Lavr kronoliv is considered one of the most successful of the White Russian generals he was also commander in chief the Russian military before being removed from office in 1917. The facts are a little murky with no official consensus on what went down on the days of September 10th-13th but the story is that kronoliv saw the provisional government as weak for conceding to the Petrograd soviet and sought to dissolve the government. It’s thought that he intended to create a military dictatorship. However kronoliv’s siege of the Petrograd soviet failed and he was removed from office. So what if it was successful? How would Russia continue through the rest of ww1? Would this butterfly the revolution?
WI:Lavr kronoliv coup successful?
- Thread starter ThecrownPrince
- Start date
To recycle an old post of mine:
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Kornilov's own appraisal of what would happen doesn't sound entirely cheerful:
"Kerensky warned him of the dangers of a military dictatorship, which would have to contend with a general strike and a massacre of officers. Kronilov was not intimidated: "I foresee that possibility, but at least those who are left alive will have the soldiers in hand."
https://books.google.com/books?id=fOxopOa4ogUC&pg=PA250
But even that was IMO too "optimistic." Kornilov was definitely for continuing the War: "The Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, acts in full agreement with the plans of the German General Staff . . . I cannot betray Russia into the hands of its historic enemy, the German tribe, and make the Russian people slaves of the Germans." https://books.google.com/books?id=kdQFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA107 I just don't see the ordinary soldiers, sick of the war, worked on by socialist agitators, anxious to go home and seize the landowners' land, following Kornilov. It was too late to re-establish military discipline six months after Order No. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petrograd_Soviet_Order_No._1
There is incidentally some dispute as to whether Kornilov originally intended a "coup" or whether he believed that he had Kerensky's support, and that if Kerensky got cold feet at the last minute, it was only because he was a captive of the soviets. But I don't think that matters--with or without Kerensky's support, Kornilov could not succeed.
Brusilov's characterization of Kornilov as a "man with the heart of a lion and the brains of a lamb" was not really fair, but all the same, people who see Kornilov as a potential saviour of Russia from the Bolsheviks do IMO overrate the man and his prospects.
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Kornilov's own appraisal of what would happen doesn't sound entirely cheerful:
"Kerensky warned him of the dangers of a military dictatorship, which would have to contend with a general strike and a massacre of officers. Kronilov was not intimidated: "I foresee that possibility, but at least those who are left alive will have the soldiers in hand."
https://books.google.com/books?id=fOxopOa4ogUC&pg=PA250
But even that was IMO too "optimistic." Kornilov was definitely for continuing the War: "The Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, acts in full agreement with the plans of the German General Staff . . . I cannot betray Russia into the hands of its historic enemy, the German tribe, and make the Russian people slaves of the Germans." https://books.google.com/books?id=kdQFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA107 I just don't see the ordinary soldiers, sick of the war, worked on by socialist agitators, anxious to go home and seize the landowners' land, following Kornilov. It was too late to re-establish military discipline six months after Order No. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petrograd_Soviet_Order_No._1
There is incidentally some dispute as to whether Kornilov originally intended a "coup" or whether he believed that he had Kerensky's support, and that if Kerensky got cold feet at the last minute, it was only because he was a captive of the soviets. But I don't think that matters--with or without Kerensky's support, Kornilov could not succeed.
Brusilov's characterization of Kornilov as a "man with the heart of a lion and the brains of a lamb" was not really fair, but all the same, people who see Kornilov as a potential saviour of Russia from the Bolsheviks do IMO overrate the man and his prospects.
If kornoliv would be successful in a siege of the Petrograd soviet and arrested or executed prominent if not all members then any general strikes afterwords would probably be gutless and without direction and a continued war with Germany would keep Germany from sending eastern divisions to the western front, so probably we would see earlier allied breakthroughs and advances forcing Germany to negotiate.
I got this info from https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSkornilovR.htm
I don’t know how reliable of a source this is but it’s a source nonetheless.
“Kerensky was now in danger and so he called on the Soviets and the Red Guards to protect Petrograd. The Bolsheviks, who controlled these organizations, agreed to this request, but in a speech made by their leader, Lenin, he made clear they would be fighting against Kornilov rather than for Kerensky. Within a few days Bolsheviks had enlisted 25,000 armed recruits to defend Petrograd. While they dug trenches and fortified the city, delegations of soldiers were sent out to talk to the advancing troops. Meetings were held and Kornilov's troops decided to refuse to attack Petrograd.”
It’s simple Kerensky has to not call for support by the Petrograd soviet and then Kornilov with the support of the British military attaché swiftly takes control of the city.
The soviets and the soldiers who followed them (whether Bolshevik or not) would have defended Petrograd against Kornilov (and dissuaded Kornilov's troops from attacking Petrograd) whether Kerensky asked them to or not.
The soviet troops would still be untrained, undisciplined with little armaments, and few in number on such a short notice, they would be facing trained and armed soldiers not a ragtag group of reactionary’s. The main deterrent to Kornilov’s men was that the Soviets were already dug in and fortified, something they couldn’t do without notice of the incoming army from Kerensky. The resistance to Kornilov would be strong but nothing that he couldn’t handle. It’s also worth mentioning that the British attaché accompanying Kornilov had armored motorized divisions that could quell any major fighting in the streets.
Still doesn’t get rid of the fact that Kronilov’s forces would smash the unprepared soviets.
You're assuming that his men are going to stay with him. The ease with which they were persuaded to turn against him in OTL suggests otherwise. And really, what motive would they have to take his side? "War to the end--to the last drop of your blood?"
They would be motivated by the same thing that motivated White Russian and Spanish nationalist forces, anti communist sentiments. Your proposing that a battle hardened Cossack is going to see a peasant with a rifle and just give up. Again because of Kerensky’s warning to the soviets they were able to entrench themselves without that warning they would only have hours to prepare.
In OTL, Muslim delegates to the soviet showed up and persuaded the battle-hardened Muslim soldiers of the Savage Division not to fight. It wasn't necessary to shed a single drop of blood.
BTW, some "battle hardened Cossacks" refused to fire on demonstrators in February.
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“failed to conciliate General Kornilov and instead turned to the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies and distributed arms and ammunition among the workingmen of Petrograd”- David Francis the US ambassador to Russia’s comment on the Kornilov Affair and Kerensky’s actions
Again, no help from Kerensky means that the soviets can’t put up a defense of Petrograd, they would not have the proper organization or armaments.
According to the memoirs of Boris Savinkovhttps://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/classes/kornilovaffair.html Kornilov sent the three options to Kerensky. If Kerensky just agrees to one of these demands then Kornilov could enter the city completely unimpeded with bolstered military support and put down the Bolsheviks before they can get any substantial power.
1. Kerensky to resign and General Kornilov to become head of the Government and form a new cabinet, of which Kerensky agreed to be a member.
2. The whole Government to resign and hand over full power to General KorniIov, who would proclaim himself dictator until the Constituent Assembly met.
3. The Government to resign and a directorate to be formed, the principal members of which would be Kerensky, General Kornilov, myself, and some others.
Can we finally put the question of how a successful Kornilov coup would take place to rest and have a conversation about the other diplomatic and political repercussions there would be?
It was not but IIRC by that time the Bolsheviks already spent a considerable effort on eliminating any semblance of discipline in an army and fleet and generating hostility toward the officers. Even given some time, and we are talking about very few weeks, the Soviet would have serious problem with turning that armed but disorganized and mostly drunken crowd in a reasonably effective military force. "Armed proletariat" was not a military force either. Most probably the encounter would closer to the 1st "battle" of Dybennko and his revolutionary sailors with the Germans than to an effective defense.
But in Brusilov's quote it is not a vague "sheep" but a "ram" - in Russian, synonym indicating combination of stubbornness and stupidity. Which describes Kornilov perfectly.
To be successful, Kornilov would have to be a much more effective organizer than in OTL and the officers would need to understand the personal danger and start joining him in the big numbers: there were still plenty of them in Petrograd and Kronstadt. AFAIK, they even had an organization and were supposed to support Kornilov from within the city but their leader, general Sidorin, allegedly spent 3 days drinking in an expensive restaurant (and probably he was not alone). On his side Kornilov also did everything he could to be defeated. He promised to ban the strikes on the railroads, easier said than done because union of the railroad workers was quite powerful, he promised to install the military tribunals to suppress the "problems" by a force of the arms but where would he get enough soldiers to do this? Anyway, he probably did not hear about "Italian strike". And which sane person would declare such a program before securing the power? He needed to promise them everything they had been asking for and even more. Delivering on the promises after the power is secured is a completely different issue.
OTOH, if Kornilov is successful in his coup, then what's next? He does not have any political organization to rely upon. Army is already falling apart and how is he going to restore a discipline? He does not have any clear political program and the list of what he does not have is going on. If he proclaims himself a dictator in Petrograd, he is still far away from controlling the country or even its considerable part. With his declared program he would have a complete paralysis of transport which would make continuation of war impossible and the same goes for sending troops to deal with the internal problems.
If we look back on the options he gave Kerensky only one of them talks about completely dissolving the government while the other two would either simply swap out Kerensky with Kornilov and then Kornilov would form a new cabinet(of such Kerensky would probably be a member) or form a triumvirate sort of directory composing of Kornilov, Kerensky, and Savinkov. Basically what I’m trying to say is that if Kornilov took power there would still be some resemblance of the old government with Kerensky still apart of it. And before Kornilov’s coup he already had the pledged support of most industrialist so getting them onboard isn’t hard. I’d say if a government under Kornilov is formed he would be able to gain control of the country his only problem would be turning back the German threat.
GiantMonkeyMan
Banned
I think you vastly underestimate the capabilities of the Soviet to organise a defence and the quality of that defence as well as vastly overestimate Kornilov's chances. The Interdistrict Committee of the Soviets established the Committee for Struggle against the Counter Revolution which was operation and organising the defence before the Provisional Government had even put out the word for the soldiers to assemble. Vikzhel, the railway workers union, worked to prevent signals and messages being sent by Kornilov to his troops, as well as diverting the trains carrying his troops and organise trains to carry the Petrograd Garrison troops loyal to the Soviet to defensive positions. Practically overnight the Bolsheviks and their allies managed to assemble a Red Guard militia of nearly 40,000 workers, arm them, organise them into detachments, and give them orders. The workers often dressed in their best clothes, their church clothes, and put up posters proclaiming discipline and against drunkenness. The suburbs of Petrograd became a military camp, workers dug trenches, laid barbed wire across intersections, built barricades and bunkers. The Petrograd Garrison, over 100,000 troops, either proclaimed their solidarity to the cause and joined the defence or they proclaimed their neutrality. Nearly 20,000 sailors armed from Kronstadt joined the defence as well and soldiers from Estonia, Finland, and Latvia sent messages of solidarity and prepared to organise to come to Petrograd's aid. The Soviet sent out delegates to meet with Kornilov's troops at Luga and soon even the Cossacks were flying the red flag with Kornilov's army disintegrating the moment they realised what they were being organised for.
Actually, it was General Alexeev who said of Kornilov that he has, "the heart of a lion, the brains of a sheep". Brusilov said of him, "The chief of a bold guerrilla band and nothing more..." Pavel Miliuikov, leader of the Kadets, said that Kornilov had a "childish trust in people who knew how to flatter him". Most damning, perhaps, is his former superior General Martynov's assessment of the man was that he was "an absolute ignoramus in the realm of politics". Martynov said that, "he lacked organising ability and with his violent temper and lack of equilibrium was little fitted for planned activity". Kornilov was, by all accounts, bold and well liked by the right-wing officers and soldiers around him, a poor strategic commander, a brutal disciplinarian, incapable in the realm of politics, and a puppet to other interests.
I can hardly overestimate Kornilov’s chances because IMO he has none, being who he was: for the coup to succeed it’s leader would need much more brains that Kornilov did, just boldness was not enough. And, I repeat, it is not “sheep”, it is a “ram”: in Russian “sheep” is a creature lacking any will of its own and witlessly following the leader while the “ram” is a creature with a lot of a willpower but no brains. Which characterized Kornilov perfectly. You can start with his “program” regarding Vikzel and there is no need to go any further. It is a big surprise that his troops managed to get as far as they did but, to think about it, as everybody knows, the agitators had been actively working among the Kornilov troops. Obviously they were not jumping into the moving trains - Vikzel took care of providing the long stops and doing other things you mentioned. Would would an intelligent leader of the coup do? Promise to Vikzel everything they could desire including places in the future government for its leaders.
As for the big numbers on the other side, besides the fact that big part of them, including garrison soldiers and the sailors, had minimal military experience, they lacked discipline and competent leadership so a well-led, motivated and disciplined military force, backed up by the fifth column would have a chance even with much smaller numbers. Look, allegedly at the day prior to the Bolshevik coup the garrison of Peter and Paul fortress had been firing the guns into the Winter Palace and did not score a single hit. To achieve such a remarkable result the artillerymen must be more than just fundamentally drunk: the target was just across the river and rather big. Then, soon after the coup the “cream of the cream” of the Bolshevik forces, Kronstadt sailors led by Dybenko had been sent to stop the advancing Germans: even before they reached the frontline they were too drunk for anything but fleeing before seeing the enemy (the day, February 23rd, became “Day of the Soviet Army”). When the brave revolutionary masses took Winter Palace (no resistance) the main problem was to preven access to the said masses into the wine cellars: drunken revolutionaries had been drowning in the lakes of wine coming from the broken bottles.