On the 23-24 of October, the Bolshevik Central Committee passed resolutions proposed by Lenin which recognised that ‘An armed uprising is inevitable and the time perfectly ripe,’ further approving the motion that ‘All the organisations of the party should act accordingly.’ Lenin’s intervention, through towering influence over the party, proved decisive in overcoming obstruction to imitating the insurrection by Kamenev and Zinoviev (as well as other members of the Committee not in attendance such as Nogin, Rykov and Milyutinh. Nonetheless, the circumstances of his attendance owed themselves to considerably good fortune - still in hiding he had been stopped by a government patrol near Tauride palace yet was permitted to proceed to the Bolshevik headquarters in the Smolnly Institute as he was not identified and presumed to be a harmless drunk.
Hypothetically, if the patrol had instead identified and taken Lenin into custody; immediate ramifications on the trajectory of the Bolsheviks. Without his presence at the meeting, it may be reasonable to postulate that the Central Committee may not pass motions in favour of insurrection. The joint meeting of the Central Committee, Petrograd Committee, military organisation, trade unions, and factory committees on the 29 of October, reflected that opposition to an immediate rising among the Bolshevik leadership was not confined solely to Kamenev and Zinoviev. A not-inconsiderable segment of the Bolshevik party (both leadership and rank and file) visualised a socialist revolution as that of an assumption of power by an organ with a rightful claim to the voice of the masses; that being the Congress of Soviets. Trotsky himself perpetuated this perspective as a means of massing popular support for the insurrection. These quasi-parliamentary tendencies were also demonstrated in support for participating in the ‘Democratic Conference’ as well Council of the Republic/Pre-Parliament. Initially willing to participate in the latter with a vote of 72-50, under Trotsky’s insistence (in no doubt influenced by Lenin as he had initially supported the measure), a few votes sealed that the Bolsheviks should attend proceedings only to symbolically walk out at the start.
While these cases may display a genuine desire for a coalition of socialist parties or confidence in a transition to Soviet authority; they should not be seen as reflective of a lack of motivation for insurrection. The looming counter-revolutionary threat that was increasingly perceived within Petrograd’s political climate had been exploited by the Bolsheviks to form the Military Revolutionary Committee on the 22 of October, a crucial mechanism in the seizure of power. One must not forget the flurry of radicalisation occurring at the time, not forget the centrality of Trotsky, nor negate the fact that Lenin’s resolutions enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee meetings.
Perhaps, it is notable that meetings where Lenin was not in attendance such as that discussing participation in the ‘Democratic Conference’ saw his agitation largely ignored. Either way, it is dependant on the extent to which one prescribes the effectiveness of Lenin’s personality.
Nevertheless, it can be confidently argued that had Lenin been arrested: the pre-existing (and prevalent) hesitancy to initiate an insurrection could of lead to its further delay. This would most certainty mean that the attempted seizure of power could/would be planned to occur after the Second All Congress of Soviets on the 6 of November.
A Congress of Soviets in which the Bolsheviks had not initiated the seizure of power is likely to manifest rather differently. Most presumably without the walkout of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary delegates that effectively permitted the Bolsheviks to monopolise the Congress and provide the insurrection a seal of legality. Without the preliminary consensus of 23 of October, the machinations that allowed the Bolsheviks to contract any attempts of the Provisional Government to retain power do not exist; this far more vulnerable position may allow the socialist parties to widen fissures within the Bolsheviks and achieve a more moderate compromise of an All-Socialist coalition.
Indeed, the Bolsheviks would enter the Congress with a caucus of 370-380, a majority amongst 670 delegates attending (in addition to the Left SRs). During the conference, a majority of delegates declared themselves in favour of ‘All Power to the Soviets’ - an endorsement of a coalition of all socialist parties without the involvement of the bourgeoise parties such as Kadets. Moreover, leader of the left Mensheviks: Martov’s proposal of a united democratic socialist coalition was adopted unanimously. Where the conference broke down was on the matter of electing a Presidium composed in proportion to party strengths motived by a refusal to be associated with the armed Bolshevik coup that had occurred, which itself was later explicitly stated. Without the coup (potentially averted at this point by Lenin’s arrest) raises the possibility that the socialist parties could of actually achieved or at least committed themselves to a coalition.
Accordingly, this raises a number of questions on the ramifications of Lenin’s arrest: Would and if so when would the insurrection be imitated? How would the Bolsheviks react to his arrest? Could the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets achieve a socialist coalition? What of the fate of the Provisional Government?
Hypothetically, if the patrol had instead identified and taken Lenin into custody; immediate ramifications on the trajectory of the Bolsheviks. Without his presence at the meeting, it may be reasonable to postulate that the Central Committee may not pass motions in favour of insurrection. The joint meeting of the Central Committee, Petrograd Committee, military organisation, trade unions, and factory committees on the 29 of October, reflected that opposition to an immediate rising among the Bolshevik leadership was not confined solely to Kamenev and Zinoviev. A not-inconsiderable segment of the Bolshevik party (both leadership and rank and file) visualised a socialist revolution as that of an assumption of power by an organ with a rightful claim to the voice of the masses; that being the Congress of Soviets. Trotsky himself perpetuated this perspective as a means of massing popular support for the insurrection. These quasi-parliamentary tendencies were also demonstrated in support for participating in the ‘Democratic Conference’ as well Council of the Republic/Pre-Parliament. Initially willing to participate in the latter with a vote of 72-50, under Trotsky’s insistence (in no doubt influenced by Lenin as he had initially supported the measure), a few votes sealed that the Bolsheviks should attend proceedings only to symbolically walk out at the start.
While these cases may display a genuine desire for a coalition of socialist parties or confidence in a transition to Soviet authority; they should not be seen as reflective of a lack of motivation for insurrection. The looming counter-revolutionary threat that was increasingly perceived within Petrograd’s political climate had been exploited by the Bolsheviks to form the Military Revolutionary Committee on the 22 of October, a crucial mechanism in the seizure of power. One must not forget the flurry of radicalisation occurring at the time, not forget the centrality of Trotsky, nor negate the fact that Lenin’s resolutions enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee meetings.
Perhaps, it is notable that meetings where Lenin was not in attendance such as that discussing participation in the ‘Democratic Conference’ saw his agitation largely ignored. Either way, it is dependant on the extent to which one prescribes the effectiveness of Lenin’s personality.
Nevertheless, it can be confidently argued that had Lenin been arrested: the pre-existing (and prevalent) hesitancy to initiate an insurrection could of lead to its further delay. This would most certainty mean that the attempted seizure of power could/would be planned to occur after the Second All Congress of Soviets on the 6 of November.
A Congress of Soviets in which the Bolsheviks had not initiated the seizure of power is likely to manifest rather differently. Most presumably without the walkout of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary delegates that effectively permitted the Bolsheviks to monopolise the Congress and provide the insurrection a seal of legality. Without the preliminary consensus of 23 of October, the machinations that allowed the Bolsheviks to contract any attempts of the Provisional Government to retain power do not exist; this far more vulnerable position may allow the socialist parties to widen fissures within the Bolsheviks and achieve a more moderate compromise of an All-Socialist coalition.
Indeed, the Bolsheviks would enter the Congress with a caucus of 370-380, a majority amongst 670 delegates attending (in addition to the Left SRs). During the conference, a majority of delegates declared themselves in favour of ‘All Power to the Soviets’ - an endorsement of a coalition of all socialist parties without the involvement of the bourgeoise parties such as Kadets. Moreover, leader of the left Mensheviks: Martov’s proposal of a united democratic socialist coalition was adopted unanimously. Where the conference broke down was on the matter of electing a Presidium composed in proportion to party strengths motived by a refusal to be associated with the armed Bolshevik coup that had occurred, which itself was later explicitly stated. Without the coup (potentially averted at this point by Lenin’s arrest) raises the possibility that the socialist parties could of actually achieved or at least committed themselves to a coalition.
Accordingly, this raises a number of questions on the ramifications of Lenin’s arrest: Would and if so when would the insurrection be imitated? How would the Bolsheviks react to his arrest? Could the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets achieve a socialist coalition? What of the fate of the Provisional Government?