WI: Lincoln chose to follow McClellan’s original plan for the Peninsula Campaign.

WI: Lincoln chose to follow McClellan’s original plan for the Peninsula Campaign.

George B. McClellan in 1862 wanted to end the war in one brilliant stroke. He was going to land the Army of the Potomac, over 120,000 men, in the Virginia Peninsula and advance on Richmond from the south. At the same time McClellan wanted McDowell’s 1st corps, 30,000 men, to advance on Richmond from the north. This would have given the Union a huge superiority in men roughly 150,000 soldiers to the Confederates roughly 55,000.

The reason Lincoln did not send McDowell’s Corps to the Peninsula is that politicians were pressuring him to deal with Stone Wall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley.

McClellan may still have messed up the campaign, even with the extra men, since he’s so darn cautious, but he wasn't performing that bad during OTL. He devastated Robert E Lee’s forces at the Battle of Malvern Hill inflicting over 5,000 casualties on the Confederates. He easily could have sweep Lee’s army aside and taken Richmond especially if he had McDowell’s corps in support.

Is anyone out there confident that McClellan could get the job done with the extra troops?
 
No, Little Mac was a gutless coward who didn't have the guts to finish off the enemy. He had MORE than enough troops OTL. If he didn't have the talent of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory the war would have ended then and there or at the very least the CSA would have lost Richmond. 50,000 troops won't turn a coward into a brave man!
 
While I think the way John is putting it is a little dramatic, I agree.

And McClellan did receive two or maybe even three divisions of what would have been McDowell's force anyhow.

But really, winning on the defense at Malvern Hill - heck, through out the Seven Days - doesn't change that McCellen was more concerned with preserving his army than threatening the Confederates. So he was indeed doing that badly - successfully 'changing his base" in response to something that an aggressive general would have prevented is no feat.
 
The problem is that no matter how Lincoln supported him it would still be McClellan running the campaign. Even if he had 150,000 men he would suddenly realize he was still outnumbered and needed 250,000. He never lacked for soldiers or material, he was simply overcautious and a poor commander.
 
The problem is that no matter how Lincoln supported him it would still be McClellan running the campaign. Even if he had 150,000 men he would suddenly realize he was still outnumbered and needed 250,000. He never lacked for soldiers or material, he was simply overcautious and a poor commander.

I think McClellan is a poor battlefield commander, but he does come up with some brillant plans. Look at Antietam the pre battle plan was brillant to attack the Conferate left wing in echelon, with three Corps, and roll up the Confederate line. While still keeping two corps in reserve to expolit the success. If Hood hadn't put up such a fight and if Hooker and Mansfield hadn't of been injuried it probably would have worked.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
McClellan always seems like such an underrated general.

He may not have done much with the Army of the Potomac, but he did create it.

His good qualities would have served him well had he been the army's chief-of-staff. But as an army commander he was a complete failure. He had two golden opportunities to win the war and failed to take them. All the men who died in 1863, 1864 and 1865 would have survived had McClellan had had more guts.
 
The number one defect in Lincoln's plan was the number one defect in McClellan's: McClellan was in charge.

McClellan's plan implemented by someone else would have worked brilliantly.
 
McClellan always seems like such an underrated general.

He may not have done much with the Army of the Potomac, but he did create it.

Oh I agree, his greatest contribution to the Union cause was in giving the Army of the Potomac organization and discipline. When it came to logistics and training he was outstanding. The problem is that is the skill set for a chief of staff, not an army commander. Grant might not have been very skilled with staff work, but he didn't need to be. That could be delegated to other officers. Where he excelled was in figuring out how to attack an enemy and then pushing through no matter what.

McClellan won the battle of Malvern Hill, and decided to retreat because he felt menaced.

Grant lost the first day's fighting at Shiloh. His response? "We'll whip them tomorrow."

That is the essence of why McClellan was a poor army commander. He was outstanding in every aspect of preparing an army for battle, but just did not have the nerve and self confidence needed to take the risks necessary to win a campaign.
 
Ironic thought. Had McClellan been killed or died of a fever toward the end of his campaign in West Virginia, his death would have been remembered as a tragic loss, and there'd be lots of WIs about how the war would have been over in half the time "if only the great man had lived".
 
I think McClellan is a poor battlefield commander, but he does come up with some brillant plans. Look at Antietam the pre battle plan was brillant to attack the Conferate left wing in echelon, with three Corps, and roll up the Confederate line. While still keeping two corps in reserve to expolit the success. If Hood hadn't put up such a fight and if Hooker and Mansfield hadn't of been injuried it probably would have worked.

And this is the point where a good army commander adjusts to the fact no plan survives contact with the enemy, brings in those reserves, and smashes the tattered remains of Lee's left wing.
 
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