WI: Longer Maginot Line

[LOTLOF]

On the contrary, there was PLENTY that could be done. It was just that the Allies didn't do it.

They could have launched a full scale assault into Germany while the bulk of the Heer was busy in poland(in fact this was exactly what they said they would do), they did not. The Belgians could have allowed the Allies to move into Belgium to shore up their defenses against the almost inevitable German attack, they chose to wait until it was too late. They could have chosen to pay more attention to the reports of German troops moving through the Ardennes, they largely ignored them.

The Maginot line could have been used to allow the Allies to conduct offensive operations in Germany with little fear of a flanking attack on France proper, thus taking the initiative and forcing the Germans to dance to their tune, unfortunately the Allies chose to ignore centuries of siege warfare and assume that simply sitting behind your walls will be all you have to do, ignoring the fact that the best way to lift a siege is to relieve it from the outside with a mobile army.

To the above I will add one more thing.

They could have paid attention to what the Germans did in Poland. They were granted about six months from the end of the Polish campaign to the attack in the west. They could have tried to apply the lessons. To concentrate armored units into divisions and corps. To have worked on developing close air support for the ground forces. To have focused on fast moving armored columns rather than on maintaining long continuous fronts.

This would have required bold leadership, and Gamelin was the exact opposite of that. However if the will had been there they did have the opportunity.

 

[LouisXIV]

As far as the Maginot Line was concerned, I recall reading that it was successfully attacked frontally and penetrated by German forces in June of 1940.

After the beginning of Fall Rot, after the armour had made a breakthrough and some Luftwaffe units were available, the German high command decided to attack the Maginot Line as a test of its abilities.

Using heavy artillery and dive bombers, and liberal amounts of smoke to mask visibility, German forces attacked a section of the line using infiltration tactics. With engineers leading the way with the new concrete bombs, they broke right through, I think even on the first day.

Thus the idea of extending the Line is a moot point anyway.

It was just a short and obscure reference of which I have lost track, but it made an impression on me. Wish I had it back.

There was also reference in another source to the French and British soldiers along the Franco-Belgian border digging an elaborate defensive line, mostly of trenches. This they were somewhat reluctant to leave when the time came to implement Plan D.

 

[maxs]

feint(s)

Part of what made Rommel's "feint" to the coast at Rouen such a debacle was the lack of radios among the French forces. Had local French units been able to accurately gauge the strength of Rommel's small force, there could have been at least one allied rout averted. And, communications were also a problem, even in trying to reach French high command, who preferred pigeons to phones. And, while France had numerous aircraft, there was a shortage of trained pilots...

 

[maxs]

pigeons

And I'm sure when the poilus heard that about pigeons, they said "I know you're kidding!"

 

[maxs]

"...Using heavy artillery and dive bombers, and liberal amounts of smoke to mask visibility, German forces attacked a section of the line using infiltration tactics. With engineers leading the way with the new concrete bombs, they broke right through, I think even on the first day.

"Thus the idea of extending the Line is a moot point anyway.

"It was just a short and obscure reference of which I have lost track, but it made an impression on me. Wish I had it back..."

MHQ article some years back showed the Line was virtually impenetrable, citing German attempts to break through with flame throwers and artillery as being relatively ineffective against the main forts. A single "bell" was once captured using the smoke and engineers and techniques referenced. But it was an exception-- though used in a German propaganda film.

I mean, the line was difficult to pierce, but why bother when you could just go round it or fly over? The heer used paratroopers in Holland; just a coincidence they didn't in France. Even without using the French (self-imposed) blind spot at the Ardennes, they could have just "jumped" over it!
Yet, while we're "what iffin", what if the French had really beefed up their AA (and the Belgians, too), and added some radios and trained pilots to their force going in. Still wouldn't have been enough, but might have made enough of a delay in some points of the pincers to have shaken Hitler's nerves about trying to go far south into France.

 

[maxs]

Radios instead of phones and pigeons could have led, not only to a failure of Rommel to reach Rouen and set off a rout, but to his capture!

 

[maxs]

decent AA in Belgium

--and probably more in France--could have led to a somewhat different outcome. Stukas would have lost some of their sting against Leopold's forces, though I suspect he'd have still capitulated, slightly later. (He really didn't have many options by then.)
One bad thing that might have happened: the circumstances that led to--but also allowed for--Dunkirk to happen, might have also not occurred, leading to it not being possible for the Brits to withdraw as successfully at any ending.
Sobering thought, thousands more Brits captured than were.

 

[maxs]

can't find an opening for it

but one other place to plug, is the frequently mentioned Ardennes. Even after Jerry was pouring through, requests for additional artillery by local French command, were rebuffed by higher-ups as unnecessary in that "impossible" terrain.
Can't find a specific head to roll, or butterfly to fly in, to change the mindset there. If we could somehow "plug that hole" even a little, might also delay some inevitability. Depends, probably, on how far back you go.

 

[Archibald]

Heck, IIRC, there's a TL somewhere on the board based on that POD

I'd like to read that ! Any link ?

 

[pieman97405]

but one other place to plug, is the frequently mentioned Ardennes. Even after Jerry was pouring through, requests for additional artillery by local French command, were rebuffed by higher-ups as unnecessary in that "impossible" terrain.
Can't find a specific head to roll, or butterfly to fly in, to change the mindset there. If we could somehow "plug that hole" even a little, might also delay some inevitability. Depends, probably, on how far back you go.

This may be to late, but getting someone other than Huntziger in charge of the second army might help. When Pierre Taittinger was inspecting the positions around Sedan he said of them,
"The Defensive measures in this sector are rudimentary, not to say embryonic. ... In certain works the concrete has not yet been poured. ... Along the approaches the minefields which have been laid, the destructions which are envisaged, and the resistance of the blockhouses cannot hold up the enemy for more than an hour."

Huntziger was to say about this (among other things),
"I believe, that there are no urgent measures to take for the reinforcement of the Sedan Sector."

So getting rid of Huntziger may help.

 

[maxs]

Other "interesting" French gear included those

1890s model 75 mm "obsolete" field guns. According to Bruce Gudmunsen. in "After Dunkirk", in MHQ vol 9 no. 2 (p65), those "made excellent anti-tank weapons." I saw, cited soldiers or officers as calling them "Panzer killers." By, perhaps, some irony, France--without awareness going in--had the very thing to take out the dreaded German armor, too. Had there been awareness beforehand of the real potential of this "obsolete" gear, could have led to a more effective deployment, perhaps? (This is the issue of MHQ, btw, which refers to the--relatively--ineffective German attack on la ferte of the Maginot Line referred to by a poster above, p 63. It refers to its "capture" as the culmination of a "herculean" effort, which only by chance avoided disaster for the attackers from counterfire from the unharmed and numerous defenders still comfited below ground, such that a repeat of this "coup" seemed unlikely and was not repeated.
Combined with radios, hedgehogs, more AA in Belgium and France, more trained French warplane pilots, artillery opening up at the Ardennes--well, you get the idea. Can't say it would have prevented the fall of France, but perhaps would have redefined what "fall" meant.

 

[maxs]

In other words, attitude on the part of leadership--

both military and civilian--seems an insurmountable obstacle to France not opting, really, to just get out of the War. But if the lower levels of the military, (as it were, largely) were able to bloody the heer even more than they were actually able, could be that Hitler ends up doing what he'd been inclined to do starting out, which was to capture the extreme northern provinces of France and securing any flanks. In this case, it would have been due to extreme losses from the campaign.
Might have some ramifications for subsequent activity vis a vis the French fleet. Just as Dunkirk might not have happened, so Mers al Kebir?
More dead German boys, sooner; fewer dead French. Stukas?

 

[maxs]

SO, we can already see

Hitler stays in the war, France gets out. Belgium stills surrenders, and Britain still has to be out of France and Belgium. But Hitler is (perhaps) now minus Rommel, and (definitely) minus more Panzers and Stukas. Would Britain still be able to withdraw as successfully as at Dunkirk? Wouid Mers el Kebir or something to that effect still have to happen? More debatable. And France, though opting for some type of non-aggressive pose (like they weren't already) or some neutrality, is largely unoccupied by Axis troops. The latter, too, is perhaps good news for Jews, on balance.

 

[maxs]

sorry--by "hedgehogs",

I am referring to the hedgehog TACTICS which France used to good effect against the Wehrmacht's infantry in such locations as Amiens.

Now, longer term-- two years out, say-- Hitler could be trying to move further into France and/or to destroy remaining French munitions by heavy aerial bombing. Or he at least could threaten to do so, unless France capitulated on an additional point he couldn't get in the first go-round, by allowing him to seize its Fleet.

France would have to beef up its AA around its armaments, and insist on the option of continued import and production of armaments throughout the time after the first armistice until USSR and U.S. intervention. Otherwise, Hitler will be able to hold in the back of his mind that further French resources are still there, and might be seizable later, if France's munitions are not refreshed.

Hitler would make the "old college try" at getting those points conceded initially anyway. That is, to get the French to agree not to update their forces, not to import or produce new munitions. And he'd ask for the Fleet to either be his-- or be neutralized.

How much leeway the French would have in those initial armistice negotiations, in asserting and gaining those points (of keeping Fleet and maintainng active munitions) at the table, might depend on how many Stukas, Panzers, soldiers, weeks, days, hours and officers they were able to wrest from the Germans before our "Paris peace talks" of 1940 began.

 

[maxs]

And, there are butterflies the other way, too.

Here, we have the very real temptation for the French to offer the Fleet, in return for a (largely) unoccupied Armistice.
Well, say Hitler got them to give him the Fleet, instead of merely neutralizing it. Hitler would have gotten his hands on those French aircraft carriers.
So, we have to be careful here, what cans of worms we might open! Hitler with aircraft carriers, could be a bad scene.

 

[Deckhand]

France didn't have aircraft carriers plural. They had this.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_aircraft_carrier_Béarn

 

[Xavier]

France didn't have aircraft carriers plural. They had this.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_aircraft_carrier_Béarn

Well, they were building two new carriers at the time, but those wouldn't have been ready before Graf Zeppelin, so...

That, and the Marine Nationale is too much of a bargaining chip to give away like that, just like in OTL. Not to mention that if the Kriegsmarine does get the French fleet it will have to find & train tens of thousands of new sailors on equipment that it doesn't have experience with.

 

[maxs]

Yeah, and I was breaking off to get the stats on air kriegsmarine had already on hand, anyway. The piddling along numbers in the French carriers and tenders, were already almost matched in the planes available or on board the Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Tirpitz, and Graf Spee. Bismarck alone could accomodate 6 aircraft, almost as many as France's second largest aircraft carrying ship, the Commandant Teste, which could handle up to ten large torpedo bomber seaplanes and up to four small catapult launched planes.
The Bearn was France's only official, total carrier, the Commandant Teste being a mixture of carrier and tender.
Besides, if Hitler had been interested in a carrier, he could have probably worked something out with Japan to reposition one of theirs in the Atlantic, although there would have been an education process if they were to crew it with Germans, as noted above in connection with cross-training to French vessels.
What was Hitler after in Nov. 42 when he set off the scuttle at Toulon, though? And, if he had been more bloodied, in June/July 1940, than he was otl, he'd have been more interested in keeping the French fleet out of his way. And, if his Stuka force was weaker, air war would have been less impressive to all, versus naval options.
So, the French are tempted to dicker this obsolescent fleet for freedom from occupation. But Hitler is also asking them to not update, or in some manner to be less threatening militarily.
And what of the several French surface vessels and the aircraft carrier/submarine Surcouf? The Japanese had those, too, but never the Germans. Meanwhile, while the French Joffre class carrier project never completed with the otl Armistice of 1940, with somewhat different terms, and a less vulnerable France, Hitler might have been more interested in ensuring it was not built this time, too. But, it is true that he ALSO never showed any interest in restarting the Joffre project and completing his carrier that way, too. (He never completed the German carrier project either, otl). Well, having been a bit more beat up at the end of "this" campaign, in the air and probably on the ground, he'd have felt more vulnerable to a stronger France especially with an aircraft carrier to counter Mussolini, who had troubles enough--or was about to. As he got bogged down against the Brits in the Med. Sea, he'd have called on Hitler to assist him in prevent France from fielding yet another carrier against him in the Med.
But this is a potential butterfly, all the same. One could make a Hitler who was more fleet and carrier conscious, based on a more chastening experience in France on the air and on the ground, or one who was more focused on ground warfare after a blooding in France, and therefore even less concerned about its (to him) unimpressive fleet.
It's a good thing he didn't get a carrier, but the very act of trying to get at the fleet, would have been a threat to the Allies. But the French might have been as unimpressed with the quality of their fleet as the above posters (a view I don't totally share, since, just because Hitler wasn't impressed by something, didn't make it effective). And Hitler might have been more anxious to get at it, in this situation, than otl. Restaffing a carrier when he had one of his own to complete, or could work w/Japan on repositioning one of theirs, are replete with difficulties, but offset by a greater blooding in France, at least to some extent.

 

[maxs]

and so, I think I agree the French

wouldn't be that interested in bargaining with their fleet in some manner. Yet, recall that Paul Reynaud was the only Frenchman, besides DeGaulle, it sometimes seemed, to want to keep up the fight. Most, given some front, some paltry show of face, wanted out of the war. If they've given a better accounting of themselves, going into the armistice, this could make them feel less interested in preserving all aspects of the fleet. They might agree not to build the Joffre, after all, for example. And they might agree to neutralize their fleet, rather than allowing some to escape as they did otl.
So, again, some good butterflies, some bad butterfly (moth?) potential, too.
Certainly, pride in their fleet would seem to have been "supposed" to be there, but... given the quality of the leadership? I don't know.
Personally, I think the French had more going for them, including in the fleet, than they seemed to give themselves credit for, given their overall leadership-level dovishness. Sometimes, their weapons seemed inadequate to the task; but, given some imagination and initiative, scholars have found real potential there, it's quite clear!

 

[maxs]

also, what I meant by "further resouces"

that might have been seized later, was not so much the fleet, as the resources of the more southern parts of France, including the munitions plants and military equipment, not nearly as much of which would have been seized this time around as otl. Sorry if I gave that impression. NO, he couldn't have used the fleet. Just preventing its use by the Allies, would be his goal.