Thats buying far too much into the De Gaulle mythos, neither France power nor prestige has even come close to what it was before 1940 and the allies would have organised elections after the war was over.
Of course, de Gaulle was not a miracle worker. In realistic terms, France had diminished due to the defeat. But de Gaulle played a critical role in keeping France a great power, which was by no means inevitable, by careful leveraging of French diplomatic strength post-war. Sure, some of the post-war arrangements were due to gifts from the allies - such as arriving onto the UN Security Council as a permanent member - but de Gaulle would carefully limit the way in which he joined and interacted with international institutions to prevent it from being treated as a junior member, such as refusing to meet with Roosevelt after Yalta for a report on the conference, and only accepting being allowed into San Francisco as a full great power member, and refusing to accept agreements, even beneficial one, that treated France as not being a great power of equal rank, which conversely meant that it required French participation in institutions like the European Advisory Commission and the Control Commission from Yalta, since not having France in it - while simultaneously partially involving them, such as in the occupation of Germany - would be absurd. De Gaulle played vital roles behind the scenes in emphasizing that while France's material capabilities were limited, France still commanded immense respect, prestige, and moral power, and emphasized the influence France had over the smaller powers. During the war, the military actions helped to keep the French forces in the spotlight and gain valuable diplomatic capital. Yes, it wasn't all de Gaulle, but he did play a key diplomatic role in enhancing France's position in the post-war era. Then during the second stint in power in the 1960s he built up the status of France as an independent party with its own nuclear weapons and a strong continuing role in Africa, which continues to, alongside the European branch of thought, constitute the main assets that France deploys as a great power.
Concerning elections, conversely a civil war at some point - either post-war, or 1958, or 1961 - was a possibility. De Gaulle played a role by virtue of his prestige and of his savvy political maneuverings to keep this from happening, especially with Algeria.
Uh huh.
The British had, possibly, even less love for deGaulle, than the U.S. at this point in the war. There were plenty of staff officers at SHAEF, both Americans and British, would would have passed out cigars if some mishap had overtaken deGaulle. Of course this was entirely reasonable since deGaulle seemed to find the Americans and British about as loathsome as finding half a worm in an apple you are eating.
Conversely, while the British might not have loved de Gaulle himself, the British were far more friendly towards France than the Americans. It was the British who were responsible for putting the French onto the UN Security Council post war, the British who were the strongest voice for French interests at Yalta, and the British who were probably the most reliable partner for the French among the Big Three in helping to elevate France to a great power.
Simple dislike about the French leader among the British military says little about British policy towards France.
Now, an Anglo-French EU was impossible for other reasons, the British operated in a different medium of economics - they had been invited to join various economic organizations both after the war and pre-war that were the core of what would be the later EU, but rejected them, most critically in the case of both the pre-war International Steel Cartel and in the post-war European Coal and Steel Community - but it wasn't due to British opposition to the French government.
