That seems like a smaller POD. I assume Kim Il Sung is not willing to fight alone. Do you think North Korea eventually become more open to the west (thinking it adopts something similar to Doi Moi in Vietnam) or does it remain isolationist like Albania,
WI Korean War doesn't happen
- Thread starter mauriceq
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That seems like a smaller POD. I assume Kim Il Sung is not willing to fight alone. Do you think North Korea eventually become more open to the west (thinking it adopts something similar to Doi Moi in Vietnam) or does it remain isolationist like Albania,
Also it looks like there have already been another of threads where he did just that: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/search/312283/?q=macarthur+president&c[title_only]=1&o=date
If the Americans directly fight alongside France then they risk their reputation among pretty much the rest of the colonized world. I can imagine some confusion though as in: why would America free the Philippines and then immediately fight to help France recolonise Vietnam? The French position in Vietnam simply isn't tenable as France is dedicating more of its own effort to other conflicts in Africa and the public isn't caring about Vietnam, and I expect America to support its own ally in South Vietnam just as it did IRL. Do you agree?
At this point Taiwan isn't nearly as developed as it is IRL and I don't see how invading it would be different than the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1895.
Except for the part where the PRC has little to no amphibious capabilities. The couldn't take Kinmen in '49 a few miles off their coast, they aren't taking the much larger and further away Taiwan just a few years later.
The first thing that comes to mind is different Supreme Court Judges. Earl Warren won't be nominated, though I don't know who Truman would nominate instead.
Yeah. You know the southern Korean communists claimed they could conduct a general uprising iOTL? Claimed. They gotta lotta heart for a group incapable of forming operational units
They are not going to stop. Years of murder by a kleptocrat dictatorship didn’t stop the communist movement in the south.
South Korea will under go an insurgency and there’ll probably be a major cross border incident at some stage.
They are not going to stop. Years of murder by a kleptocrat dictatorship didn’t stop the communist movement in the south.
South Korea will under go an insurgency and there’ll probably be a major cross border incident at some stage.
Reality? You can't just "build up a navy" in a couple of years. Especially not for amphibious operations. The POD is 1950, and the U.S. was already firmly looking out for the ROC by '54. They'd probably need to be able to lift 3-4 divisions in one wave for a realistic chance by that time, and then ten to twelve more in the weeks after establishing a beach-head. And that's over a 110 mile stretch of water, significantly more distant than the D-Day landings. The PRC's economy was a disorganized mess at that time, especially what little heavy industry there was, so they aren't cranking out the thousands of needed transport ships and landing craft any time soon.
Because Hainan was a much shorter ranged expedition against an isolated, outnumbered, overspread, and demoralized enemy that wasn't well organized or being supplied, and that was dealing with a sizable guerilla force already on the island. Even then, it was pretty jury-rigged, and saw disaster in spots.
In any case this is a distraction from whether such a confrontation would occur in the first place. If the US still believes itself capable (essentially undefeated at this point) and continues the containment policy then they could still intervene.
In a similar sense I think the US might be more aggressive in foreign policy since it hasn't been defeated/checked at any point so far. We could see an earlier Vietnam-like situation it just happens that some other country (perhaps Lebanon in 1958) is attacked a
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Is the US capable of "losing" Vietnam style in Lebanon 1958, or would it power through, ugly or not?
On the question of a PRC invasion of Taiwan and what the US would have done about it without a Korean War, here's an old post of mine from soc.history.what-if (with very slight changes):
***
Obviously, it would have been a lot harder than Hainan (which was much closer to the mainland and which already had a large Communist guerrilla force with which the invaders could link up.) But that doesn't mean that it couldn't be done:
"Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, the Acting Director of Naval Intelligence, concluded that the successive evacuations [of Hainan and smaller offshore islands] had had a 'devastating effect on morale.'1 The U.S. Charge d'Affairs and the naval and military attaches in Taipei now concluded that 'Taiwan will probably fall to the Communists sometime before the end of July.'2 Although Espe thought the attaches' estimate too pessimistic, he observed that 'there seems to be little doubt that Taiwan will in due course fall into Communist hands.'3
"The Communist drive to seize Taiwan had by then reached fever pitch. U.S. naval intelligence reported advanced preparations by the Chinese Communists for an amphibious attack, labeled appropriately 'Operation Taiwan.' Walter McConaughy, the U.S. Consul General at Shanghai, reported that the liberation of Taiwan was being trumpeted publicly by Peking as the nation's paramount immediate mission and one on which they were staking the reputation and all the resources of the new regime.
"In what would prove to be a prophetic observation, McConaughy reported to Washington that 'there would seem no avenue left for Communist retreat. Either they gain Taiwan, or, goaded by bitter humiliation and by Kremlin propaganda, they must keep it ever before the Chinese people as China's great irredentist issue and perpetual cause for anti-American vehemence. Well to remember that Taiwan Irredentism is not Communist monopoly but popular Chinese national issue.'4
"By the late spring of 1950, the Chinese Communist armed forces were prepared to carry out the assault on Taiwan, their most ambitious maritime operation yet. The Communists assembled 5,000 vessels for the invasion by commandeering freighters, motorized junks, and sampans and refloating ships that had been sunk in the Yangtze River during the fight for the mainland. Further, they gathered and trained over 30,000 fishermen and other sailors to man the flotilla.
"Since the previous year, General Chen Yi's 3rd Field Army, which was responsible for the assault, had been positioned on the Fukien coast opposite the large island. The Communists trained their troops extensively in amphibious warfare and applied the lessons learned from the Hainan and other island seizures. Despite an outbreak of the Asian blood fluke disease, which reportedly felled thousands of soldiers, preparations proceeded apace for the cross-channel attack. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson later revealed that between June 10 and June 24, 1950, the strength of the field army swelled from 40,000 to 156,000 men. Also prior to June 25, elements of Lin Piao's 4th Field Army moved from south China to the Shanghai area, where they were positioned to serve as a strategic reserve for Chen Yi. Historian Allen Whiting, author of the seminal work, China Crosses the Yalu, relates that by late June, Peking's exhortations to men in the units stationed opposite the island paralleled in fervor those broadcast to the troops before the Hainan invasion. In short, the Communists were now ready to launch the attack on Taiwan and win final victory in the civil war." https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/n/new-equation.html
See also Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History*, p. 111:
"For the young PLA, a successful amphibious invasion across the strait was a difficult but not an impossible proposition, especially given the leadership's willingness to suffer high casualties in pursuit of a political victory of such magnitude. The Chinese had reportedly mobilized over 150,000 assault troops and collected in Fujian ports a large number of motorized junks for transporting these troops by mid-1950. These junks were difficult to sink with naval gunfire; the shells tended to pass cleanly through their wood hulls leaving holes that could be plugged. They were fitted with 40 mm guns that would allow them to put up a stiff defense against both aircraft and destroyers. The Sino-Soviet alliance that coalesced in early 1950 increased the likelihood the PLA would conquer Taiwan. Stalin refused to get directly involved in the invasion, but agreed to help beef up Chinese naval and air capabilities in preparation for the assault. United States and British intelligence analysts predicted the invasion would take place sometime in the summer of 1950; the US government ordered its nonessential personnel on Taiwan to evacuate on May 26."
https://books.google.com/books?id=DNqasVI-gWMC&pg=PA111
So it appears that Taiwan might have been doomed if not for the intervention of the US Seventh Fleet. However, was the North Korean invasion of the South the only thing that could have brought about that intervention? Roy (p. 113) suggests one other interesting possibility:
"The interposition of the US Navy would make an assault on Taiwan by the PLA impossible. Truman indicated, however, that his support for the KMT regime was limited. He added that as a 'corollary' he was calling upon Taipei to cease attacks against the mainland, and that the 'future status of Formosa' was not yet settled--sharp jolts to two core KMT principles. The status of Taiwan had seemed a settled issue. The Cairo Declaration...stated that Taiwan 'shall be restored to the Republic of China.' After the war, having recognized the ROC as one of the major allied powers, the US government declined to push for independence or UN trusteeship for Taiwan, adhering to the position that Taiwan was part of the ROC even after the abuses of the Chen Yi [the Nationalist governor, not the Communist general with the same name] administration came to light. It was the Chiang government's defeat by numerically smaller Communist forces despite substantial US aid, rather than questions about the justice or competence of its rule on Taiwan, that degraded the KMT's status in the worldview of American officials. International politics, not Chinese or Taiwan politics. moved Washington to reopen the question of Taiwan's status. In short, the United States was now following a 'two Chinas' policy to justify denying Taiwan to the CCP. *A successful anti-Chiang coup might have had the same effect*... [emphasis added]
"Truman so quickly decided on using the Seventh Fleet to enforce a neutralization of Taiwan because his advisors had already discussed this contingency, *although they had linked it with Chiang's removal by a coup d'etat.* Since the war preempted the coup, the United States was now stuck protecting Chiang." [emphasis added]
So there is another interesting what-if: An anti-Chiang coup in Taiwan in 1950 before the Communists invade? According to Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950-1955*
"The boldest interventionist schemes came from Nitze, Dulles, and Rusk. In early May Nitze concocted a scheme that hitched a possible defensive military commitment to the establishment of a new government under Gen. Sun Li-jen, who several months earlier had become commander-in-chief of the Nationalist army. The American-educated Sun...was well-regarded in Washington for his military competence and progressive views...Nitze's proposal envisaged a coup d'etat led by Sun (but not involving the United States) to oust Chiang and his most prominent loyalists. With a new government in place and with 'veiled but vigorous' American guidance, Nitze hypothesized that Taiwan might become a show window for Asia and a platform for clandestine propaganda and subversive activities against Soviet imperialism on the mainland."
https://books.google.com/books?id=260sUA3BzIcC&pg=PA20
Accinelli, though, thinks it unlikely that Sun could depose Chiang, "a master of the art of political survival and intrigue." "A US intelligence report in March 1950 dismissed the likelihood of a coup attempt by Sun. Noting that rumors of a possible coup had been in wide circulation on Taiwan in recent months and were known to Chiang's entourage, the report went on to point out that Sun was politically inexperienced and lacked influence with important military and political figures." Moreover, his authority did not extend to the air force and navy.
It should be noted that there *were* some officials who even before the Korean War suggested schemes for the "neutralization" of Taiwan *not* dependent on an anti-Chiang coup, notably John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk (although Rusk's plan did call for the retirement of Chiang who was to be "induced"--Rusk did not say how--to turn over the administration of the island to General Sun and the provincial governor K.C. Wu). Regrettably, according to Accinelli, there is no record of how Acheson reacted to the Rusk plan. Acheson did tell the British ambassador in early June that he and his staff were searching for a way, short of military intervention, of keeping Taiwan out of Communist hands. Still, "short of military intervention" was the sticking point. In mid-June Dulles told a group of pro-Nationalist Republican senators that Truman and Acheson remained adamant on Taiwan. Moreover, within the military, the advocates of armed action had to contend with the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even Rusk retreated somewhat with a subsequent proposal to put the Taiwan issue before the Security Council. The idea was that the Council would appoint a commission to investigate the Taiwan question. Pending the commission's report, both Communists and Nationalists were not to attack each other in the Taiwan Strait area. Rusk added that only if the USSR vetoed the creation of such a commission or if Communist forces tried to frustrate the UN initiative or invade neighboring states would the US consider military force. It is not clear whether Truman and Acheson would have agreed to such use of force, though.
Accinelli concludes (pp. 29-30) that
"Contrary to what some historians have written, the Korean crisis was a major cause for the intervention in the Taiwan Strait and more than just the occasion for it. Despite wavering support for the nonmilitary policy within the State and Defense Departments prior to the crisis, no irresistible undertow pulled government officials toward armed intervention. Although many of the motives were clearly present for such a move, the crisis was itself a significant determining factor in precipitating it...Certainly the rapidity and unanimity with which officials embraced military action would have been impossible without the Korean crisis."
One other point: As Dulles lamented to KMT officials, one of the chief arguments raised by those who opposed any further military aid to Chiang was that in case of an invasion the Nationalists would put up no real resistance, and that the American arms would therefore fall into Communist hands. [1] If the Nationalists did put up staunch resistance to a Communist invasion, this argument might be harder to make, and the political pressure to intervene might be hard to resist.
In short, the possibility that the US would have intervened militarily even without the Korean War and even without a coup against Chiang cannot IMO be dismissed entirely. For one thing, the Pentagon by June was recommending a military fact-finding mission by General MacArthur to Taiwan; it might have been difficult to prevent that from leading to a full-scale military commitment, because once the general set foot on Taiwan, the prestige of the US would be at stake. For that reason, George Kennan urged that before a military survey was sent, two conditions had to be met: the removal of Chiang from power and a commitment by the Joint Chiefs to "go the whole hog if required." https://books.google.com/books?id=260sUA3BzIcC&pg=PA27 (It is possible that by June Chiang was so desperate that he would have "voluntarily" resigned to get US backing for Taiwan; supposedly he said as much in a secret letter to Truman.) But there was certainly no decision for such intervention before the Korean crisis. The non-interventionist line was weakening but had not yet been abandoned.
[1] As repeatedly happened on the Mainland: Derk Bodde (an American professor who was a witness to the Communist takeover), describing the PLA victory parade in Beijing in 1949 said "What made it especially memorable to Americans was the fact that it was primarily a display of *American* military equipment, virtually all of it captured or obtained by bribe from Kuomintang forces in the short space of two and one half years." https://archive.org/details/pekingdiaryayear009614mbp/page/n133