WI: Keeping Massive Retaliation in the 60s

It means the USA is really, really good at atomic war, that is a war fought with weapons nobody ever plans to actually use, and atrophies as far as conventional warfare as a huge stockpile of atomic weapons is much cheaper than a large military machine. As a result the US military becomes a Quaker Gun, intimidating only insofar as the Soviets or their various proxies don't dare call its bluff, and far less impressive than it might otherwise be when they do call it.
 
Soviet conventional superiority was largely a myth. At no point of the Cold War after ca. 1953 did Soviet Union have a meaningful conventional superiority even with land forces. Of course if one wanted to count every T-54 equipped rifle division motorized with kolkhoz trucks manned by 40-some old reservists from Ural military district...

The image of Soviet conventional superiority was necessary for NATO military commanders in order to get more money for their respective armed forces. In case of so-called Reagan revival of US forces, often cited here, it's a case for not noticing that European NATO forces had significantly modernized their forces during 1970's even when US had not.

Of course, this was only about land forces. With naval forces Soviets had never superiority or even parity, with air forces only perhaps during late 1940's.

If, with some ASB intervention, there ever was a conventional WW III, even with completely compliant Soviet satellites and Soviet civil society, it would first end up as bloody stalemate somewhere in Germany until Western economic superiority would roll up Soviets like a carpet. Threat of using nuclear weapons was just icing on the cake to deter any adventurism from Soviet Union.

Umm... no. For one, if that was the case, why did NATO plan to use tactical nukes if the Soviets invaded? It can't be icing on the cake, as that is FAR too much risk to place civilians in. Additionally, it has been shown by others that we DID NOT have conventional parity until the 1980s, partially because the Soviets had better strategy in the case of a conventional war.

For economics, no. A conventional conflict wouldn't last long enough for that come into play. The troops in place will be those that decide the result of the conflict, not the potential amount.

Besides, even if we did have conventional parity, it means nothing with strategic nuclear weapons. If things go badly for the Soviets, they'll use the nuclear option. As you yourself said, a conventional war between NATO and the USSR is ASB. The reason for that is because of strategic nuclear arms.

Because of this, it makes more sense both economically and militarily to pursue massive retaliation, as it's more cost effective, and recognizes military realities.
 
Hence why the US had soldiers in Europe. If the Soviet Union crosses the border, they're going to kill a lot of American boys, and in doing so they're going to irrevocably commit the United States to the conflict. Also, while I know that American leaders worried about whether Europe would believe they could rely on the US, was this something the Europeans actually worried about? The reading I've done on ICEWORM and the Multilateral Force makes it sound like this was something that bothered the US a lot more than it did Europe. But I may be mistaken about that.

Let's just say that at least here the faith that the USA sacrifice themself for Europe is not very high, Europe for the USA yes sure but the contrary doubtfoul at least when the situation is a nuclear war, and frankly i doubt that any goverment will feel very safe if his continuous security depend solely by the mood of his ally to die with them; ence the flexible response better credibility and one of the reason of the UK and France independent arsenal

I agree. I imagine the US aircraft industry shouldn't suffer too badly. And the US will want to maintain enough conventional capability to intervene in the third world. But if our army's primary job is to be a tripwire, then there's going to be a lot less spending on things like tanks and artillery. That's doubly true if part of the point of the nuclear approach is to contain costs.

Depend, thing like transport, helicopter (expecially anti-tank type) and all other thing used principally to support the army will be probably a lot less developed, more enphasis on bomber and fighter (they can even try to really built the B-70), for the conventional part i see a very strong enphasis on special force and very Mission-Impossible syndrome plague the Dod and the rest of the administration.

On the other hand, if the Europeans decide to either pursue their own nuclear deterrents or to rest easy under the American nuclear umbrella, then they may let their conventional forces slide as well.

Well European country like UK and France still have colonial issue and conventional force are better suited for deal with that and frankly a massive nuclear arsenal for even an united Europe is a little too much impratical and expensive; a limited force de frappe-like arsenal and OTL like conventional force is more economical and political acceptable
 
Let's just say that at least here the faith that the USA sacrifice themself for Europe is not very high, Europe for the USA yes sure but the contrary doubtfoul at least when the situation is a nuclear war, and frankly i doubt that any goverment will feel very safe if his continuous security depend solely by the mood of his ally to die with them; ence the flexible response better credibility and one of the reason of the UK and France independent arsenal

Let me dig up some of my books and get back to you on this. From a narrative perspective, I like the idea of more European independent deterrents and distance from the US, so this is not necessarily a bad thing, story-wise.

Depend, thing like transport, helicopter (expecially anti-tank type) and all other thing used principally to support the army will be probably a lot less developed, more enphasis on bomber and fighter (they can even try to really built the B-70), for the conventional part i see a very strong enphasis on special force and very Mission-Impossible syndrome plague the Dod and the rest of the administration.

I'm not sure how much difference this would make to special forces; they were part of the Flexible Response scheme as well. I don't know if the B-70 would be built, as I know next to nothing about it - I reserve my fanboyism for the atomic-powered airplane program. (Although, if we're going to have impractical superplanes, perhaps somebody might build a bomber variant of the SR-71...)

I think we'd probably also see more emphasis on counterforce. I'm not sure they could do any more than they did IOTL - they were already trying pretty hard IOTL, and the technology just didn't really exist in the 60s, or, really, ever. Missiles are too inaccurate and bombers are too slow. But I expect they'd try; if you're trying to find a way to fight an unlimited nuclear war, then the only strategy that makes any sense at all is destroying the enemy's weapons before they launch.

We might see fewer and smaller aircraft carriers, but that depends less on formal strategy and more on intra-Pentagon politics, so I'm not sure how that would go. From a theoretical standpoint you could make a strong argument either way.

Possibly an attempt to build a real civil defense program and BMD network. These make a lot of sense from a Massive Retaliation standpoint, but they'd also cost a couple of fortunes and, in the case of BMD, the technology probably doesn't exist in the 60s. Given McMahon's interest in atomic weapons as a way to save money, the price tag might be a deal-breaker. Also, a real civil defense program would require a greater public willingness to contemplate the apocalypse than I think ever really existed, and would be of questionable effectiveness.

If we wanted to get really crazy, SAC was apparently lobbying for a 10,000-missile Minuteman force in the early 60s. I'm not sure why they wanted so many - if this was an attempt to have numbers make up for inaccuracy in counterforce strike, or just typical Pentagon "if they have a hundred we need a thousand" bullshit. I don't think McMahon would go for that, though.

Well European country like UK and France still have colonial issue and conventional force are better suited for deal with that and frankly a massive nuclear arsenal for even an united Europe is a little too much impratical and expensive; a limited force de frappe-like arsenal and OTL like conventional force is more economical and political acceptable

I was thinking of something like the Force de Frappe, not a massive arsenal.
 
The problem with the Civil Defense program is that at the end of the day... there really isn't a way to save people from a nuclear apocalypse, or rather, not enough of them to be politically acceptable.

To save SOME, you would have to build ridiculously strong bunkers, and then you would have to make them HUGE to house the number of people needed. Then, you would need a way to make these bunkers self sustaining, being able to produce their own food without sunlight for example, and their own water, which would mean linking them to a river. That would also mean adding filters, among other things.

Keep in mind with above, at most, that probably saves 100,000 per city, and I'm probably MASSIVELY overestimating. This assumes also you had time, which you won't. Nuclear weapons will hit in what, seven minutes? You couldn't evacuate a city in seven HOURS, or even seven DAYS, much less seven minutes.

So yes, massive retaliation doesn't work from this perspective, because at the end of the day, you basically have to tell people, "You'll probably die, and there is absolutely nothing you can do about it."
 
The problem with the Civil Defense program is that at the end of the day... there really isn't a way to save people from a nuclear apocalypse, or rather, not enough of them to be politically acceptable.

To save SOME, you would have to build ridiculously strong bunkers, and then you would have to make them HUGE to house the number of people needed. Then, you would need a way to make these bunkers self sustaining, being able to produce their own food without sunlight for example, and their own water, which would mean linking them to a river. That would also mean adding filters, among other things.

After thinking about it more, I think McMahon would find the price for civil defense too steep, both political and financial. But, for what it's worth, I think you're overestimating what 60s civil defense would entail. In particular, nobody in the 60s knew about nuclear winter - the first mention I've seen of it was in an SF novel in the late 70s, and it didn't become a mainstream theory until the 80s. Even today there's considerable uncertainty about how severe it would actually be.

IOTL, there were a couple of different possibilities presented for how CD would work. Most CD plans focused on building fallout shelters in suburban and rural areas that would be dusted by fallout but would escape blast damage. In addition to saving local residents, they could house evacuees from urban areas. A "bolt from the blue" attack without warning is probably the least likely form of nuclear war; more probable would be a buildup to war lasting days or weeks, during which the cities could be emptied. (Some strategists - i.e., Hermahn Kahn - even suggested that city evacuation could serve as a diplomatic tool, a way to signal the United States' resolve not to back down...)

To be sure, an effective Civil Defense program would be extremely expensive, but it is not outside the realm of possibility. A few of the European neutrals actually built programs like this. Whether or not they would actually work is a valid question - they could probably save enormous numbers of people from being immediate casualties, but with the industrial infrastructure smashed and the possibility of nuclear winter that may just leave them to starve in the aftermath.

So yes, massive retaliation doesn't work from this perspective, because at the end of the day, you basically have to tell people, "You'll probably die, and there is absolutely nothing you can do about it."

This is the big deal-breaker for CD (well, that and the cost). Even if it performs as advertised, and enough of the economy survives to prevent total collapse, tens of millions of people would die. Even if it would have been hundreds of millions without CD, that's something that nobody wants to think about. And effective CD would force people to think about it on a regular basis. You'd need to enlist volunteers to coordinate evacuations, educate people on where to go for shelter, do a whole host of things that would keep the apocalypse firmly in view.

Is that politically possible? Given sufficient motive, yes. After all, Switzerland did it, or something like it. But, absent a major crisis, I think it's unlikely that McMahon would go for it; he has more important things to spend his political capital on. So, at least for the moment, let's set this one aside.
 
After thinking about it more, I think McMahon would find the price for civil defense too steep, both political and financial. But, for what it's worth, I think you're overestimating what 60s civil defense would entail. In particular, nobody in the 60s knew about nuclear winter - the first mention I've seen of it was in an SF novel in the late 70s, and it didn't become a mainstream theory until the 80s. Even today there's considerable uncertainty about how severe it would actually be.

IOTL, there were a couple of different possibilities presented for how CD would work. Most CD plans focused on building fallout shelters in suburban and rural areas that would be dusted by fallout but would escape blast damage. In addition to saving local residents, they could house evacuees from urban areas. A "bolt from the blue" attack without warning is probably the least likely form of nuclear war; more probable would be a buildup to war lasting days or weeks, during which the cities could be emptied. (Some strategists - i.e., Hermahn Kahn - even suggested that city evacuation could serve as a diplomatic tool, a way to signal the United States' resolve not to back down...)

To be sure, an effective Civil Defense program would be extremely expensive, but it is not outside the realm of possibility. A few of the European neutrals actually built programs like this. Whether or not they would actually work is a valid question - they could probably save enormous numbers of people from being immediate casualties, but with the industrial infrastructure smashed and the possibility of nuclear winter that may just leave them to starve in the aftermath.



This is the big deal-breaker for CD (well, that and the cost). Even if it performs as advertised, and enough of the economy survives to prevent total collapse, tens of millions of people would die. Even if it would have been hundreds of millions without CD, that's something that nobody wants to think about. And effective CD would force people to think about it on a regular basis. You'd need to enlist volunteers to coordinate evacuations, educate people on where to go for shelter, do a whole host of things that would keep the apocalypse firmly in view.

Is that politically possible? Given sufficient motive, yes. After all, Switzerland did it, or something like it. But, absent a major crisis, I think it's unlikely that McMahon would go for it; he has more important things to spend his political capital on. So, at least for the moment, let's set this one aside.

Actually, I would like to discuss this because it actually sounds quite interesting in some ways, but yes, lets save that for another thread.

But, it does need to be brought up because under massive retaliation you have two options in regard to telling the public with this, which are either,

A. We can protect you, which implies a very expensive fallout shelters, and I'd argue, a way to make these shelters self sufficient(They may not know about nuclear winter, but I think they know how long fallout can last, among other things.)

B. If things escalate, you'll die.

The latter is, obviously, completely unacceptable. But, the former is also unacceptable from an expenses standpoint.

So, I'd argue a reason Flexible Response was pursued is because they didn't want have to deal with telling the public that in the circumstance of a war between the USSR and the USA, it would be apocalypse. The problem is... that's what would happen. So, I'd argue the best doctrine is something along the lines of retaliation(not necessarily massive, but rather enough to enforce MAD.)

Hence, your guy needs a way to convince the treasury to do the former if he doesn't want to commit political suicide. Then, he's going to have to explain why his system saves so much money, considering the amount spent.

On a side note, for Europe that... isn't applicable. For Switzerland, didn't they already have those bunkers from previous defense needs? Even if not so, they have to house a much smaller population, which is much easier to evacuate. US... not so much.
 
But, it does need to be brought up because under massive retaliation you have two options in regard to telling the public with this, which are either,

A. We can protect you, which implies a very expensive fallout shelters, and I'd argue, a way to make these shelters self sufficient(They may not know about nuclear winter, but I think they know how long fallout can last, among other things.)

B. If things escalate, you'll die.

Well, there's a couple of other options as well.
Option A can be pursued by intercepting the incoming warheads and preventing them reaching their targets somehow - also fantastically expensive, but perhaps an easier sell politically than "dig holes and stuff everyone in them". And if it fails, they won't have time to write to their congressman about it.
And Option B isn't necessarily all or nothing either. It could be presented in such a way that "if things escalate, some of you will die". Perhaps tied to specific areas ("anyone in New York who isn't wearing SPF 5 million is going to have a very bad day, but we're doing what we can to prevent that with ABM defences and bunkers").

Even with the ability to deliver thousands of strategic warheads to the USA, the USSR can't nuke everywhere. For anyone not caught in a blast zone there will be lots of problems, but you don't need to be in a huge and expensive bunker to survive. So part of how this idea is presented could involve the idea of evacuating the population to places which probably won't be hit, giving them the means to cope with the fallout and ensuing confusion, and somehow persuading them that although the US might be hurt, it would remain a going concern after the exchange (some sort of ABM system to limit the amount of damage incurred, perhaps). If people generally believed that being in a nuclear war was more like London during the Blitz - dangerous, uncomfortable, but ultimately life would go on - the idea of actually fighting such a war might seem less impossible.

The thing is, this idea doesn't have to be correct. It just needs to be sufficiently plausible and hard enough to falsify that it gets enough political support to make massive retaliation an accepted policy.


On a side note, for Europe that... isn't applicable. For Switzerland, didn't they already have those bunkers from previous defense needs? Even if not so, they have to house a much smaller population, which is much easier to evacuate. US... not so much.

They had those defense needs because it was national policy to attempt to defend the civilian population - in this case, the cart goes behind the horse. They have some geographical advantages, yes, but the entire continental US doesn't need to be evacuated. It might be thought to be enough to get them to places which won't receive direct strikes.
 
You make some interesting points, however the more that is found about the effects of fallout, the harder it's going to be to sell that.

At the end of the day, fallout is the killer with this one. It spreads far beyond its initial blast radius(especially if the Soviets hit ICBM sites with nuclear bunker buster bombs) and makes areas it touches unusable, possibly for a rather long time. Hence, why you would need bunkers to send the populace too, and so on.

As for ABM... the things I've heard aren't encouraging, especially in the 60s. Simply put, unless we started getting ABM satellites(don't know if militarization of space ban has happened yet, but if so that presents an obstacle) we can't really shoot enough nukes down to save enough people. Even with them, enough may still get through, although maybe not, depending on their effectiveness.

Granted, the public doesn't know the latter, but the former? They'll learn that, as even if the government tries to cover up research like that... well, lets just say journalists can be very annoying at times for the state.;)

With all that in mind, interesting food for thought. BUT, would what you suggest be cheaper than its Flexible Response counterpart?
 
Actually, the technology to build a working BMD system did exist in the 1960s: look at Nike-Zeus, particularly with an ER warhead.
 
Actually, the technology to build a working BMD system did exist in the 1960s: look at Nike-Zeus, particularly with an ER warhead.

The argument never really convinced me, probably because the idea to use a macross barrage of nuclear weapons who detonate upon you to stop the attack unsettle me to use just an euphemism.
 
You make some interesting points, however the more that is found about the effects of fallout, the harder it's going to be to sell that.

At the end of the day, fallout is the killer with this one. It spreads far beyond its initial blast radius(especially if the Soviets hit ICBM sites with nuclear bunker buster bombs) and makes areas it touches unusable, possibly for a rather long time. Hence, why you would need bunkers to send the populace too, and so on.

As for ABM... the things I've heard aren't encouraging, especially in the 60s. Simply put, unless we started getting ABM satellites(don't know if militarization of space ban has happened yet, but if so that presents an obstacle) we can't really shoot enough nukes down to save enough people. Even with them, enough may still get through, although maybe not, depending on their effectiveness.

Granted, the public doesn't know the latter, but the former? They'll learn that, as even if the government tries to cover up research like that... well, lets just say journalists can be very annoying at times for the state.;)

With all that in mind, interesting food for thought. BUT, would what you suggest be cheaper than its Flexible Response counterpart?

First off, there are several ways to conceal an unpalatable truth. As you say, suppressing it isn't very practical. But bringing out other studies sufficient to throw doubt on how bad it would be could raise enough doubt to prevent it being seen as obviously fatal, and that might be all that's needed. The bottom line is to change the public perception of fallout's effects, and I'm sure you can think of ways that might be achieved without descending to wholesale brainwashing.

As for the ABM issue, yes, of course it's difficult. Expensive and probably not totally (or even more than minimally) successful either. And the ABM treaty basically hobbled it anyway, so although it might defend one location it won't achieve more than that at best. Again, however, what's required is for the public perception to be that it has some chance of success. There are several ways to help with that - if people don't think the USSR will flood it with targets; if most of them won't need to be engaged (fail to function, fail to reach their targets, etc) or if their effects won't be as devastating as we might believe, for example.

As a cheaper alternative to flexible response, I think we're really talking some sort of nuclear option simply due to the economics of the weaponry. That's not necessarily the same thing as massive retaliation, however - there might be scope for an intermediate stage, perhaps the widespread use of tactical warheads.
 
First off, there are several ways to conceal an unpalatable truth. As you say, suppressing it isn't very practical. But bringing out other studies sufficient to throw doubt on how bad it would be could raise enough doubt to prevent it being seen as obviously fatal, and that might be all that's needed. The bottom line is to change the public perception of fallout's effects, and I'm sure you can think of ways that might be achieved without descending to wholesale brainwashing.

As for the ABM issue, yes, of course it's difficult. Expensive and probably not totally (or even more than minimally) successful either. And the ABM treaty basically hobbled it anyway, so although it might defend one location it won't achieve more than that at best. Again, however, what's required is for the public perception to be that it has some chance of success. There are several ways to help with that - if people don't think the USSR will flood it with targets; if most of them won't need to be engaged (fail to function, fail to reach their targets, etc) or if their effects won't be as devastating as we might believe, for example.

As a cheaper alternative to flexible response, I think we're really talking some sort of nuclear option simply due to the economics of the weaponry. That's not necessarily the same thing as massive retaliation, however - there might be scope for an intermediate stage, perhaps the widespread use of tactical warheads.

True, we're seeing that with Global Warming in some ways, so I guess I have my answer to that particular question right there. In this case, lets hope this universe never has to find out how bad it can truly get.:p

But okay, tactical nukes... I can't see. Why not just go strategic? After all, isn't the point of massive retaliation to be able to just sit behind your nuclear shield and call it a day?
 
I don't think Massive Retaliation would be regarded any differently from Flexible Response by most of the public. From the public's point of view, they're slightly different labels for the apocalypse, and would mostly just try not to think about it. To be honest, I think that's a pretty rational course of action.

At the end of the day, fallout is the killer with this one. It spreads far beyond its initial blast radius(especially if the Soviets hit ICBM sites with nuclear bunker buster bombs) and makes areas it touches unusable, possibly for a rather long time. Hence, why you would need bunkers to send the populace too, and so on.

I don't want to get too deeply into this, since it's not really relevant to the question of MR vs. FR, but the longevity of fallout has been much exaggerated. In particular, while vast swathes of the country would be contaminated beyond current acceptable standards, that's because current standards are designed to prevent measurable numbers of cancer deaths. A post-war society would likely be more... expedient.

As for ABM... the things I've heard aren't encouraging, especially in the 60s. Simply put, unless we started getting ABM satellites(don't know if militarization of space ban has happened yet, but if so that presents an obstacle) we can't really shoot enough nukes down to save enough people. Even with them, enough may still get through, although maybe not, depending on their effectiveness.

I have read all kinds of conflicting reports on ABM effectiveness, and mostly just ended up confused. I'm extremely skeptical it could work given 60s technology, and somewhat skeptical it could work today. As far as Nike-Hercules goes, I've read articles written by nuclear weapons scientists in the 60s arguing it could not work - and I don't mean things written by people like Linus Pauling, who would be expected to dismiss it, but by insiders of the nuclear weapons complex, people who would want it to work.

However, whether or not it would actually work doesn't necessarily effect whether or not it would be built. People want to believe in ABM; people want there to be a defense against the unthinkable. If nothing else, McMahon and his advisors might tell themselves that, even if the system only has a slim chance of working, that's still a chance.

And ABM doesn't have to able to block an entire Soviet first strike to be considered useful by strategists. There are other, less demanding uses - complicating enemy targeting, defending against third party attack, defending again Soviet second strike. I doubt any but the first option would be possible in the 60s, but I'm not sure.

With all that in mind, interesting food for thought. BUT, would what you suggest be cheaper than its Flexible Response counterpart?

I'm not sure. I need to look up the price tag on Nike-Hercules. ABM is very expensive, but lots of military systems are expensive; it may end up a wash or even net-ahead if they scrap enough conventional capability.

But okay, tactical nukes... I can't see. Why not just go strategic? After all, isn't the point of massive retaliation to be able to just sit behind your nuclear shield and call it a day?

There were competing viewpoints on this subject in the 50s. I think they'd keep the "tactical" nukes, even if they'd emphasize the strategic - they want to destroy the Soviet conventional army at the same time they destroy Soviet society.
 
I don't think Massive Retaliation would be regarded any differently from Flexible Response by most of the public. From the public's point of view, they're slightly different labels for the apocalypse, and would mostly just try not to think about it. To be honest, I think that's a pretty rational course of action.



I don't want to get too deeply into this, since it's not really relevant to the question of MR vs. FR, but the longevity of fallout has been much exaggerated. In particular, while vast swathes of the country would be contaminated beyond current acceptable standards, that's because current standards are designed to prevent measurable numbers of cancer deaths. A post-war society would likely be more... expedient.



I have read all kinds of conflicting reports on ABM effectiveness, and mostly just ended up confused. I'm extremely skeptical it could work given 60s technology, and somewhat skeptical it could work today. As far as Nike-Hercules goes, I've read articles written by nuclear weapons scientists in the 60s arguing it could not work - and I don't mean things written by people like Linus Pauling, who would be expected to dismiss it, but by insiders of the nuclear weapons complex, people who would want it to work.

However, whether or not it would actually work doesn't necessarily effect whether or not it would be built. People want to believe in ABM; people want there to be a defense against the unthinkable. If nothing else, McMahon and his advisors might tell themselves that, even if the system only has a slim chance of working, that's still a chance.

And ABM doesn't have to able to block an entire Soviet first strike to be considered useful by strategists. There are other, less demanding uses - complicating enemy targeting, defending against third party attack, defending again Soviet second strike. I doubt any but the first option would be possible in the 60s, but I'm not sure.



I'm not sure. I need to look up the price tag on Nike-Hercules. ABM is very expensive, but lots of military systems are expensive; it may end up a wash or even net-ahead if they scrap enough conventional capability.



There were competing viewpoints on this subject in the 50s. I think they'd keep the "tactical" nukes, even if they'd emphasize the strategic - they want to destroy the Soviet conventional army at the same time they destroy Soviet society.

Okay, the first... again, different thread because it's a fascinating topic but yes, distracting from this.

ABM... the same. I've heard very different viewpoints on it, but from what I've heard, basically, pipe dream at best. However, that doesn't mean it couldn't be advertised, and strategically it could be useful.

Now for tactical nukes... this I have to disagree with. Okay, what's the point of having tactical nukes when you're going to unleash a total apocalypse upon them? Radiation will get high enough to go to not just cancer, but to radiation sickness levels like Cherynobl for likely all of Russia at least. One might as well invest more in strategic nuclear arms.

With that in mind, if one were to do massive retaliation, it might end up being slightly cheaper, from not only conventional arms being reduced, but also things like ABM being more for public perception than actual effectiveness. This will though have very interesting impacts on things like the military industrial complex, as that now has been killed in its infancy.
 
Now for tactical nukes... this I have to disagree with. Okay, what's the point of having tactical nukes when you're going to unleash a total apocalypse upon them? Radiation will get high enough to go to not just cancer, but to radiation sickness levels like Cherynobl for likely all of Russia at least. One might as well invest more in strategic nuclear arms.

Relying solely on strategic nukes is getting closer to a different strategy, Minimum Deterrence. (Which, as it happens, is the school of strategy I personally follow.) One of the big differences between the two is that Massive Retaliation, at least implicitly, is still trying to "win" the war, and destroying the enemy's land forces is part of that. Relying on fallout to eliminate them is risky at best: military units will be hardened against radiation, and fallout patterns are unpredictable. Strategic nuclear weapons can, in principle, be used to attack military formations, but "tactical" units will generally do the job cheaper and quicker.

With that in mind, if one were to do massive retaliation, it might end up being slightly cheaper, from not only conventional arms being reduced, but also things like ABM being more for public perception than actual effectiveness. This will though have very interesting impacts on things like the military industrial complex, as that now has been killed in its infancy.

I very much doubt the Military-Industrial Complex would be killed off entirely! Smaller, hopefully, although given the nature of Pentagon politics, even that may not end up happening. Nuclear-armed bombers and missiles may be cheaper than an "equivalent" conventional force, but they're still very expensive, and there's reason to doubt they're all that much cheaper except in terms of area destroyed per dollar. No Vietnam War will help a lot in keeping defense spending from ballooning too badly, though.
 
I'm guessing having minimum deterrence isn't an option? I can see why that's your favorite(easily the cheapest, and all things considered, I'd consider the most realistic one for human nature.)
 
I'm guessing having minimum deterrence isn't an option? I can see why that's your favorite(easily the cheapest, and all things considered, I'd consider the most realistic one for human nature.)

Oh, now where's the fun in that? :p

Minimum Deterrence probably wouldn't fly at this point in time, unfortunately. Among other problems, Minimum Deterrence would amount to a one-sided withdrawal from the nuclear arms race, an arms race the US has so far been winning, and that just won't fly politically, in Congress or the Pentagon. It's also fundamentally a decision to give up on trying to survive/"win" a nuclear war, which is going to offend a lot of people.

I do sort of imagine McMahon's "Massive Retaliation with controlled expenses" shifting towards Minimum Deterrence over time, just as McNamara's Flexible Response shifted over time into MAD, which was arguably the prototype of Minimum Deterrence.

Besides, Massive Retaliation, while it may starve the Army, gives the Air Force lots of money for cool (atomic-powered?) jets, which makes me all a-quiver.
 
Formaly Massive Retaliation stayed the offical NATO-doctrin till 1967. Most Western European counties would have still prefered MR because they thought, Flexibel Responce was a way for USA to mimisize their own risk. I think the best way for MR would be, that the USA actually support West Germany in getting their own nuclear weapons.
Following POD: In the Fifties there was a informal aggrement between France and West-Germany, that WG would finanziel support the frech nuc-program and Germany would get french-produzed Warheads. But after DeGaulle came to power, he killed the aggrement. So lets DeGaulle decide to keep the aggrement, and in the early Sixties Germany gets their own nukes. Prsident Nixon (I think you need Nixon to win for this) decided its the best, if the USA is supportiv to this and offers the French and the Germany the same Polaris-deal like the Britains. 1970 U.K., France and W-Germany all have at least 4 Polaris-boats and MR stays offical NATO-doctrin. (Don´t stop the American fom being a bit more Flexibel outside Europe)
 
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