WI: Let Sleeping Giants Lie

Some time in the 1930s, someone in the Japanese government makes an analysis similar to the one quoted below, and is listed to:

Zero probability event.

I think that Jonathan Parshall posted the best analysis of the economic issue available online here:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm


A couple highlights

The United States had:

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Nearly twice the population of Japan.
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Seventeen time's Japan's national income.
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Five times more steel production.
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Seven times more coal production.
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Eighty (80) times the automobile production.

That's BEFORE the war

Overall the United States had almost 42% of the total industrial warmaking potential of the entire world, Japan had 2.5%

As a result, Japan's foreign policy towards the US in the late thirties and after can be summud up as 'Let Sleeping Giants Lie'. Don't give the Americans a reason to go to war, and if someone else does, make sure Japan is seen as either neutral, or an ally.

So, what effect does this have on WWII? Personally, I could see the European from still happening. Hitler was a megalomaniac, and Churchil and Roosevelt were just ruthless enough to create a casus belli that could be reliably blamed on Germany.
 
Something probably would have happened that would have gotten the US involved in the European Theater. However, as Japan to do nothing at the time will probably permanently relagate you to a second class power, which the radicals in the military are not going to permit.

China is a quagmire of sorts, success along the coasts but problems inland. Which will just continue since the Chinese are getting aid from the US. Your economy is dependent upon US exported steel, oil and other things. Without which everything grinds to a halt. The Soviets are not the Russians of your father's days and as long as they remain a landpower in Asia you can't adequately grapple with them.

Expansion into Southeast Asia will be difficult since the US controlled Philippines lies directly across all lines of communication.

If you ally with the Germans you will get technical aid and may be able to have them turn over French and Belgian possessions in the Far East.

The option to declaring war against the US and Britain looks like a long shot, but if a careful war plan is devised you may be able to stun the US into dropping out of Asia altogether.

There are a few ways that the Japanese could have bettered the odds in their favour to produce a defeat not as crippling or even a negotiated conditional surrender - even with the smashing success at Pearl Harbor.
 
Japan needed to be seen as an ally by the Americans. Otherwise, they will inevitably lock horns with them - the Americans were supporting the Chinese fighters, don't forget. The only way Japan could possibly not get into a war with the USA is to back out of China to a large extent, never take a crack at US possessions - Phillippines, Hawaii, anything - and probably actively fight against Nazi Germany. That's tough to pull off.
 

CalBear

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It is actually even worse than TheMann notes.

Japan and the United States had been pawing the ground and staring each other down since at least 1900, perhaps earlier. It was literally a case of the Pacific Ocean not being big enough for both of them.

Japan had, it believed, legitimate security and territorial claims across a wide swath of the Pacific. The League of Nation Mandates, which had more or less be captured from Imperial Germany during WW I were defacto colonies. Formosa, which Japan had captured from the Chinese as early as 1874 (formally after the 1st Sino-Japanese War), after being coveted since the establishment of the Shogunate, was a critical element of Japanese overseas possessions. These territories needed to be defended and a clear channel of cummunication between them and the Home Islands was absolutely necessary.

On the other hand the United States had, it believed, legitimate security and territorial claims in the Pacific. These included American Samoa (from Germany in 1899), Guam & the Philippines (Both from Spain in 1898), Hawaii (formally a territory since 1894), and the Aleutian Islands (1867 from Imperial Russia). These territories needed to be defended and a clear channel of cummunication between them and the Mainland was absolutely necessary.

Unfortunately, these entirely reasonable security requirements intersected at many points. The eastermost island in the Aleutian Islands (Attu), and westernmost of the Kurile Islands (Paramushir) are only 521 miles arpart. Palau is less than 500 miles from The Philippines and stands between the Islands and Guam. Betweeen Luzon and Formosa is a Strait less than 200 miles wide, while U.S. Guam and Japanese Tinian & Saipan are barely 100 miles apart.

Unless the two states were on VERY friendly relations (or some sort of MAD situation existed as in the Cold War between the USSR & U.S.) frictions were going to exist. With the other issues between the two countries (ranging from the shameful treatment of Japanese nationals and their children in the United States to the Japanese actions in China) things were far from friendly and there was no Sword of Democles hanging over the two states so the frictions were high indeed.

You can not have two major powers confronting each other without something flaring up. Japan's grave error was that they thought themselves to be a Great Power, not just a major one, while the United States was arguably the Greatest Power (in potential if nothing else).

The U.S. believed it was morally right and wasn't going to give an inch, reasoning (sensibily) that the advantages were on their side. Japan beieved that it had a national right to expand outside of its traditional borders, as the other Great Powers had done and they were't going to back down either.

Japan could do some of the math, and knew that their was a vanishing window when they could act against the U.S. with any hope of success (a time span covering roughly Novermber 1941, when Zuikaku was commissioned & worked up to late 1942 when the massive increase in American naval and air assets from the June 1940 expansion acts would begin to arrive in strength. Japan thought it had 13 months to win (as noted they did SOME of the math, not all of it) and wasted almost none of that time. Unfortunately, they didn't take the time to do ALL the math.
 
Japan could do some of the math, and knew that their was a vanishing window when they could act against the U.S. with any hope of success (a time span covering roughly Novermber 1941, when Zuikaku was commissioned & worked up to late 1942 when the massive increase in American naval and air assets from the June 1940 expansion acts would begin to arrive in strength. Japan thought it had 13 months to win (as noted they did SOME of the math, not all of it) and wasted almost none of that time. Unfortunately, they didn't take the time to do ALL the math.
True. This thread assumes that they did do all the math, and asks what they do if they know they can't win, and what happens to the war, as a result.
 
I think Calbear has it right. In order to have the US and Japan stay friendly you need get the US out of the Pacific as much as possible.

So let's say the Spanish sell all of there pacific colonies to Germany during the Spanish-American war. Japan picks up what it did OTL during the first world war plus the Philippines and Guam. The US sphere of influence stops at Midway.

That work?
 
Some time in the 1930s, someone in the Japanese government makes an analysis similar to the one quoted below, and is listened to:
The Bold part is the important part.
Admiral Yamamoto did do this Analysis, both for the US and for China. As a result He then came out against attacking China, or provoking the US.
For this he ended Up Living onboard a battleship, and his Family had to live in Secure Quarters on a Naval base, in order to prevent Assassination by the Militarists.
By the 30's it was to late for this kind of Analysis to prevent the Clash.
 
Logical militants

I guess the question isn't about the inevitability of friction, but a Japanese realization that they simply WILL loose if the USA gets going. So, we need the militarists to conclude that Americans aren't weak, and won't seek a negotiated peace just because they loose a few battles.

So, here's a POD for that realization:

1918, France. For whatever reason, on a couple of occasions, small American forces get overrun by the Germans. They don't surrender or retreat, but die in place. These desperate holding actions catch the attention of Japanese observers with the British forces, some of who raise to real power in the 30's.

To cap it off, another small unit launches a near suicidal counterattack against a larger German force to buy time for other forces to retreat/regroup/form for a new attack/whatever.

In short, Togo and his advisers realize, "The Americans have Bushido," although by another name.

In the '30's, they do the math, and it's the most militant that realize that, if they fight America, they will loose, because America has the will to fight as well as the resources to do it with.

So, now they know that, at all costs, they can't get the USA truely angry. Could this work to get a more cautious Japan?
 
Unfortunately, not even this would work. The US has had an interest in China since its independence. The first China Clippers were traveling from New England to Chinese points as early as the mid-1780s. American's had been involved all through China throughout the 19th century. Commodore Perry, who had led the opening of Japan, had advocated that the US make protectorates of Formosa, Okinawa and several other Pacific Islands, and while his advice was ignored it illustrates how the US was already involved in the affairs of the Orient. The "Open Door" policy of the 1890s-1900s did not arise out of thin air and had its roots in a long policy of supporting open trade in Asia.

As soon as Japan invaded China it embarked on a course that was sure to anger the US. Japan would need to make the move toward state supported corporate capitalism immediatly following the Meiji Restoration. If both of the US and Japan supported an Open Door than a relationship of mutual support may ahve arisen despite the racism. Thus, a POD as early as the 1870s may be needed to avoid putting the US and Japan on a collision course.

Benjamin
 
Collision Course...

I see this point, and agree with it. But, what if Japan's leaders realized the following in the 1930's:
1. We're on a collision course with the USA
2. If we collide, we WILL loose
3. The Americans DO have the stomach for a fight, if one happens.

Therefore, WE have to do something to prevent the collision.

As rational militarists who have done the math, what actions can they take?
 
I think Calbear has it right. In order to have the US and Japan stay friendly you need get the US out of the Pacific as much as possible.

So let's say the Spanish sell all of there pacific colonies to Germany during the Spanish-American war. Japan picks up what it did OTL during the first world war plus the Philippines and Guam. The US sphere of influence stops at Midway.

That work?

Not really.

The Americans would take over the islands whether Spain sold them to Germany or not. Why would the Germans buy? At the time they had no hope in hell of being able to supply or have communication between those colonies.

The only way I can see the war not starting - because once the war begins, as CalBear points out, Japan is toast whether they like it or not - if is the Red Scares immediately post-WWI force the Japanese and Americans onto the same side, and they keep on the same side. Again, I can only see that if Japan does not continue to expand its Pacific wishes. Perhaps instead they go looking elsewhere. Russia is a bad idea (Red Army), the Aleutians are American territories, China is a mess, Southeast Asia puts you up against the French and British (not good ideas either), Indonesia puts you at odds with the Dutch, and if Australia gets a threat, the British, Commonwealth and Americans again.

Japan could realistically expand to include Korea, Manchuria, Formosa, much of the Chinese coast, Kurile and the Japanese Marianas. Phillipines is out of the question. Mind you, with all of that, it does seem to me that if the Japanese used their heads (and their resources) they can legitimately use that territory to defend themselves without butting heads with the Americans. This of course assumes the two do not have many issues with each other - but, they do, so as Calbear said its likely they could not stay apart forever.
 
The first China Clippers were traveling from New England to Chinese points as early as the mid-1780s.
The China Clipper wasn't developed till the 1840's, You probably mean East Indiamen,
And American ships were visiting China Pre ARW, sailing under the British Flag.
 

burmafrd

Banned
The only realistic path is NOT attack the US in Dec 1941 BUT go after the Dutch and french possessions. That gets them the oil that they had to have right away, and some of the other resources needed. What they also needed badly as well was steel; and the only other source of that would have to be Russia. So Japan waits and when Stalin is desperate Japan offers a non agression pact on the condition that the Russians send steel. Now of course that mean the russians have the steel to spare- which they probably do not. I really do not see a way they can get steel otherwise- at that time there were very few sources of steel and raw iron ore (not sure how well the Japanese were set up to actually MAKE steel).
 
The only realistic path is NOT attack the US in Dec 1941 BUT go after the Dutch and french possessions.

That's one path, but not the only possible one, IMO. I liked this ATL, in which some adroit diplomacy by the Japanese in 1940 gets them their aims in the Pacific by allying with the British - and Germany and Japan are the only countries to do well in WW2. It seems plausible, if you accept the PoD of the Emperor understanding the strategic situation and taking action.
 
That's one path, but not the only possible one, IMO. I liked this ATL, in which some adroit diplomacy by the Japanese in 1940 gets them their aims in the Pacific by allying with the British - and Germany and Japan are the only countries to do well in WW2. It seems plausible, if you accept the PoD of the Emperor understanding the strategic situation and taking action.

Interesting and original and implausible. I don't see the British accepting it even if Tokyo threatens. How are things to turn out if Britain allies with Russia?
 
friends not puppets

Give Manchuqo real autonmy. Help bose in india.
Sooth the Muslims in Indonesia, you will have a fighting chance.
 
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