WI: Libya keeps its WMDs?

The_Persian_Cat

The_Persian_Cat

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Libya (under the presidency of Muammar Qaddafi) sought to normalise relations with the US and the West. A big part of this project was disarmament. In the 1990s, during the early Clinton administration, Libya dismantled its nuclear weapons programme. In December 2003, Qaddafi renounced Libya's possession of weapons of mass destruction, and invited international inspectors to see Libya followed through on its programme of disarmament. In 2004, Qaddafi acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and declared Libya's chemical weapons stockpile to the international community. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) set a deadline of January 2014 for Libya's total chemical weapons disarmament, and Libya began destroying its chemical weapons stockpile under OPCW supervision, only stopping in 2011 upon the outbreak of the Libyan Civil War. Disarmament continued after Qaddafi had been overthrown, with Libya's chemical weapons stockpiles being fully destroyed as of November 2017.

Qaddafi's decision to disarm was unexpected by most of the international community. It was motivated by a desire to normalise relations with the West in the post-Cold War era, get the US and other countries to lift sanctions, and (after 2003) not meet the same fate as Iraq. It worked, to some degree; Libya established diplomatic and commercial ties with the EU, and the US lifted trade sanctions on Libya. Libya established a diplomatic liaison in Washington in 2004, and the US did the same in Tripoli. However, tension between the two countries remained, and when violence broke out in Libya in 2011, the US (under Obama) and other NATO countries cut all diplomatic ties with Qaddafi, reimposed sanctions against Qaddafi and his government, and intervened to overthrow the regime.

But what if Qaddafi hadn't decided to disarm? What affects would this have had on Libya? What if Libya had maintained not only its chemical weapons programme, but also its nuclear weapons programme? I don't know when Libya may have got the Bomb. But Libya's nuclear weapons programme was believed to have started in the 1970s, and by the 1990s Libya had developed some nuclear infrastructure including working centrifuges, and Libyan intelligence had also infiltrated the Pakistani military and government (and had acquired the services of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a top nuclear physicist and the father of Pakistan's nuclear programme), my uneducated guess is that Libya wasn't too far from becoming a nuclear power. What might this have meant, if Libya had developed a nuclear arsenal before 2001, and Qaddafi didn't decide to destroy it or its chemical weapons arsenal?
 

Monk78

Qaddafi or his son would still be in power if he had nukes

unless Egyptians would be brave or foolhardy enough to attempt an invasion financed by NATO
 
The_Persian_Cat

The_Persian_Cat

Monk78 said:
Qaddafi or his son would still be in power if he had nukes

unless Egyptians would be brave or foolhardy enough to attempt an invasion financed by NATO
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I don't know why Egypt would do that, or why NATO would turn to Egypt.

In the context of the War on Terror, why wouldn't the US invade Libya themselves? If they attack Libya at all, that is.
 

Monk78

The_Persian_Cat said:
I don't know why Egypt would do that, or why NATO would turn to Egypt.

In the context of the War on Terror, why wouldn't the US invade Libya themselves? If they attack Libya at all, that is.
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Better to use Egyptian lives than NATO lives
Plus there is already no love lost between the two regimes
 
Al-Za’im

Al-Za’im

The Libyan nuclear programme was far from successful, described as a series of initiatives that collapsed, one after the other. The regime invested enormous sums in buying equipment without getting significantly closer to the nuclear weapons threshold, meanwhile senior officials remained exasperating oblivious, believing Libya was five years away from developing nuclear weapons (a claim heavily contested by other officials and existing evidence). A weak state apparatus (due in part to Gaddafi's "Culutural Revolution''), limited number of non-foreign scientists and constantly broken equipment, are all factors that plagued the fledging programme.

The decision to disarm was a crucial shift in foreign policy under an overarching programme of normalization of relations with the West. Although it was highly unlikely Libya would develop nuclear weaponry, it marked a desire to reintegrate into the international community. Sanctions had crippled the economy which had been reeling from a degraded energy sector and crumbling infrastructure. The lifting of these sanctions was deemed necessary in order to facilitate the economic revitalisation that Libya desperately needed. Under the assumption that the West would be more open to improving relations if the autocratic regime appeared to transition into a softer, more liberal nature of governance, Gaddafi utilised his son Saif to project a façade of political and economic liberalization. Following the Disarmament deal (which marked a guarantee of Libya's eventual reintegration into the international community), Gaddafi helped Saif launch a comprehensive reform project dubbed Libya al-Ghad, for the purpose of promote the country’s modernization in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences.

By it's very nature, Libya al-Ghad was essentially a sham. Gaddafi offered little leeway to permits its success, tightening security through a range of ultra-loyal Kaateab/battalions, intervening when Saif's rhetoric became troubelsome. refusing to decentralize Libya's wealth and re-introducing his exiled son Mutassim as a counterweight to the reformist faction coalescing around Saif. Political concessions such as the release of Islamist prisoners quickly became the forefront of the agenda with Saif courting international press to present himself as a liberal reformer spearheading reconciliation. Such measures divided and alienated upper cadres of the Libyan bureaucracy. As a result, Mutassim and Saif, vying for power and influence, would develop bases of supporters amongst the regime elite and international backers.

Efforts toward normalization had been kickstarted prior to the agreement, Libya had renounced and handed Abdelbaset al-Megrahi (suspected perpetrator of the Lockerbie bombing) to a Scottish tribunal in the Netherlands, allowing for a temporary lift of sanctions. In the midst of the War on Terror, Libyan intelligence co-operated with the US-UK. Nevertheless, integration into the international community required more than bilateral conversations about terror reparations and other security concerns. Without a measure as significant as the Disarmament deal, the autocratic regime remains in an awkward position. In such a scenario, it is likely the UN sanctions remain unlifted. Notwithstanding the reality of its failure/lack of success, Libya Al-Ghad had allowed for at least some semblance of an economic upturn, along with promoting a perception that change would occur which deeply resonated with the populace, particularly the youth. While Gaddafi may continue to presented Saif as a reformist face of the regime and his potential successor, his endeavours may fail to achieve the equivalent levels of support. Moreover, it is likely that conservatives and radicalists (who sought nuclear weapons to promote and exert Libya's influence and revolutionary policies abroad remain influential in the regime bureaucracy, enough so to prevent Gaddafi from sanctioning the release of Islamist political prisoners. Mutassim's return is placed into question. Without the increasing influence of the reformists, it's unlikely conservative elites within the regime may appeal for his return as a counter to Saif and Libya Al-Ghad.

It is likely that the Gaddafi regime remains in the midst of attempts for re-integration into the international community. With a looming economic crisis and disillusioned populace, an Arab Spring equivalent in Libya may enjoy even more revolutionary fervour and support then that of OTL 2011.
 
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