WI: Kim Jong Un Defected to South Korea?

kim-jong-un.jpg


What if Kim Jong Un, while still acting as President of the DPRK, defected to the South to avoid an internal assassination plot?

What would be the immediate political ripple effects in both the South and the North?
May China intervene?
 
kim-jong-un.jpg


What if Kim Jong Un, while still acting as President of the DPRK, defected to the South to avoid an internal assassination plot?

What would be the immediate political ripple effects in both the South and the North?
May China intervene?

He's put in prison by the South Koreans, and tried in the Hague.
North Korea collapses, and is potentially carved up between the PRC and South Korea.

And don't be surprised if this thread gets locked, because, although I know this is a WI, it's still pretty close to present-day politics. You might wanna move this to chat.
 
First, this is supremely unlikely to occur.

He's put in prison by the South Koreans, and tried in the Hague.
North Korea collapses, and is potentially carved up between the PRC and South Korea.
The first is possible, depending on the circumstances of his defection. The rest however...

North Korea is unlikely to collapse; Western analysts have been predicting a North Korean collapse for decades, but it still hasn't come. The main powerbrokers in the country are intact, and there are other members of the Kim family that can serve as a replacement figurehead. By most scholarly analysis (and based on what high-level refugees from the country have experienced and written about), Kim Jong Un is (very likely) a figurehead for Kim Jong Il's "old boys club" and circle of close friends. The main effect of his defection is destabilize internal NK politics and presents a major PR disaster, but this can be glossed over and recovered from, given the level of control within the country. A collapsing NK threatens the interests of the country's ruling oligarchy and military, which is why no one in power will push for it. As there is no independent civil society in the country or media accesss, there is no effective method for any major revolutionary or resistance movements to spring up (coupled with relative isolation).

Also, even if North Korea does collapse, the PRC will not annex a square foot of the country. Why in blazes would it? It has no territorial aspirations or claims on the country, and needlessly antagonizes the United States (one), has annexed a likely hostile and backwards parcel of land of small economic worth, and needlessly strains relations with Seoul, which Beijing has been working to peel from US influence, with some success. Largely due to recent historical revisionism issues and friction between Seoul and Tokyo (which was "resolved" recently, but time will tell), and the (generally accurate) feeling in Seoul that when push comes to shove, the US will choose to side with Tokyo over Seoul.

Depending on the regional political climate, Beijing may be entirely willing to assent to reunification (and far enough into the future, participate in/coordinate with Korean-American plans to stabilize the country in the event of a collapse), provided US forces in Korea are withdrawn, as their stated purpose, after all, was to assist South Korea against North Korea. If this occurs in the immediate future, it is unlikely (Beijing will look on any moves towards reunification or regime change as a grab for regional influence), but in a few decades, it becomes a possibility. The preferred outcome for Beijing in the immediate future, provided such a collapse occurred, would simply be to assent to (or cooperate in) the removal of WMDs and nuclear stockpiles, while re-instating a new North Korean government under Chinese influence.

Current scholarly discussion within Chinese academia, ever since Xi Jinping's ascension, has moved away from a traditionally positive outlook of North Korea in East Asian geopolitics towards and increasingly critical one (ranging from disapproval with their nuclear weapons program, to the view of North Korea as a dangerous, destabilizing force in the region). Indeed, Xi Jinping has not graced North Korea with a visit since he came into office, and it was only in October that a high level Chinese official visited the country since that time (in sharp contrast to the regular meetings of the Hu Jintao era).

EDIT:
If you want to learn more about North Korea,
http://38north.org/

This is a regularly updated "blog" of sorts, run and operated by the US-Korea Institute at SAIS (John Hopkins), and the contributors are all North Korean specialists.

Additionally, while Kim Jong Un is a figurehead, it does not mean he himself it not complicit and invested in the continuation of the North Korean state. We do not KNOW his personal views on the matter outside of his preference for Western luxuries and entertainment.
 
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First, this is supremely unlikely to occur.


The first is possible, depending on the circumstances of his defection. The rest however...

North Korea is unlikely to collapse; Western analysts have been predicting a North Korean collapse for decades, but it still hasn't come. The main powerbrokers in the country are intact, and there are other members of the Kim family that can serve as a replacement figurehead. By most scholarly analysis (and based on what high-level refugees from the country have experienced and written about), Kim Jong Un is (very likely) a figurehead for Kim Jong Il's "old boys club" and circle of close friends. The main effect of his defection is destabilize internal NK politics and presents a major PR disaster, but this can be glossed over and recovered from, given the level of control within the country. A collapsing NK threatens the interests of the country's ruling oligarchy and military, which is why no one in power will push for it. As there is no independent civil society in the country or media accesss, there is no effective method for any major revolutionary or resistance movements to spring up (coupled with relative isolation).

Also, even if North Korea does collapse, the PRC will not annex a square foot of the country. Why in blazes would it? It has no territorial aspirations or claims on the country, and needlessly antagonizes the United States (one), has annexed a likely hostile and backwards parcel of land of small economic worth, and needlessly strains relations with Seoul, which Beijing has been working to peel from US influence, with some success. Largely due to recent historical revisionism issues and friction between Seoul and Tokyo (which was "resolved" recently, but time will tell), and the (generally accurate) feeling in Seoul that when push comes to shove, the US will choose to side with Tokyo over Seoul.

Depending on the regional political climate, Beijing may be entirely willing to assent to reunification (and far enough into the future, participate in/coordinate with Korean-American plans to stabilize the country in the event of a collapse), provided US forces in Korea are withdrawn, as their stated purpose, after all, was to assist South Korea against North Korea. If this occurs in the immediate future, it is unlikely (Beijing will look on any moves towards reunification or regime change as a grab for regional influence), but in a few decades, it becomes a possibility. The preferred outcome for Beijing in the immediate future, provided such a collapse occurred, would simply be to assent to (or cooperate in) the removal of WMDs and nuclear stockpiles, while re-instating a new North Korean government under Chinese influence.

Current scholarly discussion within Chinese academia, ever since Xi Jinping's ascension, has moved away from a traditionally positive outlook of North Korea in East Asian geopolitics towards and increasingly critical one (ranging from disapproval with their nuclear weapons program, to the view of North Korea as a dangerous, destabilizing force in the region). Indeed, Xi Jinping has not graced North Korea with a visit since he came into office, and it was only in October that a high level Chinese official visited the country since that time (in sharp contrast to the regular meetings of the Hu Jintao era).

EDIT:
If you want to learn more about North Korea,
http://38north.org/

This is a regularly updated "blog" of sorts, run and operated by the US-Korea Institute at SAIS (John Hopkins), and the contributors are all North Korean specialists.

Additionally, while Kim Jong Un is a figurehead, it does not mean he himself it not complicit and invested in the continuation of the North Korean state. We do not KNOW his personal views on the matter outside of his preference for Western luxuries and entertainment.

I bow to your greater knowledge, and leave further speculation to you.

But it makes sense that Kim Jong-un would mostly be a figurehead. After all, he's too young to be a seasoned political leader, and I imagine the military has monolithic influence in North Korea's circles of power.
 
I bow to your greater knowledge, and leave further speculation to you.

But it makes sense that Kim Jong-un would mostly be a figurehead. After all, he's too young to be a seasoned political leader, and I imagine the military has monolithic influence in North Korea's circles of power.
To a degree. But it really comes down to who is part of the main North Korean clique, and how the byzantine, closed-door political winds blow.

For instance, in 2014, one of Kim Jong Un's uncles, a highly influential politician, was purged (along with his immediate family). There has been intense discussion about it, given his extremely high, "unoffical" rank and his role in Sino-North Korean relations (and his stated aim at facilitating a Chinese-style modernization of North Korea). Theories range from continuing the isolation of Kim Jong Un to a repudiation of Chinese modernization, but the uncertainty that still surrounds such a high profile purge showcases just how little we truly understand about internal North Korean affairs.

The PRC has extensive interests in the DPRK. The DPRK has massive mineral resources valued at trillions of dollars, and is the world's largest exporter of anthracite coal, the highest quality type.
Indeed they do; but economic interests do not necessitate annexation when a similar arrangement can be made with South Korea (at worst), or with a new North Korean puppet-state (more ideal), or even imported overseas from one of the many developing markets China has increasingly worked to exploit (see: the Silk Road Initiative and Chinese investments in South America and Africa).

They are not irreplaceable, and China is not a Nazi Germany aiming to acquire lebensarum and resources on territory they've never had a claim on in the first place. The China Seas islands are another matter entirely, as is Taiwan, but North Korea will NOT be annexed by China. Beijing is invested in ensuring a friendly (client) state in North Korea, not the annexation of said state.
 
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kim-jong-un.jpg


What if Kim Jong Un, while still acting as President of the DPRK, defected to the South to avoid an internal assassination plot?

What would be the immediate political ripple effects in both the South and the North?
May China intervene?

If it's an internal assassination plot that presupposes that there must be a cabal ready to take power if they succeed. Therefore, if he defects, they've won and no difference than if they had assassinated him. New group in power, the PRC send their expectations; the Russians try to gain influence; the US, SK, and Japan send feelers to see what direction this new group is going. Regardless of which direction, more severe (like that's possible) or glasnost/perestroika, either way SK is going to have to hand him over to the World Court or some sort of tribunal. If he's going to defect and look for protection, he'd have gone to the PRC, not South Korea; the PRC would at worst put him in "house arrest for his own safety" and let him live in a huge country estate and live out his life in seclusion and relative care.
 

Yuelang

Banned
if he defects early enough (such as two or three months after being Supreme Leader), claim that his daddy forced him into his role, and tell everyone that he's actually identify more with the West due to education and he never want to be a dictator in the first place, there will be sympathy.

Especially if he managed to smuggle his way alongside Dennis Rodman, bring the working nuclear warheads and blueprints with him (to be neutralized), and giving detailed plan of Artillery emplacements and targets of North Korea, he would be hailed as Hero instead... :D
 

Absolutely agreed. If I may add a few things:
  • The Kims have been slowly eliminating any, any option to the North Korean leadership since the 1960s. First went the pro-Soviet faction, then the Maoist Partisans, then anyone with a strong military or academic history. Now North Korea has come to the point where the head of the KPA has to kneel to talk to Kim Jong-un. Everyone has his or her "balls" caught in Kim's hands, one way or another. With Kim gone, the only ones left are either too stupid to lead, or lack legitimacy.
  • China is definitely in a pickle - a one similar to South Korea. For both they have strong historical allies(NK and the US) whom, while having foreign policy interests aligned during the initial periods of the diplomatic relationship, have turned more or less sour - North Korea is too into brinksmanship, and the US is much more happy to support Japan over South Korea - something that has been mentioned over several times now in major news sources. But because they are so used to the historical relationship without stronger impetuses the situation will not change.
  • North Korea is definitely stable - it can even be said that revolts and rebellions aren't occurring because the dissatisfied are too physically weak to do so and the fit are too happy with their present situation. All investments go into Pyongyang. Pyongyang residents watch US- and Korea-based films and TV shows daily, and consume American products. But they aren't influenced by the situation because they know to well that if North Korea falls all of the daily pleasantries disappear.
  • The present time and future is very interesting. South Korea has resumed hostilities and the domestic parties(3 major ones, 2 minor) are beating each other daily on how incompetent they can be. Even Park has failed majestically with the slipshod "comfort women agreement". Nothing can be guessed with confidence at this point, and the year 2016 will present a very interesting future for South Korean politics - and the fate of Kim Jong-un.
 
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