WI:Lavr kronoliv coup successful?

Alright so what if Kerensky accepts Kornilovs demand and a directory is formed. The directory consist of Kornilov(military) Kerensky(SocDem) Savinkov(NatSoc) and also Julius Martov(Menshevik). There is no defense of Petrograd, because Kornilov got his way and now has no reason to march on Petrograd. And the Petrograd Soviet won’t launch there own coup because they also have representation. Most importantly Bolshevik support and influence is diminished. Would this be a government that satisfies all?


Martov is never going to go along with this.

"...In June 1917 Martov professed his alarm that the Provisional Government might summon 'its praetorian guard from the front [and] play the role of a Cavaignac'. This, he conceded, would have the beneficial practical effect of eliminating the Bolsheviks as a political force in Russia. But it would also destroy the Soviets, and in particular the Petrograd Soviet—-to which Martov, not coincidentally, was addressing when he evoked the precedent of Cavaignac's betrayal, of which he knew everyone in his audience would be cognizant.

"After Martov finished, Iraldi Tsereteli assured him that neither he nor the Mensheviks nor the Russian proletariat had anything to worry about. Martov's analogy, he explained, was mistaken:

"'Comparing our revolutionary army with the soldiers of Cavaignac, you forget that the nineteenth-century revolutionary stereotype is quite inapplicable to our revolution. Then the bourgeoisie, relying on a conservative peasantry and an army composed of such peasants, disposed of the proletariat and paved the way for the victorious counter-revolution. But the army of revolutionary Russia is part of the revolutionary peasantry, and is at one with the working class in the soviet ...in consolidating liberty.'

"Tsereteli may well have been correct in dismissing the chance of a Russian Cavaignac marching on Petrograd, disbanding the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government. and instituting a military dictatorship. That Kornilov, who was the closest (albeit still distant) equivalent of both Cavaignac and Napoleon Bonaparte in Russia in 1917, was unable to do this—if that in fact was his actual intention—suggests that he was. But the Georgian Menshevik, who had no illusions about Lenin's benevolence (or about Stalin's), fell prey to a different delusion when considering the Mensheviks' options should a genuine Russian Cavaignac appear. In that instance, he assured the Bolsheviks, 'we shall fight in the same ranks with you'.47 Such a scenario, one can suggest with some confidence, would have been an excellent example of the cure being worse than the disease..." https://books.google.com/books?id=5UKjDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA369

Indeed, by July Martov had already called for a government excluding the "organized bourgeoisie":

"The offensive had collapsed, and the first coalition government with it. With the resignation of the Cadet ministers on 2 July, Russia faced another political crisis. The workers and soldiers of Petrograd and Kronstadt grew more and more restless and hostile to the government and to the leaders of the Soviets who supported it. The 'July days' were at hand. Whether tinder the pressure of these events or as the result of his own belated realization that, 'bourgeois' or not, his revolution was in danger, Martov came out on the morning of 3 July with a demand for a new 'democratic' government based largely on the parties represented in the Soviets, without the organized bourgeoisie.' He admitted that up to this point he had regarded the passing of power into the hands of the Soviets as undesirable, but had changed when the resignation of the Cadet ministers showed that the entire organized bourgeoisie was relinquishing power. Such bourgeois ministers as stayed on, e.g. M. I. Tercshchenko, I. V. Godnev, or N. V. Nekrasov, represented no one but themselves; no reason remained why 'our ministers ought to remain in a minority in a coalition govemment.' 'History demands,' Martov declared, 'that we take power into our hands'; at least a majority of the Provisional Government ought to be made up from the Soviets, for there was no doubt that if the whole of Russia were asked, 'the revolutionary democracy would support us'. The main tasks of that new 'democratic' government, as he saw them, were to carry Russia through to the Constituent Assembly and above all to 'tear Russia out of the embraces of the war which strangles the revolution and prevents the consolidation of the conquests of the revolution'.. Its practical programme should contain the following points:

"(i) immediate peace negotiations with all sides renouncing annexations and contributions, and recognizing the right of nations to self-determination; Russia to withdraw from the 'imperialist war' and democratize its army for the purpose of defence against 'imperialist designs' from whatever quarter;

"(ii) thorough reorganization of the bureaucracy by means of a purge of all its counter-revolutionary elements;

"(iii) preparation of measures to enable the Constituent Assembly to realize within the shortest possible time an agrarian reform on the basis of the confiscation and handing over to the people of all land belonging to the Crown, monasteries and landowners..."

https://books.google.com/books?id=K663PZgP3s0C&pg=PA155#

You get the idea. Martov (like his counterpart in the SR's the center-left SR Chernov) was the sort of person Kornilov wanted shot--to him, such people were hardly distinguishable from the Bolsheviks.
 
@David T i feel like you overestimate the willingness of the Petrograd Soviet to rebel against a new Kerensky-Kornilov directory. Before the whole affair the soviet wasn’t as far left as you think with the only group not allying with Kerensky being the Bolsheviks. The Ispolkom(executive of the soviet) along with Kerensky were calling for the defense of Petrograd. If Kerensky(who was apart of the Ispolkom) never calls for the defense of the city then most likely only hardliners in the Ispolkom would give any fuss. While this probably wouldn’t resort in the crushing and dissolution of the soviet as Kornilov would of wanted, the soviet would probably lose legitimacy as more and more Ispolkom officials see no point in trying to fight The provisional government. The resulting Kornilov Kerensky directory i think would keep both sides in check, as socialist rally behind Kerensky and conservatives rally behind Kornilov. Both men checking the others ambition.
 
The soviet could support Kerensky (though its left wing--not just the Bolsheviks but the Menshevik Internationalists like Martov and center-left SR's like Chernov--was already getting dissatisfied with him) but not if he went along with the plans for a Kerensky-Savinkov-Kornilov dictatorship. Even the moderate socialists could see that such a dictatorship would be fatal to them--Savinkov had called the soviet the "Council of Rats', Dogs' and Chickens' Deputies." Indeed, to the extent that the soviet still voiced support for Kerensky in early August, it was because he reassured them by distancing himself from Kornilov:

"Kerensky publicly voiced his distrust of Kornilov to the Soviet Executive Committee only the day after Kornilov's visit to Petrograd. The Soviet leaders badly needed reassurance, and Kerensky was greeted coolly at first; but after a while, his unfailing persuasiveness began to melt the ice and he left to warm applause. He reaffirmed his faith in the democratic revolution; the ruin of the revolution meant the ruin of Russia and vice versa. He warned anyone who felt tempted to take power by force: "As long as I stand at the head of the new government, I declare determinedly that I shall not permit any attempts at a restoration, or a return to autocracy or monarchy." This overture to the soviets exasperated the Kadets who saw it as a "political step, toning down, like many things in the last few days, that determined line which it seemed the new government wants to adopt."..

https://books.google.com/books?id=fOxopOa4ogUC&pg=PA251

The soviet could never have gone along with a Kerensky-Kornilov-Savinkov dictatorship. (And Kerensky himself must have realized he would be reduced to the role of a figurehead if it came about.) Moreover, the Petrograd garrison was more radical than the soviet--the soviet was barely able to restrain them during the July Days.

The basic problem with either a Kerensky or a Kornilov or a Brusilov dictatorship was stated by Brusilov when Kerensky asked him if he (Brusilov) was himself prepared to become dictator: it would be like "building a dam when the river is in flood."
 
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