"I doubt this bit. Denmark Straits, the key Swordfish attacks, the final battle of the Bismarck, all of these took place outside of the range of German aviation."
You're thinking of traditional Me-109s & Stukas.
Bergen to the middle of the Iceland-Faeroes Gap = 580 statute miles. Brest to the middle of the Iceland-Faeroes Gap = 980 statute miles.
Range of the Do-18 flying boat (avail in quantity 1938) = 2175 statute miles.
Range of the He-115 float plane (avail in quantity 1939) = 2082 statute miles.
Range of the FW-200 patrol plane (avail in quantity spring 1940) = 2212 statute miles.
Range of the BV-138 flying boat (avail in quantity late 1940) = 2760 statute miles.
I'd like a minimum of 2 squadrons of 12 BV-138 torpedo bombers apiece, 1 stationed at Bergen & the other at Brest. The LW had 'em, but coordination with the KM was so poor that the Bismarck couldn't call for 'em. Even if they couldn't successfully torpedo a Brit ship, their mere threat could've kept the Brits off the Bismarck; & they should've at least been able to shoot down a couple of Fairey Swordfish biplanes.

 

[Markus]

MARKUS : "Not much."
I'd submit that the availability of LW squadrons equipped & trained for long-range naval attack could have made a HUGE difference in facilitating the breakout of KM vessels into the N Atlantic. If the Bismarck had had a couple squadrons on call then she might well have survived.

Sorry, the "Not much", refers to "What would be necessary for this to occur?" By 1940 the LW was not nearly as bad as alleged and by 41 most of the actual defects had been fixed.